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ABSTRACT. QF THESIS 
Trade Unions and Redundancy: Opposition 
and- Aeguie seenee
This thesis focuses on the collective responses of 
union members and unions to redundancy. It adopts a 
theory of trade union action based on the idea that 
workers react to violations of what they perceive to be 
"rights" in the employment context. "Rights" are to a 
degree inculcated into the minds of workers by "union 
cultures", which condition moral and ethical judgements 
of behaviour. Connections are drawn between "cultures", 
"ideologies" and "world views". Workers' responses to 
redundancy it is suggested should show evidence of the 
influence of union cultures in a sequence of events over 
long periods of time. This is borne out in the empiri­
cal chapters; Chapter 4 (which describes the historical 
background to the 1965 Redundancy Payments Act) quotes 
developments in union responses to redundancy since the 
1930s. In a further section, Chapter 5, a case study of 
a series of redundancy events in the computer company, 
ICL, is provided, covering union responses to redundancy 
in the period 1969 to 1979.
The evidence also calls into question the view ex­
pressed in some academic and policy work on redundancy, 
that the 1965 Redundancy Payments Act has defused union 
opposition to redundancy. The period before 1965, the 
evidence suggests, could not be characterised as a
period of strong union opposition, and the years since 
the passing of the Act have not seen a predominance of 
union acquiescence. On this basis, too, Hardy's argu­
ment that managements have managed redundancy and 
closure by a process of legitimisation, is called in to 
question. Also, the work of neo-classical labour econo­
mists, who see workers and union attitudes towards re­
dundancy in terms of the decisions of "economic man", is 
refuted by the evidence and the argument in the thesis, 
which emphasises the moral influence of unions and the 
practice of unionism.
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INTRODUCTION
When I began to write this thesis, redundancy was a 
subject of such obvious relevance to the problems of 
social existence in the 1980s that the customary jus­
tifications for the choice of subject seemed barely 
necessary. Completing it now, at the end of the decade, 
the overwhelming regularity of large scale redundancies 
is less evident. Nonetheless, it seems that the idea of 
"job security" is a tenuous concept, and while many of 
the older industries have had their work forces 
"slimmed-down" to the bone, we continue to witness job 
losses in coal, shipping, motor vehicles manufacture, 
food processing, and print, to name but a few industrial 
sectors. Nor could it be said that the newer industries 
are immune. The latter half of 1989 has seen job losses 
in computer manufacture, petroleum exploration, finance 
and electronics, and the State sector seems to be moving 
closer to the brink of insecurity, with the developing 
concepts of compulsory competitive tendering for ser­
vices, and privatisation rendering redundancies more 
likely in areas previously considered relatively secure. 
Even if sophisticated approaches to manpower planning 
make redundancies less commonplace than they once were, 
the unforeseen event, the rapid change in the economic 
climate, fluctuations in exchange levels or interest 
rates, will ensure that they remain as a continuing 
feature in experience of working life in Britain in the 
1990s and beyond.
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I start with two basic propositions, upon which much 
that follows will ultimately depend. The first is, that 
in the "real world" and in academic literature, and the 
perspectives of public policy makers alike, redundancy 
is often a confusing phenomenon. In particular, in 
this, I single out the role of trade unions. Where 
trade unions may be able to point to marked improvements 
in working conditions as a result of collective bargain­
ing, their success is less clear-cut in the field of 
redundancy. One of the problems here, is that there is 
no clear or accepted yardstick for measuring success. 
There are those who subscribe to the view that redun­
dancy, if not desirable, is a necessary and inevitable 
event, that trade unions need to recognise this and 
simply ease the path of their members, so far as is 
possible, when faced with it. There is a quite dif­
ferent view, that trade unions "ought" to oppose redun­
dancy and to fight for the "right to work". This view, 
if not generally supported by any academic analysis, 
is nevertheless certainly encountered among trade 
unionists. So, while there is disagreement about trade 
union objectives, confusion and ignorance about their 
success or failure is perhaps inevitable. This con­
fusion, however, is mirrored in the academic and public 
policy debates involving trade union action in situa­
tions of redundancy. In the main, both academic 
analysts and public policy makers alike have assumed 
one position or another, without seeking to establish 
factually or theoretically, any basis for their
16
assumptions. This study is intended to go some way 
towards remedying that deficiency.
My second proposition is that trade unions are im­
pelled into certain courses of action, not simply by a 
need to exact the best wage-work bargain on behalf of 
their members (though they are certainly imbued with 
that need). Nor is their significance to be found 
purely and simply in their ability to negotiate and come 
to terms with structures of power and control of the 
labour process (though undoubtedly, they are significant 
for this, too). More than this, there is a way in which 
unions express and generate moral ideas and values among 
their members that often differ with, sometimes strongly 
contradict, the ideas and values of management, or 
owners of capital. In other words, trade unions have a 
potential ethical significance. It may perhaps be 
argued that if trade unions express ethical beliefs, 
and give rise to moral influences, then these emerge as 
the relatively unexceptional values and beliefs of 
labourism. This may well be so. However, I suggest 
that in redundancy there is an area where unions can, 
and sometimes do, express goals of a more radical 
nature, and trade unionism is associated with moral 
beliefs that are not at all easy to accommodate within 
the framework of a capitalist market economy. Such 
moral beliefs may for example be found in the battles 
that sometimes occur in relation to the so-called "right 
to work", and do not seem to fall within the mainstream 
of labourism's philosophy or methods. I start from the
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point that the existence and expression of beliefs in 
values of this kind, is simply one of a number of pos­
sible facets of trade unionism. I argue that if (as it 
would seem) there are different systems of values which 
operate in the practice of trade unionism, the task of 
academic enquiry must be to explore and explain these 
variations, rather than (as some observers seem more 
inclined to do) to declaim disapprovingly against the 
predominance of one or other tendency at particular 
moments in time. It is in part the variation between 
these different systems of values which trade unions 
might express, that I intend to examine in this thesis. 
In so doing, I hope that we may obtain a better under­
standing of trade union responses to redundancy - and 
rather more. Hopefully, we may gain some insights, too, 
into more generally applicable aspects of union charac­
ter, which may perhaps serve to broaden knowledge in 
this area.
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In the 
first chapter we will review briefly some of the general 
literature on redundancy. Since much of this is of only 
peripheral interest to the central theme of the thesis, 
it will be of necessity truncated, giving somewhat 
greater scope for more detailed consideration of those 
relatively few studies that have chosen to make unions 
and unionism central to a study of redundancy. In the 
second chapter we commence the search for a theory in 
which we might begin to understand trade union responses 
to redundancy. In so doing we will look at a number of 
studies, including studies of plant closures. To this
18
extent the chapter may be seen as a continuation of the 
general literature survey in chapter one, but as will be 
seen, we then proceed to touch on the work of a number 
of contributors to industrial relations theory, to 
extend our search for an appropriate framework in which 
to set the empirical analysis which follows in later 
stages of the thesis.
In chapter three we will refer to a range of sources, 
before developing a theoretical framework of "trade 
union cultures" as expressions of the moral and ethical 
influence of unions and the practice of unionism. It 
will be suggested that such a framework may help in the 
analysis of union responses to redundancy, and that we 
might expect to find evidence of cultural influences if 
we consider union activity around redundancy in longi­
tudinal studies. We will contrast this point of 
view with two writers who have adopted different 
perspectives, the first on employee responses to plant 
closures, the second on union members' attitudes to 
redundancy as evinced in bargaining strategies in pay 
issues.
In chapter four we will consider the applicability or 
otherwise of the theoretical framework, by conducting a 
survey of the historical background to the main current 
legislation on redundancy. The Redundancy Payments Act 
1965. Chapter five will represent a case study of a 
series of redundancy events in the computer manufac­
turing and servicing company. International Computers 
(ICL). These two chapters taken together represent the
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substantive empirical work of the thesis. Chapter six 
will serve to provide some conclusions and make an 
assessment of the validity or otherwise of our initial 
theoretical propositions.
My first objective (in chapter one) then, is to 
review the general scope of the academic study of redun­
dancy. Much that follows suggests a variety of openings 
for research. At this stage therefore, it is important 
to make it clear that, although this particular study 
must be located within an academic approach to the sub­
ject of redundancy, it does not purport to set out a 
major research programme to repair all the shortcomings 
or unanswered questions in previous studies. Rather, it 
seeks to illustrate the problematic nature of the study 
of redundancy and point to one specific area of research 
that has been largely neglected. Very simply, that area 
relates to the field of trade union activity in redun­
dancy. In particular, the questions that have not been 
investigated relate to the moral values expressed by 
trade unions in the actions they pursue over redundancy. 
This is the area that will become the focus of attention 
of this thesis.
20
CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE ON REDUNDANCY
21
1.1 RESEARCH ON■THE WIDE&-ASEECTS.OF ■REDUNDANCY
The study of redundancy has occupied a small and 
somewhat esoteric niche in academic research for the 
past thirty years. During this time, some remarkably 
familiar themes have been pursued by different resear­
chers, whilst seemingly fertile areas of study appear to 
have been ignored. Thus there is, in reality, little 
previous work to draw on that relates directly to the 
specific area with which I am concerned. Very little of 
the work which has been done genuinely falls into a 
perspective that could be described as an "industrial 
relations perspective". Furthermore, very little 
research is from the specific point of view of an inte­
rest in trade unions and trade union action. By and 
large, the political content of redundancy research has 
been confined to conclusions that argue for sympathetic 
treatment of the redundant, rather than being in favour 
of some wider analytical point of view. Such studies 
have avoided the wider issues that frequently concern 
sociological or political researchers, such as the 
distribution of power, the expression of conflict or the 
role of major institutions or groups of interest in our 
society. In short, whilst there has been some conside­
rable interest in redundancy, it has figured somewhat 
marginally in the study of either industrial relations, 
trade unions or workplace politics. Conversely, in­
dustrial relations issues, trade unionism and collective 
bargaining have played a peripheral role in most studies 
of redundancy.
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The scope of academic study of redundancy in its 
broadest sense has been described in a number of books 
and articles by Wood. In particular, two 1977 articles 
set out the different academic perspectives that have 
been adopted, and outline a number of possible angles 
that could be fruitfully chosen by future researchers. 
The first emphasises the particular need for a socio­
logical approach to the subject (1), and stresses the 
predominance of labour economists' contributions to the 
subject to date. Though applauding attempts to intro­
duce sociological and psychological perspectives into 
the study of redundancy. Wood's conclusion is that those 
that had been undertaken to the time of writing did not 
represent any significant break with the economic 
approach. The second article written with Cohen (2), 
covers similar ground, and concludes by outlining some 
six areas that future researchers could take up in 
dealing with this subject. Both of these articles 
stress the need for the redundancy process to be 
studied, and to move away from an exclusive concentra­
tion on the labour market. Both of them stress the need 
to examine the social production of redundancy, and 
reactions to it. As summaries of the main academic 
research in this area they represent useful bibliogra­
phies, which it is not necessary to replicate.
As recently as the late 1950s, redundancy emerged as 
an issue of significance, both in State policy and in 
written research. At this stage, however, the focus was 
less upon the need to protect the redundant ; more upon
23
the need to manage redundancy and the "objective" needs 
of the economy that it should be brought about. The 
Acton society researchers in 1958 (3), Goodman, a labour 
journalist writing in 1980 (4), and various Ministry of 
Labour studies from 1958 onwards (5), were all concerned 
with this general theme, as was the economist Shanks 
(6), also writing in this period. In most of this work, 
there was an implied assumption that workers opposed 
redundancy, though this was not in any sense put to the 
test. Moreover, there was no attempt to analyse the 
extent and underlying purposes (if any) of such assumed 
resistance.
The first published work of any real academic stan­
ding that addressed itself to questions of redundancy, 
appeared in the mid 1960s. Kahn, commencing her 
research in the late 1950s, but not publishing it until 
1964 (7), was among the first to commence investigations 
in this field. Focusing on the redundancies in the 
Midlands motor industry in 1956, she attempted to record 
the experiences of redundant workers, and catalogue the 
effects of redundancy upon them, in terms of their 
social position and their subsequent employment. In so 
doing, she initiated a theme that was taken up (with 
varying levels of sophistication) by other writers. 
Wedderburn (8), in 1964, 1965 and 1968, is the prime 
example, emphasising the social hardship that the redun­
dant face, and underlining the need for State policy 
that provides for their needs in material terms.
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Subsequently, the concerns of researchers shifted 
away from the social problems of redundant workers to 
seek to understand more closely their behaviour in the 
labour market. Writers such as Daniel, in 1970 and 1972 
(9), and Mukerjee, in 1972 and 1973 (10), stressed the 
need for state intervention in the labour market, to 
assist the redundant in finding work, or to rationalise 
the management of redundancy and develop better and more 
reasonable circumstances in which redundancy decisions 
could be reached.
A parallel, but distinct theme was followed by 
researchers at Glasgow University. Mackay and Reid 
(11), and Heron (12), studied the job search characte­
ristics of individual redundant workers, and their 
subsequent employment experience. Essentially, however, 
this work was from the point of view of those studying 
the labour market as economists, rather than as prospec­
tive policy reformers, which is the position adopted by 
Daniel and Mukerjee.
Other writers have attempted to develop a socio­
logical approach to the study of redundancy. Martin and 
Fryer (13), in 1973 and Seglow (14), in 1971, are cases 
in point. These writers attempt to direct research and 
policy away from economic analysis, towards other dis­
ciplines of the social sciences, and take as their 
starting point a critique of the economic perspective 
adopted by previous researchers in the field. In par­
ticular, they stress an attachment to occupations, firms 
and communities, and affirm the need to treat these as
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legitimate, not simply as barriers to mobility. In 
attempting to explain the behaviour of individuals, they 
emphasise, not simply their marketability but also their 
preferences and the attachments and ideas formed in the 
firms which they have left.
Writers such as Wood in 1981 (15), Callender (16), 
and Coyle (17), in 1984, have examined the differential 
impact of redundancy on women, as part of a far wider 
growth of feminist literature relating to industrial 
relations and employment issues emerging during the 
1970s and 80s. Whilst aspects of these writers' work 
echo the concerns of earlier writers with the economic 
effects of redundancy, and the labour market experiences 
of the redundant, their emphasis on gender as a distin­
guishing factor stresses the social nature of the ex­
perience of redundancy and its after effects, and links 
them firmly with the sociological approaches described 
above.
Despite differences of emphasis and approach, most 
of these studies have a basic similarity in that they 
have focused upon the labour market experiences of the 
redundant worker, and have dwelt little on the actual 
processes of redundancy, or the underlying industrial 
relations issues. Despite their differences in emphasis 
and perspective, they have in common, an approach to the 
study of redundancy that does not deal with the event of 
redundancy itself. They take redundancy as a "given", 
looking at the problems of fragmented individuals, and 
interesting and illuminating though such perspectives
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have been, this has not substantially furthered know­
ledge of the way redundancy has been handled as a 
process or event in an industrial relations setting.
Furthermore, whilst each of these main contributors 
has, in one way or another, acknowledged the importance 
of trade union attitudes to redundancy, and hinted at 
the implications for industrial relations flowing there­
from, it has been left to a relatively small number of 
writers to take up these issues in detail.
1.2 RBFEREMCES I.Q-TRADE. ÜMIQM ACTIQH IN REDVNDAHCY
In general terms then, the studies referred to above 
have little to offer on questions of union reaction to 
the event of redundancy or involvement in the redundancy 
process. This gap is, in part, a product of the chosen 
perspective of the writers concerned, in part, a product 
of their methodology. The social welfare and labour 
economics perspectives which have predominated, do not 
accept the event of redundancy as something of interest 
until after it has occurred. The chosen methodology of 
social survey techniques, with interviews of individual 
redundant workers predominating, does little to enable 
the role of trade unions in opposition to or complicity 
with redundancy to be understood, still less the ideo­
logical and moral influences which they carry with 
workers involved in the process. The following examples 
illustrate what little can be gleaned about active 
industrial relations from the studies concerned.
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Kahn's study (which focused on a redundancy in which 
one might have expected that questions of union opposi­
tion would have been vividly highlighted) does not deal 
with issues of collective interest. Instead it adopts 
an approach of enquiring into the experiences of indi­
vidual employees. Of interest, however, is Kahn's 
finding that workers generally support a "pecking order" 
of dismissal. Views about the position of different 
groups in the dismissal league, point to the singularly 
divisive nature of redundancy, with substantial propor­
tions of respondents favouring the dismissal of married 
women, "coloured" or foreign workers and men over 
65 years of age, prior to other groups. Sixty-two per 
cent of workers favoured an unqualified use of "last in, 
first out" as a redundancy selection criterion, the 
remainder preferring more discriminatory, less objective 
criteria.
Wedderburn on the other hand, refers to the general 
dissatisfaction (among her white collar worker sample), 
with a seemingly complex system of selection, and argues 
that "morale" would have been greatly assisted by the 
use of a single, simple principle in selecting workers 
for redundancy - by implication, the adoption of the 
"last in, first out". Her findings in relation to the 
attitudes of employees towards the role played by their 
trade unions are similarly blurred. The general point 
seems to be that some were "dissatisfied", whilst others 
were "satisfied" or "well satisfied". In the situation 
which she studied (redundancies in the Stevenage
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aircraft industry), specific comments were offered that 
were critical of the lack of determined opposition by 
the trade unions, though little attempt is made to probe 
or explain such criticisms, other than the fact that 
trade union members were a minority of the total work­
force. Both these studies raise a number of questions 
relating to the attitudes of workers, but do not pose 
the issues of trade union membership or action in any 
coherent or searching sense.
A more searching reflection upon the role of trade
unions in redundancy is given in Mukerjee's 1973 work
(18). He notes that in 1957, a delegate conference of
the AEU instructed the executive committee of that union
"to conduct a national campaign against redundancy and
unemployment, and for the right to work". Mukerjee
comments that:-
"Whilst other British trade unions did not put 
their position with such vigour, the general view 
among organised workpeople, particularly at shop 
floor level, was that collective bargaining pres­
sure should be exerted to prevent the disappearance 
of jobs" (19).
However, apart from the single example of the AEU resol­
ution, no evidence is offered in support of this asser­
tion, nor is there any attempt to describe the variety 
of formal policies on redundancy of different unions, or 
the possible variations between formal, official poli­
cies and informal workshop and plant practices in these 
matters. Nevertheless, in a later section of the book, 
Mukerjee appears to recognise the greater complexity of 
the problem himself. In a passage on opposition to
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redundancies and the Redundancy Payments Act, he casts 
doubt both on the conclusions that have sometimes been 
drawn, that the Act reduced opposition, and on the 
suggestion that workpeople resisted the modernisation of 
industry by opposing redundancy prior to the legislation 
being introduced.
An issue that is brought out clearly in Mukerjee's 
study is the difficulty of drawing conclusions about the 
degree of redundancy resistance from official strike 
statistics. The conclusion that analysts sometimes draw 
is that opposition to redundancy has declined since the 
1965 Redundancy Payments Act, and it is often claimed 
that the Act is responsible for this reduction.
Mukerjee presents some convincing arguments which sug­
gest that such conclusions are, to say the least, sim­
plistic. For example, he notes that the main review of 
the effects of the 1965 Act - the OPCS Study of 1969 
(20), compared strike statistics for five-year periods 
either side of 1965. As Mukerjee notes, the problem 
with such comparisons is that they can easily become 
inadequate if one year contains freak figures. In this 
case, the number of redundancy related stoppages in 1962 
was abnormally large. Discounting them statistically 
raises doubt as to whether the Act had the dampening 
effect upon strikes so often claimed for it. As 
Mukerjee puts it, "The verdict on the efficacy of the 
Act as a defuser of redundancy generated conflict, has 
to be non-proven". (21). His conclusion is a useful 
pointer to the problems of policy oriented research on
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redundancy. The macro analysis perspective, combined 
with the scarcity of detailed statistical information 
over a long period of time, present almost insurmoun­
table barriers to any really reliable assessment.
Linking this with a perspective that (in the case of the 
OPCS Study) appears to identify closely with the objec­
tives of the legislators and attempts no detailed 
examination of individual redundancy cases, means that 
much that has been said about trade union behaviour is 
somewhat unreliable. Whilst broad statments about trade 
union objectives are easy to make, careful judgements 
based on established facts are not so easy to to find.
Unfortunately, the usefulness of Mukerjee s study is 
somewhat restricted in the present context, being essen­
tially a manpower planning study of the effects of the 
Redundancy Payments Act, and a cross national comparison 
with other systems. On the whole, he does not attempt 
to explain the role which trade unions have played in 
redundancy. Although he points out, for example, that 
the British system of giving redundancy payments is 
unique, he does not explain how it came about, or why it 
should be so. He points to the relative inactivity of 
British trade unions in securing redundancy agreements, 
in contrast with trade unions in America and Germany, 
the implication being that this explains the principal 
role of legislation in this country. As will be 
gathered from the overall perspective of his study, he 
offers no explanation for these same variations in terms 
of trade union character or methods, other than in the
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way described, and whilst his points are of interest to 
the academic study of redundancy from an industrial 
relations perspective, they unfortunately do not pene­
trate the problems in sufficient depth to add much to 
understanding in this particular area. Moreover, some 
of the points he makes which bear on industrial rela­
tions issues, appear to suffer a degree of mutual 
contradiction. For example, he draws attention to the 
coolness of British unions to legislation to lay down 
rights to specified periods of notice before dismissal 
(including for redundancy). He also notes that unions 
in the United Kingdom have been apathetic to the idea of 
security of employment agreements along the lines at 
that time pursued by their American counterparts, and 
concludes by suggesting that union officials were con­
tent to "collude with employers to keep the whole thing 
low key" (22). However, this scenario, if not totally 
at odds with his earlier assertion that unions were 
prepared to exert "collective bargaining pressure to 
prevent the disappearance of jobs", certainly requires 
a fuller explanation.
In the main then, much of the research that has been 
conducted on aspects of redundancy, has not dealt with 
trade union responses in any searching or analytical 
sense. Either the response of trade unions has been 
taken as a popularly understood "given" or, if questions 
have been raised, they do not seem to have been probed 
in any degree of detail. There are, however, a number 
of writers to whom this generalisation does not apply.
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and there is now a need to consider what light they 
are able to shed upon the issues I have outlined for 
examination.
1.3 RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF THE REDUNDANCY PAYMENTS ACT
If one considers those studies which have attempted 
to assess trade union responses to redundancy, an inte­
resting common denominator emerges. A thread which runs 
through the majority of such studies is the question of 
what (if any) effect might the legislation on redundancy 
have had on the behaviour of trade unions. This can be 
made more specific, for whilst there is not just one, 
but several pieces of legislation relating directly to 
matters of redundancy, the questions that tend to be 
posed relate to the 1965 Redundancy Payments Act. 
Moreover, such studies tend to have in common an assump­
tion that the Act undermined the effectiveness of trade 
unions to fight redundancy. If there is a theory of the 
study of redundancy then, to a large degree, it stems 
from the debates and contradictions between various 
writers in this area.
The most complete statistical review of the 
Redundancy Payments Acts was the OPCS Study by Parker 
et al, conducted in 1969 for the Department of 
Employment (23). (The main interpretative chapters were 
written by McCarthy and Ellis.) Reviewing and reaffirm­
ing the policy link between the need for economic 
growth, the modernisation of industry and the need for
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what was described as "effective” use of manpower, 
McCarthy and Ellis argue that fears of economic 
insecurity had "generated workplace attitudes and stra­
tegies" designed to minimise such insecurity, and that 
this in turn had led to an "under utilisation of man­
power" . For them then, the Act was partly an attempt to 
alleviate "the problem of uncertainty" and the conse­
quential attitudes and strategies, which were barriers 
to productivity and growth. More directly, it was 
introduced to reduce trade union opposition to redundan­
cies "at the point of their occurrence". The writers 
put the point as follows, in a much quoted passage:-
"It was never expected that the provision of statu­
tory compensation would in itself eliminate the 
union and workplace opposition which is typical and 
natural in the redundancy situation: rather, the 
most that was hoped for was to achieve some reduc­
tion in its intensity."
Even if the reduction in union opposition to redun­
dancy was only expected to be partial, the provision of 
a statutory scheme of redundancy payments was expected 
to have the further consequence that it would engender 
greater management control of the redundancy process 
itself. "Criteria of efficiency" were to become more 
important in decisions about who to retain and who to 
dismiss, and this was not wholly compatible with the 
"last in, first out" principle which trade unions fre­
quently insisted upon in the selection of redundant 
workers.
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Again, according to Ellis and McCarthy's reading of
the underlying purposes of the Act, the aim was...
"... not to give employers an unlicensed freedom 
to apply their own criteria in redundancy situa­
tions irrespective of the rights and views of 
those affected; rather, it was intended to create 
a situation where those affected are more likely 
to accept the implications of these economic con­
siderations (i.e. the need for efficiency and mobi­
lity of labour). The statutory payment provides 
workers with an incentive to break with the prin­
ciple of 'first in, last out'". (25).
According to McCarthy and Ellis, the Act largely 
succeeded in achieving its intended purposes. Its 
industrial relations effects were, among others, to 
influence the criteria adopted by employers in selecting 
workers for redundancy - encouraging them to place more 
emphasis on age and sickness records (besides the cri­
teria of "last in, first out", efficiency in the job, 
and skill level).
Moreover, they found evidence that the statutory 
provisions had made employees more prepared to accept 
redundancy, and detected "a decline in overt conflict". 
The Act had had an impact on the attitudes of employers, 
too. By formalising certain aspects of the redundancy 
process, specifically, the rights of employees to a 
statutory payment, some employers had "been led to treat 
the whole affair of redundancy more precisely and care­
fully" (26). The net result of this was that there had 
been a decline in strike activity over redundancy issues 
since the introduction of the Act. The conclusion of 
McCarthy and Ellis was that, although it was not speci­
fically intended to contribute to improved industrial 
relations, the Act had had a generally beneficial effect 
in this sphere.
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1.4 WOOD'S CRITICISM OF THE OPCS SURVEY
Attacks on the conclusions of the study by Parker 
et al have come from two distinct directions. The first 
is a critique of its theoretical framework and the 
validity of its findings. It questions whether the 
conclusions of McCarthy and Ellis, that the Act had been 
broadly successful in achieving its objectives, are 
accurate. This critique is adopted by Wood. The second 
line of attack - from Fryer - is essentially, that both 
the Act and the Parker study represent a managerialist 
approach that is inadequate or unacceptable as a frame­
work for public policy.
The main thrust of Wood's criticism is, not merely 
that McCarthy and Ellis failed to draw valid conclusions 
from the survey data (though he does devote a substan­
tial amount of attention to this point). Rather, he 
chooses to emphasise what he considers to be a flaw in 
their theoretical perspective which caused them to adopt 
a false conception of "the redundancy problem" (27). By 
adopting a pluralist approach to the problem, they had 
assumed that, despite a conflict of interest between 
employers and the employed, a compromise was possible. 
Wood does not so much argue that this is not so (as he 
may well have done were he, for example, commited to a 
Marxist perspective), rather, he suggests that the terms 
of the compromise, if they are to be considered accep­
table, must involve giving a redundant worker a new job. 
Wood's criticism comes down to the fact that McCarthy 
and Ellis assume that an active labour market policy
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is possible and is working. Acting on this assumption, 
it is possible for them to focus on the R.P.A. in 
abstract of other policies. Wood's prescription is not 
so much for a given theoretical perspective. Rather, it 
is that there is a need to study redundancy in a way 
that does not merely accept given views and reactions to 
redundancy, but incorporates an examination of them into 
the research. The implication is that the absence of 
any valid, coherent, theoretical framework precluded 
this in the case of McCarthy and Ellis.
In particular. Wood argues, there were assumptions by 
both policy makers and academic researchers, that trade 
unions opposed and frustrated managements' attempts to 
effect redundancies prior to the 1965 Redundancy 
Payments Act. It is one thing, argues Wood, for public 
policy to be directed by untested beliefs of politi­
cians, but quite another for academic researchers to 
subsequently adopt the same beliefs without subjecting 
them to enquiry. Emphasising the lack of knowledge 
available to support McCarthy and Ellis, Wood observes:-
"It is a dangerous strategy which starts with what 
amounts to almost a complacency about its knowledge 
of the real world, particularly in a highly vola­
tile area such as industrial relations. It is 
especially dangerous in an applied area, since we 
may end up imposing our normative view on the 
world, not simply to change it, but in order to 
describe it." (28).
Wood's point is that this is exactly what McCarthy 
and Ellis have done. He, in short, charges them first 
with starting from an assumption that trade unions 
systematically frustrated managements in their attempts
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to create redundancies, and then with proceeding to a 
conclusion that the legislation had weakened this 
opposition.
The problem which we now have in any assessment of 
trade union action, before and after the Redundancy 
Payments Act, is that there is no readily available data 
to draw upon, describing the extent of union opposition 
to redundancies prior to 1965. Possibly, impressions 
were formed about trade union opposition, which were in 
fact generalisations based upon a limited number of 
examples. (It is true, for example, that there were a 
number of disputes in the motor industry, which attrac­
ted considerable attention.) The researchers, in 
following the assumed position of a generality of 
opposition, then found by empirical evidence that there 
was an absence of such in the post 1965 period under 
consideration. Quite unjustifiably, they put this 
latter situation down to the effects of the legislation. 
Manifestly, for those responsible for introducing the 
R.P.A., this was a comforting conclusion, and Wood is 
right to question whether or not it was in any sense 
justified by reality.
1.5 f r y e r: S CRITIQUE QF-PUBLIC POLICY MD.. “MAHAGERIALISH-
Fryer (29), besides attacking the OPCS Study from a 
different direction, has been responsible for a more 
radical analysis of the Act. In a very real sense, it 
is possible to lump these two targets of criticism 
together, because Fryer's attack on the Act is, in large
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measure, an attack based on the findings of the OPCS 
survey, whilst his attack on Parker et al is that they 
assume a similar standpoint to that of the legislators 
in explaining the need for legal intervention.
The thrust of Fryer's criticism is that the legisla­
tion - as an expression of public policy - is based upon 
an understanding of the redundancy "problem" as essen­
tially a "management problem". The threat of economic 
and technological stagnation is caused by the restric­
tion of managerial initiative and the unwillingness of 
workers to change. An alternative standpoint that could 
have been adopted, argues Fryer, is that redundancy, as 
such, is undesirable, and that legislation could play a 
part in eliminating it. The emphasis adopted by the 
makers of public policy, however, has not merely been to 
seek the easier resolution of the "management problem", 
but in so doing, to underline the legitimacy of redun­
dancy and to encourage workers to accept the inevita­
bility - indeed, the desirability - of it. Fryer quotes 
at length from the speeches of politicians during the 
passage of the Bill through parliament, and from various 
sources which purport to analyse the "redundancy 
problem", both before and after its enactment. The 
overall tenor of analysis of the "problem" has been, he 
argues, to see the "management problem" as serious and 
rational, whilst that of the workers - i.e. how to avoid 
redundancy - is treated as "unrealistic" and "imprac­
ticable". Moreover, argues Fryer, this bias towards 
management's perception of the "redundancy problem"
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extends to the area of control in selecting individuals
for redundancy - so that employers could keep "the best
man for the job" rather than be tied to the "non-
rational" "last in, first out" principle. Where
redundancy is concerned, he argues, the law cannot be
seen to have served as some kind of impartial social
institution satisfying social wants. On the contrary,
the supposed needs of the economy are revealed as...
"... in truth the actual needs of one particular 
group in industry".
In considering questions of effectiveness, therefore, he
suggests we begin by asking the questions: "Effective
for whom?"; "Successful for whom?"; Urgent for whom?";
"A problem for whom?". (30).
The standpoint of McCarthy and Parker et al is 
closely identified by Fryer with this evident manage­
ment-biased perspective on redundancy. The weakness of 
public policy has been that it has "neglected the 
conflicting rationality of managements and workers, 
indeed has ascribed rationality to managements' view­
points, and irrationality to that of the workers".
Similarly, the authors of Effects of the Redundancy
Payments Act, define the problem of redundancy as...
"... how best to underpin the economic rationality 
of management by modifying the emotive non-rationa­
lity of workers".
In this sense, his critique bears a close similarity to
that of Wood. However, there are major differences in
the approaches adopted by these two writers, which are
spelt out in detail in the following section.
40
1.6 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WOOD M D  FRYER IE. APPROACHES TO THE 
STUDY OF REDUNDANCY
The principal difference between these two writers is 
that Fryer is firmly of the radical school in industrial 
relations. The "problem" of redundancy for him is a 
problem that must be understood from the workers' point 
of view, i.e. that it is a thing to be avoided at all 
costs. This contrasts with the "managerialist" view 
which Fryer criticises, and which perceives the redun­
dancy "problem" as that of worker opposition and how 
best to overcome it. Starting from a position where 
workers are expected to adopt a quite different attitude 
towards redundancy from that of management. Fryer em­
phasises the existence of opposition in the form of 
occupations, sit-ins and the like.
Wood's perspective is less easily characterised. 
Although he himself emphasises the differences between 
the "radical school" and his own approach, he fails to 
state explicitly what that approach is, except to adopt 
a carefully correct research methodology, and to query 
the validity of assumed positions. So, for example, 
where Fryer argues that the workers' definition of the 
redundancy problem should influence the shape of public 
policy (31), Wood criticises this on the basis that 
Fryer has, in fact, offered little evidence to support 
his assertion of radically different workers' values.
On balance, asks Wood, despite Fryer's examples of 
worker opposition in the form of sit-ins, occupations 
and so on, is there really sufficient evidence to
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justify Fryer's contention of a radically different 
workers' perspective? Wood concedes that Fryer has made 
an important contribution to the study of redundancy by 
pointing to the weaknesses in the assumption that wor­
kers who accept the "inevitability of redundancy" accept 
the rationality of management's definition, by concur­
ring with its desirability. However, says Wood, Fryer 
fails to develop this adequately. The need is clear, he 
says, for a sociological investigation of the reality of 
workers' perspectives on redundancy and despite discer­
ning such a need. Fryer has failed to fill it in his own 
research. (32).
Consequently, for Wood, Fryer has much in common with 
other writers on redundancy, such as McCarthy and Ellis. 
The common denominator between them is that of assumed 
positions and inadequate research. Assumptions are made 
that the Redundancy Payments Act has facilitated "shake 
out", "reduced resistance to redundancy", "changed the 
criterion on which selection of redundancies is made", 
"increased the incidence of collective bargaining over 
redundancy", and legitimised the process of redundancy. 
All of these assumptions are made. Wood points out, 
without a real basis of investigative enquiry. In all 
of this, both Fryer and McCarthy and Ellis make the 
mistake of "assuming public policy to be as anticipated, 
with little or no systematic investigation". (33). The 
point that Wood himself reaches, therefore, is that 
there is a pressing need to study the processes of 
redundancy and so enable assumptions to be abandoned in 
favour of empirical facts.
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1.7 *OQD_AHD_DEYS' CASE STUDIES OF REDUMDAtfCILJEEQCESSES
In the present context, the principal value of Wood's
work (the substantive body of which is published in a
single collaborative work with Dey) (34), is that it
takes as its starting point, the seeming inaction of
trade unions and workers in opposing redundancies. Wood
and Dey adopt a case study approach, from which the main
issue that arises is the fact that even where workers do
not engage in outright opposition to redundancy, a
measure of resistance frequently occurs over some aspect
of the way the issue is being handled. They express
this opposition as a desire by workers to exercise
choice, as they put it:-
"Opposition to or acquiescence in redundancies to 
various degrees involved a concern with choice and 
an acceptance or rejection of the restraints where­
by that choice was limited... The range of reac­
tions to redundancy can more easily be understood 
in this context than through the common assumption 
that resistance to redundancy is animated primarily 
by concern with job security moderated only by the 
prerequisites of economic efficiency." (35).
The case studies which lead them to this position 
consist of two non-unionised companies, one unionised 
firm and the Bristol District Committee of the AUEW. In 
the two non-unionised firms, the analysis put forward by 
Wood and Dey seems to be largely justified. In the 
first, the company was seen as being unfair to indivi­
duals who wanted to take advantage of the voluntary 
redundancy scheme, but were prevented from doing so. 
Choice, then, was an issue, in that there were indivi­
duals who wished to choose redundancy. In the
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second case study, the company offered the workers (in 
theory) the opportunity of moving to Wales upon the 
relocation of the factory. However, this choice was 
seen by some workers as illusory, and they were con­
firmed in this view by the fact that they received no 
practical encouragement to move. For these people, the 
lack of choice in any real sense was the issue. For 
others, the lack of opportunity to participate in the 
decision to relocate was the greater deprivation of 
choice.
When it comes to the case studies which introduce 
trade union activity and bargaining into redundancy, 
however, the characterisation of worker reaction to 
redundancy merely in terms of choice and control is 
generally less convincing. This emerges, to a degree, 
in the third case study - the closure of the "Champion 
Brewery" (an East London brewery) where the shop 
stewards sought to oppose the rationale for closure per 
sé. (They argued strongly against the inevitability of 
redundancies, though without success.) Of course, it is 
possible to argue that this was, in effect, merely a 
concern to preserve the "choice" of work at the brewery. 
However, this seems to be a peculiarly inadequate way of 
expressing the problems of the people concerned, and 
appears only to have the dubious merit of providing an 
artificial common denominator with the first two case 
studies.
In the final case study, the writers explore redun­
dancy as an issue within the context of militant
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trade unionism. The Bristol militants of the AUEW
rejected both compulsory and voluntary redundancy as a
matter of policy, and advocated work sharing as an
alternative to unemployment. Wood and Dey suggest that
the actions of these militant shop stewards are not
adequately explained by "the radical approach" to the
study of redundancy, such as that adopted by Fryer.
Their main reason is that, as they put it, the radical
appoach assumes that the interest of workers lies in job
security. On the contrary, the writers suggest, the
opposition of the District Committee militants was...
"... animated less by a blanket assertion that 
the basic interests of workers were contradicted 
by redundancy, than by their concern with issues 
of choice and control". (36).
The evidence for this view is found by the writers in 
the facts that the shop stewards were able to perceive 
merits in a voluntary approach to redundancy, but never­
theless rejected it on principle, and that they advo­
cated work sharing as an alternative to redundancy. The 
merit of this analysis, according to the writers, is 
that : -
"Accepting a concern with issues of choice and 
control one can acknowledge that in some circum­
stances redundancy may be of material benefit to 
those it affects. In this respect, therefore, 
the perceptions of redundancy of the Bristol 
activists were more flexible and less dogmatic 
than the radical approach allows. This may help 
explain why opposition to redundancies has been 
more ambiguous and less widespread than the 
radical approach implies." (37).
For the writers, the main lesson for the purpose of
theoretical studies of redundancy is that the radical
perspective is seriously flawed:-
"It underestimates the problem of change, choice 
and control which so exercised the militants of the 
Bristol D.C." (38).
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For Wood and Dey, the radical approach defines wor­
kers' concerns as being exclusively to do with the issue 
of "job security" as a "sectional interest". Much of 
this comes excessively close to straining at a gnat.
Wood and Dey fail to test the range of meanings in the 
term "job security", which they reject as an inadequate 
explanation of worker resistance. On the other hand, 
they state that the D.C. militants in Bristol were 
concerned to challenge the employers' prerogative to 
hire and fire union members, and they were opposed to 
change where it was enforced through the imposition of 
redundancy and unemployment. Perhaps the single major 
reason for this confusing line of argument is that the 
term "job security" is open to a variety of interpreta­
tions, and clearly. Wood and Dey do not accept that it 
encompasses the sorts of concern expressed by the mili­
tant stewards in their Bristol study. Plainly, there is 
a need for greater precision in terminology, not to say 
some clarification of the views ascribed by radical 
theorists to workers opposing redundancy.
Although much of the work of Wood and Dey represents 
a positive step in the study of redundancy, there would 
appear to be a number of weaknesses in it. To be fair, 
in the major part of their work, they exercise great 
care to avoid the pitfalls of the orthodox school of 
industrial relations research. In particular, they are 
careful to avoid assuming that the formal "givens" and 
accepted orthodoxy of industrial relations reflect the 
reality. For these reasons, they do represent a
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valuable starting point for further study. However, the 
principal weaknesses in their analysis need to be noted.
The writers go to some lengths to draw a sharp dis­
tinction between their own work and that which they call 
the "radical critique". In so doing, they seem to 
define the concerns of workers and shop stewards in 
terms which are too narrow. (The example has already 
been quoted of their narrow use of the term "job secu­
rity" .) This creates a false polarity between their own 
work and that of adherents to the radical critique. At 
the same time, their findings could quite easily have 
been incorporated within a variant of the same radical 
line of argument.
The writers argue that the view of the radical cri­
tique, that collective bargaining over redundancies 
incorporates and constrains trade unions, is not proven 
by their own research findings. (In this, they quote 
examples of "gains" that were supposedly achieved in the 
case studies that, say the writers, cannot be described 
as "fractional".) This is not an entirely convincing 
argument, however, for three reasons. Firstly, the 
significance of the "gains" achieved by bargaining in 
the case studies is a matter of judgement. Suffice it 
to say that in the Bristol Engineering case study, the 
AUEW militants did not regard the "gains" as satisfac­
tory. Secondly, Wood and Dey assume that a beneficial 
result will flow from formal redundancy procedures 
introduced after particular battles. They do not, 
for example, make any assessment of whether these
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procedures, in practice, serve to avoid redundancies, 
or whether they possibly undermine and inhibit more 
effective worker opposition. Thirdly, just as it would 
be possible to find examples of redundancies where 
strong worker opposition is evident, so the possibility 
must be accepted that other cases would reveal far 
weaker, more constrained opposition to redundancy.
The case studies hardly serve to dismiss the arguments 
of workers being incorporated and controlled by the 
institutions of collective bargaining. However, they 
do show that any attempt to simplify worker reaction to 
redundancy, as either passive acquiescence or outright 
opposition, is full of danger, whilst they do not dis­
prove the possibility of either of these extremes.
In general terms then, the distinction, which the 
writers draw between their own work and the radical 
critique, obscures the fact that a range of worker 
reactions to redundancy are perfectly possible, from 
outright opposition to acquiescence, though they them­
selves highlight a variety of responses in their own 
particular studies. Useful though these examples are, 
one cannot be entirely satisfied with the explanations 
they offer for the variation in workers' reactions to 
redundancy. This connects with a further point which 
may be made in relation to the approach adopted by 
these writers. They suggest that perceptions of redun­
dancy and ideological influences may be significant, and 
recognise that conflicts over redundancy may well be 
determined less by bargaining per sé, than the different
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ways redundancy is seen by the participants in bargain­
ing, and their ability to impose those perceptions on 
others. (39).
However, they do not address the problem of what 
sorts of issues and factors may influence the percep­
tions of others. They suggest that the ability to 
impose such perceptions may depend on...
"... economic and ideological factors which are to 
some extent independent of the bargaining process, 
such as the degree of dependency, or the degree of 
resistance to redundancy". (40).
However, as a generalisation, this falls short of any 
satisfactory explanation of how or why such variations 
in perceptions might occur. Whilst in a study of this 
kind it may not be appropriate to demand a full analysis 
or detailed review of the wider societal forces shaping 
perceptions of redundancy, one is entitled to expect an 
acknowledgement of the importance of the directly rele­
vant factors in industrial relations. Within this 
limited scope, it is noticeable that Wood and Dey do 
not, for example, devote much attention to the range of 
political beliefs of individual trade union activists. 
Nor do they describe the circumstances leading to the 
opposition or non-opposition to redundancy, or show how 
an initial disposition to oppose redundancy may be frus­
trated or modified in practice. Moreover, because they 
offer their own analysis (based on "choice" as 
a common factor in workers' responses to redundancy) 
in preference to that of the radical critique, they 
fail to ask how and why trade union reactions to 
redundancy vary.
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Finally, it would seem that the above problem may to 
some extent be linked to the writers' approach towards 
the role played by unions in the redundancy process.
The writers seem, in the main, to adopt an approach to 
trade unions that identifies them as organs of bargain­
ing, but does not recognise their political or ideologi­
cal significance. (This is something of a paradox, 
since one of the case studies focuses on a group of 
militants in the AUEW.) Overall, however, there is 
little recognition of the political connotations of 
trade union activity, and the political constraints 
under which trade unions may labour in contending with 
the problems of redundancy. One would not wish to 
suggest that the wider party political issues in society 
should necessarily have been drawn into a study of 
redundancy processes, but rather that in any considera­
tion of the ability of unions to oppose redundancy, 
attention needs to be given to the forces within them 
that stand in the way of this, and also to the struc­
tures of power and authority which unions have to con­
front in exacting concessions over redundancies. The 
problem with Wood and Deys' analysis is that it is 
largely depoliticised, and political processes are given 
too little emphasis in accounts of the actions of trade 
union members. The result of this is, of course, that 
struggles against redundancy are not seen in any sense 
as political struggles. It should be said, however, 
that this absence of concern with political processes 
contrasts oddly with Dey's original thesis, in which he
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sets out to "rehabilitate unemployment as a political 
issue". (41).
1.8 SALMON :S HISTORICAL SURVEY..Q£. REDUliDMCY,
AND TRADE UNION ACTION
A further valuable contribution to the study of 
redundancy, which approaches the specific issue of trade 
union responses to job loss, comes from Salmon. (42).
In a detailed historical study of the British motor 
industry from 1940 onwards, Salmon takes the issue of 
redundancy as an aspect of what he terms "power con­
flict" , and attempts to place this within a broader 
commentary on industrial relations issues.
Salmon takes as a starting point the lack of research 
into redundancy as it affects workplace relations. (He 
observes that studies have been largely about the impli­
cations of redundancy for the workings of the labour 
market, and that even though public policy has defined 
worker resistance as a prime reason for intervention, 
the implications of redundancy on collective employee- 
employer relations have been neglected.) He takes as 
his "object of study", therefore, the impact which 
redundancy has on the exercise of power in the work­
place. He concludes that redundancy is a key issue in 
the determination of power in workplace organisation.
The main theoretical arguments and conclusions of 
Salmon's study are as follows. He takes issue with the
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large body of research on redundancy which focuses on 
the individual redundant worker, and specifies the 
failure of most researchers to recognise the power 
inherent in the employer's right to hire and fire. The 
result of this emphasis on the problems of the indivi­
dual redundant worker, argues Salmon, is that it fails 
to recognise that workers may have an interest in retai­
ning employment, and atomises wage labour in market and 
work situations. Hence the need, he says (taking up 
points made by Wood), to stress and understand the 
redundancy process.
There is something of a paradox, however, in the fact 
that, whilst Salmon sets out to establish the importance 
of "job defence", much of the evidence he quotes sug­
gests that job defence per sé has, in general, been 
subordinate to other issues of control, compensation and 
the defence of union rights against arbitrary attacks in 
situations of redundancy. At times, he seems to confuse 
workplace struggles against this wider range of redun­
dancy related issues with a generalised proposition that 
the struggles were actually against redundancy per sé 
i.e. for "the right to work". Generally, his case 
studies do not altogether support this analysis.
Rather, they seem in the main, to be illustrating 
struggles for control of the redundancy process. For 
example, in some cases, victimisation of shop stewards 
emerges as the most signigicant issue. Thus, at one 
point, the following statement is made:-
"The policies advocated by the workplace leadership 
to resist redundancy had increasingly encouraged 
workplace organisation to seek a greater influence 
in the way redundancy decisions were taken by 
management." (43).
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There is no evidence in this to suggest that Salmon 
is aware of any material or qualitative difference 
between the two distinct sets of policies and practices 
to which he alludes - i.e. resistance to redundancy on 
one hand, and greater influence on the way the decisions 
were taken on the other.
One could ask why, in such an otherwise careful 
piece of research, should such confusion emerge? The 
single most convincing answer has to be that, whilst 
Salmon is able to catalogue the minutiae of events that 
constituted a sequence of workplace struggles, broadly 
in relation to redundancy issues, he makes no effort to 
distinguish between the (sometimes fine, sometimes 
marked) differences in substance and purpose of one 
demand against another. In failing to draw such dis­
tinctions, he therefore lumps together demands for the 
non-victimisation of individuals, with questions of 
procedure and selection of the redundant and other 
issues of outright, politically directed opposition to 
redundancy. He does this, in part, because he is con­
cerned, through the conduit of a historical study, not 
to discover something of the nature of trade unionism, 
trade union values, or whatever, but (in his own words) 
with "considering redundancy in terms of workplace 
relations and as a question of power". Valid though 
this objective may be, it seems to lead him into the now 
familiar trap of assuming a trade union position of 
opposition, and generalising that such opposition is a 
manifestation of a demand for "the right to work". That
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the reality is possibly more complex seems to have been 
overlooked. At later stages in the study, however, 
Salmon seems to become acutely aware that trade union 
leadership policies can be far from passive, and yet a 
great distance from any real demand for "the right to 
work".
1.9 ttQtm. MG£KTL-lLQJ^.Da,££DI^
The above studies represent the major examples of 
academic work on the theme of redundancy. They have 
been supplemented by a considerable body of work which 
deals with the issue of factory closures. These latter 
studies, in effect, simply examine a particular form of 
redundancy - i.e. the closure context, and a number of 
them do take trade union responses as being of central 
importance. For reasons which will become clear, we 
will consider these in the next chapter, as part of a 
search for a theoretical perspective on union responses 
to redundancy.
Over the years, there have been a number of studies 
of redundancy in the mining industry. Bulmer in 1971 
looked at the effects of the Redundancy Payments Act in 
the Durham coalfield (44), and concluded that the Act 
was not always achieving the objectives of the legis­
lators. More recently, with the 1984-85 miners' strike 
over pit closures, there has been a plethora of litera­
ture describing aspects of this remarkable dispute.
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Within the framework of this study, the book written by 
Jonathan and Ruth Winterton is of interest. Of par­
ticular note is the explanation they offer for the 
failure of the Nottinghamshire miners to identify with 
the campaign against pit closures. For various reasons, 
they argue, the Nottinghamshire miners never developed a 
sense of mining community in the same way as other 
groups in different coal areas. The Nottinghamshire 
coalfield provided "easy coal", which led to less rank 
and file pressure for militant activity, and fewer 
opportunities for militants who succeeded in getting 
elected to Branch positions to demonstrate their skills. 
The membership of Nottinghamshire, they argue, remained 
unpoliticised, with no more than an instrumental attach­
ment to the NUM. The relative lack of concern of 
Nottinghamshire miners is described then, in terms of 
the absence of a militant tradition. To this the 
writers add that there was a lack of leadership in 
Nottinghamshire to counter the ideas that the jobs of 
Notts miners were not under threat, and the national 
leadership made the mistake of allowing these ideas to 
remain unchallenged by emphasising the peripheral nature 
of the jobs threats in Nottinghamshire.
In contrast, the successful maintenance of the strike 
came down to the wider comunity and rank and file sup­
port which was developed with women's action groups and 
local support networks with the wider labour movement. 
This account needs to be contrasted with less sympathe­
tic analyses, such as that provided by Adeney and
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Lloyd (46), who describe the strike within a framework 
of implicit support for the "new unionism" of the EEPTU 
and the AEU. MacGregor (with Tyler) (47), as might be 
expected, provides an entirely personalised account of 
his central role in the dispute.
Useful though these books are in charting a remar­
kable episode in British industrial relations in the 
1980s, they do not add very much to the study of redun­
dancy, in an academic sense. Their principal drawback 
is that they are only what they are - discrete studies 
of one particular event, the miners' strike. They do 
not, therefore, serve to illuminate our understanding 
greatly, of the more general everyday responses of 
unions to redundancy, nor for that matter do they seek 
to generalise the factors that led to such prolonged and 
bitter protest in the 1984-85 dispute, so that they can 
be understood as elements or parameters in a wider field 
of struggles.
Leaving aside the numerous accounts of the miners' 
strike, and the considerable number of studies of fac­
tory and plant closures (which we will consider in the 
next chapter), we have then, a relative paucity of 
studies focusing on trade unions and redundancy. Those 
that have been provided, have concentrated on economic, 
or public policy aspects, including the ramifications of 
the Redundancy Payments Act. This remains the case even 
with more recent articles. Booth (48), for example, 
looks at the question of "Extra Statutory Redundancy 
Payments" from an economist's point of view. Though she
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offers an explanation of extra-statutory payments in 
these terms, her analysis is of little help in under­
standing the processes by which they are achieved, 
including the role of unions and collective action in 
securing them. Sutherland (49), examines public poli­
cies towards redundancy from several perspectives, 
touching on the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, and the 
Employment Protection Act 1975 which incorporated pro­
visions on consultation with unions. Daniel (50), 
examines the effects of the 1975 Employment Protection 
Act's consultations provisions, and finds that very 
little has changed as a consequence of their introduc­
tion. Where trade unions were well organised, he sug­
gests, policies and practices were already established 
before 1975, which made the Act's provisions largely 
irrelevant. Where such policies were not well esta­
blished, the trade unions tended not to be so strongly 
represented, and the Act was consequently less effec­
tive, anyway. Turnbull, (51), considers the produc­
tivity implications of redundancy touching on the ini­
tial objectives of the 1965 Act, the changes that have 
occurred in such practices as "last in, first out" in 
selecting the redundant, the prevalence of compulsory 
versus non-compulsory redundancy, and the effects of 
unfair dismissal law on the policies employers adopt to 
deal with redundancy.
Overwhelmingly then, the focus of research on redun­
dancy has not been directed towards unions and unionism 
It is hoped that in some measure this study will con­
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tribute towards a broadening of knowledge in a relative­
ly neglected area. As will be seen, there are wider 
areas of academic research that need to be drawn upon in 
order to further this process, and some of these will be 
touched upon in the next two chapters. In the next 
chapter we will advance towards the formulation of a 
theoretical framework that might facilitate understand­
ing in this area, and in so doing continue to review 
aspects of the relevant literature.
58
REF£REfiCES
1. S. Wood: "A consideration of the Study of 
Redundancy", Scottish Journal of Sociology,
Vol.2, No.l, 1977.
2. S.J. Wood and J. Cohen: "Approaches to the Study 
of Redundancy", Industrial Relations Journal,
Vol.8, No.4, 1977.
3. Acton Society Trust: "Redundancy: A Survey of 
Problems and Practices", 1958.
4. G. Goodman: "Redundancy in the Affluent Society", 
Fabian Society, 1962.
5. Ministry of Labour and National Service and the 
Central Office of Information: "Positive 
Employment Policies: Examples of Management 
Practice Contributing to Good Relations in 
Industry", 1958; also: "Security and Change: 
Progress in Provision for Redundancy", 1961; 
and: "Redundancy in Great Britain", 1963.
6. M. Shanks: "The Stagnant Society: A Warning",
1961.
7. Hilda Kahn: "Repercussions of Redundancy", 1964.
8. Wedderburn, D .: "White Collar Redundancy", 1964; 
"Redundancy and The Railwaymen", 1965;
"Redundancy", in D. Pym (ed.), 1968.
9. Daniel, W.W.: "Strategies for Displaced 
Employees", 1970; "Whatever happened to the 
workers in Woolwich?", 1972.
10. S. Hukerjee: "Making the Labour Market Work", 1972; 
"Through no fault of their own", 1973.
11. D. Mackay and G. Reid: "Redundancy, Unemployment 
and Manpower Policy", Economic Journal,
December 1972.
12. F. Herron: "Redundancy and Redeployment from 
UCS", 1960-70 Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, November 1972.
13. R. Martin and R. Fryer: "Redundancy and 
Paternalist Capitalism", 1973.
14. P .  Seglow: "Reactions to Redundancy: The Influence 
of the Work Situation", Industrial Relations 
Journal, September 1971.
15. S. Wood: "Redundancy and Female Employment", 
Sociological Review, Vol.29, No.4, 1981.
59
16. Claire Callender: "Women and The Redundancy 
Payments Scheme", paper presented to ESRC Workshop 
on Employment and Unemployment, 1984.
17. Angela Coyle: "Redundant Women", 1984.
18. See note 8 above.
19. Ibid p.35.
20. S.R. Parker, C.G. Thomas, M.D. Ellis and 
W.E.J. McCarthy: "Effects of the Redundancy 
Payments Act", 1971.
21. Hukerjee Ibid p.137.
22. Ibid p.39.
23. Parker et al op cit (see note 20).
24. Ibid p.10.
25. Ibid p.11.
26. Ibid p.13.
27. Wood, Stephen: "Reactions to Redundancy", Ph.D 
Thesis, University of Manchester, 1980.
28. Ibid pp.4.27-4.28.
29. R. Fryer in R. Martin and R. Fryer: "Redundancy 
and Paternalist Capitalism", 1973.
30. Ibid p.227-228.
31. Ibid p.260.
32. Wood op cit 4.35.
33. Wood Ibid 4.41.
34. Stephen Wood and Ian Dey: "Redundancy", 1983.
35. Ibid p.104.
36. Ibid p.97.
37. Ibid p.97.
38. Ibid p.98.
39. Ibid p.108.
40. Ibid p.108.
41. Ian Francis Dey, Ph.D: Thesis, p.6, University of 
Bristol, 1979.
60
42. John Salmon: "Organised Labour in a Market 
Economy: A Study of Redundancy and Workplace 
Relations as an Issue of Power Conflict in the 
British Motor Industry", Ph.D Thesis, Warwick 
University, 1983.
43. Ibid p.512.
44. M.I.A. Bulmer: "Mining Redundancy: A Case Study
of the Workings of the Redundancy Payments Act in
the Durham Coalfield", Industrial Relations 
Journal, Vol.2, November 1971.
45. Jonathan and Ruth Winterton: "Coal Crisis and 
Conflict: The 1984-85 Miners' Strike in South 
Yorkshire", 1989.
46. Martin Adeney and John Lloyd: "The Miners' Strike 
1984-5: Loss Without Limit", 1988.
47. Ian MacGregor and Rodney Tyler: "The Enemies With­
in : The Story of the Miners' Strike 1984-85", 1986
48. Alison Booth: "Extra Statutory Redundancy Payments 
in Britain", British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 1987, Vol.XXV, No.3.
49. John Sutherland: "Redundancy: perspectives and 
policies". Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.II, 
No.4, 1980.
50. W.W. Daniel: "The United Kingdom"; in Cross (ed.): 
"Managing Workforce Reduction", 1985.
51. Peter Turnbull: "Leaner and Possibly Fitter: the 
Management of Redundancy in Britain", Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol.19, No.3, 1988.
61
CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS A THEORY OF UNIONS 
AND REDUNDANCY
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I will consider some of the theories 
(or partial theories) which have a bearing on trade 
union responses to redundancy. This will then pave the 
way in chapter three for a theoretical framework within 
which to consider trade union reactions to redundancy, 
and the remainder of the thesis will apply and evaluate 
this in an empirical context, utilising a case study 
approach.
A key objective of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 
was the modification of trade union behaviour in res­
ponse to redundancy. (1). It therefore comes as some­
thing of a surprise to discover that the academic study 
of industrial relations has found little need for any 
theoretical basis for the assessment of trade unions' 
responses to redundancy. If there is an explanation for 
this, it may well be in the nature of those studies 
which have been conducted. Most have not concentrated 
on the event of redundancy at all, but (as was seen in 
the last chapter) on the fate of workers after redundan­
cy. Those which have concentrated on the process of 
redundancy are relatively few, and as we have also seen, 
have tended to be confined to a limited number of case 
studies. Whether or not these are sufficient reasons to 
explain the shortage of theory, is as a matter of judge­
ment. Nevertheless, it does seem that there is a pos­
sibility of connection between these points.
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In particular, it would seem that it is in the nature 
of studies of discrete episodes, that broadly applicable 
conclusions are unlikely to emerge. Indeed, most 
researchers would consider it excessively rash to 
generalise on the basis of a limited number of studied 
events. This being the case, broad theoretical proposi­
tions are not easily tested, and thus are somewhat 
unlikely to be developed in the course of studies of 
this nature; a fact which should be borne in mind when 
deciding upon the type of empirical evidence that needs 
to be obtained to test one's assessments.
So, whilst studies of discrete episodes and of the 
post redundancy experiences of workers are often of 
considerable interest, it is felt that a different type 
of study (and more especially, a theoretical context for 
assessment) are now very much needed. In the first 
instance, we will look at studies which have focused on 
factory closures, to see whether they have any theoreti­
cal content that will assist in a general understanding 
of redundancy. We will then consider a particular 
variant of such studies in which questions of legitimacy 
and ideology are advanced to explain the reactions of 
workers. We will then turn to theories of trade union­
ism to search for clues that might explain union be­
haviour in response to redundancy, and finally, we will 
consider what modern labour economists have to offer to 
this discussion.
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2.2 PLANT. CLOSURE STUDIES
One aspect of the process of redundancy which has 
interested academic observers, has been the matter of 
plant closures. Whilst these have not resulted in 
general theories or explanations of trade union respon­
ses to redundancy, a number of the studies have con­
tributed helpful insights on the problems that closure 
decisions have created for workers, unions and manage­
ments. Very broadly, the studies tend to be either 
written from a point of view of sympathy with workers, 
or of regarding closures as problems which managements 
need to resolve. A number of studies adopt more of an 
investigative approach, looking into some aspect or 
consequence of closure decisions, and several attempt to 
make some kind of political analysis. A particular 
variety of struggle against plant closures has attracted 
considerable attention, i.e. factory occupations in 
their various forms.
Of the worker oriented category, Foster and 
Woolfsons' study of the Upper Clyde ship builders (2), 
is the most impressive, both for its thoroughness and 
its attempt to explain the success of the work-in. They 
do so in terms of the political leadership of the rank 
and file leaders, the alliances they were able to create 
in the workplace and the wider trade union movement, and 
the tactics they adopted to overcome workforce sectiona­
lism. They identify as important, factors such as the 
stewards' use of language to define issues in ways that 
met with popular support, the political context of
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Scotland at a time that the Conservative Party was 
experiencing a dramatic decline in electoral prospects, 
and a backcloth of hositility from the official union 
movement and active rank and file network, to the 1972 
Industrial Relations Act and the government responsible 
for it.
Their book on the Caterpillar Tractors occupation 
(3), is in many ways similar, and is particularly inter­
esting in the divisions it shows between different 
groups of workers, as well as the political differences 
between the shop stewards and the national union leader­
ship. It also explains the reactions of wider Scottish 
society, particularly the owners of Scottish business 
and the Conservative Party, elements of each expressing 
a measure of support for the occupation. As with the 
UCS work-in, the Caterpillar Tractor occupation raised 
issues of "the right to work". The authors identify 
what they believe to be an important political effect of 
the dispute, linking it to the overwhelming defeat of 
the Conservative Party in Scotland in the 1987 General 
Election. Another factor of interest that the book 
explores is the response of the right wing AEU leader­
ship to what was perceived to be a left wing initiative. 
The tension between the strikers and the union official 
leadership (which the account describes) has to be 
largely understood by acknowledging the nervousness of 
the executive, to possibilities which the left wing 
might utilise to capitalise on the occupation, at the 
expense of the right.
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While both of these books are illuminating of the 
specific incidents they describe, and are useful studies 
of the political leadership of shop stewards, it seems a 
pity that they are, on the whole, treated as separate 
cases. (The Caterpillar Tractor study makes relatively 
brief reference to the earlier UCS dispute, but little 
or no attempt is made to link the studies together.) 
Nevertheless, the books are useful, and set out a theory 
of trade union action, that is essentially dependent on 
political leadership for its initial impetus and depends 
on the balance of class forces, and worker unity for its 
success. In terms of facts and analysis they are im­
measurably more helpful than most other studies of 
workers' occupations - e.g. another book on the UCS 
work-in by Thompson and Hart. This latter book by 
contrast is largely a paean of praise to those involved 
in the work-in, and analysis of the issues in any 
serious theoretical sense is not attempted.
Another writer, looking at occupations from the point 
of view of sympathy with the workers involved, is Coates 
(5). In his book, "Work-ins, Sit-ins and Industrial 
Democracy", he concentrates not on plant closures, nor 
on redundancy per sé but on the mechanism of opposition 
to these problems which workers adopted with increasing 
frequency in the early 1970s, in the aftermath of the 
UCS work-in. Making occupations the focus of the study 
means that a variety of disputes unrelated to closures 
and redundancies come within its ambit. However, as 
Coates makes clear, the overwhelming stimulus to this
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form of industrial action gaining such popularity in the 
1970s, was redundancy and factory closures. Besides 
providing interesting insights into a number of factory 
occupations, Coates provides useful evidence of the 
scale of support which was achieved for such methods as 
a response to redundancy, and as a sanction in disputes 
over other matters. There is no attempt however, to put 
this into context, by comparing the figures of occupa­
tions, and workers involved with the number of plant 
closures or large redundancies, where workers did not 
adopt such tactics. Nor does the book attempt any 
theoretical explanation of occupations, but rather 
places the account of events firmly within a political 
perspective of support for such methods as a step to­
wards practical implementation of the ideas of workers' 
control. (The author is closely identified with the 
Institute for Workers Control, and much of the book 
emerged from seminars organised by that body - a fact 
which he freely acknowledges in his introduction.)
If the 1970s gave rise to optimism on behalf of those 
commenting on factory closures, the period since 1979 
has evoked a more pessimistic response. Like all gene­
ralisations, there are exceptions to this, and there 
have still been examples of writers taking case studies 
of occupations, describing events in some detail, and 
drawing encouragement from them. Lorentzen (6), con­
tributing to a volume of essays entitled "Fighting 
Closures' (7), describes the Lee Jeans occupation.
Levie (8), describes a fight to keep a chemicals plant
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in Essex open in 1981. Bryer et al (9), describe 
efforts to oppose the closure of the Corby Steel Works 
in 1979, and a number of other studies appear in similar 
vein. Useful though these are as descriptions of the 
events in question, there is little attempt to analyse 
the behaviour of unions and workers in any theoretical 
sense. Rather, they are offered in much the same spirit 
as Coates' work (referred to above), as a contribution 
to discussion among those trade union activists who 
would like to see trade unions fighting closures more 
effectively, and with more determination.
The main preoccupation of these authors then, appears 
to have been to answer the question, "Why have not 
unions been more active in fighting closures, and how 
can they become so in the future?" They have not em­
barked on any serious study of what unions have been 
doing in the absence of work-ins, occupations, or other 
forms of industrial action. In essence, these writers 
operate within a model of political trade unionism, in 
which opposition to closures and redundancy is seen to 
be the preferred or expected response of unions, and in 
which this is effected in a variety of ways including 
the said occupations, work-ins etc. They then observe 
that reality falls short of their model and they con­
clude by bewailing the fact that unions are not more 
successful (i.e. do not fit the model). In the main, 
however, they offer no explanation as to why reality 
differs from the scenario they have created, nor do 
they offer convincing strategies for overcoming the 
differences they have identified.
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With regard to the question of trade union strate­
gies, Foster and Woolfson overcome this problem, by 
advocating an approach of developing political leader­
ship, and building unity and alliances within trade 
unions. With regard to the lack of explanation of why 
the perceived shortcomings of unions exist, Moore (10), 
in a short chapter in the above mentioned book by Levie 
et al, offers a view based on the nature of union goals, 
and the nature of union organisation. The fragmented 
structure of unions, he argues, and the narrowness of 
their concerns with pay and conditions of work, together 
with a limited sense of solidarity they embody with 
people outside work, leads to...
"... narrow concepts of common interest, lack of 
concern over the employment of others, and short­
sighted endorsement of the transmission of unem­
ployment from one generation to the next as jobs 
are sold for the proceeds of early retirement and 
redundancy payments". (11).
Moore's strategy for overcoming these weaknesses is 
essentially that unions should evolve company based 
structures of organisation, supported by adequate ser­
vicing from trade union head offices, and a move towards 
analysis and argument over companies' business plans. 
However, one notes that Moore himself provides no evi­
dence of the inaction of unions, and that the case 
studies assembled in the same volume tend to support a 
view of unions engaged in a great deal of oppositional 
activity, but which in general has limited degrees of 
success. On this basis it must be questioned whether 
Moore has any sound basis of justification for the
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charges he makes relating to the "lack of concern" of 
unionists over employment, and their "shortsighted 
endorsement of the transmission of unemployment from one 
generation to the next as jobs are sold... ". Indeed, 
it would appear that the studies in the volume in which 
he makes his contribution, point rather more to the 
problems of unions overcoming imbalances of power at the 
workplace, rather than simply pointing to a "lack of 
concern" and "shortsighted" approaches. This being so, 
one is inclined to raise serious doubts as to whether 
the strategy Moore outlines would have the desired 
effect; appearing to be more to do with increasing union 
representatives' level of sophistication in their criti­
ques of company plans, than with enhancing their power 
to alter or frustrate them when they lead to job losses 
and plant closures.
Love (12), describes the study of the Lawrence Scott 
factory occupation in Manchester in 1982. Although the 
study is of interest in that (unlike most others) he was 
able to gain access to both management and workers, the 
final result is little more than a variant of the pes­
simistic (and largely atheoretical) type already men­
tioned. He comes close to Levie et al in urging that 
unions should more closely monitor financial and produc­
tion performances and intentions of employers, in the 
interests of saving jobs, though it is not altogether 
clear how such monitoring will produce the latter ef­
fect. Yet, despite these problems, he identifies some 
interesting issues. For example, he observes that
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whilst opposition to the closure could be interpreted 
as...
"... a challenge to the power of corporate capital, 
and more specifically the eventual factory occupa­
tion could be seen as demonstrating that the work­
force were prepared to adopt tactics beyond the 
boundaries of normal collective bargaining and the 
legal framework, it has to be concluded that the 
industrial action had no politically radical 
impetus or direction". (13).
He makes the point that the occupation only materia­
lised as a form of strike action after the unions had 
proceeded through the negotiating procedure. However, 
he observes the occupation was purely about retaining 
jobs subordinate to the control of capitalist enter­
prise. Thirdly, he argues that it was not a principled 
opposition to the essence of redundancy that fuelled the 
action against the company, rather it was "the exclusion 
of the unions from an opportunity to devise with manage­
ment an acceptable programme of voluntary redundancies". 
(14). However, whilst these are interesting points, 
without any kind of theoretical framework (other than an 
implied political perspective of censure from the 
author) it is difficult to know what to make of them. 
Moreover, the fact that this is merely an isolated study 
makes it difficult to judge whether the findings relate 
to a generality of occupations or otherwise. Certainly, 
there is a large measure of contradiction with the work 
of Foster and Woolfson, where the political character of 
leadership of the unions was identified as a crucial 
point in the course of progress of the two events 
considered.
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A study by Dickson and Judge (15), possibly sheds
light on the differences between Love's and Foster and
Woolfsons' findings. They argue that the decimation of
manufacturing since 1979 and the contribution of
Conservative ideology to closure, is an aspect of class
relationships, and that...
"... the real significance of the Thatcher 
Government rests in its attempts to depoliticise 
the issue of closure, and to acclimatise labour, 
specifically, and the public more generally in the 
'inevitability' of closure. Indeed, the inculca­
tion of a sense of futility in the face of closure 
has been one of Thatcherism's more notable 
achievements". (16).
However, while these observations appear on the face 
of it to carry some force, they seem to stem largely 
from the subjective instincts of the writers, rather 
than from any empirical analysis. When one turns to the 
main textual material, it is clear that the above quota­
tion does not represent any particularly unifying theme. 
Rather, the book is a compendium of studies, each deal­
ing with different aspects of closures and decline, and 
although there is some support for Dickson and Judges' 
argument, this does not appear to be without 
contradiction in the same volume.
For example, Patricia Findlay (17), looks at the role 
of women workers in closures, focusing on the occupation 
of the Plessey factory at Bathgate in 1982. Noting the 
consciousness raising effect of the occupation, she 
provides the kind of narrative account that is fairly 
typical of such studies. On this evidence alone it does 
not seem to be clear that closures have become "de- 
politicised", nor that a "sense of futility" has been
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inculcated, nor that either of such alleged effects (if 
so they be) could be attributed wholly or mainly to 
Thatcherism. Moreover, it is not easy to square Dickson 
and Judges' depoliticisation argument with the 
Caterpillar Tractor occupation in 1987, and Woolfson and 
Fosters' book of these events. Whilst there may be an 
element of truth in Dickson and Judges' argument, it 
should be emphasised that this is only as a broad gene­
ralisation, and that feelings of futility in response to 
closure are by no means new, nor have they been 
universally inculcated under Thatcherism.
In contrast to writers like Foster and Woolfson, and 
Coates, a number of researchers have played down the 
political significance of factory occupations, denying 
that they differ materially from other forms of 
industrial action, and rejecting suggestions of any 
revolutionary effect. Greenwood (18), writing in 1977, 
observed that sit-ins were not new in European labour 
history, although at the time of writing they were 
experiencing a vogue unknown since the 1920s. What was 
different about them currently, he suggests, was their 
concern with job protection - a theme expressed in the 
earliest of the new wave of occupations, the UCS work- 
in, and the occupation of the Lip watch factory in 
France. In effect, he argues, sit-ins are without 
political connotation and arise only as...
"... a tactical response to the problem in hand,
in this case that of saving jobs". (19).
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Bradley and Gelb (20), go further than this, looking 
at worker takeovers not so much as radical responses, as 
a conservative policy option that is available to 
governments to encourage in certain circumstances. Much 
of their material is drawn from American sources, but 
with regard to the worker co-operatives of the 1974 
Labour Government they argue that the initiatives were 
overwhelmingly pragmatic as opposed to radical in ori­
gin, emphasising the point that workers' demands for 
employment were "the central motivating force" (21), as 
opposed to any philosophical commitment to concepts of 
workers' control. It follows, they argue, that worker 
takeovers represent an approach to industrial policy 
which could be followed, allowing governments to use 
them as a means of promoting industrial efficiency, 
whilst placing the responsibility for future failure or 
success firmly on the shoulders of the workers 
themselves.
Many of these studies, whilst having aspects of 
general interest, are without theoretical dimension of 
real significance, and are thus of marginal interest in 
the present context. This appears also to be true of 
the American literature on this theme (of which there is 
a substantial body). It will be sufficient to refer to 
only a few examples. Wendling (22), refers to decisions 
of the National Labour Relations Act which have held 
that employers must negotiate over the effects of a 
closure decision, whilst also ruling out obligations to 
bargain over the decision per sé. Essentially it is a
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contribution to American policy debate aimed at making 
plant closure a generally accepted issue for bargaining.
Rothstein (23), asks why the effects of plant clo­
sures have not spurred American workers to greater 
political and trade union militancy. Essentially, his 
is a comparative approach focusing on steel plant clo­
sures in France and the USA, and goes some way to demon­
strate the value of treating studies of redundancy other 
than by examination of discrete episodes. In the USA, 
he notes, workers have not been active in pressing 
politically for legislation to regulate plant closings 
(sic) and lay-offs. He contrasts this state of affairs 
with what he observes the situation to be in Europe, and 
concludes that American union and workers' apathy is 
attributable to the "hidden face of power" of American 
business. This he describes as the power of business 
interests to set the political agenda and suppress or 
impede the full public exposure of certain issues or 
grievances. This deceit (which Rothstein attributes to 
companies and government) restricts debate, clouds 
responsibilities, and, argues Rothstein, renders 
militant opposition difficult.
Rothstein also argues that the public and trade union 
members have accepted a myth that organised labour had 
too much power, of political and economic form. The 
unions themselves, he says, have in certain cases acted 
upon a myth and have not supported workers who were 
prepared to fight closures. This argument has a certain
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similarity with that put forward by Lockyer and Baddon 
(24), which we shall consider in the next section of 
this chapter.
There seems to be much to be said in favour of 
comparative approaches, because although there is no ex­
plicit theoretical framework of analysis here, one gains 
the impression that the comparative dimension itself has 
leads to some useful questions being asked. Interes­
tingly, in the few other examples of comparative 
studies, the steel industry figures prominently.
Kourchid (25), for example, looks at redundancy in steel 
plants in the USA and France, and notes the same con­
trast in levels of militancy that absorbed the attention 
of Rothstein. He attributes the quasi-insurrectionist 
attitude of the workers in France to their earlier 
revolutionary traditions.
There are a number of examples of other work in 
this area, which are often very interesting, but on the 
whole they do not advance our search for theoretical 
explanations of union responses to redundancy. Whilst 
continuing to focus on the work of researchers into 
plant closures, therefore, we will at this point con­
sider the work of Cynthia Hardy, who has essentially 
offered an explanation of worker acceptance or opposi­
tion of closure in terms of managements' exercise of 
mechanisms of control.
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2.3 EÛW£IU-LEGITIMACY AND_TH& MANAGEMENT QF CLOSURES
Hardy's (26) interest in the subject of closures 
adopts a focus on management strategies. In her book 
and a further published article (27), covering similar 
ground, she sets out to create an analytical framework 
in the general approach of organisational theory.
Within this framework, she sees the explanation of 
action (or non-action) by workers to oppose closures as 
residing in the impact of "intra and extra organisation­
al variables", which impinge on the organisation. (The 
"organisation" it should be stressed, being the company 
and its workforce.)
Of particular importance is her view of power, which 
she identifies as being capable of taking more than one 
form. She posits the existence of unobtrusive forms of 
power which may incorporate a conscious use of symbolic 
means of legitimising desived outcomes so that conflict 
is prevented. Thus opposition to closure may be con­
trolled by management.
An important aspect of the process of achieving 
legitimacy. Hardy suggests, is the creation of an accep­
table culture for managing the closure. She draws on 
one of her case studies, in which there had been a
history of open conflict between management and unions,
but where a more participative style of management had 
been adopted in the years prior to the closure. One 
member of management is quoted as saying:-
"I can't see how we would have tackled the closure
successfully in the old culture." (28).
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As a resuilt of achieving this measure of legitimacy, 
Hardy argues, union officers perceived that there was 
nothing they could do to prevent the closure, the 
decision having been accepted by employees and stewards 
alike. (29). As for the process by which this legi­
timacy is claimed to have been achieved. Hardy empha­
sises the justifications that management give of their 
decisions, which must be set out so as to convince 
workers that the closure is in all the circumstances 
both reasonable and inevitable. A further aspect of 
this, is the allocation of the undesirable closure 
decision, with more legitimate symbols such as consul­
tation, union involvement, and redundancy consultation. 
This association of legitimate actions with unwanted 
closures, has the effect, argues Hardy, of assisting in 
the legitimation of the latter. Hardy's case is that 
these sorts of approaches are now typically adopted as 
personnel departments manage the acceptance and 
execution of closures.
It should perhaps be acknowledged at this stage that 
the study is a helpful pointer to a theoretical frame­
work, particularly in its presentation of the ideologi­
cal and cultural influences on workers' outlooks. 
However, despite this, it appears to have a number of 
weaknesses. For example, it presents an excessively 
simplified picture of opposition and non-opposition.
This to some extent seems to stem from the focus which 
Hardy chooses to adopt, identifying closures as her 
subject, without recognising that they are simply one
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category of redundancy. The fact that closures may have 
particular implications on workers' power of resistance 
(i.e. in that strikes may simply accelerate closures) is 
not considered. Opposition to closure as such is taken 
as the only significant issue, and this by definition 
minimises the relevance of other kinds of redundancy, 
which may be just as important to workers, and form the 
basis for conflicts with managements. And while opposi­
tion to closure is defined as the measure of workers' 
resistance and, according to Hardy, can only be achieved 
by undermining managements' legitimacy on the issue, 
there is no searching enquiry of how or by what process 
this can be achieved.
Nevertheless, in her book and the separate article on 
the same theme (30), Hardy succeeds in raising some 
interesting questions, and the possibility of her expla­
nations proving broadly correct needs to be examined, 
notwithstanding certain omissions and flaws in her 
approach. For example, she points out that the 
recession (in the 1970s)...
"... led to increasing numbers of closures in the 
industrial sector throughout the decade. The 
response to this, however, has been sharply demar­
cated. The early part of the decade (1970-5) saw a 
concerted effort to resist the closures by union 
and employee groups which used a new form of 
attack: the factory occupation... From 1975 on­
wards, however, the use of this weapon seems to 
have died down and academic interest is almost non­
existent." (31).
This is an interesting point, but Hardy's approach to 
it is problematic. Firstly, she refers to the founding 
of a number of worker co-operatives (wrongly including
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UCS Shipbuilders among them). She states that in the 
period in question there were some 200 factory occupa­
tions, and that there was a large measure of support for 
them from the general public. What she fails to stress, 
however, is that even at its peak the factory occupation 
was very much the exception rather than the rule in 
workers' collective responses to redundancies. Whilst 
occupations involved some 150,000 workers from 1970-75 
over a million workers became eligible for redundancy 
payments in each of the years 1971 and 1975 alone, and a 
total of over four million did so over the whole period. 
(32). Allowing for the fact that this figure could be 
increased by a further one-third to get a truer picture 
of the total number of redundants (33), less than three 
per cent of the redundant workforce in this period 
became involved in factory occupations to oppose redun­
dancy. The figures therefore beg the question: "What 
then did the remaining workers do?" As has already been 
made clear, Hardy's research does not address itself to 
this point.
Emphasising the fact that occupations were a minority 
response to closures and redundancy does not belittle 
their significance. However, it does emphasise that any 
explanation of worker responses to closures also needs 
to examine forms of opposition to redundancy, other than 
occupations, if the reasons and sources of such opposi­
tion are to be properly understood. Moreover, such an 
emphasis encourages one to search for reasons why 
occupations occurred rather than focusing on their 
decline.
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Hardy, for example, ignores the campaigns of opposi­
tion to the closure of steel works in the 1970s, noting 
that they took the form of "... demonstrations, lobbies 
of parliament, and appeals to the public and the media" 
(34), rather than worker sit-ins.
However, in doing this, she escapes the obligation to 
account for the fact that moderate leadership of the 
ISTC (after being supplied with ample consultation and 
legitimating argument) became involved in the 1979-80 
strike which was remarkable for the militancy and soli­
darity of its support by steel workers and others in the 
trade union movement. (35). Instead of taking these 
issues into account (in a book published some five years 
after the strike), she glosses over them with the obser­
vation that...
"... as closures and redundancies [among steel 
workers] became more prevalent, they became more 
acceptable. This may be an inevitable result of 
attitudes adjusting to behaviour." (36).
What she fails then to note, is that the 1979-80 
strike, whilst ostensibly about pay, was very much bound 
up with the anger and frustration of steel workers at 
the successive plant closures that they had been com­
pelled to witness. Indeed, it is hard to square Hardy's 
suggestion that closures became "acceptable", and that 
attitudes "adjusted to behaviour", with accounts of the 
strike which catalogue the rising levels of frustration 
of steel workers at their loss of bargaining power, the 
increasing threats to their jobs, and the deteriorating 
relationships with BSC management. (37). Moreover, the
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link which BSC made between pay and local productivity 
deals explicitly linked the dispute to feared job losses 
in the future, and it is significant that, during the 
course of a dispute which was characterised by unprece­
dented displays of militancy, mass picketing and sym­
pathy action from other groups of workers, the Wales TUG 
called a general strike to protest at plant closures and 
redundancies in the iron and steel industry. (38). All 
of this. Hardy fails to mention, which, if it were only 
an omission would be bad enough, but in the light of the 
above misleading quotation, must be viewed as a major 
failing.
Moreover, Hardy compounds this problem by her use of 
language, using such phrases: "In order to understand 
the decline in resistance to plant closure... " (39), 
when what she has in fact demonstrated is a decline in 
the frequency of factory occupations which, as we have 
seen, were (at their peak) a minority response to redun­
dancy in any event. Had she taken all forms of opposi­
tion into account, she may have found that over the 
period there was not a decline in the responses of 
workers to redundancy, but rather the reverse, with the 
climax in 1979-80 of the national steel strike already 
mentioned.
A further difficulty with Hardy's work is in her 
suggestion that the economic situation may well in­
fluence the propensity of workers to occupy factories 
threatened with closure. She suggests that the exis­
tence of above average unemployment locally is a key
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factor in determining whether or not workers will occupy 
a factory, and quotes local and national unemployment 
rates at the times of the commencement of the UCS work- 
in, and the occupations to form worker co-operatives at 
Fakenham, Kirkby, Meriden, and the Scottish Daily News 
in Glasgow. However, there seems to be no obvious 
reason why these five examples were chosen to test 
Hardy's arguments, since by her own figures there were 
some 200 cases of occupations between 1970-75. More­
over, in two of the five examples which Hardy quotes, 
local unemployment rates were below the national rates 
at the times when the occupations commenced. So, while 
there appears to be logic in the suggestion that factory 
occupations are linked to unemployment, it is not by any 
means safe to assume that there is a simple relationship 
between relative levels of local and national statistics 
on one hand, and the tendency of workers to occupy on 
the other.
Before finally completing our consideration of 
Hardy's work, it is appropriate to mention the contri­
bution of Lockyer and Baddon. (40). These writers in 
many ways adopt a similar position to that of Hardy, 
though they reach it via a somewhat different route.
They take the view that there has been a diminution of 
union opposition to closures, but that this has been 
brought about by a combination of factors. Among other 
things, they cite the introduction of legislation on 
strike ballots, lawful picketing and the restriction of 
trade union immunities. They argue that whilst the rise
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in unemployment may have been accompanied by a weakening 
in workers' subjective commitment to resistance of 
closures, there is no need to accept Hardy's case that 
this is due to managements' success in defining redun­
dancy as "legitimate" to groups other than themselves. 
Rather, they suggest, the existence of a dominant ideol­
ogy presents a one sided "common sense approach" to 
economic events. Such interpretations define employees 
themselves as largely contributing to their own job 
losses, by pursuing inflated wage claims, remaining 
inflexible, or engaging in restrictive practices.
Within such an ideology, they argue, management are seen 
to respond rationally to market forces when they take 
"unavoidable decisions" to close plants or declare 
redundancies.
Despite the differences identified here between Hardy 
and Lockyer and Baddon, there is a similarity in the 
overall arguments they present. Lockyer and Baddon are 
effectively saying that the dominant ideology of the 
wider society makes it unnecessary for management to 
secure the perceptions of workers, that closure is 
legitimate, but questions do, nonetheless, arise in 
relation to the execution of the decision. If manage­
ments fail to provide counselling, opportunities for 
training, extensive consultation etc, the management of 
the closure may be perceived as illegitimate. Hardy's 
view, as we have seen, is that these are secondary 
issues, which if associated with the closure in a posi­
tive way can serve to cast a halo of legitimacy
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over the closure decision itself. Nonetheless, all are 
agreed that the management of closure is all important 
in determining workforce response. And while Lockyer 
and Baddon rely on wider external social and political 
factors such as legislation, to explain workers' lack of 
opposition. Hardy, too, incorporates these sorts of 
influences within her framework as "extra organisational 
variables". (Although, unlike Lockyer and Baddon, she 
does not explicitly refer to the effects of 
legislation.)
There are, however, a number of weaknesses in both 
these studies, and they need to be considered. With 
regard to Lockyer and Baddon's "dominant ideology" 
argument, it is well known that this concept needs to be 
treated with caution. The work of Abercrombie, Hill and 
Turner (41), though not denying the possibilities of 
ideological incorporation, strongly suggests that ver­
sions of "the dominant ideology thesis" have adopted 
an...
"... over-socialised conception of society which 
leads them to exaggerate the extent to which subor­
dinate classes are ideologically incorporated." 
(42).
In short, dominant ideology arguments give too little 
scope for the existence of rival ideologies. With 
regard to the acquiescence of workers to closure deci­
sions, the role of power would seem to be a crucial 
factor. If workers believe that ultimately they lack 
the power to overcome managements' intentions of forcing 
a plant closure, they may begrudgingly acquiesce to the 
decision. This, however, says little to suggest there
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has been any idological acceptance of the closure deci­
sion. Lockyer and Baddon's case (and to a certain 
extent, Hardy's) would appear to suffer somewhat from 
overlooking these points.
Interestingly, Hardy, too, identifies culture and 
ideology as factors which bear on managements' ability 
to legitimise closure decisions. However, while she 
acknowledges the importance of sub-cultures, she does 
not explore their significance as rival sources of 
power, nor their potential to undermine the legitimacy 
of managements' decisions. While she focuses on manage­
ments' attempts to gain acceptance of closure decisions, 
there is no consideration of whether, and to what ex­
tent, unions may seek to gain acceptance by workers, of 
rival meanings contrary to managements' desired 
accounts. In looking at the broad scope of Hardy's 
work, it should be said that these omissions are not by 
any means inevitable conclusions from her case studies. 
Whilst one of her examples does appear to lend support 
to her view of a compliant workforce and union officials 
accepting closures as "legitimate" (perhaps as a result 
of managements' efforts to convey this perception), the 
second case study paints a different picture (as, in­
deed, Hardy herself acknowledges). In this study, 
management arranged no advance consultation with the 
union, and it would seem that the closure was handled 
ineptly. The proposed closure met with opposition, 
which Hardy attributes to these managerial failings.
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thus seemingly providing support to her case. However, 
she also throws away the apparently casual remark 
that...
"... furthermore, the new steward was less middle 
of the road than his predecessor, and presented 
management with problems because he had inherited 
a powerful position." (43).
From this quote, it would seem that Hardy is more 
concerned to explain away the awkward attitude of a shop 
steward who is "not middle of the road", than to inves­
tigate the possibility that such attitudes may be regu­
larly encountered as rival sources of power. In a study 
of closure (which she herself defines as a political 
process) it is surely important to give greater weight 
to the possibility of political stances of union offi­
cials challenging the legitimacy of management's deci­
sion, albeit ineptly executed.
Despite all the reservations expressed, it will be 
obvious that Hardy's work represents a genuine attempt 
to provide a general theory to explain union opposition 
or non-opposition, albeit within the limits of factory 
closures and worker occupations. We will return to it 
at a later stage for the purpose of reassessment in the 
light of the theoretical framework and empirical evi­
dence which appear in later pages of this thesis.
Hardy's account of non-opposition and management strate­
gies of legitimation will be borne in mind, too, when 
describing the characteristics of the case study which 
forms chapter five of this study.
At this stage then, we can summarise the general 
usefulness of plant closure studies in providing
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theories of union responses to redundancy, as somewhat 
limited. Those accounts which appear to be most con­
vincing (like the two studies of Foster and Woolfson) 
are specifically tied to the events they related, and 
broader generalisations are not really attempted, 
whilst Hardy, attempting a broader-brush treatment, is 
unconvincing for the reasons indicated above. Nonethe­
less, both point to factors which may well be important 
in any developed theory. Foster and Woolfson refer to 
the consciousness, and political leadership of the rank 
and file leaders, the political climate at the time, the 
use of language by the leaders to touch the sympathies 
of members and shape their conceptions of the disputes 
around popular issues, and the tactics employed by 
leaders in overcoming sectionalism among the workforce. 
Hardy, on the other hand, in her emphasis of power in 
organisational terms, highlights the question of legi­
timacy, and although she concentrates on managements' 
efforts to legitimise closures, it is apparent on review 
of her work that this is a process that should be seen 
to cut both ways, and that opposition to legitimacy may 
stem from rival cultures or sub-cultures, which Hardy 
identifies but fails to take into account. Moreover, 
Hardy refers to the influence of other external (or 
"extra organisational") constraints such as the economy, 
the political system, and Lockyer and Baddon highlight 
the role of the law, and dominant ideology in constrain­
ing workers. Although, individually, each of the above 
studies is clearly an insufficient basis for the
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construction of a theory to explain trade union respon­
ses to redundancy, taken together they do seem to 
provide a substantial beginning.
One feature of the above studies which is decidedly 
lacking is any basic questioning of the nature of trade 
unions and trade unionism. No doubt, a number of the 
contributions referred to embody implicit assumptions of 
this kind, but it would seem that there may be value in 
considering theories of trade unions, with a view to 
extracting explanations of their behaviour that may be 
directly applicable to the task in hand; that is, of 
course, how do we understand the responses of trade 
unions to redundancy? At this point, therefore, we will 
consider whether theoretical frameworks for the study of 
trade unions, have anything to offer in our attempt to 
explain and understand union responses to redundancy.
2.4 THEORETICAL WEITIKGS ON TRADE UNIONS
It should be made clear at the outset that I do not, 
in this section, intend to examine in any detailed way, 
approaches to theories of trade unionism. (This has 
been done by others in any event, but such a study is 
not within the immediate scope of the present thesis.) 
Rather, my intention is to identify aspects of trade 
union and industrial relations theories which may assist 
in creating a conceptual framework to apply to a study 
of trade union responses to redundancy. I intend to
90
approach this task by looking at the work of the main 
theoretical schools, namely the “Oxford School", of 
which Allan Flanders was the chief exponent, and the 
modern Marxist approach to industrial relations, ex­
pressed in particular through the writings of Richard 
Hyman. Finally, I shall draw upon the work of Michael 
Poole who, relying heavily on the work of Max Weber, has 
developed a theory of trade unionism, based on the 
action approach in sociology. In all of this it is 
necessary not to lose sight of our central problem of 
how to understand and explain trade union responses to 
redundancy.
Accounts of the state of theoretical study in British 
Industrial Relations invariably commence by acknowledg­
ing the primacy of Allan Flanders' contribution as the 
chief exponent of the Oxford School, in the period from 
the mid-nineteen-fifties onwards. Much of what was 
written at the time, however, appears now as strikingly 
lacking in theory, seeming to embody a combination of 
shrewd common sense analysis, elegant prose, and a fair 
measure of liberal ideology. Nonetheless, the approach 
has served as a major current of academic influence in 
the field of industrial relations, and its analysis 
underpinned much of the Donovan Report's prescription of 
British industrial relations problems in the late nine­
teen-sixties. In providing a focus for critiques from 
different political and theoretical positions, it also 
advanced the process of theorising at least in the sense 
of a catalyst for other studies. Moreover, in
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developing concepts of pluralism, voluntarism, and in 
the focus it places on job regulation, and in emphasi­
sing the role of institutions of industrial relations, 
collective bargaining, and the importance of the State, 
the approach has formed the bedrock of academic study of 
industrial relations for the past thirty years. None of 
this in itself establishes a claim to theory in the 
strict sense, but the proliferation of studies of 
various aspects of industrial relations (from sector 
analyses to investigations of the role of law) can 
hardly be discounted.
With regard to the main theoretical contributions of 
Flanders, his description of the industrial relations 
system as a system of rules, and his focus on the in­
stitutions of industrial relations, as supporting a 
system of job regulation, figure among his most often 
quoted achievements, together with his appeals for 
reform of the system according to various prescribed 
remedies. (44). Within his writing is a recurrent 
interest in values and moral influences. Thus in his 
often quoted essay "Industrial Relations What is Wrong 
with the System?" (45), the British system of voluntary 
collective bargaining with a minimum of legal interven­
tion, is seen as being possible because normative prin­
ciples shared between unions and management served to 
underpin and uphold the voluntary approach. But when it 
came to the system changing in response to an increa­
singly interventionist State, incomes policies, new 
attempts to introduce concepts of national planning, an 
increasing measure of local bargaining, and growing shop
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stewards' structures in most companies, the system was 
unable to adapt itself to the changes needed. Flanders' 
explanation was couched in terms of values. The effect 
of his prognosis was that the values which had under­
pinned the established system had not been substituted 
by new, shared values, more appropriate and generally 
acceptable to management and unions, in keeping with 
their altered expectations and the role of the State in 
industrial relations.
Elsewhere, his analysis is couched in terms of the 
"normative order" in industrial relations (46), and 
disorder is attributed to situations where a group 
against the resistance of another seeks to change the 
procedural or substantive norms, or where "there is an 
absence of regulation about certain issues on which one 
group at least has normative expectations". (47). It is 
clear moreover that Flanders' use of "norms" derives 
directly from Durkheim (see for example, his essay 
"Collective Bargaining from Donovan to Durkheim" (48), 
and its definition as "a rule, a standard, or pattern 
for action" (49), does not exclude a moral or ethical 
component. Norms become "standards", "rules" or 
"patterns for action" in large measure because they are 
infused by ethical standards. Norms and moral consi­
derations are therefore closely intertwined, and in 
Durkheim's formulation became fundamental in establi­
shing a general collective conscience that formed the 
social bonds that caused societies to cohere. (50).
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This emphasis upon moral values reflects on Flanders' 
understanding of trade unions, which he saw as having 
the capacity to uphold the principles of social 
justice : -
"The trade union movement deepened its grip on 
public life in its aspect of a sword of justice. 
When it is no longer seen as this, when it can 
no longer count on anything but its own power 
to withstand assault, it becomes extremely vul­
nerable. The more so since it is as a sword of 
justice rather than a vested interest that it 
generates loyalties and induces sacrifices among 
its own members, and these are important founda­
tions of its strength and vitality." (51).
Moreover, he recognised the importance that socialism
has traditionally represented as the "conscience of the
labour movement", though he suggested this was...
"... socialism as a set of ideals, as a moral 
dynamic, not as a particular blueprint for an 
economic or political system." (52).
And he acknowledged the importance of "traditions" in 
controlling union members' behaviour. Traditions ex­
pressed in generalised form...
"... the enduring lessons of the workers' expe­
rience in industry; the modes of behaviour which 
have been tried and tested, and judged to be good 
by the group concerned. In short they express the 
group's collective wisdom, orally transmitted from 
generation to generation. By the same token, 
however, this endows the traditions with an in­
fluence on behaviour which in normal times 
transcends any other." (53).
Tradition, he argued, quoting Turner, could be 
likened to personalities in people. The "character 
traits" would not be readily apparent unless one studied 
the union's history or had other ways of understanding 
its mores...
"... but they mean a great deal to the union's 
active members. They are the basis of their pride 
in belonging to this union rather than another, and 
lend point and significance to their activity on 
the union's behalf." (54).
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It is premature to form conclusions upon the useful­
ness of these few points extracted from a considerable 
volume of writing by Flanders in the field of industrial 
relations. It is at this stage enough to comment that 
whilst Flanders' approach to industrial relations analy­
sis may be faulted for its prescriptive tone, which 
appears largely unsupported by theoretical or empirical 
analysis, there is nonetheless much of interest in what 
he offers. Whilst one would question the evidence, for 
example, of the shared values and normative expectations 
postulated by Flanders, it would nevertheless seem 
important to consider this suggestion further as an 
underlying factor of action or inaction in response to 
redundancy. To what extent, one may ask, are workers' 
responses to redundancy dependent upon some underlying 
values which the redundancy itself is challenging? 
Moreover, Flanders characterisation of unions as acting 
as a "sword of justice", and the influence of tradition 
as a collective organisational personality, are inte­
resting themes which may well have a bearing on subse­
quent attempts to explain action and inaction with 
respect to redundancy.
It is of course well known that Flanders' presump­
tions and essential approach has been criticised on a 
number of fronts (55), and whilst this is not the con­
text in which to review these commentaries, we will turn 
now to look briefly at the work of Hyman, who has 
contributed significantly to them.
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The central issue for Marxist writers considering 
trade unions is their capacity or otherwise to mobilise 
the working class for revolutionary change. On this 
point there is a substantial area of disagreement, and 
on the face of it a measure of surprising ambivalence 
in the writings of Marx and Engels and Lenin. (56).
Hyman (57), has analysed this area of disagreement, 
dubbing the respective tendencies "optimistic" and 
"pessimistic", according to whether or not they offer 
a positive prognosis for revolutionary struggle in which 
unions share a role. According to the "optimistic" 
view, unions are capable of leading workers into 
struggles far wider than their initial concerns, and in 
this way may eventually pave the route to revolutionary 
action by the working class. In short, the experience 
of organisation, the limited gains achievable through 
industrial struggle, and the consciousness raising 
effects of becoming involved in such struggles, impell 
workers to more overtly political forms of action. (58). 
According to the more "pessimistic" line of analysis, 
however, unions have no place in revolutionary politics. 
This view holds that the influence of unions upon wor­
kers is essentially economistic, and that far from 
posing a threat to the dominant order, unions tend to 
obscure and inhibit class issues and action.
The main thrust of Hyman's argument is that 
industrial relations, on the evidence available, appears 
to call into question substantial parts of both the 
"pessimistic" and "optimistic" prognoses. On one hand.
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he argues, unions have not followed the predictions of 
Lenin, and become totally integrated into the capitalist 
system of power and values, nor have they been strangled 
by Trotsky's predicted incorporating embrace, nor total­
ly perverted by corrupt and self interested leaders, as 
Michels thought likely. On the other hand, observes 
Hyman, the optimistic scenarios have not justified the 
expectations of their creators. Neither interpretation 
seems valid.
Hyman's tentative scenario is that unions may achieve
a form of progressing, "encroaching control" (59), and
that whilst workers' consciousness would not normally
rise to incorporate visions of revolutionary
possibilities...
"... under specific objective conditions the 
educational potential of collective industrial 
action may be immense... And involvement in a 
specific victory or defeat, in itself of little 
obvious world historical significance, may have 
critical consequences in terms of workers' 
subjective confidence and aspirations." (60).
However, the argument is ultimately inconclusive. 
Though Hyman suggests that unions may play a revolu­
tionary role, qualifications and references to unspeci­
fied "objective conditions" needing to be right, make 
this a very foggy prospect indeed. Moreover, whilst 
Hyman lays great stress upon such favourable "objective 
conditions" also being needed to develop workers' con­
sciousness and ideology, he gives little clue as to how 
the said consciousness and ideology might be influenced, 
and in what way such influence may be expected to be 
reflected in industrial activity.
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These deficiencies, together with a seeming reluc­
tance by Hyman to produce empirical data to test his 
major propositions, confirm the tentative nature of much 
of what he has to offer. Moreover, Hyman is ultimately 
content to observe that...
"No general theory is available to relate the 
struggle for material reforms to the development of 
consciousness..." (61),
and simply fails to address the problem he has thus
identified, by offering some indications of his own
views on this issue.
Looking back at this point to the discussion (earlier 
in this chapter) on occupations, it will be recalled 
that one question raised by a number of case studies, 
was whether or not work-ins and sit-ins should be seen 
as incipiently revolutionary acts. In view of the fact 
that Hyman's specific focus is on Marxist theories of 
trade unions, one might perhaps have expected to find 
some clues which could help towards an answer on this 
point. Disappointingly, however, little or no light is 
thrown upon the matter by Hyman's discussion of Marxist 
theories of trade unions, nor by his own tentative and 
guarded conclusions. One is merely left to wonder 
whether factory occupations and other struggles against 
redundancy might be examples of the "kind of struggle 
for material reforms" that would have a consciousness 
raising effect, and whether, in certain ill-defined 
"objective conditions" they might end up as part of a 
struggle for "encroaching control" which could have 
society-wide political consequences. Interesting though 
these questions are, they are of litle immediate help to
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the task of producing a theoretical framework in which 
to understand trade union responses to redundancy as 
they are unaccompanied by satisfactory answers.
A further question which arises in the context of 
Marxist writing on industrial relations, is how radical 
ideas might emerge in the minds of workers in an essen­
tially hostile environment. Hyman and Brough (62), have 
taken up the question of the influence and formation of 
ideology in industrial relations. Directing their 
comments to the question of pay differentials, they 
argue that generalised ideological assumptions, formed 
in a variety of ways and at different levels in society, 
underline the prevailing notions of fair pay. As they 
put it:-
"The dominant cultural perspective, persistently 
inculcated by the various agencies of social in­
doctrination, is that high material advantages are 
the rewards for personal ability, effort or 
initiative." (63).
In short, a consensus is created on issues of pay 
relativity, by prevailing ideological assumptions. 
Unions, however, have a minimal role in moulding the 
said ideologies. Whilst they may be capable of under­
mining such values as the prevailing respect for 
authority, unions (according to Hyman and Brough) may 
question the values of the dominant culture, but rarely 
do they seriously weaken it.
Hence, Hyman and Brough appear to have demonstrated 
that trade unions do not make serious efforts to 
undermine the dominant values with regard to pay relati­
vities. It may perhaps be inferred from the general
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tenor of their work, that they would expect the counter­
vailing influence of trade unions to be equally marginal 
in respect of other areas where social values reflect in 
industrial relations. However valid their arguments may 
be with respect to pay differentials however, it would 
be a sweeping gesture to extend this argument to other 
areas without substantial empirical evidence being 
offered in support. Nonetheless, it should be noted 
that the view advocated by Hyman and Brough has some 
similarities with those of Hardy (64), and Lockyer and 
Baddon (65), who (as we have already seen) suggest that 
dominant values and processes of rational argument with 
regard to factory closures, rarely confront serious 
challenges from trade unions. Such arguments require 
examination in a theoretical as well as an empirical 
sense. The possibility should at least be considered, 
that contrary to Hyman and Broughs' view of unions 
having a marginal impact on the dominant value system, 
there may be aspects of industrial relations where the 
dominant values of managements find opposition in the 
form of different fundamental principles in the minds of 
workers. If this is so, questions would no doubt arise 
as to the sources and influences of such countervailing 
principles and what particular issues they related to.
In the present context it is sufficient for the time 
being to note that these questions would be of interest 
in formulating a theoretical model of trade union 
reactions to redundancy.
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On the whole, one may conclude, the above examples 
from Hyman's work are not particularly helpful in con­
structing a theoretical framework to deal with the 
question of union responses to redundancy. However, it 
would be wrong to ignore the usefulness of the general 
perspective he adopts on the study of industrial rela­
tions. Rejecting definitions of the subject as being 
concerned with the process of "job regulation" he opts 
for a wider definition of the field of interest as "the 
study of processes of control over work relations".
(66). Thus industrial relations in Hyman's perspective, 
embodies the need to study "contradictory forces and 
processes" to those provided by managements, instabi­
lity as well as stability and the concerns of workers 
and the processes which stem from collective worker 
organisation. In particular, he rejects conceptions of 
the subject in terms of "relationships between agencies 
and organisations, rather than between people" (67), and 
emphasises the fact that casual informal relationships 
are often significant factors in this wider definition 
of the subject. Moreover, an examination of the subject 
from the wider perspective advocated by Hyman, emphasi­
ses the significance of power as a factor of key impor­
tance in controlling outcomes of disputed issues, and 
leads to an examination of power differences, and 
sources of such differences in industrial relations.
This approach, whilst not necessarily stemming from 
Hyman to the exclusion of other writers, is one which
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he explicitly lays down as constituting an essential 
element in a Marxist approach to the subject.
In his overview of theories of trade unionism,
Michael Poole (68), suggests an adoption of the "action" 
approach in sociology. He observes that in this, cultu­
ral and other subjective factors are crucial elements of 
explanation of unions and unionism. This is a theme 
which he develops out of a broad consideration of the 
work of other writers, and in which he underlines the 
roots of theories advanced by Dunlop, and Flanders, in 
the earlier sociological writings of Talcott Parsons and 
Emile Durkheim. The general picture we identify is that 
consciousness of workers is a recurring theme among 
theories of trade unions, and is important in "all but 
the most one-sided structuralist accounts within the 
Marxist Tradition". (69). Dunlop, he reminds us, refers 
to "actors" in the industrial relations system (though 
it is also the case that he implied a common system 
ideology). Moreover, the Webbs, Flanders, Clegg and 
others (urges Poole) all stress the impact of ethical 
and moral factors in trade unions. Poole attempts to 
build on this and provide a model of trade union action, 
incorporating cultural and value premises, including the 
perceptions and orientations of trade union members, 
representatives and full time officials which are all 
identified as crucial variables. In this, Poole adopts 
a Webarian social action perspective.
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Poole's argument may be briefly summarised as
follows. Firstly, he considers the methodological
implications of an action approach, and reminds us that
Weber saw sociology as a...
"... science concerning itself with the interpre­
tative understanding of social action, and thereby 
with a causal explanation of its course and conse­
quences." (70).
In the social action approach, sociologists are con­
cerned with "action"; so far as the individual attaches 
a subjective meaning to his or her behaviour...
"... be it covert, omission or acquiescence.
Action is 'social' insofar as its subjective mean­
ing takes account of the behaviour of others and 
is thereby oriented in its course." (71).
Action categories are laid down in which the defining 
quality of "social reality" becomes values. Webarian 
theory ascribes to values a meaning and significance 
which goes beyond Durkheim, for example, in his exposi­
tion of "social facts". Ethical considerations become 
part of...
"... a conscious process of action rather than a 
correlate of behaviour. Indeed on these assump­
tions action consists of motive and behaviour." 
(72).
In classical Webarian scholarship therefore, causal 
analysis and meaning were part of the theory of social 
action. Culture, civilisation and values become para­
mount in explaining union purpose and action, though it 
should be stressed, the "action" approach is not seen as 
one sidedly "culturist", but acknowledges the importance 
of structural aspects of social behaviour.
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Secondly, Poole cites a number of studies which he 
considers illustrate the value of "culturist" explana­
tions of union behaviour, referring in particular to the 
work of Gallie on the petrochemical industries of France 
and Britain. Gallie observes that the principal unions 
in French and British refineries...
"... had fundamentally different conceptions of 
the role of trade unions in the workplace; and 
this difference had important implications for 
their method of operation on the shop floor. The 
nature of the relationship between the workplace 
and central union organisation, the type of de­
mand that was made on management, and the quality 
of the relationship between the unions and the 
workers themselves." (73).
Gallie emphasises differences and divergences between 
the British and French situations with French unions 
emphasising mobilisation and British unions placing the 
emphasis on regulation. In consequence, though both 
nations shared in a common, capitalist mode of produc­
tion, generating similar conflicts of interest between 
employers and employed, the consequences and impacts of 
these commonalities could be quite different. Gallie 
suggests that the crucial mediating variables...
"... are factors like the managerial ideology, the 
typical structure of power in social institutions, 
and the ideology and mode of action of the trade 
union movement characteristic of the specific 
society." (74).
Poole's response to these observations is to confirm 
his view that cultural and value considerations are 
paramount in any explanation of trade union behaviour, 
but that these need to be interpreted through an under­
standing of action theory as applied to trade unions. 
According to such theory he notes trade unions
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should be regarded as embodying both political and 
economic purposes, but these have to be viewed within at 
least three explanatory parameters. Firstly, at the 
structural level, there is the question of the impact of 
economic, organisational, political and technological 
change upon union growth and character. Secondly, at 
the level of values, there is the question of the sub­
jective perceptions of members, and their impact on 
union goals, objectives and purposes; and thirdly, there 
is the question of the power of "actors" in industrial 
relations, including employers, unions, the legislature, 
political parties and the State.
Poole notes the importance of power in Weber's 
approach to industrial relations, as well as the "ethi­
cal nature of his orientation, even in the economic 
sphere". (75). This could be seen in Weber's well known 
definition of social action categories viz, instrumen­
tal, value based, effectual, and traditional forms of 
action. (76). Analysing union behaviour according to 
which of the above categories seems to be the predomi­
nant influence on union members appears to Poole to 
offer advantages. These include the possibility of 
using "ideal types" to realise "the principle of socio­
logical rationality" (77), and, encompassing the effects 
of structural and other variables, there is the flexibi­
lity to "evaluate a variety of expectations of unions". 
(78). Poole's case is that each of these orientations 
should be considered as possible aspects of trade union 
action, though in his final comments he inclines to the
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view that ethical and cultural values will ultimately be 
seen to have the most profound effects on shaping the 
contours of the labour movement, and that such values 
will come to play an increasingly important part in the 
theoretical analysis of unions and unionism.
2.5 IMPLICATIONS fQR A THEORY OF REDUNDANCY AND TRADE UNIONS
In considering the above examples of theories of 
trade unions and industrial relations, it becomes evi­
dent that the issue of subjective influences on workers' 
action is a recurring theme. Casting the net somewhat 
wider to take in further examples confirms this overall 
impression. Dunlop (79), adopting the familiar conser­
vative posture of Parsonian sociology, conceives ideol­
ogy to be a characteristic of the industrial relations 
system. For Flanders (80), Clegg (81) and others in the 
orthodox mainstream of academic thinking in industrial 
relations, tensions and crises in the system are attri­
butable to an underlying lack of accord in moral values. 
Unions and unionism are explained by these writers in 
terms of the normative order, and while there are clear 
differences in their position and the systems approach 
of Dunlop, similarities can also be observed between 
them. In Dunlop's account, for example, it is interes­
ting to note that the role of the expert (i.e. personnel 
manager, union officer etc) is to preserve the values of 
the industrial relations system against subverting
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cultural and motivational pressures. (82). Moral values 
and ethical standards remain as important issues, albeit 
interpretations of their significance differ.
These concerns go back to the intellectual roots of 
modern theories of industrial relations, in the writings 
of Parsons and Durkheim, whose interests were to esta­
blish answers to the great social questions of order and 
liberty (Parsons emphasising the former, Durkheim the 
latter). Following similar influences, writers like 
Goldthorpe (83), and Fox (84), in the pluralist tradi­
tion have emphasised the importance of "just and prin­
cipled distribution of economic and social rewards as an 
essential condition for eradicating the consequences of 
the anomic division of labour". (85). Moreover, the 
significance of values was accepted by the Webbs (86), 
who distinguished between different sources of values 
including those stemming from religious "emotion", from 
humanistic ideals, and deliberate planning for effi­
ciency in carrying out social purposes. (87). And while 
Marxism has been criticised for an apparent absence of 
ethical thought (88), it is nonetheless interesting to 
note that questions of workers' subjective confidence, 
consciousness and aspirations figure prominently in 
Marxist explanations of industrial behaviour. (89). 
Nonetheless, Bottomore's (90), comment that the lack of 
ethical theory has been a source of weakness in Marxist 
writing is well taken when applied to writers such as 
Hyman, who represent the modern Marxist current in 
industrial relations theory. In the next chapter we
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will consider the possibility of developing an under­
standing of workers' moral claims in terms of perceived 
"rights", building on the work of Rude (91), and Sabel 
(92). It may be that developments of this kind could go 
some way towards meeting the criticism of Bottomore, 
referred to above.
Bearing in mind the above discussion, and relating it 
too, to the earlier consideration we have given to 
studies of plant closures, what conclusions may we draw 
for the general characteristics of a theoretical frame­
work in which to assess union responses to redundancy?
As already seen, accounts of plant closures, which 
appear to offer the most convincing theoretical expla­
nations of union action, introduce consideration of the 
subjective perceptions of workers. On one hand, Foster 
and Woolfson refer to consciousness, rank and file 
politics, the political climate of the day, conceptions 
of the disputed issues in relation to popular images and 
so on. They do not offer a general theory, but it may 
be inferred that if any such theory were to be advanced, 
it would at least embody these aspects. Hardy, on the 
other hand, concentrates on the processes of legitima­
tion. She accepts that opposition to legitimacy may 
stem from cultural sources, but omits to develop this 
theme. Moreover, her overall description appears to 
minimise the scope for such opposition. An examination 
of a number of contributions to industrial relations 
theory, and in particular, views of trade union action 
within such theories, confirms the view that values and 
culture are called upon in general explications, and
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one is drawn to the conclusion that an explanatory 
theory of redundancy and union action should commence at 
this point, and utilise similar propositions.
2.6 ECONOMIC THEORIES OF UNION BEHAVIOUR
At this point, it is necessary to point to a strongly 
dissident line of argument to the general view which has 
been outlined above, that ethical and moral considera­
tions are important factors in explaining union beha­
viour. The opposing line of argument emanates from the 
work of Labour economists of whom Blanchflower and 
Oswald (93), have been principal contributors. In 
effect, this argument attributes much of the increase in 
unemployment in Western capitalist countries to union 
behaviour in wage bargaining. Some of this work appears 
to show scant understanding of industrial relations from 
an academic or even practical viewpoint. However, it 
does appear to form a significant influence in the 
thinking of present members of the British government, 
and it is important that we consider the implications of 
these ideas for the creation of a theory of trade unions 
and redundancy. The main variations of such theories of 
economic behaviour of trade unions have been summarised 
by Oswald, and I propose to concentrate on his overview 
of the research together with his personal contribution 
in this area.
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The attention of labour economists to trade union 
behaviour, centres around the effect of unions in pay 
determination. With the increase in unemployment levels 
in the 1980s, economists and members of Her Majesty's 
Government appear to have placed the blame for these 
increases on the "rigidity" of wage rates. Oswald (94) 
starts from this position, observing that levels of 
unionisation in Western Europe have been held to be the 
ultimate culprit. The effective coverage of collective 
bargaining, he notes, is often significantly higher than 
unionisation rates, three quarters of British workers 
being encompassed within such bargaining for the purpose 
of determination of pay rates.
Bearing in mind the extent of union coverage, Oswald
argues that the unemployment elasticity of real wages is
a factor of great importance. It is, he says, "small
and negative", and appears to be between zero and
- 0.15, perhaps closer to - 0.10. What this implies, he
points out, is that...
"... we can expect a doubling of unemployment to 
lower real wages by (other things being constant) 
a little under ten per cent." (95).
Oswald examines four main economic models of trade 
union behaviour. Firstly, he considers the union mono­
poly model. This assumes that the union cares prin­
cipally about its members' real pay and about the level 
of unemployment of those members. In short, the union 
wishes for high wages and employment levels. However, 
it is constrained by the demand curve for labour which 
shows an inverse relationship between the wage rate
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and unemployment level. The weakness of this model, he 
notes, is that it does not appear to reflect the 
realities of collective bargaining.
The effective bargain model sets out to overcome 
this and other difficulties by assuming that the union 
bargains over wage rates and the total level of employ­
ment. This assumes that the employer will not be 
allowed to set employment levels unilaterally and that 
"... because of this there will be some degree of over­
manning". However, Oswald notes, a problem with this 
model is that it is not clear that unions do indeed 
generally bargain about the level of unemployment.
The right-to-manage model is a further analytical 
framework adopted by economists. (Oswald quotes a 
number of contemporaries whom he claims have worked 
within it.) This depends on the assumptions that first­
ly, it is the firms which decide upon the level of 
unemployment, secondly, it is wage bargaining between 
firms and workers which determines how much people are 
paid, and that thirdly, "the union's aim is to push up 
the demand for labour power".
Lastly, Oswald refers to the seniority model, which 
appears to complement the right-to~manage model, provi­
ding what Oswald describes as a "logical justification" 
for the latter's assumptions. This leans heavily on the 
(strikingly questionable) assertion that:-
"All over the world, but most obviously in the 
USA and Britain, there is a convention known as 
'last in, first out' or 'lay-offs by [inverse] 
seniority'".
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The model argues that:-
"Because even large slumps therefore do not threa­
ten the jobs of the bulk of employees [they know 
that it will be the young workers whose jobs will 
be cut]. In any trade union with majority voting 
it is unlikely... that much emphasis will be given 
to the goal of high employment. The majority of 
employees are seniors with safe jobs who realise 
that redundancies are not decided by random draw.
In general they, and therefore the union itself 
will simply want to push the wage rate up as high 
as possible and will be content to let the firm 
decide on the exact level of employment." (96).
It is unclear to what extent the adherents to this 
model (whom appear to include Oswald himself) have 
investigated the validity of their assumptions about the 
generality of "last in, first out" arrangements. The 
only justification which Oswald himself offers for the 
assumption that LIFO provisions generally apply, is that 
they are "a particular stylised fact", though exactly 
how such "fact" was established is not described. The 
sole example quoted is in a single footnote which refers 
to an occurrence in 1966 when Cowley car workers 
(against the advice of union leaders) voted to reject 
lower bonuses for all, after being offered a choice of 
such cuts or redundancies among the lower graded 
workers. As Oswald himself puts it, "anecdotes along 
these lines exist". (97). One can only comment that it 
seems a frail basis for such a theory of economic be­
haviour, that fundamental tenets should be simply ad­
vanced as "stylised fact" or based on very limited 
"anecdotal" evidence. Indeed, we do not need to go far 
to discover evidence which strongly suggests that LIFO 
as a criterion for redundancy selection has been very
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largely replaced by a much broader range of factors, and 
Turnbull, (98), has pointed very clearly to the fallacy 
of Oswald's assumption.
As Oswald describes, a considerable amount of work 
has been done by labour economists in specific sectors 
of industry, utilising variants of the above four 
models. Examples quoted include Layard and Nickell, who 
have attempted to produce empirical determinants of real 
pay in Britain and elsewhere. Others have attempted to 
isolate variables which influence various aspects of one 
or other of the models - eg the influence of unemploy­
ment or wage rates elsewhere on the "preferences and 
bargaining power" of trade unions, and therefore in­
directly on levels of unemployment. Macurdy and 
Percival are quoted as having applied the efficient wage 
bargaining model to the printing industry, where they 
find it a better fit than the monopoly union model.
Their conclusions include the observation that...
"... union indifference curves are rather flat, 
that is, that at the margin the union appears to 
place a high value on wages relative to employment." 
(99).
Carruth and Oswald in a 1986 study of the British 
Coal and Steel industries, on the empirical evidence, 
are compelled to reject the seniority model's prediction 
that unions "typically place all their weight on the 
goal of high pay for members". However, it would appear 
that this leads to only relatively minor reservations or 
modifications to the model, which is still regarded as 
essentially valid. Moreover, in terms of general
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adherence to the seniority model, Oswald has indicated 
in other published papers (101), that he believes the 
essential principles hold good.
There are a number of obvious problems with this 
analysis, looked at from the point of view of an in­
dustrial relations approach to the issue of trade union 
behaviour. The first is (as has already been indi­
cated), Oswald does not appear to have located his 
economic assumptions in any real understanding of 
industrial relations research or practice. Secondly, 
even when he demonstrates himself that the seniority 
model is an unsatisfactory explanation of union beha­
viour in chosen sectors (coal and steel), he fails to 
acknowledge the need to explain the behaviour of workers 
and the influence of unions with regard to other than 
economic factors. There is no attempt to introduce 
questions of political values, moral and ethical in­
fluences, or other subjective factors, other than the 
simplistic model of economic man, self-interested, and 
concerned with the narrowest conceptions of economic 
gain. Moreover, unions and their members are treated as 
relatively predictable entities, unaffected by the moods 
and political movements of the time, and the possibi­
lities of long or short term changes in behaviour in 
response to changes of moral opinion, mass movements, or 
the influence of individual leaders is not considered.
It would seem that these sorts of assumptions are also 
embodied in the other economic models which Oswald 
considers. They share in a tendency to ignore trade
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unions as part of a labour "movement" in which there is 
scope for wide variation in policy positions, and in 
which elements of socialist values emerge in one form or 
another, however variable or unpredictable this may be.
The right-to-manage model, moreover, embodies a 
singularly pessimistic (not to say, depraved) view of 
human nature, which were it based on any empirical 
evidence, would be a disturbing prospect. And whilst 
the underlying lack of empiricism might be assumed to 
lower the credibility of the model, it is nonetheless . . 
interesting to note that it appears to have been largely 
adopted by ministers in the present Conservative 
Government, as an argument to support certain of their 
proposed policies in the field of employment. The White 
Paper, "Employment for the 1990s" (102), quoted research 
by Blanchflower and Oswald to back up its contentions 
that unions have pushed up costs. "Recent research 
shows that trade unions have used their power in ways 
which adversely affected labour costs, productivity and 
jobs" (103), the White Paper said.
In contrast, Turnbull has argued that:-
"By denying any of the central theoretical concerns 
of industrial relations, economists have failed to 
recognise, let alone model many of the defining 
characteristics of trade unionism in capitalist 
countries. The interests which employees seek to 
advance or protect through trade union (or other) 
activities extends beyond their interests as market 
bargainers, to include such factors as security and 
status, equity, resisting the intensification of 
work participation in decision making, autonomy in 
their working lives, involvement in a collective 
identity and even on-the-job leisure." (104).
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Turnbull's argument is an interesting riposte to the 
models of labour economists. Among other factors, he 
points out the mistake of economists in ignoring the 
political and social roles of unionism, and in assuming 
that employment contracts stipulate the totality of the 
employment relationship. In fact, he argues, it is only 
a vague "more or less" bargain because no one can exact­
ly define what is done in return for a week's wages. 
Labour time is sold and employers must apply incentives 
(or force) to harness the co-operation, motivation, 
initiative, effort etc of the workers. The result is 
uncertainty, and a relationship of conflict and accom­
modation at the point of production. (105). Several 
points have already been made with regard to the econo­
mists' misconceived notion of trade unionism, which 
Turnbull strongly supports. He makes the argument 
that...
"... negotiations over market relations' cannot... 
be analysed in isolation from negotiation over 
managerial relations' because negotiations over 
the former inevitably lead to negotiations over the 
latter, in particular the control of work." (106).
In particular, argues Turnbull, the collective infor­
mal processes required for unions to survive and grow, 
lead to the pursuit of institutional goals. Though the 
idea of institutional needs is a reification (only the 
members can give meaning to such needs) trade unionism 
involves some submission of the individual will to the 
collectivity. And, as Turnbull suggests, there is 
always a possibility of policies to achieve organisa­
tional strength being pursued for their own sake rather
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than in the long term interests of the rank and file.
In summary, argues Turnbull, "the key to understanding 
trade union behaviour lies in the analysis of production 
rather than exchange". (107).
On the other hand it may be argued by supporters of 
the labour economists' case, that collective needs of 
unions, considerations of "managerial relations", the 
control of work, and the many other social concerns and 
political influences that have been suggested here, are 
mere incidentals to the overwhelming, dominant influence 
of economic relations. Such a case would no doubt argue 
that images of economically motivated humans do not have 
to exclude other influences, but that firstly, these 
cannot be taken into account by economists, and second­
ly, they are incidental to the main consideration of 
people, who after all come to work to earn money. Such 
an argument would no doubt need to suggest that evidence 
of "movement" in trade unions, as some underlying corpus 
of ethical and moral influence, is hard to identify, and 
that if it ever existed must surely be in decline over 
the present decade. It will be appreciated that the 
case constructed here is a hypothetical defence against 
the attacks on labour economists' analysis, though it 
finds echo in a number of the popular journalistic 
analyses of trade unionism, and is not so very far 
removed from the critique of economism which Hobsbawm 
has offered in his essay, "The Forward March of Labour 
Halted?" (108).
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Arguments of this kind can only be resolved by deeper 
research, to which it is hoped that this thesis may 
offer some contribution. At this point, therefore, it 
is appropriate that we should pause to review the sign­
posts towards a theory which this chapter has provided, 
and then to note the main requirements that these sug­
gest should be acknowledged in the subsequent chapters 
of empirical research.
2.7 C Q H C L U S I Q H S
On the basis of literature surveyed in this chapter, 
a view has been formed concerning the essential require­
ments of any satisfactory theoretical explanation of 
trade union responses to redundancy. This is that trade 
unions and the practice of trade unionism somehow exert 
normative influences. In some way, unions contribute to 
the subjective perceptions of workers and it would 
appear that moral and ethical standards are bound up in 
this. The review of studies of plant closures touched 
upon the work of Foster and Woolfson who, writing from a 
broadly Marxist perspective analyse factory occupations 
with regard to the consciousness of workers, the politi­
cal awareness and leadership of shop stewards, concep­
tions of the rights of workers (and the effects on them 
of managements' decisions), and the wider political 
context in society at large. On the other hand, an 
examination of some of the work of Hyman suggested that 
whilst Marxist theories have regard to questions of
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workers' subjective confidence, consciousness and aspi­
rations, a lack of ethical theory has been an underlying 
weakness. Michael Poole has suggested that a Webarian 
theory of social action underlines the potential of 
value rational action as a means of conceiving and 
explaining the significance of trade unionism in 
industrial relations. This, as we have seen, emphasises 
the importance of ethical factors in a general sense, 
and points to an orientation towards trade unionism 
which acknowledges and accepts concepts of workers' 
rights. The conclusion towards which we are drawn is 
that trade unions exert an influence (how, how much, and 
in what form is not yet clear) on the ethical and moral 
perceptions of workers, and that conceptions of rights 
may well prove to be an important aspect of this. With 
regard to workers' responses to redundancy it is thought 
that such explanation as is offered, needs to embody 
these observations as integral to any theoretical 
framework.
In contrast, we have two opposing lines of argument. 
The first is from Hardy who, in proposing an explanation 
of managements' behaviour in handling factory closures, 
has propounded a theory of legitimation. Managements 
manage redundancy by legitimising it in the eyes of 
workers. Her approach, however, appears to completely 
overlook the prospects of workers and their organisa­
tions projecting rival meanings and interpretations of 
closures. Though she touches on the possibility of 
opposition stemming from cultural sources, she fails to
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develop this argument in terms of the subjective values, 
and expectations of workers. Essentially, her explana­
tion of opposition or non-opposition is reduced to 
questions of management techniques and competence.
Unions by and large are seen as malleable, and with suf­
ficient management expertise, opposition to redundancy 
and closure can be controlled by exercise of unobtrusive 
forms of power. Management legitimises its own actions, 
and in part achieves its ends by the creation of an 
appropriate culture of acceptance.
A second line of opposition comes implicitly from 
labour economists, including Oswald. As we have seen in 
the preceding section of this chapter, unions are con­
ceived as little more than collections of "economic men" 
and the collective effect of unions and unionism on 
workers' values and moral perceptions is minimised.
So, to summarise the position more succinctly, we are 
led to the view that a theoretical explanation of unions 
and redundancy must reside in questions of moral values, 
and perceptions of workers' rights. This needs to be 
explored more fully in the next chapter. At the same 
time we have two principal contradictory theories with 
which to contend, as expressed by Hardy and Oswald, 
already summarised above.
From the foregoing it will be seen that there are 
different levels at which it might be possible to 
consider the influence of trade unions in redundancy 
situations. The work of Hardy and the case studies 
closures, in the main adopt a company/workplace/union
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focus in which union opposition or non-opposition is 
looked at. As has already been argued, this approach 
appears to have been weakened by a tendency to deal with 
redundancy events or closures as discrete separate 
entities. There is no scope to observe long term 
trends, or continuities and discontinuities. A longer 
view of such studies is argued for. Secondly, whilst 
the work of Oswald and the neo-classical labour econo­
mists focuses on the firm, there is a generality about 
their approach which introduces a national focus. To 
one extent or another, this becomes apparent in the work 
of other writers; Lockyer and Baddon look at the impact 
of national legislation; Hardy (again) looks at the 
fall-off nationally in factory occupations in the late 
nineteen-seventies; Foster and Woolfson have regard for 
the national political context. In any event, there is 
arguably merit in adopting different viewpoints of 
attention in any empirical work that is conducted. This 
has a bearing on the selection of areas for in-depth 
studies which appear later in this thesis. For the 
present it is sufficient to note that chapter four will 
comprise a detailed study of the background to the 
Redundancy Payments Act, with particular regard to the 
role and influence of trade unions in bringing this 
legislation to the statute book. This introduces ques­
tions of the relationship of unions to the political 
processes, and the role of the State in industrial 
relations, as well as being of historical interest. It 
will also, I hope, help us to investigate further the
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question of the moral and ethical influences on unions 
as expressed by the goals they pursued for legislation, 
and the rationale advanced by union representatives to 
support such objectives. In the fifth chapter we will 
consider the actions of unions acting at the level of a 
company - the computer company, ICL. The fact that the 
company concerned has a large, well managed personnel 
function enables Hardy's legitimacy approach to be 
tested. More specifically, a long term approach is 
adopted which will hopefully enable us to trace any 
significant continuities in actions. It is hoped that 
this case study will enable us to assess the question of 
the influence of unions and unionism through the values 
and moral goals of workers. Chapter six will draw 
together our conclusions.
In the meantime, however, there is a need to further 
develop the initial examination of theoretical back­
ground attempted in this chapter, and in chapter three, 
which follows, we shall consider further points which 
will contribute to a theoretical framework to analyse 
trade union reactions to redundancy.
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CHAPTER 3
A THEORY OF UNION 
CULTURES
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
How then are we to develop our theoretical framework 
to help in understanding trade union responses to redun­
dancy? In the last chapter we have considered partial 
theories based on case studies of factory closures.
We have also looked at theories of trade unions. The 
emerging synthesis is a theory that relies on the moral 
perceptions of workers and acknowledges the role of 
unions in influencing those perceptions. In this 
chapter we will develop this argument further.
The arrangement of this chapter is as follows. 
Firstly, we will examine the use which various writers 
have made of what I take to be key concepts which relate 
to the collective formation or possession of moral 
perceptions and points of view - the concepts of "cul­
ture", "ideology", and "world view". We will examine 
the similarities in these concepts, so far as they have 
been interpreted by other writers, and in particular we 
will consider their usefulness or otherwise in explana­
tions of the occurrence of popular protest, in a broad 
sense - i.e. not specifically related to protests 
against redundancy or even necessarily to the industrial 
context. We will then move to consider the question of 
workers' perceptions of "rights". Examples of a number 
of broad categories of perceived "rights" will be consi­
dered, and the influences that conveyed them, or led to 
their formation in the minds of workers, will be sought.
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From this point we will come to the nub of ray argu­
ment, which is that perceived "rights" are associated 
with and conveyed by the existence of cultural forces, 
and in particular cultures which are linked to trade 
unions and trade unionism of different forms - what I 
describe as "trade union cultures". This will then lead 
to the general proposition that workers' responses to 
redundancy might be expected to exemplify their percep­
tions of "rights" of various kinds, and that in exami­
ning the responses of workers and unions to a long terra 
sequence of events we may expect to see the re-emergence 
of similar moral claims in keeping with the influence of 
union cultures. The suggestion here is that "rights" 
and union cultures are not simply helpful in explaining 
union responses to redundancy, but are important factors 
that have to be acknowledged in any theoretical or 
empirical study in this area. Before completing this 
chapter, we will briefly consider two examples of 
studies, one dealing with an individual case of indust­
rial conflict, another taking a much broader national 
perspective, and a longitudinal line of analysis. In 
both cases I will suggest there are advantages in intro­
ducing the concept of union cultures. This will lead to 
some points in relation to the empirical work in the 
chapters which follow this, in particular the type of 
case study material that would be most likely to illumi­
nate different aspects of union cultures, if indeed this 
concept is seen to be, in practice, useful in explaining 
the events and circumstances that we described.
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3.2 C U L T U R E S ,  I D E O L O G I E S  A N D  W O R L D  V I E W S
Before addressing the question of how the subjective 
ideas in the minds of individual workers might influence 
their behaviour as a collective mass, let us for one 
moment dwell upon the issue of concepts. Accounts of 
the social processes underlying popular protest, inevi­
tably perhaps, rely upon concepts that ascribe shared 
ideas and values. The mechanisms through which those 
ideas and values come to be implanted, and the manner in 
which they cause workers to respond to events and cir­
cumstances in the world, are in essence the factors for 
which concepts are created to describe and explain. 
Arguably, there is a similarity between concepts such as 
"culture", "ideology", and "world view", therefore, 
which if recognised, affords a certain freedom to draw 
on the work of writers, that might otherwise be lost in 
an avalanche of semantic distinctions. However, on 
closer scrutiny this similarity is much more than a 
superficial likeness, which simply arises because of a 
common function of the concepts in explaining the occur­
rence of collective protest. Rather, there is a sense 
in which the essence of the ideas they embody is also 
very similar.
For example, Sabel (1), uses the concept of "world
views" which relies upon the idea of humans being...
"... socialised during various stages of 
development, with visions of success or 
failure, feelings about the possibilities 
in life that define at once our ambitions 
and our sense of social honour. (2).
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Conflicts arise when world views are disappointed. On 
investigation of the use of this concept of "world view" 
however, it becomes clear that Sabel sees it as embody­
ing an explicitly moral component. He gives the example 
of craftsmen who...
"... learn as apprentices that management tries 
to profit from eliminating their prerogatives.
When such challenges do come they are resisted as 
an affront to the craftsmen's ethos, an insult to 
their dignity, an attack on their well being and 
the freedom they need to work. But they do not 
come as a surprise, for management was always 
suspected of neither respecting the dignity of 
skilled workers nor appreciating the moral basis 
of their work." (3). (Emphasis added.)
Militancy, therefore, is regarded as arising not 
from a hidden aspect of the worker's personality, more 
or less rational than the accommodating everyday perso­
nality more commonly seen. Rather, it is a result of 
the worker's determination to defend that everyday 
conception - which, as the above example illustrates, 
comprises ideas of status, images of self-importance, 
and also, crucially, a picture of "rights" and 
"wrongs" - which is essentially rooted in a set of 
moral or ethical assumptions.
E.P. Thompson explains how a "plebeian culture"
emerged in the eighteenth century in England, and uses
this concept to explain mass movements which occurred,
and prevented the all pervasive domination of society by
the gentry. Underlying the culture, there is, as
Thompson puts it, the notion of legitimation, by which
he means that...
"the men and women in the crowd were informed by 
beliefs that they were defending traditional rights 
or customs and in general that they were supported 
by the wider consensus of the community."
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In writing of the circumstances in which the popular
masses came to protest, Thompson emphasises the
influence of traditional views of social norms and
obligations, and of the proper economic functions of
groups within the community - views which taken together
can be said to constitute the "moral economy of the
poor". As he puts it:-
"An outrage to these moral assumptions quite as 
much as the actual deprivation, was the usual 
occasion for direct action." (5).
In such events as food riots, for example, there was 
a great particularity of action, underlying which were 
"general notions of rights", which were in turn under­
pinned by "tradition" and "the popular memory", and 
feelings that certain standards of behaviour "ought" to 
be expected in relation to questions of shortages of 
food and economic exchange.
These then are the elements of the "plebeian cul­
ture" , but it is noticeable that in many of the examples 
quoted by Thompson, the responses of groups to their own 
fluctuating fortunes could equally well be described in 
the terms of "world views" of, for example, the weavers, 
or the city artisans who were minded to protest at their 
fate. Other historians have written in terms of the 
"mentalities” of the masses, and Hutton, for example, 
has pointed to the conceptual identity of "mentalities" 
and "culture", and has observed that, "the problems of 
culture were essentially problems of world views". (6). 
Writers, like Parkin (7), writing of "values" and 
"meaning systems", share similar concerns and
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perspectives. (Parkin explains the existence of order 
and conflict in society in terms of competing "meaning 
systems", and it seems clear that "meaning systems" have 
a moral basis, and are conceptually close to "world 
views" and "culture".)
The concept of "ideology" allows for somewhat dif­
ferent conceptual uses. Marx, it will be recalled, 
referred to "ideology" as "false consciousness", a 
clearly more restrictive meaning than that which is in 
current use. Religion, for example, was "ideology", but 
it was also false "consciousness". Marx and Engels 
referred to their own work as a "theory", though others 
have referred to it as "ideology". Plamenatz (8), draws 
these connections and also sees "world views" as a form 
of ideology of the most comprehensive kind. Gramsci (9) 
(who did much to liberate the concept of ideology from 
the narrow use described above) distinguished between 
"organic" ideologies, "necessary to a given superstruc­
ture", and ideologies which are "arbitrary, rationalis­
tic, willed". (9). "Organic ideologies" are, in the 
present context, of most interest. They were seen by 
Gramsci as having a "psychological" impact, and could 
"organise" human masses. They...
"... form the terrain on which men move, acquire 
consciousness of their position, struggle etc." 
( 10) .
Arbitrary (i.e. more explicitly structured) ideo­
logies on the other hand could only "create movements, 
polemics and so on... ". Moreover, Gramsci did not see
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"ideology" as the exclusive preserve of the fundamental
classes in society. There was room, too, for the...
"... less structured forms of thought that circu­
late among common people, often contractory, and 
confused, and compounded of folklore myth and 
popular day to day experience." (11).
Used in this way, it would seem there is little to 
distinguish between "ideology" and "culture" though, as 
has already been made clear, the concepts could scarcely 
be described as proximate if one uses ideology in its 
classic Marxist sense. Rude (12), clearly influenced by 
the Gramscian interpretation of "ideology", also adopts 
an interpretation that appears conceptually close to 
"culture". His approach refines the notion of "ideo­
logy" to allow for structured ideas, and much less 
formal, basic outlooks to be differentiated within it, 
giving rise to different aspects of ideology which will 
be further explored in due course.
Examining these concepts of "culture", "ideology", 
and "world view", therefore, and the uses to which they 
have been put, a thread of continuity can be traced, 
which enables us to see the interconnections more 
clearly. Each of the concepts is used in some way to 
describe the collectively held subjective views of 
people. Each goes somewhat further, and embodies an 
element of ethical and moral values which frequently 
find expression in beliefs concerning "rights". Within 
this moral conception of "rightness" it would seem, 
workers (and others) interpret events in the world, and 
to the extent that such events offend the said moral
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positions, protest of some form is the result. The 
notions would appear, therefore, to have a similarity in 
both their explanatory function, and basic conceptual 
roots, which entitles us to expect to be able to use the 
studies that employ them to complement and support each 
other.
Nor, in this, should we forget the work of sociolo­
gists like Weber and Durkheim, whose work offers an even 
sounder basis for the conceptual similarities suggested 
here. Durkheim, for example, referred to the 
"conscience collective" (13), which may be translated 
as, "the common consciousness", or "common conscience" 
(or even "the generalised social conscience" according 
to one writer (14)) which underlies the basis of mora­
lity, and which explains much that we come to understand 
as social behaviour, including the obligations of indi­
viduals towards each other, their duties and responsibi­
lities, their expectations and perceptions of "rights" 
in their dealings with authority, the State, their work 
colleagues, families and so on.
It is not, at this point, necessary to adopt any 
dogmatic position with regard to the terminology consi­
dered here, but rather, for the time being, to note the 
variety of usages in force. As will shortly emerge, 
this thesis will rely rather heavily on the concept of 
"culture", but its use will encompass aspects of Rude's 
use of the word, "ideology", and will not be dissimilar 
to Sabel's use of the phrase, "world view". Though the 
latter term would appear to imply a breadth that might
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not be expected in the case of, "culture", the moral
element in both emphasises similarity rather than
distinction : -
"World views are normative as well as explicative. 
They are not just models of the world, they are 
models for the world as well. They are evaluative 
and simultaneously they create meaning. If we 
regard the world from the vantage point of a world 
view, the distinction between facts and values 
dissolves." (15).
"Ideology" on the other hand must be redeemed from 
its narrow Marxist usage, which in any event is not 
favoured by modern Marxist writers. Unless the context 
makes it clear that we are adopting a specific interpre­
tation favoured by some other author, I will use this 
term in the more commonly understood sense favoured by 
Plamenatz, i.e. that it refers to...
"... a set of closely related beliefs, or ideas, 
or even attitudes characteristic of a group or 
community." (16).
Having said this, the concept of ideology as adopted 
by George Rude seems particularly interesting, and goes a 
considerable way to illuminate the sources of popular 
protest, as will be seen in the next section. Further 
than this I find it unnecessary to go on defining termi­
nology - at least at this stage. Hopefully, where there 
is room for more than one meaning the sense will be 
clear from the context. At this point, therefore, it 
will be helpful to consider in rather more detail, the 
uses which two writers have made of the concepts of 
"world view" and "ideology" in explaining the occurrence 
of popular protest, in the hope that this will lead us 
to a framework in which to better understand the 
responses of unions and their members to redundancy.
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3.3 S O U R C E S . O F  P O P U L A R  P R O T E S T
As we have seen, writers like Sabel and Rude assist 
considerably in clarifying the appearance of confusion 
in the use of the terminology considered above. More 
important, however, in this context, is the way they 
link the concepts they employ to explanations of popular 
protest. Rude draws on writers like Foster (17), and 
Tholfson (18), to show that the capitalist class in the 
early and mid-nineteenth century in Britain, set out to 
re-stabilise industry and implant "a cohesive culture - 
a highly knit structure of values: institutions, roles 
and rituals". (19). According to Foster, these re­
stabilisation strategies were "quite deliberately 
devised" by the capitalist class, and he describes how 
in Oldham in the 1840s this approach took various forms. 
These included the introduction of wages differentials 
to divide workers, and the making of half concessions to 
their demands with similar objectives in mind. (20). 
Tholfson's work suggests that over a period of twenty 
years in the mid-nineteenth century, the capitalist 
class was largely successful in facilitating the re­
placement of a culture pervaded by social tension, by 
one of "shared values, internalised and institutiona­
lised". (21). The means used were, "working men's 
clubs, newspapers, Sunday Schools, mechanics' insti­
tutes, mutual improvement societies, reading rooms, 
libraries, savings banks, churches and chapels...
(22), and an examination of the founding principles of 
these organisations appears to confirm Tholfson's
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argument that they were building blocks in the 
construction of a cohesive culture.
There was no complete surrender to capitalist ideo­
logy, however, as Rude demonstrates, referring to a 
number of historical examples as cases in point. Much 
of his book utilises earlier historical episodes to 
demonstrate the impact of ideology on forms of popular 
protest. As we have already seen, he uses the concept 
of ideology in a broad sense, drawing on Gramsci, and 
noting that the latter includes in his definition, 
"loose, less structured forms of thought that circulate 
among common people". (23). Rude's main contribution to 
an understanding of the concept he employs, is to iden­
tify the existence of two elements of ideology. The 
first element he describes as the "inherent” traditional 
element...
"... a sort of mother's milk ideology, based on 
direct experience, oral tradition or folk-memory 
and not learned by listening to sermons or reading 
books." (24).
This first element (unlike the second). Rude sees as
being the "peculiar property of the popular classes".
The second element, according to Rude, is the stock of
ideas and beliefs "derived" or borrowed from others.
This "derived" aspect of ideology often takes a more
structured form as...
"... systems of ideas, political or religious, 
such as the Rights of Man, Popular Sovereignty, 
laissez faire, and the Sacred Right of Property, 
Nationalism, Socialism, or the various versions 
of justification by Faith." (25).
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Rude shows how these two elements fuse together to 
form the ideologies of popular masses, and then in turn 
contribute to the expression of popular protest.
The connection he makes between his own ideas and 
those of Gramsci is interesting, and he focuses on the 
concept of hegemony, in which the ruling class is able 
to exert power by imposing a consensus in the realm of 
ideas, using largely peaceful means. This happens 
through its control of the media of indoctrination, in 
that part of the State termed "civil society" - through 
the press, the church, the education system and so on. 
Under the influences of these forces, the people "become 
willing partners in their own subjection" (26), and the 
question arises: how can the proletariat shake off this 
"ideological servitude"? (27). Gramsci's answer, as 
will be familiar, is that this can only be achieved by 
the proletariat building up its own counter-ideology to 
weaken the defences of its opponents, before defeating 
them in the struggle for power. (28).
The interesting aspect of Rude's work in relation to 
the foregoing is that he suggests the development of 
ideologies takes place as an iterative process, blending 
together the "inherent" and "derived" elements, passing 
on new, modified "inherent" elements to the next genera­
tion and so forth. Ideology is not seen as static, it 
evolves. There is no such thing as an...
"... empty tablet in the place of a mind on which 
new ideas may be grafted where there were no ideas 
before... ";
and...
"... no such thing as an automatic progression from 
'simple' to more sophisticated ideas."
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Neither is there any "wall of Babylon" dividing the 
two types of ideology from each other. They fuse to­
gether, and what is today's "derived" ideology, may in 
modified form become an element of tomorrow's "inherent" 
ideology. Whether the resultant mixture takes on mili­
tant or revolutionary qualities, or is counter revolu­
tionary and conservative, depends according to 
Rude...
"... less on the nature of the recipients or of the
'inherent' beliefs from which they started, than on
the nature of the 'derived' beliefs compounded by 
the circumstances then prevailing... ". (30).
So, in short, there are three elements which have a 
bearing on the final ideological perspective of workers; 
the "inherent" element which forms the base on which the
rest is built, the "derived" element which "can only be
absorbed if the ground was already prepared" (31), and 
the "circumstances and experience" which, in the final 
analysis, determines the nature of the mixture.
Rudé himself draws a parallel between his "inherent 
ideology" and E.P. Thompson's similar concept of a 
"plebeian culture". (32). He clearly follows Thompson 
in his argument, that notwithstanding the "popular 
achievements" brought about under the influence of the 
"plebeian culture" or "inherent ideology", only limited 
advances could be expected without the supplemental 
influence of a "derived element", the political, philo­
sophical or religious ideas, which in Thomson's termi­
nology, "became absorbed in the more specifically 
popular culture". (33). Rudé gives examples of this
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merger of "inherent" and "derived ideas, which takes 
place at different levels of sophistication. At the 
most basic stage it takes the form of slogans, and he 
instances the Americans' "Death to revenue officers", 
and "No taxation without representation", or "No Popery" 
shouted by eighteenth century Londoners, and the "Vive 
le Parlement” shouted by the Parisian crowds on the eve 
of the revolution. (34). At a more sophisticated level, 
relatively structured ideas could become part of the 
"derived" element. Notions of "Rights of Man", "social 
contract", and "Third Estate" emanating from the wri­
tings of Paine and Rousseau, were conveyed principally 
by the spoken word, but also by passages from books and 
journals being read aloud in public.
As I have already suggested, Sabel's use of "world 
views" (36), is not dissimilar to Rude's use of "ideo­
logy" . Though he himself takes issue with the "mora­
lists" , "world views" as used by Sabel embody an 
explicitly moral component:-
"World views are like penal codes or codes 
of honour. They permit an exhaustive cate­
gorisation of actions as licit or illicit, 
honourable or dishonourable." (37).
Sabel argues that many industrial conflicts arise 
when workers' expectations of propriety and justice are 
violated. Conflicts come about when two conditions are 
fulfilled. Firstly, prompted by the pressure of compe­
tition (for example, management attempts to speed up 
work or to rationalise working methods and structures), 
the terms of management's relationship to the work
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group is altered. Secondly, the work group declares 
its integrity and place in the division of labour 
threatened. Strikes by craftsmen in defence of wage 
differentials, or freedom from shop floor supervision 
would, suggests Sabel, be examples of such conflicts. 
(38). Sabel quotes others, including the peasant wor­
ker's demand for "a fair day's pay for a fair day's 
work". All groups, he argues, "... have the capacity to 
raise and defend moral claims". (39). Moreover, "... 
the pursuit, even of moral claims perceived as traditio­
nal, can alter the status quo rather than reinforce it". 
(40).
World views, argues Sable, help to explain the range 
and variety of conflict and acquiescence in industry. 
Looking particularly at theories of "blue collar" wor­
kers, he comments, that no single theory of behaviour...
"... accounts for this variety of opposition and 
no theory that predicts the militancy of any one 
of these groups accounts for other crucial aspects 
of its behaviour, its acquiescence in authority as 
well as its revolts against authority, its inabi­
lity to find allies as well as its willingness to 
join broad political movements. From the point of 
view of existing theories, too much as well as too 
little is going on in factories." (41).
Moreover, Sabel's use of "world views" to explain 
issues of power relations is interesting. They have the 
capacity, he argues, to "legitimate or at least obscure 
disparities of power by making them appear to be facts 
of nature". (42). In this, the tendency of occupational 
and other groupings to defend their own niches in the 
division of labour can isolate each one from its most
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likely allies - the other workers in the plant. Workers 
may share a "common enemy", but they are not always 
united. (43). But world views can influence the balance 
in either direction. While on one hand they may legiti­
mate power disparities and perpetuate divisions between 
workers, they can also lead to widened conceptions of 
rights and the moral conviction to sustain workers in 
their struggles to achieve and protect them. However, as 
pointed out above, Sabel distances himself from the 
"moralist" position of seeing the defence of morals as 
the basis for workers' collective action, and stresses 
that. . .
"... there is more room for debate over the 
meaning of moral ideas, and more jockeying for 
social position than the moralists allow." (44).
A number of aspects in the work of Rudé and Sabel are 
of interest in the context of the present study. One 
such aspect of Sabel's approach appears to form a link 
with the argument we will outline towards the end of 
this chapter, but for the sake of convenience we shall 
consider it briefly at this point. This is touched upon 
by the reference he makes to the idea of "national 
culture" (45) - a concept which he emphasises has been 
fairly extensively used by other writers. The precise 
purpose he has in introducing the concept, and the use 
to which he puts it are not especially important, and it 
is in fact only a relatively minor feature of his over­
all argument. However, his definition of "national 
culture" as "a nation's political world view" (46), is 
interesting. Firstly, it indicates acknowledgement that
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there is some conceptual similarity between "culture" 
and "world view". Secondly, it indicates a more 
flexible use of the concept of "world view" than is 
implied in general in Babel's book. Elsewhere, Sabel 
appears to see occupational groupings (technicians, 
supervisors, skilled workers etc) as the appropriate 
locus around which to consider the effect of world views 
in a collective sense. But here, in referring to "a 
nation's political world view", we see a different 
usage. Moreover, this is borne out when Sabel suggests 
that "world views" (qua "national cultures") can in­
fluence the "world views" of groups of workers. (47).
In effect, he is implying that workers may be brought 
under the influence of more than one world view, opera­
ting at different levels (i.e. in this case, the natio­
nal and the work group setting). This analysis seems to 
be borne out by Sabel's use of the adjective "politi­
cal", in his definition of "national culture" as "a 
nation's political world view". The question of what, 
if any, other forms of world view it might be possible 
to identify is not made clear, but the point is made 
that, in applying a concept which relates to the collec­
tive conceptualisations of people, one can consider 
groups, organisations, or even nations as appropriate 
levels at which to employ the notion of "world view".
Paradoxically, however, in a study that seeks to 
explain collective worker behaviour, there is very 
little reference to the role played by trade unions.
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and the possibility of analysing moral positions from 
the point of view of union influences appears to have 
been overlooked or rejected. Nonetheless, the wider 
usage of "world view" hinted at here leads one to con­
sider how trade unions might be brought more centrally 
into the analysis. In particular one might ask, would 
union organisation at various levels represent a valid 
locus for considering the effect of world views? There 
would seem to be at least two levels at which such 
analysis might be applied - following directly the line 
of reasoning indicated above. Firstly, Sabel s main 
approach, which focuses on occupational groupings within 
the working class, would appear to require little adap­
tation to be applied to various forms of union organisa­
tion. The divisions Sabel discerns in occupational 
terms are, after all, familiar enough in British union 
structures, and have been reflected in a number of 
studies by Lockwood (48), Allen (49), Roberts et al (51) 
and Hill (52), to name but a few examples. At another 
level, however, one might seek to follow Sabel's more 
flexible use of the idea of "world view", and suggest 
that just as a "national culture" may help to explain 
the broader national level influences on workers (and 
their group level "world views"), so we might advance 
the concept of a "trade union culture" to explain the 
possible influences on workers at the level of trade 
union organisation. The point will be more fully 
developed in due course, but suffice it to say that a
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"trade union culture" could be defined as existing not 
only at the level of a union nationally, but within 
discrete organisational units of the union in companies, 
industries, and at the level of a given workplace, as 
has already been suggested.
Furthermore, taking up the cue given by Sabel in 
suggesting that a multiplicity of world views may apply 
in any given industrial setting, it could be suggested 
that different cultures might be found within given 
unions and might, among other factors, reflect different 
occupational groupings, political factions, regional 
variations, etc. Evidence to support the notion of such 
variations in cultural influences might be found in the 
traditions and practices of trade unions, the influence 
of factions or "rank and file" groupings within them, 
inter-union rivalries, occasional breakaway movements, 
and so on. Instances of the above examples come readily 
to mind. The miners' strike of 1984-85 provided an 
illustration of many of these divisions, including the 
formation of a breakaway union. The Union of Democratic 
Mineworkers. (53). The existence of sectionalism and 
dissenting elements in large-scale public sector dis­
putes, including in steel, health, and teachers, has not 
only emphasised the weakness of solidarity (54), but 
arguably the continuing existence of different union 
cultures in these sectors. (55). And while the tradi­
tions of craft independence have apparently underpinned 
an element of sectional elitism among unions, these same 
traditions have in different circumstances been seen to 
contribute to the growth of a radical shop stewards'
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movement in the period from the beginning of 
World War I. (56).
There are a number of other aspects of the work of 
Rude and Sabel which appear particularly relevant to a 
study such as this, which seeks to account for trade 
unions' and workers' responses to redundancy. Both 
stress the dynamic aspects of the concepts of "world 
view" and "ideology", which would appear to offer some 
assistance in explaining the variation in workers' 
responses to redundancy, over time, and in different 
contexts. Also of direct relevance, is the application 
of "world views" and "ideologies" to the question of 
legitimacy of managements' actions. The observation 
which both writers make, that the influences on workers' 
minds can operate in either direction, sustaining oppo­
sition and the exercise of countervailing power, as well 
as at other times legitimising unpleasant managerial 
decisions, is of obvious importance when considering the 
arguments of writers such as Hardy (56), and Lockyer and 
Baddon (57), who were referred to in the last chapter.
In summary then, the link between "world views", 
"ideology" and "culture", and the importance which the 
work of Sabel and Rudé give to moral claims, and workers 
beliefs in "the way things ought to be", would appear to 
have a direct bearing on the project embarked upon here, 
of creating a theoretical framework to account for 
workers' and unions' responses to redundancy. Both 
writers offer useful and interesting accounts which go
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some way towards explaining the occurrence of popular 
protest, but also to its variable, inconsistent occur­
rence. Rudé's analysis, whilst focusing on large 
national movements and the outbreak of revolutionary 
conflict, may be helpful in obtaining a greater under­
standing of workers' movements - e.g. the sit-ins and 
occupations of factories to oppose redundancies, which 
blossomed in the 1970s. But Sabel's analysis, looking 
at occupational work groups, and implying too, a more 
flexible approach allowing analysis at different levels, 
brings us towards a possible line that affords scope to 
investigate the role and influence of trade unions and 
trade unionism. Both accounts have a bearing on the 
question of legitimacy, and offer insights into the 
processes which may be involved in achieving or under­
mining it. Using Rudé's terminology, legitimacy might be 
said to depend upon management successfully implanting 
an element of "derived ideology" in the minds of wor­
kers. This might include notions of the inevitability 
of market forces, the logic of standards of "reasonable­
ness", the positive nature of change (even when it 
disrupts the lives of workers) and the virtues of compe­
tition, efficiency and so on. Clearly, any attempt to 
explain the process of legitimisation, using Rudé's 
approach to "ideology", would have to offer some comment 
on the means whereby these "derived" ideas are implan­
ted, bearing in mind too, the effects of possible rival 
elements, including aspects of "inherent" ideology which 
may strongly reject the morality of the proposed action.
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Examination of these appraoches then, leads to the 
distinct view that workers are moved to protest about 
matters that cannot be defined in purely economic terms. 
Though neither writer suggests that workers only respond 
defensively to attacks on moral principles, both of them 
indicate that such defensive actions can be important 
aspects of worker protest. In selecting redundancy as 
an area of study we are, perhaps inevitably, emphasising 
the defensive nature of workers' protests, and it is as 
well to remember the context when looking, in due 
course, for any general conclusions. At this stage, 
however, having indicated a link between theories of 
popular protest and the expression of beliefs in moral 
obligations of various kinds, I propose that we should 
now turn to investigate the nature and extent of such 
claims as seen in trade unions.
3.4 RIGHTS AMD-HQRAL-CLAIHS.
When one attempts to analyse the moral basis of 
workers' perceived "rights", one is confronted by a 
number of problems. The first of these is the diffi­
culty of saying, with any certainty, how other people 
perceive the world to be. We can only draw inferences 
based on factors such as the way claims of "rights" 
appear to be expressed or demanded, and the language 
that is used to describe such claims, etc. At best, 
however, this is a somewhat uncertain process, and
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we should recognise the rather tentative nature of any 
propositions which emerge. A similar problem relates to 
any attempt to identify the source of such perceptions. 
Again, one cannot be entirely categorical. There may be 
a number of influences forcing workers to adopt a parti­
cular point of view, that has the effect of a moral 
imperative, and in all possibility, workers themselves 
may find no practical usefulness in distinguishing 
between those sources, or even identifying them in any 
explicit sense. Nonetheless, we should attempt to 
loosen this knot of practicality if we are to seek to 
apply the ideas considered in the last section to an 
explanation of workers' and trade unions' reactions to 
redundancy.
Let us consider how workers manifest their moral 
beliefs through the expression of what they see as 
"rights". Several questions may be asked which have an 
immediate bearing on the nature and sources of moral 
perceptions that workers form in relation to their 
employment. If workers see the obligations of their 
employer in terms of "rights" what sorts of "rights" do 
they come to believe in? More especially, what seem to 
be the predominant sources of influence in forming these 
"rights"? The difficulties referred to above are not 
easily put aside, and it must be observed that though 
these are interesting questions there is no immediately 
satisfactory answer. Within the context of the present 
thesis, however, we can begin by examining the readily 
available evidence, based on what is more or less common
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knowledge of the area of industrial relations. This may 
help us to gain some initial impressions, and lead to a 
theoretical framework. This we can then attempt to 
apply to the subject of redundancy, and in so doing, 
hopefully gain some further insight by way of answers to 
the above questions. We will proceed on this basis, 
first examining the question of "rights" in a general 
sense in this chapter. We will consider them under four 
categories (which are intended as examples, rather than 
any complete categorisation of the range of "rights" 
that apply to the employment context), first starting 
with the range of "rights" which workers perceive in 
relation to the terms and conditions on which they are 
employed.
3.5 CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
Are the perceived "rights" of workers in employment 
established because they are laid down legally as 
rights, either contractually or in some other sense? 
Lawyers, writing about employment rights, tend to empha­
sise the primacy of contract (58), whilst others may be 
inclined to see the legal relationship as of lesser 
importance than the social context. This view has been 
emphasised by Fox (59), Kahn-Freund (60), and others. 
Durkheimian sociology, it will be recalled, analysed the 
law as a "social fact" and argued that legality was 
premised upon shared conceptions of morality existing
153
within society. (61). In looking at the sources of 
workers' perceptions of "rights", therefore, one is 
immediately alerted to the danger of assuming that the 
relationship between legality and morality is necessa­
rily from the former to the latter. If the employment 
contract, as a legal expression of rights and obliga­
tions, does not in itself condition workers' perceptions 
of their rights, what then may be taken to do so?
It is, as the lawyers say, "trite law", that a con­
tract of employment includes both oral and written, 
express and implied terms. (62). Prior to 1963 there 
was no statutory regulation of the extent to which 
employment contracts should be reduced to writing. The 
statutory regulation is now laid down in the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, which provides a 
list of issues in respect of which details of an employ­
ment contract should be provided in written form. (63). 
Also, employees are entitled to be informed of the 
procedures they should adopt in matters of discipline, 
or in settlement of grievances. (64). However, one does 
not need to dwell unduly on the social nature of the 
employment relationship to recognise that in practice, 
written statements of contractual arrangements are 
likely to cover only a bare outline of a far wider range 
of expectations that employer and employee have of each 
other. As Wedderburn has noted:-
"The problems of real life are always sufficiently 
unpredictable to bring to light gaps in what the 
parties have agreed." (65).
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The lawyers' solution to this problem is to create
the artefact of the "implied contractual term". What
this amounts to is that the law pronounces by inference
upon the terms which (in the judgement of a court) both
parties recognise as aspects of their mutual obligations
and undertakings. As one might expect, the law says
little of the underlying ethical and moral basis of such
perceived obligations. When it does venture opinion, it
often does so with a bias that labour lawyers have
identified as fundamental in employment law, and its
judicial interpretation. As one judge put it, in a 1946
case on implied contractual terms...
"... 'it goes without saying', some term not ex­
pressed, but necessary to give to the transaction 
such business efficacy as the parties must have 
intended." (66).
And as to the nature of the said "business efficacy", 
one could turn to a 1926 case, in which a colliery 
closed its mines whilst repairs were done to make the 
mine safe. The judge found that the mine had become 
unsafe through no fault of the employers, and that there 
was no implied term to pay wages to the employees. (67). 
One can only guess at the feelings of the workers in 
response to such decisions as this, but it would seem 
that in such cases their probable perceptions of 
"rights" are incapable of being recognised by the cri­
terion of "business efficiency", or such other yardstick 
as the courts might apply in similar vein.
In relation to employment conditions then, it would 
seem likely that workers perceive "rights" as correspon­
ding to the established status quo, irrespective of
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the underlying legality of the situation they identify. 
If this is so, one might expect to find that workers 
respond more readily when conditions are being worsened, 
or favourable arrangements are being withdrawn, than 
they may be expected to in order to secure comparable 
conditions which have never been established. How could 
one test the validity of such a proposition? One factor 
which might be considered helpful lies in the relative 
distribution of defensive strikes versus those of an 
offensive nature - i.e. strikes to defend an attack on 
an existing condition, as compared with strikes to 
support claimed improvements. The difficulty here, 
however, is that there is no control data of the inci­
dence of threats to worsen conditions, against claims 
for improvements. However, it is interesting to note 
that between 1893 and 1945, published strike data clas­
sified wage related stoppages according to whether they 
were linked to claims for increases (i.e. offensive 
actions) or in protest at proposed reductions (i.e. 
defensive actions). Leaving aside the difficulty al­
ready mentioned, of lack of information on the number of 
claims and threats, it is interesting to note that the 
figure for stoppages over decreases is rarely less than 
twenty per cent of the quoted figure for wage increases 
in any one year, and in the years when depression and 
economic contraction began to bite, in the 1920s and 
1930s the incidence of defensive strikes was several 
times higher than offensive strikes. (68). One scarcely 
needs to add that the 1926 general strike was over the
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issue of proposed cuts to the pay of miners, and exten­
sions to their working week. Earlier battles by the 
miners, and other groups of workers (e.g. in the cotton 
industry) testify to the bitterness with which workers 
opposed pay reductions imposed by the sliding scale 
system at the end of the nineteenth century. (69). And, 
if one looks for an example of a group of workers with 
traditions of industrial peace and moderation, the 
school teachers provide a case in point. They responded 
to the cuts in pay threatened or imposed in the early 
1920s, by establishing a strike fund in the NUT, and 
engaging in a number of defensive strikes which were 
without precedence in the union's history. (70).
Another way to consider the question is to look at 
the matter of claims for non-wage improvements. Despite 
an increasing emphasis since the 1970s on a broader 
range of issues, ranging from pensions to maternity pay, 
strikes in support of claimed improvements in the newer, 
"fringe benefit" type issues are rarely reported. On 
the other hand, there have been a number of reported 
instances when managements have chosen to abolish esta­
blished conditions, for example, on account of their 
"time consuming" or "wasteful" nature. For example, it 
is possible to discover a number of disputes over the 
abolition of tea breaks (71) (yet, unsurprisingly, no 
such examples can be found of disputes to establish a 
tea break when arrangements for them have not previously 
existed). On the face of it, one may observe, there is 
an odd contrast between the apparent lack of militancy
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of workers to secure improvements in benefits such as 
pensions, which may have a considerable financial value, 
and their readiness to defend an established benefit of 
lesser value, such as a tea break, by taking industrial 
action. Examples such as this, however, tend to confirm 
the view that workers have notions of "rights", and that 
(so far as conditions of employment are concerned) their 
principal aim is to secure what they already have, 
either by explicit agreement, or by quoting and enfor­
cing "custom and practice". Views of "fairness", 
"equity" etc appear then to be based on conserving the 
established order first and foremost. And while workers 
may approve suggestions that they should strive, for 
example, to reduce the length of the working week, 
secure sabbatical leave, maternity leave, or other less 
commonly provided arrangements, they do not necessarily 
internalise these ideas so that they become associated 
with the same ethical or moral connotations of perceived 
"rights", as seems to happen when conditions are under 
attack.
The readily observable evidence therefore appears to 
suggest that in relation to conditions of employment 
(viewed in a wide sense of including informally estab­
lished practices), workers perceive themselves as having 
"rights" at work which are not necessarily rooted in any 
real appreciation of their legal rights. Workers' 
perceptions of "rights" it would seem are conditioned by 
other factors, including "custom and practice", and the 
idea of "what we have, we hold". Insofar as the moral
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force behind workers' perceptions of "rights" may be 
identified therefore, it would seem to be akin to the 
notion of property, and it is likely that while unions 
and unionism consolidate this ethical basis for defen­
sive action, its existence owes much to the prevailing 
values of society at large in which "possession is seen 
to be nine-tenths of the rule".
To this extent, perhaps, unions and unionism reflect 
values which offer little to challenge the existing 
order. This need not necessarily be the case, however, 
with regard to other categories of "rights" and we will 
at this point turn to consider the question in relation 
to attempts to control access to, and execution of, 
work.
3.6 ACCESS TO M D  CONTROL Q£ WORK
The Webbs, writing of union demarcation disputes in
the nineteenth century, refer to the declared trade
union principle of "the right to a trade". They give
examples of a number of nineteenth century inter-union
disputes to support their contention of the existence of
such a principle, and quote the following from a report
of the Amalgamated Shipwrights Society in 1893:-
"No employer should in suiting his own convenience 
give away another man's means of earning a living, 
anymore than no workman would be allowed to go into 
an employer's office and take money from his safe 
and give it to another." (72).
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This example, and others quoted by the Webbs, reminds 
us of the exclusive protectionist traditions of craft 
trade unionism. The perceived "right to a trade" was, 
or is, a sectional claim, and relates to the belief that 
unqualified (i.e. non-time-served apprentices) should be 
excluded from certain jobs, which should be reserved for 
those possessing the necessary craft qualifications.
The traditions of autonomous craft control and regu­
lation have been recognised as a feature in the growth 
and historical evolution of the British system of in­
dustrial relations, to a greater degree than appears to 
have applied on the continent of Europe and elsewhere. 
(73). But what has perhaps been less generally acknow­
ledged has been the prevalence of similar attitudes and 
practices of demarcation and restrictionism throughout 
the whole structure of English professional and commer­
cial activities. As Fox points out, the antecedents of 
this are to be found in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries and much earlier:-
"Claims to prescriptive rights to a trade and to 
its status, privileges, demarcations and restric­
tions derived their peculiar force from widespread 
phenomena of freeholds and liberties that littered 
English life at all social levels, and bred a 
degree of truculence, a willingness to fight and 
litigate that bordered on neurosis." (74)
And for liberties in the form of craft rights, 
acquired in an earlier age, to be asserted against the 
repressive forces of growing industrial capitalism, 
organised labour had to exploit the concept of political 
liberty - also developed by the gentry as a means of 
legitimating their own ruling order. (75). Fox
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describes how, in the mid and late nineteenth century, 
with the quickening rate of change and the increasing 
pace of economic fluctuations, craft groups moved more 
and more into collective bargaining while managing to 
retain their own workplace restrictions and regulations. 
At the same time, non-craft groups also sought to apply 
workplace job regulation if they could manage it.
Such "rights" of control over access to and method of 
application of work are not then, entirely peculiar to 
traditional skilled or craft occupations. As Friedson 
(76), has pointed out, some occupations possess a de- 
facto autonomy by virtue of the isolated or specialist 
character of their work, but such autonomy is more 
accidental than not, and is subject to fluctuations 
with, for example, variations in public opinion. How­
ever : -
"Unlike other occupations, professions are deli­
berately granted autonomy including the exclusive 
right to determine who can legitimately do its 
work and how the work should be done. Virtually 
all occupations struggle to obtain both rights, 
and some manage to seize them, but only the pro­
fession is granted the right to exercise them 
legitimately." (77).
And numerous writers have focused attention exactly 
on these struggles which workers engage in to enforce 
such "rights" of control. So, while Braverman (78), 
describes the success which management has had in impo­
sing control over the work process, Beynon (79), in his 
familiar study of workplace relations in the Ford motor 
company, emphasises the degree to which workers suc­
ceeded in imposing their own controls over the
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production process, and Goodrich (80), describes a court 
case in the 1920s in which a colliery overman was asked 
whether he could say that a particular miner did his job 
properly : -
"I never saw him work," he replied.
"But isn't it your duty to visit each working place 
twice a day?" asked the magistrate.
"Yes," replied the overman, but: "they always stop 
work when they see an overman coming, and sit down 
'til he's gone... they won't let anybody watch 
them." (81).
The evidence of these and other writers then, would 
appear to support the view that certain groups of wor­
kers perceive "rights" of access to, or control over, 
certain jobs. The idea of autonomy of action, and 
independent execution of a job, has not, however, been 
the exclusive preserve of skilled craftsmen. As we have 
already noted, efforts to impose such controls embrace a 
range of jobs from professional to unskilled and semi­
skilled workers. And while managements have achieved 
demonstrable successes in breaking down many of the 
restrictions and controls historically imposed by craft 
workers, in the interests of efficiency and mass produc­
tion (82), this has not been all in one direction. In 
contrast, Beynon emphasises the importance of sustained 
struggles at the workplace in achieving and protecting 
workers' "rights", and the crucial role played by work­
place union leaders in this process. His entire book is 
replete with examples, but just one will suffice. In 
his chapter, "Controlling the Line", Beynon notes that:-
"Men became stewards in their battles with super­
visors over injustices over the workers' rights as 
opposed to management's indiscriminate right to 
manage." (83).
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He describes the dialogue between stewards and 
management over a proposed alteration of the line 
speed : -
"We just said, 'No. We're not doing it.' It was 
as good as anything else at the time.'
They'd say: 'You've got a complaint?'
We'd say: 'No, we're all right. We've not got any
complaints. '
They'd say: 'But what about the line speed, the
work allocation? I thought you were complaining 
about that.
We'd say: 'No, it's all right now. We're happy as
it is. We're only complaining if you try to change 
it. '
They'd say: 'Oh, but we are going to change it.
The speed must be changed.'
We'd say: 'Well, we're not doing it. Yer not on.'"
(84).
In both the language that Beynon uses, and the 
approach of the shop steward quoted, it will be noted 
that the situation appears to confirm analysis in terms 
of struggles for and enforcement of "rights" of control. 
Not all groups of workers would seem to need to struggle 
for such basic and fundamental "rights" as is referred 
to in this context. Indeed, the objective 
organisational and technological demands of industry 
has, by Mallet's account (85), accorded white collar 
employment with not only technical control, but the 
historic role of leading the working class in future 
struggles for economic and political change. Whether or 
not such arguments are sound and prove to have practical 
validity to the extent suggested (and Mann (86), 
Poulantzas (87), and others have argued to the
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contrary), the activation of potential power and leader­
ship would seem to depend largely on the strength and 
affinity of workers to trade union organisation.
At this stage, we will consider the question of 
"rights" which workers appear to come to perceive in 
relation to union activity and organisation, which would 
seem to have an important bearing on the previous point.
3.7 TRADE UNION AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
Let us now turn to the question of "rights" which 
workers may perceive in relation to collective trade 
union organisation and activity. Perceived "rights" 
which come to mind include the "right to strike", the 
"right to organise" or the "right to belong to a union". 
Whether or not such perceptions of "rights" accord with 
reality, in the sense of there being a constitutional or 
legal equivalent, is an obvious question of interest. 
However, we are especially interested in the present 
context in whether perceptions of these "rights" exist 
in the minds of workers, though the possibility of an 
interaction between perceptions and legal enactment may 
be considered.
Students of English labour law are familiar with the 
peculiar path which has been followed in this country in 
relation to legal recognition of trade union action. 
Whilst continental unions were able to achieve the 
position of legally recognised status and legally
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established positive rights (e.g. the right to strike, 
the right to collectively bargain), this was not the 
pattern in Britain. Rather the establishment of lega­
lity for the trade unions, and tolerance of union 
methods, was achieved by statutory measures constraining 
judges in their application of common law torts to trade 
unions, merely because of their existence (88), or 
because they engaged in acts of conspiracy (89), intimi­
dation (90), and other forms of common law wrong. The 
result was the creation of a series of "immunities" from 
civil action for trade unions, provided by the statutes 
of 1871 (91), and 1906 (93). The effect of this has 
been to establish certain freedoms for unions to orga­
nise, to strike, and apply other forms of industrial 
action, but in legal and constitutional terms there has 
been no enactment of positive rights with respect to any 
of these activities (94).
It would seem, however, that in the perceptions of 
workers and trade union activists, these technical 
distinctions carried little weight. The effect of 
Parliament's action to constrain the application of 
judge-made common law, was in a practical sense to 
establish the equivalent of legal rights to organise, 
strike etc, and there seems no reason to doubt that 
workers have perceived the existence of "rights" co­
terminous with these intended effects of legislation. 
Despite the uncertainties created when the creative 
powers of judges have discovered new avenues of attack 
on union activities (95), the trade unions (as more
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than one commentator has observed) have seen little 
purpose in constitutional enactment of positive rights 
(96). Perceptions, it would seem, were that the 
"rights" existed in any event, and it has been noted 
that trade unions "spoke the language of rights (and 
still do)". (97).
Experience of developments in labour law in Britain 
since the end of the nineteen sixties has been in marked 
contrast to the long era of "legal abstention" that 
followed the Trade Disputes Act of 1906. (96). The 
sequence of developments has been described elsewhere 
(89), and it is not necessary here to narrate the events 
that occurred from the publication of the Donovan Report 
in 1968 onwards. A few examples will suffice. From the 
moment of publication in 1969 of the White Paper, "In 
Place of Strife" (100), the notion of the "right to 
strike" was to become an issue that politicians and 
governments of both parties repeatedly moved to the 
centre of the political stage. The reaction of unions 
was to mount opposition to these various proposals.
In 1969, in response to the anti-strike proposals put 
forward by the Labour Government in "In Place of 
Strife", a considerable campaign of rank-and-file oppo­
sition was orchestrated nationally via the unofficial 
Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions.
(101). Central to the opposition of unions and rank and 
file activists was the perceived attack on the "right to 
strike". (102). At the same time, the TUC and the 
official movement discussed the proposals with the
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government in an attempt to secure agreement on alterna­
tive, less unacceptable legislation. (103). So far as 
activists in trade unions were concerned, the opposition 
to "In Place of Strife" was fundamentally connected with 
"rights", and as one union pamphlet put it...
"... the assertion of an essential freedom does, 
indeed, tend to be a nuisance; it is also the one 
thing that distinguishes a free man from a serf." 
(104).
With the election in 1970 of the Conservative 
Government, new legislation on industrial relations was 
introduced. The Industrial Relations Act 1971 (105), 
attempted to introduce into the practical conduct of 
industrial relations in Britain, an entirely new frame­
work of law. The details have been described fully 
elsewhere (106), as has the opposition of the trade 
union movement, and an analysis of the practical conse­
quences which the legislation actually had on union- 
management relations. (107). Again, opposition took the 
form of defence of trade union "rights", and it is 
interesting to note that the TUC and official movement 
played a major role in educating full-time officials and 
lay members alike, as to the effects of a complex piece 
of legislation on the collective "rights" of unions, 
including its effects on what in TUC propaganda was 
described as, "the right to strike".
It is also of interest that the Industrial Relations 
Act itself adopted the language of rights and introduced 
the specific legal right to join or to refuse to join a 
registered trade union. (108). The point so far as
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trad© union leaders were concerned was that such decla­
rations of individual rights, represented an attack on 
what they had effectively achieved within the absten- 
tionist legal framework, namely freedoms (or “rights") 
to establish 100 per cent membership arrangements, and 
enforce the closed shop. In practice, the introduction 
of a legal right to belong or not to belong to a trade 
union appears to have had little practical impact on the 
extent of the closed shop, though there were a handful 
of incidents where workers, enforcing their rights to 
leave the union, aroused considerable displeasure from 
their immediate work colleagues. In one celebrated case 
involving an employee of the Chrysler Car Company, the 
individual concerned returned from a Birmingham Indust­
rial tribunal with a ruling that he had the right not to 
belong to the AUEW, to be greeted by, "shouting, jeering 
and swearing workers who had staged a lightning walk-out 
in protest". (109). Whatever one's views as to the 
propriety of this form of behaviour, it is hard to deny 
the existence of beliefs of workers that their interests 
were in some way being betrayed by the actions of the 
dissident former AUEW member.
The demise of the Industrial Relations Act is a 
familiar episode in the industrial relations and politi­
cal history of the 1970s. As is well known, its repeal 
had to await the election of a Labour Government in 
1974, and was not before several sensational events had 
occurred, including the imprisonment of five dockers
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for taking part in unofficial industrial action in 1972. 
The evidence of the response of unions to this piece of 
legislation would seem to offer confirmation for the 
view that members were influenced by perceptions of 
"rights", which derived their moral basis from the ideas 
and influence of trade unionism. With regard to the 
legal rights enacted by the statute, there is little in 
the historical accounts of the Act that suggests that 
these were successful in replacing existing perceptions 
to any significant extent, or fundamentally altering the 
moral values of people in any general sense, much less 
changing their manifest behaviour in industrial 
relations.
At this point then we might consider briefly, respon­
ses to the collective rights introduced into law by the 
Employment Protection Act 1975. Among other things, 
these included provisions to give unions a right of 
consultation before collective redundancies occurred 
(110), a mechanism for achieving recognition by the use 
of ACAS (111), and a means of seeking unilateral arbi­
tration for the award of "fair" wages and conditions. 
(112). Though these changes were widely used by unions, 
it is far from clear that they made a deep impression on 
the consciousness of union members and other workers as 
new "rights", in the sense of their own moral and ethi­
cal perceptions. Had this been the case one might 
expect a significant improvement in the appeal of union 
membership as a direct consequence of the changes, and 
indeed, on the face of it this appears to have been the
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case. Union membership levels (expressed both in actual 
figures, and density) grew during the period that the 
collective rights were in force. (113). Moreover, the 
rate of growth of union density in the years 1975 to 
1979 (1.025 per cent per annum) was significantly grea­
ter than in the five years prior to the legislation 
(0.66 per cent per annum). Furthermore, since the 
beginning of the 1980s decade, when the legislation was 
repealed, union membership has been in decline both in 
actual and percentage terms. (114). However, this 
provides little basis to argue that there has been a 
direct causal connection between growth of membership 
and the legal rights provided by the EPA. Bain and 
Price have argued that economic factors such as wage and 
price inflation are among the most important influences 
on growth (115), and even if union officials referred to 
the existence of the legal rights when addressing pros­
pective members (116), this falls short of demonstrating 
that the said rights were internalised and perceived in 
terms of moral imperatives by the workers to whom these 
comments were addressed. Nonetheless, the question is 
not finally resolved by this discussion. It would, for 
example, seem possible that even if the enactment of 
legal rights of a collective nature did not enter the 
consciousness of un-unionised workers and find the 
support of an ethical or moral accord, this might have 
been the case with certain groups of union members, 
possibly including those who were more active and, 
therefore, more sensitive to the benefits of improved
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collective rights. The legislation relating to recogni­
tion of unions provides a useful test of this possible 
scenario. In this connection, the Grunwick dispute is 
of interest.
The recognition provisions of the EPA were laid 
down in sections 11-16 of the Act. The details of the 
procedure are not at this point especially important, 
except that ACAS had a responsibility to investigate 
claims for recognition, by ascertaining the opinions of 
management and workers, considering other relevant 
factors, and then making an award. As such it was plain 
that the procedure depended upon a reasonable level of 
co-operation from managements of companies, not least to 
gain access to workers for the purpose of inquiring as 
to their opinions.
In a recognition claim involving the film processing 
company, Grunwick, this orderly procedure was not pos­
sible. The company (a relatively small concern employ­
ing mainly immigrants) sacked 137 workers when they 
walked out on strike. The workers then remained at the 
gates, attempting to persuade others to join them, and 
the dispute became focused around the issue of recogni­
tion of the union and the reinstatement of the sacked 
workers. ACAS attempted to investigate the claim for 
recognition for more than a year, during which the 
strike continued with little publicity. When the com­
pany refused to act on the recommendations of ACAS that 
the union APEX should be recognised, the largely token 
picketing that had occurred since the start of the
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dispute was scaled up to mass-picket proportions in an 
attempt to seal off the factory. Considerable publicity 
was attracted to the dispute, and the TUC General 
Council was moved to call for a supporting demonstra­
tion, which eventually saw some 20,000 sympathisers and 
attendant union banners filling the narrow streets of 
the area surrounding the factories. Support was given 
by postal workers, who (unable to selectively "black" 
the company) withdrew their labour completely, thus 
disrupting postal deliveries to a sizeable area of North 
London for a period. (117).
The question arises as to how we should interpret the 
actions of those involved in the dispute, both the 
strikers/sacked Grunwick employees, and the considerable 
number of trade union members who engaged in supportive 
action of some kind. Looking at the Report of the Court 
of Inquiry into the dispute, it seems fairly clear that 
the strike itself began because workers were of the view 
that their "rights" were being infringed. In the past, 
the company had refused to recognise a union. When an 
incident occurred involving the dismissal of an 
employee, and the refusal of another to work what she 
considered to be unreasonable overtime, efforts were 
repeated to win support for the idea of a union in the 
company. The initial demands of the workers for recog­
nition of a union were not then couched in terms of 
legal rights; indeed, there is no reason to suspect that 
they had any knowledge of their legal rights at the time 
they formulated their demands. However, lacking any
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significant involvement in unions previously, they 
nonetheless focused their demands around membership of a 
union - in essence the "right" to have a union organisa­
tion in Grunwick. (118).
But what of those who were not employees of Grunwick, 
for example, those who acted to "black" the company's 
work, or who attended the mass pickets, and had no 
conceivable prospect of material gain as a result of 
their actions? Where did the support which they ex­
pressed find its moral force and ethical roots? On one 
level, it could be argued that union sympathisers were 
indignant because the company was so easily ignoring the 
legal procedures that had been laid down, and that the 
ethical basis for their concern derived from the legal 
enactment of rights into statute law. By this measure, 
perceived "rights" would be seen as being based on legal 
rights, and workers' moral concerns would be seen in 
relation to the legal/moral duties of employers, and the 
necessity that they should be upheld. However, this 
seems to be an inadequate explanation. If it were the 
case that perceptions of "rights" arose simply from 
workers' legal rights, one would have to allow that 
perceptions adjust to the unpredictable and sometimes 
bizarre nature of judicial decisions. In the Grunwick 
case it transpired, ACAS had no right to infer findings 
as to the opinions of employees on the question of union 
membership, even though there was no practicable way of 
overcoming the problems caused by the employers' refusal 
to allow ACAS officers to interview them, or issue
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questionnaires. Moreover, those workers who had been 
sacked had no legal means of being reinstated, and could 
not even persuade an industrial tribunal to accept that 
it had jurisdiction to consider their cases. By any 
objective assessment of the legal rights of employees as 
they came to be interpreted, the law was a dead letter 
in this dispute. Long before this point had been 
reached, however, the strikers had come to see the law 
as an adversary rather than a friend, in that the com­
pany was able to use it to its advantage by seeking 
injunctions to prevent "blacking" of its products, and 
generally seeking the protection of a sympathetic local 
police force. It was in these circumstances that 
Mrs Jayaben Desai, the leading figure in the dispute, 
told the press:-
"I have no faith in the legal position. I believe
only in the power of the trade union movement."
(119).
Characterisations of the views of the strikers' 
supporters as being conditioned by their assessments of 
the morality of the company's actions within a simple 
framework of legal rights and wrongs, would not then 
appear to be a sufficient explanation of their sources 
of concern. First and foremost, it would seem, there 
was a view that workers have "rights" to join unions 
without facing the sack, and that they have "rights" to 
establish recognised trade union organisation at their 
place of work. As a subsidiary factor, it would seem, 
unionists were indignant because the company appeared to 
be determined not to do "the decent thing", and
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co-operate in the recognition procedures. More to the
point, anti-unionism and the pursuit of "sweat shop"
employment policies, exploiting the vulnerability of
immigrant workers, was seen by unionists (even those on
the political right, like Roy Grantham of APEX) to be so
morally repugnant, that they were prepared to test the
limits of the law by resorting to mass picketing and
forms of secondary action which the courts might hold to
be unlawful. The episode of the UPW local leaders'
efforts to win support for unofficial action to "black"
the company's mail, illustrates this point. Taylor and
Dromey describe how the local leaders put the case to
their members:-
"The risks are appalling. You will be taking on 
the law, the Post Office and maybe even your own 
union... But, the question is simply this - is 
what we are doing right?"
And subsequently, the same leaders put it:-
"You can't prosecute our union because we alone are 
blacking Grunwick mail, not the UPW nationally. If 
you wish to imprison us, then try it. We have had 
enough." (120).
On the evidence of these sorts of statements, it is 
hard to see how the moral concerns of trade unionists 
could be regarded as a simple emanation of the statutory 
rights provided in the Employment Protection Act. On 
the contrary, there seems to be strong evidence here of 
union beliefs that workers were willing to enforce, in 
the face of what they perceived to be a hostile legal 
context. In the case of the postal workers, the law had 
prevented them from taking sympathetic action with the 
Grunwick strikers. Now, they had "had enough", and were
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determined to exert both their own "rights" to take such 
action, and defend those of other workers struggling for 
more fundamental causes.
The interplay between legal enactment and workers' 
perceptions of "rights" then, would appear to be com­
plex, and one hesitates to pronounce in any general 
sense on the basis of limited anecdotal evidence.
However, one notes that it did not appear that workers' 
sensibilities were unduly outraged when the legal rights 
which they had been granted under the EPA 1975 were 
watered down or finally repealed. On the other hand, 
there were considerable expressions of protest when in 
1984 the government banned trade union membership at the 
Cheltenham Communications spy centre (GCHQ), offering 
them £1000 to relinquish employment protection rights and 
trade union membership. (Two hundred still refused to 
do so over a year later.) (121). Overall, one's conclu­
sion then, would incline to the view that the law has 
played only a secondary role, in the creation of moral 
perceptions in workers' minds that might be described in 
terms of beliefs in "rights". In considering the 
actions of workers in the sorts of episodes that have 
been described here, in relation to collective rights, 
one is obliged to conclude that the perceptions of 
workers are subject somewhat more readily to the moral 
influence and ethical basis of unions and unionism, than 
any aspect of the force of law. While there may be 
circumstances when union perceived "rights" are widened 
by legislation, the ethical basis of trade unionism has
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had to acquire a certain independence of the law, and 
this appears in the interaction that sometimes occurs 
between these two forces.
In the era post 1980, the legal context has been 
increasingly complex. Employment Acts in 1980 and 1982, 
a Trade Union Act in 1984, and a further Employment Act 
in 1988 have served to dramatically alter the basis of 
union immunities. They have encroached upon union 
"rights" in picketing and have seemingly attempted to 
introduce new legal rights for union members (via a 
commissioner for trade union rights, provided for in the 
1988 Act), rights relating to unfair dismissal in a 
closed shop, ballots before industrial action etc. The 
underlying philosophy of much of the legislation has 
been that employers should be readier to litigate, and 
that by this means and a general policy of encouraging 
the moderate voices of unheard (but presumably "typi­
cal") rank and file union members, union militancy would 
be brought to heel. Throughout the 1980s, conflicting 
messages have been conveyed as to the effects of much of 
this legislation. According to some observers, unions 
have been faced with a profound shift in attitudes of 
members as a result of these changes, expressed most 
clearly in the support of workers for legislation on 
ballots, and their willingness to cross picket lines. 
(122). Examples such as the NUR's failure to command 
the support of its members in a dispute over the with­
drawal of guards from London Underground trains, point 
to the success of the legislation in undermining the
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perceived "rights" of employees. (An injunction was 
granted against the union on the Friday before the 
strike was due to commence. On the following Monday,
70 per cent of members refused to obey the strike call. 
The union complained that each of the members had been 
made to feel that it would be illegal for them perso­
nally to take strike action. (123)). On the other hand, 
episodes such as the Stockport messenger dispute and the 
miners' strike in 1984-85 seemed to show that unions and 
members were willing to face up to high profile poli­
cing, including the danger of injury or arrest, as well 
as possible fines and sequestration of union funds.
Yet, if these disputes confirmed the willingness of some 
workers to go to remarkable extremes of struggle in 
defence of their "rights", they also demonstrated that 
there was considerable scope for division and dissent 
among union members, to some extent bolstered by the new 
legislation. The failure of the NUM to hold a national 
ballot in the miners' strike (as the legislation pro­
vides), for example, has been seen as an important 
factor leading to the union's eventual defeat and the 
emergence of the breakaway Union of Democratic 
Mineworkers. (124). There seems, however, little reason 
to doubt that whatever impact the new legislation has 
had (even taken together with the effects of economic 
depression and unemployment, and the claimed changes in 
managerial attitudes since 1979), the influence of trade 
union and collective "rights" as moral forces in the 
minds of workers continues to persist.
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At this point then, we will consider the question 
of "rights" further, by looking at what is sometimes 
called "the right to work". However, as will be seen, 
"the right to work" in fact embodies a number of quite 
distinct and different notions, and the use of the 
plural, "rights", will be self-explanatory.
3.8 RIGHTS TO WORE
So far, we have touched upon three different cate­
gories of "rights" which workers may perceive in rela­
tion to their employment. These I have somewhat loosely 
described as categories of "contractual rights", "access 
and control rights", and "collective and trade union 
rights". In the main, it will be noted, these cate­
gories refer to "rights" of employees in work, and make 
little reference to the unemployed worker who aspires to 
become part of the employed workforce. And though in 
general terms, trade unions' chief focus of activity is 
in the area of employment, the fears of trade union 
members, as well as their actual experiences, of unem­
ployment, are a factor which cannot be ignored. Trade 
unions sometimes express demands for a "right to work", 
as any examination of labour history will quickly 
reveal. How far, and to what extent these demands may 
be said to accurately fit the description given to them 
is, however, another matter. Also, it would seem that 
the phrase, "the right to work", has been used to
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describe a number of perspectives, with such widely 
differing political and philosophical undertones, that 
it is confusing to see such variety of meaning encom­
passed within the same phrase. So, it is perhaps appro­
priate that in relation to employment and unemployment, 
we consider "rights to work" as a generic category 
within which there are a number of variations.
The Webbs (125), recall how the Spitalfields silk 
weavers, in 1765, without employment owing to the impor­
tation of foreign silk, marched in protest to 
Westminster and engaged in riots. The result was to 
prod Parliament into legislation on their behalf. They 
describe, too, how more generally the legal persecution 
of trade unionists in the first twenty years of the 
nineteenth century, often around issues of job protec­
tion sometimes drove members into violence and sedition. 
The French Socialists in 1848 put forward demands for a 
droit au travail, in the specific sense of a right with 
a corresponding duty on the part of the public autho­
rities to provide work (128), a claim which the revolu­
tionary Marx castigated as...
"... in the bourgeois sense, nonsense, a wretched, 
pious wish." (127).
However, he also saw "behind the 'right to work', the 
June insurrection", and recognised the revolutionary 
potential of the "right to work" as "power over capital" 
for the "abolition of wage labour, capital and their 
mutual relationship". (128),
During the great depression of the 1880s and 1890s, 
socialists and Liberal radicals in Britain focused
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agitation against unemployment around the concept of a
"national right to work". "Right to work committees"
were established in many parts of the country, and a
"Right to Work Bill" was drafted for consideration by
Parliament. (129). The cause was taken up again in 1907
by Ramsay McDonald, and though the Bill appeared under
another title, it became known by the same name. Clause
3 of the Bill provided that:-
"Where a workman has registered himself as unem­
ployed it shall be for the local unemployment 
authority to provide work for him in connection 
with one or other of the schemes herein provided, 
or otherwise or failing provision of work to pro­
vide maintenance should necessity exist for that 
person and those depending on that person for the 
necessities of life." (130).
The ideas of Chartism and the influence of Owen in
the thinking of trade union members in Britain, was (as
the Webbs noted), a significant force. Owen asserted
the existence of "rights" for working men, including...
"... the right of every workman who is unemployed, 
to employment and to such an amount of wages as 
have been indicated." (131).
Historians like Thompson have written of the "ten
hours movement", at a time when trade unions were barely
legal organisations, which aimed to...
"... lighten the labour of children, give the 
shorter working day to adult operatives, and 
spread the available work more widely among 
hand workers and the unemployed." (132).
Hinton (133), traces the links between socialist 
parties and the reactions of workers to unemployment.
He recalls for example how the Social Democratic 
Federation agitated among the unemployed in London's 
East End, and organised a number of protest marches.
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some of which led to violent confrontations with the 
police. The rise of syndicalism from 1910 onwards, the 
growth of the shop stewards movement in the First World 
War years, and the subsequent emergence of the National 
Unemployment Workers' Movement to spearhead active 
resistance to unemployment in the 1920s and 1930s, are 
all traced by Hinton. And while the TUC and the Labour 
Party have been described as showing "no interest" in 
organising the unemployed (134), the NUWM met with 
considerable success in politicising the unemployed 
around the issues of unemployment, and demanded a "right 
to work or full pay". The trades councils in particular 
were closely involved with the NUWM in organisation of 
the hunger marches, and were associated with demands 
made on local Guardians to increase the levels of relief 
to the unemployed. Historical accounts of this period 
testify to the impact which the NUWM had on the "politi­
cal and ideological" make-up of trade union activists, 
which is to say, including their moral and ethical 
beliefs expressed through their perceptions of "rights".
Accounts of more recent history continue to reflect 
these concerns. Salmon, writing of the Midlands motor 
industry, notes the role of shop stewards' combine 
committees in opposing redundancy and fighting for "the 
right to work". (136). Finch, a union convenor in the 
1950s, recalls the historical background to some of 
these events and describes how the motor industry com­
bine committee formulated demands to shorten the
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working week to prevent redundancies, and called for 
measures to "retain and retrain" workers who might 
otherwise be dismissed. (137).
It will be evident from the above discussion that 
there are a number of senses in which the phrase, "the 
right to work", has been used to identify political or 
moral demands within the broad trade union and labour 
movement. Hepple (138), provides an interesting catego­
risation of the various senses in which the "right to 
work" has been employed as a concept, including at the 
level of the State, the employer, and the trade union. 
Following his categorisation, the "right to work in 
relation to the State" relates to an expectation that 
the State should assume a welfare role in a general 
sense, including by adopting full employment policies to 
protect the job opportunities of workers. (Such epi­
sodes as the silk weavers' marches, the ideas of 
Chartism, the hunger marches, and other demands for 
political intervention, might be said to come under this 
heading.) Hepple notes that it is in the sense of 
providing employment services for workers, including 
vocational training, etc, that the concept of a "right 
to work" is incorporated in the European Social Charter, 
and in the constitutions and labour codes of a number of 
countries in both East and Western Europe. (139).
Looking at the "right to work" in relation to 
employers, Hepple distinguishes between:- (a) the right 
to be engaged; (b) the right to be given work to do when 
employed; and: (c) the right to remain continuously
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employed, including the right to be reinstated in the
event of unjustified termination". (140). Pointing out
that in relation to engagement there has, historically
speaking, been no legal constraint on the capricious or
even reprehensible action of an employer in refusing to
offer work to a particular individual. Hepple points
out that to some extent, legislation has mitigated this
area of freedom by introducing requirements for equal
treatment of men and women, and different racial groups.
He points out that...
"... the only two significant exceptions to the 
general absence of a right to be engaged for em­
ployment, are the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 
1944, and the Dock Workers Employment Scheme 1967." 
(141).
Significantly, the first of these pieces of legisla­
tion is regarded as "practically speaking, a dead 
letter" (142), and since the time when Hepple was 
writing, we had in 1989 the abolition of the National 
Dock Labour Scheme, which resulted in an unsuccessful 
attempt to defend the scheme by calling a national docks 
strike.
Simlarly, with regard to "a right to be given work", 
Hepple's conclusion is that the law has done little to 
insist that an employee should actually be given work to 
do when in employment, and in general it is sufficient 
for an employer to simply pay wages. The exceptions are 
of somewhat marginal significance in the mainstream of 
industrial relations, and do not support any conclusion 
that a "right to be given work" exists, at least as far 
as the law is concerned. Thirdly, Hepple looks at the
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question of termination of employment, and makes inte­
resting comments with regard to the powers of industrial 
tribunals to order reinstatement or re-engagement of 
dismissed workers. Again, his observations are essen­
tially to the effect that there is an absence of legal 
rights in this country (though he makes comparisons with 
the American, German and Swedish systems where powerful 
remedies are available to the Labour Courts to order 
non-dismissal).
Finally, Hepple refers to the application of the 
term, a "right to work", in relation to trade unions.
In this he is touching on a different concept. Which 
is, effectively, a tendency for the law, either through 
statutory means (as in certain parts of the United 
States) or through the intervention of judges (as in 
Lord Denning's pronouncements in a number of cases), to 
question the authority of unions to enforce a closed 
shop arrangement, by calling for the dismissal or non­
employment of non-union members.
The conclusion, which Hepple draws to this extensive 
analysis of the concept of the "right to work" is inte­
resting from the point of view of the present discussion 
of perceived "rights". It is essentially that within 
Western market economics, a "right to work" enforceable 
against the State, is a meaningless phrase, and that the 
most that can be guaranteed is a right to social assis­
tance. (Hepple's remedy is to urge a number of inter­
mediate reforms, for example, removing the unlimited 
freedom of employers to discriminate against potential
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employees on grounds of age and social origin, and 
giving unions the right of consultation in connection 
with any type of dismissal, and not simply in relation 
to collective redundancies). However, this raises the 
question of what sense and meaning we should attach to 
the concept of "the right to work", in the various forms 
in which it has been used. It will be clear from the 
above discussion that the phrase has essentially taken 
the form of a political goal or slogan, which at various 
times has had a powerful effect in mobilising groups of 
workers and the unemployed to various forms of mass 
protest. And, while trade unions and trade unionsts 
have sometimes identified themselves with demands for a 
"right to work", it seems significant that those moments 
when such demands have been made, have represented also, 
highly politicised episodes of union activity.
Arising from this, one might observe that Marx's
assessment of the revolutionary potential in the "right
to work" sometimes finds echoes in the evaluations made
of the various campaigns to prevent closures in the
1970s. In such assessments it is pointed out that the
"right to work" became the means of challenging the
fundamental values of the capitalist system which failed
to provide the right. For example, as Reid expressed it
during the course of the UCS work-in
"The right to work is a simple demand, yet also a 
profound one. And if this system is not able to 
provide it, let us have another." (143).
Making due allowances for the rhetorical nature of 
these comments, it is nevertheless hard to avoid the
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conclusion that struggles by workers for the "right not
to be made redundant" have been imbued with a political
connotation that puts them in a distinctive category,
rarely achieved in other kinds of disputes. For
example, Woolfson and Foster conclude their book on the
Caterpillar Tractors occupation with the following
observation : -
"The Caterpillar workers seized not just a factory 
but the centre of the Scottish political debate.
In doing so, they raised issues which pose funda­
mental challenges to the political and economic 
system. Why, they asked, cannot working people 
seek the support of other workers in order to match 
the power of capital - and to whom the trade union 
movement is ultimately accountable? Why should 
people not have the power to control and plan the 
economic and social fabric of their own lives - to 
ensure a future in which the right to work is made 
a basic human right?" (144).
But, as we saw in the previous chapter, there is room 
for considerable debate over the meaning and signifi­
cance of factory occupations to oppose closures. None­
theless, even those accounts which have played down the 
suggestion of any revolutionary political overtones, 
have tended to acknowledge that at their most basic 
level, occupations, and sit-ins represent struggles 
against unemployment, as opposed to, for example, tac­
tics merely designed to accommodate to redundancy by 
securing a greater level of redundancy pay. (145).
It is not at this point necessary to make any final 
pronouncement on this issue. Suffice it to note that 
were there to be any widespread acceptance of the ethi­
cal and moral concept of the "right not to be made 
redundant", one would not expect such a perceived 
"right" to have become part of the mental make-up of
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people, without the support of some active vehicle that 
could convey the ideas concerned. It is scarcely neces­
sary to labour the point, that the only likely vehicle 
for the carriage of such ideas into the minds of people 
would be political movements and trade unions, and most 
likely a combination of the two. At moments when the 
tendency of workers to oppose redundancies and closures 
appears to gather strength, one might expect, therefore, 
to find evidence of a politicisation of trade unions 
that may reflect in a number of ways and not simply in 
battles against redundancy and closure. Consequently, 
it is interesting to note that the period when campaigns 
against closure, and when factory occupations were at a 
peak during the early 1970s, also marked a time when the 
trade union movement fought the Industrial Relations 
Act, including a number of major demonstrations and 
through a general strike called by the TUC to protest 
against the imprisonment of the five dockers in 
Pentonville Prison, and when the influence of left 
parties, e.g. the Communist Party, and the Socialist 
Workers Party/International Socialists in the trade 
unions, was at its height in the post war era. However 
one understands the notion of the "right to work", it
would seem that the ethical and moral roots of its
formation lie somewhere in the path of socialist move­
ments, and trade unionism in its more radical forms.
Further than this it is at this stage not necessary 
for us to venture. We will now consider the question of
"rights" within the context of the ideas reviewed
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earlier in this chapter, namely "culture", "ideology", 
and "world views". In particular we will consider the 
use of "culture" as a notion that may be applied to the 
ethical and moral influences exerted by unions and 
unionism, in their role in conveying ideas and expres­
sions of "rights", as we have here examined.
3.9 TRADE UHIOH.CULTURES
So far, in this chapter, we have considered the 
usefulness, and relationship between the concepts of 
"ideology", "culture", and "world view". We have noted 
their conceptual similarities, and the way they have 
been used to help understand the dispositions of people 
to engage in collective activity, in including popular 
protest of various forms. In sections 3.5 to 3.8 we 
have looked at some examples of perceived "rights" of 
workers. I have suggested that though the notion of a 
"right" may be taken to have a legal connotation, per­
ceptions by workers of "rights" are not necessarily 
rooted in any real legal formulation. Rather, I have 
suggested, they have evolved from defensive positions 
relating to what workers have become accustomed to 
enjoy, or from occupational and union outlooks and 
traditions, and crucially ethical and moral influences 
which to some extent - perhaps a very significant extent 
- stem from the influence of unions and unionism. At
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this stage we will attempt to bring these elements 
together and, hopefully, point the way towards further 
investigations. We will begin by referring back to the 
idea of "culture" which has been touched upon in rela­
tion to the earlier discussion of "ideologies" and 
"world views".
"Culture", "ideology", and "world views", it will be 
recalled, have each in their own way been applied to the 
question of the moral conceptions of workers, and what
they believe to be "right" or "their rights". Each goes
somewhat wider than this, and contains its own nuances 
and emphases, but I have argued that there is (notwith­
standing) a conceptual similarity. When we talk of 
culture in a sociological sense, we are referring to 
defined appropriate modes of thinking, acting and 
feeling. In sociological theory, culture refers to the 
totality of what is learned by individuals as members of 
a society. It embraces customs and behaviour, but these 
in turn flow from common standards of good and bad. To 
a large extent, it is clear, culture is about ideas.
(146). "Ideology" as a concept has been used in several
different ways earlier in this chapter, and we noted in 
particular the usage adopted by Rude. He distinguishes 
between two aspects of ideology, it will be recalled, 
namely the traditional, folk law "mother's milk" ele­
ment, which he describes as an "inherent ideology", and 
a "derived" element, borrowing from the stock of ideas 
conveyed by others in a more formal or structured man­
ner, such as in sermons, speeches, or in various
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pamphlets and books. (147). Rude, however, appears to 
see no clear distinction between the concept of "cul­
ture" and his "inherent ideology". For example, he 
draws parallels with E.P. Thompson's use of the phrase, 
"plebeian culture" (148), and he writes of "the inherent 
beliefs of one generation, ... forming part of its basic 
culture" including, "many beliefs that were originally 
derived from outside by an earlier one". (149).
On the other hand, we have seen that Sabel, in his
use of the term, "world view", has adopted a concept
that overlaps with "culture". "World views", it will be
remembered, derive from a process of socialisation, and
incorporate...
"... a set of fears and hopes, visions of success 
and failure; an intuition of possibilities that 
define at once our ambitions and our sense 
of social honour" (150);
and it will be recalled, too, that though Sabel emphasi­
ses the variation of world views around occupational and 
other divisions in the labour force, he writes of 
"national cultures" as a form of political "world view", 
influencing in turn such occupational "world views". 
(151).
In what follows, therefore, I have decided to adopt 
the concept of "culture", encompassing elements of these 
other formulations. "Culture" implies shared, socia­
lised, ways of thinking, feeling and responding to 
events in the world and, whilst in normal usage it 
embraces customs and behaviour, these flow from common 
standards of good and bad. It embodies shared values, 
and ideas, and it would appear to substantially
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over-arch the concepts of "ideology" (particularly 
"inherent ideology") as used by Rude, and "world view" as 
used by Sabel. Moreover, it has a distinctive ethical 
component. In identifying the existence of perceived 
"rights", shared by groups of workers, we are, in 
effect, noting the existence of shared moral influences, 
and these may in turn be conceived as aspects of "cul­
ture" .
In looking at the "ideological" make-up of workers, 
or examining their "world views" and underlying moral 
beliefs, writers note the variations from one group to 
another. We should expect then to use the term culture 
to denote not only shared attitudes, values, ideas etc, 
but also to indicate their differences from one group to 
another. And, since cultures in sociological terms 
reflect a shared, socialised set of influences within a 
given society, we can adapt this usage to describe and 
explain the variations we find within different groups 
of workers and their union organisations. Unions have 
no separate existence outside the workers who belong to 
them, and to this extent one should avoid reification of 
unions. However, when workers join unions, they are 
joining existing collectivities of workers, which it may 
be observed have both a dynamic and continuity of in­
fluence (which we might describe as "tradition") that 
creates a culture into which newcomers are induced.
This culture then provides a socialising effect on 
others. They come to share in the culture, and to one 
extent or another, find themselves influenced by its
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values and outlooks. We might see the cultural in­
fluences thus described as a "trade union culture".
We should acknowledge, however, that there is no 
sharp line which separates unions and their members from 
other cultural influences in society. The culture of 
craft unionism, for example, may be seen as linked to 
the occupational characteristics of a trade or appren­
ticeship system, as well as the wider values in society, 
which to some extent encourage groups to defend and 
protect their own interests at the expense of others, or 
to value status or aspects of elitism. Whilst not 
necessarily adopting these values in entirety, craft 
union cultures would seem to reflect some of their 
aspects, and may in turn contribute to their perpetua­
tion as elements of the culture of the wider society. A 
similar case might be seen in the instance of unions in 
education and health care which represent workers in 
what might be loosely described as "the lower profes­
sions". The policies of such unions, e.g. arguing for 
maintenance of professional standards, and excellence of 
service provision, would seem to be reflected in a 
general concern of other sections of society over such 
issues, which may to some extent be influenced by the 
unions concerned. If such policy issues are supported 
by values that are seen as part of union cultures, then 
it would seem that union cultures in some cases overlap 
and penetrate the cultures of the wider society. Unions 
then, are not self contained, water tight compartments 
within which cultures and their associated moral
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values develop separately. Rather, they represent 
ideas, doctrines, notions, centred around an area of 
human activity, i.e. membership of unions, and the prac­
tice of trade unionism, which have a bearing on the 
culture of society and the behaviour of members in it in 
a general sense. (152). If one were to describe the 
elements of a union culture then, one would have to 
allow for the influence of tradition and other factors 
central to unions and unionism but also the influences 
of the occupational environment, and factors in the 
wider society.
Union cultures, one might venture, may reflect dis­
tinctive characterisatics of different unions. There 
could be certain features of a union's national approach 
to, for example, the relative importance of the role of 
shop stewards as against full-time officers, which 
became part of the assumed and expected context within 
which events were seen, and decisions taken. Besides 
this, however, one would expect to find variations 
within unions, in given industries, or even in indivi­
dual plants. Union cultures need not necessarily be 
compatible, or cohesive - witness the conflict which 
appears within unions when different expectations and 
values appear to clash, or between unions when values 
and objectives differ. Conflict and rivalry between 
unions does not have to be explained in terms of cul­
ture, but the long term persistence of it over many 
years is arguably a strong indication of cultural in­
fluences that underly the said conflict. (153).
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The concept of a trade union culture may, for 
example, be useful in explaining the contrasting charac­
ter of different unions. Why is the EEPTU, on the face 
of it, more "right wing", and imbued with a spirit of 
business unionism, than other unions, e.g. the T&GWU or 
MSF? Is it because a far larger proportion of EEPTU 
members just happen to be politically more to the right 
than is the case with members of other unions? Or is it 
that the union conveys values and educates its activists 
to some extent to adopt perceptions, values and politi­
cal points of view that are characteristic of a distinc­
tive culture? Or what of the National Union of 
Mineworkers - in particular before the dispute of 1984- 
85 that led to the formation of the breakaway Union of 
Democratic Mineworkers? Why should certain Areas of the 
NUM be regarded as traditionally more militant than 
others, and have perpetuated such traditional differen­
ces over a considerable number of years? (154). It may 
be that the concept of distinctive trade union cultures 
would be helpful in explaining these questions.
On the other hand, we should be cautious before 
accepting that differences in national policies of 
unions necessarily reflect underlying cultural differen­
ces in those same unions. It may be that policy posi­
tions reflect the political views, values and attitudes 
of only a relatively small layer of union leaders and 
activists, who by skillful use of union decision-making 
machinery, gain official approval for their views. 
Underneath, the vast mass of union members may not be
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touched by the same attitudes, values and political 
views. Investigation might demonstrate that the in­
fluence of union cultures is weak at the level of the 
ordinary member, or that the cultural pressures of the 
wider society, untouched by unions and unionism, are 
enough to explain the variations in the behaviour of 
groups of people, including their behaviour in trade 
unions. Such an argument gives rise to the possibi­
lity - indeed the need - to examine the influence of 
cultures at the level of national union leaderships, and 
at the level of rank and file members and workplace 
union organisation.
If union cultures are substantially identifiable by 
the beliefs and values they embody, what then is the 
significance of perceived "rights"? It has been argued 
that "rights" represent an expression of ethical and 
moral points of view, which may be strongly influenced 
by unions or unionism. To the extent that shared per­
ceptions of "rights" are seen to exist, therefore, they 
may be regarded as central features of culture. But it 
should also be noted that the discussion of "rights" 
which we have conducted in this chapter, suggests the 
possible influence of a number of factors in workers' 
commitment to them. Such factors may include action by 
the State by legislation or other means, the attitudes 
and values of management (which may be reflected in 
certain decisions they take which affect the lives of 
workers, and which may be perceived as legitimate or 
otherwise) and other influences on viewpoints and
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moral positions that stem from the wider society, 
through religion, the education system, political 
parties, the press and so on.
However, it also follows from this discussion that 
one would expect that perceptions of "rights" would be 
influenced by basic elements of trade unionism - "trade 
union principles" - as well as other more explicit 
policy aspects of unons. Such basic elements might 
include aspects of some or all of the "rights" which we 
have already considered; beliefs in "rights" of access 
to or control of work, collective "rights" such as the 
"right" of recognition or the "right" to strike, for 
example. They might also include moral obligations such 
as not crossing a picket line when there is a strike. 
Elements of culture which appear in the expression by 
workers, of demands for what they perceive as "rights", 
may therefore arise from values that have been deeply 
ingrained in the traditions of trade unionism, and are 
part of the moral force that it has historically ac­
quired. Such elements may be likened to the "inherent" 
element in Rudé's concept of ideology, passed on from one 
generation of trade unionists to another. On the other 
hand, there is the possibility of a more variable ele­
ment in the perceptions of workers, which may stem more 
from the influence of trade union leaders. At moments 
of crisis (but not exclusively so) leaders, including 
those at rank and file level, may succeed in moulding 
the views of members to incorporate aspects of a more 
coherent political understanding.
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In looking at union cultures through workers' percep­
tions of "rights", therefore, we may come to a better 
understanding of how unions respond to events, and 
motivate their members to action. We may also be able 
to understand better the differences in workers' beha­
viour in similar contexts, marked out by differences in 
unions and forms of union organisation. In this it 
would be surprising if union cultures failed to impact 
upon the behaviour of workers and the responses of 
unions in redundancy situations. It would be surprising, 
too, if we were unable to observe such cultural influen­
ces through the expression by workers of perceived 
"rights" in relation to redundancy. At this point, 
therefore, it would seem appropriate that we pause to 
summarise the elements of our theoretical synthesis, and 
begin to relate them to the task of understanding union 
responses to redundancy, which forms the principle focus 
of this study.
3.10 SUMMARY Qf THEORY
Let us summarise what has emerged as a theory to 
explain union responses to redundancy. Workers may be 
expected to react to redundancy (as to other events of 
moment) in some measure according to how their moral and 
ethical expectations are confronted. Such normative 
influences, and ethical outlooks are not only comprised 
of the individual beliefs that workers bring to the
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workplace, as socialised members of society they are 
influenced within the employment context by the expe­
rience of employment itself. And while moral expecta­
tions as elements of "world views" or "ideologies" 
derive from a process of socialisation, aspects of that 
socialisation include workers' experience of management 
style, technology employed, and the wider forces of the 
law, economy and the role of the State. Crucially, 
however, they are, I suggest, likely to be influenced by 
the experience of unions and unionism. This influence 
may be exerted by the existence of a "trade union cul­
ture", which embodies collective perceptions of 
"rights", which do not necessarily find support as legal 
rights but nevertheless occupy a position in workers' 
views of what is legitimate, or illegitimate. When 
perceived "rights" are violated workers are likely to 
want to find ways of defending them, and union cultures, 
and the possession of perceptions on "rights" may there­
fore explain variations in, and patterns of, responses 
to redundancy. Union cultures may embody a lower key, 
"basic principles" element, as a more or less constant 
influence in any specific culture, given a number of 
different contexts. They may also take on additional 
(perhaps explicitly political) elements from time to 
time, and possibly undergo changes as a result. And 
cultures may be expected to reflect the policies of 
trade unions nationally, as well as to respond to some 
degree to the changing contexts and pressures of outside
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forces - the economy, the State, organisational and 
other factors in the world of business, the uses of 
technology and so on. It would be surprising, however, 
if unions were to be completely dominated by managerial 
or other ideologies, though there may well be influences 
which inhibit and confuse the development of ideologies 
to counter the influence of the dominant class. (155).
For the sake of clarity, it should be stressed that a 
particular trade union culture need not be conceived as 
correspsonding to a national trade union organisation. 
Rather, company or workplace organisations to some 
extent may have their own relatively distinct cultures, 
which may or may not embody elements of influence from 
the union, nationally. Alternatively, it would be 
possible to consider cultures operating simultaneously 
at a global union level (reflected in union leaders, and 
others on the national scene) and locally, in the work­
place or company, where members and lay officials may 
have a degree of autonomy of action that facilitates 
separate development of traditions, moral values, and 
expectations. If this is so, it might become important 
to examine the degree to which regional or national 
organisations of unions succeed in projecting a cultural 
influence that penetrates individual company and work­
place organisations.
It is necessary to bear in mind the foregoing when 
considering the application of the theoretical outline 
that has been described here, to the task of explaining
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union responses to redundancy. It would appear that 
analysis at two distinct levels would be important, 
namely at the level of a company or workplace trade 
union organisation and at national level, in respect of 
the global culture of a union or unions. In the case 
studies which follow in chapters four and five, these 
two levels have been adopted in turn, and it will be 
necessary to alter our focus accordingly. At this point 
we may illustrate the application of the theory in the 
approaches of two other writers which focus on the 
national macro analysis, and the local company based 
case study.
3.11 THE THEORY APPLIED TO OTHER STUDIES
The first of the two examples which 1 propose that 
we should briefly consider, is taken from the work of 
Gouldner. (156). This is a single company, single 
dispute case study, based on a gypsum mine in the U.S.A. 
Looking at the accounts which workers and management 
have to offer, Gouldner sets out to analyse events from 
a sociological point of view. Essentially he concerns 
himself with such questions as: how did the strike come 
about?; did the parties expect it?; etc. He looks for 
causes of the strike through analysis and examination of 
the belief systems of workers, and management, and asks 
how they entered into the events that occurred. He 
considers, for example, group tensions, and refers to
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"symptoms" of such tensions. A symptomatic complaint, 
he notes "constitutes a statement of frustrated expecta­
tion". (157). He refers to the question of "speed up", 
and notes that a "symptom" of tension is identifiable in 
the expressed frustration of workers that the speeds 
should not be continually varying. He mentions the 
complaints made by a number of workers about the habit 
of certain managers to abuse them verbally - to engage 
in "cursing". These complaints, he observes, reflected 
violated expectations that supervisors would not overtly 
express aggression and disrespect for the workers they 
supervised. He refers also to complaints about manage­
ment's broken promises, which he says, demononstrate 
that workers expected to be able to trust, and be trus­
ted by management. There was, he notes, "A general 
complaint that management was not even conforming with 
the expectations which it had deliberately given workers 
reason to believe they would respect". (158).
Symptoms are only symptoms by Gouldner's definition 
then, when workers do not regard the breach of expecta­
tion as legitimate. For example, a miner, whose foreman 
was said to have been doing work which he was not expec­
ted by workers to perform, did not really object to this 
breach of expectation by the foreman. It was only 
regarded as illegitimate when the foreman did the work 
in such a manner as to increase his control over the 
worker. A second line of enquiry by Gouldner in his 
case study, is on the conditions which frustrate
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the expectations of complainants. For example, in the 
above instance, Gouldner observes, it was the actual 
increase in close supervision that mattered.
Gouldner's theory to account for the occurrence of 
the strike, therefore, is advanced in terms of expecta­
tions of workers which were in various ways frustrated. 
He explains it in the light of the changing expectations 
of workers, and management, leading to a state of uncer­
tainty, and he refers to the inconsistency of expecta­
tions as a further factor. (Tension increases, he 
argues, if there is a lack of awareness of others' 
expectations.) The strike was in essence then, accor­
ding to Gouldner, about the legitimacy of expectations. 
Where either side had expections that were pereceived by 
the other as non-legitimate, tensions increased and the 
result was industrial action.
Interestingly, workers usually defined the strike in 
Gouldner's case study, in ethical terms, holding it to 
be morally justified. As many of them put it, "We're 
out to get our rights". The strike was not interpreted 
by them (as management was inclined to define it) in the 
amoral exercise of power. On the contrary, Gouldner 
notes, the hositility of workers "towards the swearing 
supervisor, and against supervisors who overstepped 
their bounds, expressed moral indignation". (Emphasis in 
original.) (159) .
The parallel between Gouldner's approach and that 
which we have developed in this chapter so far, is 
reasonably clear. His description of "expectations"
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(and in particular in his insistence on the moral basis 
of what workers perceive to be legitimate expectations) 
is akin to the description of perceived "rights" which 
has been considered. As such, it provides a useful 
example, which might be taken further, but for the chief 
limitation of all such case studies being based on 
isolated events. We have no way of knowing whether the 
said "expectations" (or perceived "rights") of workers 
operate in any continuous or durable sense. Are they 
long term, ingrained expectations, that remain as conti­
nuing influences in the minds of workers, or are they 
merely ephemeral flashes of momentary consequence? The 
answer is important to our understanding of the nature 
of industrial conflict. However, it also has a bearing 
on the application of the concept of culture. If the 
"expectations" of workers appear to vary widely over a 
period of time, it would be hard to argue that "expecta­
tions" derive from moral and ethical forces that are 
elements of culture. Nonetheless, the workplace focus 
of the study is a good example of the type of approach 
in which the local aspect of union cultures might be 
considered, even though this is not developed in this 
particular study, by the lack of a longer term analysis.
In looking at this example of a local company based 
case study then, one finds a number of aspects to it 
which are of interest, bearing in mind the theoretical 
line that has been advanced relating to the importance 
of union cultures. The first point is that in referring
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to "expectations" and their moral element, Gouldner is 
echoing the argument that has been developed with regard 
to "rights". Secondly, however, he does not consider 
the source of the said moral expectations, neither does 
he question their durability or otherwise over a period 
of time. Applying a case study such as this to the 
theory which has been developed would, therefore, only 
be of limited value, and clearly, in any attempt to 
investigate the influence of union cultures at a local 
level, we shall need to adopt a longer term view. At 
this point we might consider the question of the ap­
proach needed in any analysis at a macro, or national 
level.
Looking at the fluctuations in strike statistics from 
data collected since 1888, Cronin (16), considers 
theories advanced to explain the occurrence of indust­
rial conflict. The detailed arguments he puts forward 
in relation to other studies, though interesting, are 
not especially important in the present context. It is 
sufficient to observe that Cronin regards the assumption 
behind most studies that workers' desires and attitudes 
are translated without difficulty into strike action, as 
being at root, a cause of considerable deficiency. He 
examines various theories, including economic models, in 
some detail, and concludes that in the main they fail to 
explain the peculiar wave-like pattern of statistics on 
industrial conflict. Even seemingly helpful studies, 
argues Cronin, suffer from this defect, and he instances 
the work of Shorter and Tilley (161), who advance the
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argument that technology, and its social impacts, has 
a crucial effect on workers' ability to organise in 
unions, which in turn has direct consequences on levels 
of militancy.
Cronin insists that one must deal with the problem by 
two means. The first is by associating the uneven 
character of economic growth with the comparable uneven­
ness of industrial conflict. The second is by ensuring 
that consciousness of workers is seen to intervene 
between structural aspects of society on one hand, and 
trade union organisation on the other. As he puts it, 
by leaving out the subjective dimension, other writers 
have tended to...
"... telescope and oversimplify the complicated 
process by which the structural features of society 
come to inform collective action." (162).
The dynamism of industrial society, observes Cronin,
throws up new industries and new processes with each
successive phase of growth. He argues that:-
"The effect upon workers of this uneven pattern is 
to confront them with a different complex of prob­
lems and grievances at each major shift and to 
stimulate a 're-making' of their consciousness and 
forms of collective organisation every two or three 
decades. Strike waves thus appear as periodic and 
concrete manifestations of the new attitudes and 
novel strategies, produced by the impact of 'long 
waves' of economic growth upon the working class." 
(163).
The important essential of Cronin's argument then, is 
that the main strike waves - or "explosions of strike 
activity" - are correlated with significant phases in 
the cycle of economic growth. Each strike wave is also 
associated with breakthroughs in union structure
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and strategy, and substantial (at times dramatic) in­
creases in membership. So...
"... both strikes and unionisation are reflections 
of a broader learning process on the part 
of workers, stimulated by the effects of different 
phases of economic development."
Moreover, consciousness evolves and develops in 
various stages of growth, and according to a range of 
historical experiences, as Cronin describes. He touches 
on the attitudes of workers towards unemployment, which 
were...
"... burned deeply into the collective conscious­
ness of almost every working class family... later 
translated into political terms no later than the 
election of 1945." (164).
He comments that the memories of the 1930s had a pro­
found effect on workers' attitudes and beliefs.
Workers' consciousness during the 1950s was crucially 
affected by their experience of the 1930s, but also of 
the 1940s, and early 1950s, which taught them by 1955 
that unemployment was not only to be feared and hated, 
but that it was also unnecessary. Consequently by 
1956...
"... the number of strikes over the employment 
of particular persons, working arrangements 
and similar matters grew noticeably, betokening 
an increased concern for job rights and 
security." (165).
Moreover, workers' fears about insecurity of employ­
ment had taught them that their best plan was to, "Go 
all out for what they can get while the company's pro­
fits are high". (166).
Consciousness of workers, and the lessons and expe­
riences they draw from successive periods of history
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then, are seen as the crucial moderating factors between 
economic and technological change on one hand, and 
industrial militancy on the other. Generations of 
workers are used as an essential way of explaining the 
emergence of different groups with different opponents 
and different "inventories of problems". And, as one 
generation of labour movement activists succeeds ano­
ther, with different "ensembles of issues" to resolve, 
they enter different stages of economic growth, which 
alters consciousness, and this in turn stimulates 
organisation and strikes.
Again, interesting though this account is, it seems 
somewhat incomplete in its vague and generalised refe­
rences to workers' consciousness. Cronin is at pains to 
distance himself from the Marxist use of the term con­
sciousness, but he provides little indication of what he 
believes the relevant components of consciousness to be, 
with regard to its impact upon militancy and strike 
action. Moreover, while he invokes the concept of 
"generations" to explain the emergence of new "attitudes 
and orientations", there is little to be found as to the 
process whereby those said "attitudes and orientations" 
are generated, or conveyed into the minds of workers in 
general. Furthermore, one is obliged to wonder about 
the concept of "generation", which seems to imply that 
every so often unions make a fresh start with new groups 
of activists, who have had little or no opportunity of 
being influenced by earlier "generations" of activists. 
As we know, however, reality is not like this, and while
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society and the values of groups within it are, in most 
circumstances, liable to change over time, individuals 
are born into societies which already exist, together 
with all their accompanying ideologies, "attitudes and 
orientations". Moreover, there is rarely anything 
complete in the process of changing personalities... 
Newcomers move into situations where they are compelled 
to co-exist with workers who have already defined objec­
tives and orientations. To talk of new generations 
changing society (or simply the "orientations and atti­
tudes" of groups within it), simply because they replace 
old generations, therefore, makes no more sense than to 
suggest that the snake changes its personality when it 
sheds its skin, and emerges in a new one bearing the 
same pattern.
Hence we see in Cronin's study, an example of a study 
at the global national level of society, in which the 
subjective orientations of workers are seen as crucial 
in explaining the phenomenon under consideration - 
namely the fluctuating pattern of strike statistics. 
Interesting, and impressive though it is, it fails to 
deal adequately with the question of changes in workers' 
consciousness, because the elements of consciousness, 
and the processes of changing them, are not explored.
The importance of unions and unionism as vehicles of 
consciousness (via culture) from one generation to 
another, is of course not touched on, but in absence of 
this there is a neglect of the processes of changing 
consciousness, which results in the inadequacies 
described above.
209
Nonetheless, there is much to be said for the longi­
tudinal type of study which Cronin has performed. 
Reverting to our discussion of the responses of workers 
and unions to redundancy, one might apply something of 
Cronin's methodology to available statistical informa­
tion. Figure 3.1 (p.212) shows a graph of the number of 
reported redundancy payments (167), against a time axis, 
superimposed on a graph of strikes over redundancy 
questions, on the same time scale. (168). On first 
examination, it appears that there is a close relation­
ship between the number of redundancy payments, and 
redundancy related stoppages, the peaks and troughs of 
both graphs appearing to coincide at roughly the same 
points in time. On second consideration, however, it 
would be perverse to expect less than this. Redundancy 
related stoppages would be unlikely to rise dramati­
cally, for example, in response to a short term fall in 
the number of redundancy payments. Of much greater 
importance than the question of whether or not there is 
any kind of relationship between strikes and redundan­
cies (expressed by the number of payments) (169), there­
fore, is the question of, "What kind of relationship?"
At this point it becomes necessary to observe that there 
are important discontinuities in the relationship bet­
ween stoppages and payments. Payments peaked at 1.1 
million in 1971 for example, at which time there were 
153 stoppages on redundancy questions. At the next 
payments peak of 1.02 million in 1975, there were
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115 stoppages. In 1980, payments at 982 thousand were 
88 per cent of the 1971 peak, whilst the 76 stoppages 
represented only 49 per cent of the corresponding number 
for 1971. Moreover, in 1981, payments reached in excess 
of 1.6 million, but the strikes level at 141 was still 
lower than the 1971 peak. In 1984, however (the year of 
the miners' strike against pit closures), there were 153 
stoppages on redundancy questions (the same as the 1971 
peak) but with 850 thousand payments, the number of 
redundancies was some 77 per cent of the number which 
had triggered the earlier wave of militancy.
Workers' responses to the event of redundancy do not 
(it would seem from the above evidence) follow any 
simple or predictable path, and no doubt one approach to 
the study of redundancy could be to set out explanations 
for these statistical variations, much as Cronin has 
done with his wider analysis of stoppages. Such an 
approach would at least have the merit of somewhat 
greater statistical completeness than in White's (170), 
study which considers reported conflicts over redun­
dancy, as measured by the number of cases referred to 
ACAS for collective conciliation. Any satisfactory 
explanation for the variations in workers' responses to 
redundancy would no doubt need to call upon a variety of 
factors, but ultimately it would have to address ques­
tions of attitudes of workers, and their subjective 
responses to redundancy, much as Cronin's study even­
tually leans heavily on the question of workers' con­
sciousness. In absence of a theory to explain how
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workers' attitudes and consciousness may be influenced 
within the industrial context, explanations are unlikely 
to prove satisfactory. One approach, as we have seen in 
chapter two (171), is to place the emphasis on manage­
ment's actions to create an acceptance of redundancy, by 
a process of legitimisation. The focus advocated here, 
however, is that workers' consciousness cannot be satis­
factorily explained without considering the ideas of 
unions and unionism. While the global, national or 
macro type of analysis has much to commend it from the 
point of view of sociological completeness, it is there­
fore important that any theory of union influence upon 
workers' attitudes and behaviour should be seen to be 
relevant at an appropriate level of analysis. At this 
point, therefore, we should turn to conclude the essen­
tial arguments of this chapter, before attempting to 
apply the theory to the study of redundancy at the two 
levels indicated - i.e. the local company case study, 
and in the wider national picture.
3.12 CONCLUSIONS
This then, is the general outline of a theory. It 
will be clear that, if it has any validity, the concept 
of a trade union culture would have wider application 
than in a study of union responses to redundancy. 
Nonetheless, this is a suitable and manageable area in 
which to put the theory to the test. If it should be
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well founded, it would appear to provide strong grounds 
to challenge the view of unions put forward by the 
labour economists such as Oswald, whose ideas we consi­
dered in chapter two. Moreover, it would seem that if 
the theory of trade union cultures is good, Hardy's 
concept of management strategies based on legitimisation 
of their actions, is severely circumscribed. If union 
cultures are a significant influence on the outlooks of 
workers and their perceptions, how could managements 
exercise such control of the redundancy process, and 
workers' responses to it, as Hardy claims? Or if we 
adopt for one moment, Hardy's notion of legitimacy, it 
would seem that workers may well be influenced in their 
views of what is, or is not legitimate, by the moral and 
ethical forces embodied in unions and unionism. To sug­
gest, therefore, that managements may manage redundancy 
by the expedient of manipulating workers' views of 
legitimacy, would seem to be a flawed position. The 
corollary of this is that managements probably have less 
scope for control of the redundancy process than Hardy 
suggests, and one might expect that even in companies 
with strong and sophisticated personnel departments, the 
control of management over redundancy events (including 
closures, on which Hardy concentrates) could be made 
tenuous, where there is strong trade union organisation, 
and a strong influence of trade union culture.
In the next chapter we will attempt to put the theo­
retical framework to the test by considering the role of 
unions and the values they expressed in the historical
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evolution of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965. In this
we shall be looking for evidence of perceived "rights"
in the sustained and long term sense that may justify us
in attributing them to the influence of a union culture.
There is, however, one point to be made before this.
The debates around the introduction of the Redundancy
Payments Act 1965 make it clear that a generally held
perspective on the problem of redundancy (from the point
of view of managements, government ministers and others)
was how to alter the attitudes of workers, so that
redundancy was more acceptable. The Act, as the writers
of the OPCS study carried out in 1969 put it, was...
"... influenced as a background measure to facili­
tate modernisation and change in industry; part of 
an overall manpower policy, aimed at securing a 
greater acceptance by employees of the need for 
economic, organisational and technological change." 
(172).
This has led some writers (notably Fryer) (173), to 
conclude that the very legitimacy of redundancy has 
been underlined by the legislation of 1965. If the 
Redundancy Payments Act has been successful in substan­
tially overcoming union opposition to redundancy, one 
might expect to find evidence for this in changes to 
union cultures over the period of the Act's operation.
It might be difficult to demonstrate such changes defi­
nitively, but at least one might expect to find evidence 
of a trend, possibly towards a more cash oriented cul­
ture in trade unions. This would suggest that union 
cultures are less influenced by perceived "rights" which 
are in conflict or contradiction to redundancy, and more 
influenced by questions of compensation. If unions and
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their members were to show little or no interest in 
opposing redundancy, but instead were simply content to 
maximise payment levels, this would possibly be compa­
tible with the view that the Redundancy Payments Act had 
changed attitudes. If it could be shown that over a 
period there was a trend away from demands for "rights" 
in opposition to redundancy, and towards acquiescence in 
and compensation for redundancy, this would be strong 
evidence to support the view that the RPA had achieved 
its objectives. It will be interesting to bear this 
point in mind and in due course form a view as to whe­
ther union responses to redundancy are substantially 
conditioned by what could be described as a "redundancy 
culture", or whether there are other elements and per­
ceived "rights" that lead to an underlying source of 
opposition to redundancy (or aspects of it) as a general 
feature of unions and unionism.
Finally, a brief comment is needed by way of intro­
duction to the next two chapters. It follows from the 
foregoing that it would be of some interest to examine 
union cultures from a "before and after" point of view. 
"Before" being before the RPA, and "after" being after 
its enactment. It follows too, from our earlier discus­
sion of union cultures, that we are interested in unions 
at the local or company organisation level, and we are 
interested in their activities on the national stage and 
in the national policies they pursue. Moreover, one 
feels obliged, in order to give Hardy's perspective a 
fair trial, to select a company for attention, that has
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a strong professionally managed personnel department. 
And, at various points in this chapter and the two 
preceding ones, we have noted the weakness inherent in 
approaches that focus on a single event rather than 
follow a long term line of study.
This brings us to describe the material covered in 
the next chapter and chapter five. Chapter four is a 
study of the evolution of the Redundancy Payments Act 
1965, and the role of unions in this process. It 
focuses on the national position of unions, though it 
includes reference to the local context, too. It covers 
a period of a number of years prior to 1965, and as such 
helps us with the "before" element of the "before and 
after" combination. Chapter five is a long term case 
study of the computer manufacture and servicing company, 
ICL. It covers a period from 1969 to 1979, and as such 
embodies the "after" component of the "before and after" 
concept. More importantly, perhaps, it takes us through 
a period of political change on the national stage, and 
it also covers a period of time when, the evidence of 
the graph in table 3.1 suggests, there were marked 
changes in the propensity of union members to strike in 
response to redundancy. It focuses to some extent on 
the local role of union organisation, and to some extent 
on the national role, though it is primarily a study of 
a company wide focus where the company has both national 
and local bargaining arrangements. Also, it satisfies 
the requirement of a study that includes a strongly 
managed personnel function, in that the personnel
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department at ICL was well endowed with professionally 
qualified personnel managers and support staff. As an 
additional point, it will be seen that the two chapters 
concentrate heavily on the role of white collar unions, 
in particular ASTMS and its predecessors. This is to 
some extent coincidental, but it is a fact which may be 
of significance when drawing overall conclusions.
It will be seen then, that the next two chapters 
attempt to cover the main areas of comparison and inte­
rest that have been raised so far. It now leaves us to 
conclude this chapter and turn to our study of the 
background of the RPA, outlined in chapter four.
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CHAPTER 4
A HISTORY OF REDUNDANCY 
PAYMENTS LEGISLATION
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4.1 IHIBQDÜCTIQH
In the last chapter we considered the question of the 
ethical and moral influences that bore upon the collec­
tive behaviour of workers and we examined what 1 have 
decribed as perceived "rights". The "rights" studied in 
the examples quoted, suggested that to varying degrees 
unions have represented important instruments for the 
conveyance of moral ideas into the minds of workers, 
which have in turn had an important impact on the way 
they respond to events and issues that confront them in 
the world; sometimes leading to demonstrations of mass 
protest, in various forms. These moral influences, 1 
argued, could be seen as aspects of "ideology" (as the 
term has been used by George Rudé) or "world view", but 
we also noted the relevance of the concept of "culture" 
and concluded that this latter term was a more appro­
priate description of the mechanism of influence.
"Trade union cultures", 1 suggested, might provide a 
context within which individuals came to be socialised 
into certain ways of thinking and behaving as a result 
of membership of and involvement in unions and union 
activity. Such cultures would embody collective percep­
tions of "rights", which do not necessarily find support 
as legal rights, but which would, nonetheless, fundamen­
tally bear upon workers' views of what is legitimate or 
otherwise. Union cultures, 1 argued, might help to
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explain variations in and patterns of responses to 
redundancy. They may be taken to embody basic prin­
ciples and an additional political element which could 
in time become absorbed as part of the fundamental, 
basic aspect of culture. Moreover, they might reflect 
the policies of unions nationally, and locally at the 
workplace, and I ventured tentatively that one might 
expect them to reflect the changing contexts of outside 
forces such as the economy, the policies of the State, 
the effects of technology, the prevalent attitudes of 
business and so on.
In this chapter, therefore, I propose that we should 
assess the usefulness or otherwise of this theoretical 
outline. The approach I propose to adopt is to survey 
the historical background to the Redundancy Payments Act 
1965, but also touching on the collective bargaining 
approaches of unions on the question of redundancy. It 
is expected that in completing this task we may encoun­
ter examples of perceived "rights", and should those 
perceptions appear to exercise a durable influence over 
a period of time, we may feel entitled to ascribe them 
to a continuing influence of culture. Hopefully, it 
will in this way become clear whether the term, "trade 
union culture", is applicable, but more importantly, 
whether it assists in our understanding of trade union 
responses to the issue of redundancy. Moreover, it is 
hoped that we may also discover something of the way 
"rights" become established in the first instance, and 
possibly, whether and to what extent, cultures appear in 
conflict and clash with one another.
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So much can be said of our need to follow the theore­
tical ideas pursued in the last two chapters. There is 
a further purpose, however, which is simply to clarify 
some of the factual background to the redundancy pay­
ments legislation, that with very few changes is still 
with us a quarter of a century after its enactment. In 
an era when so much of labour law is in an area of 
political controversy, it would seem appropriate that we 
should examine the background of one piece of legisla­
tion that appears to have been something of an island of 
consensus since its initial introduction. Whether this 
has always been the underlying position on the question 
of payments to redundant workers will emerge in due 
course, and it is a matter of speculation as to whether 
or not the consensus can reasonably be expected to 
survive intact for a similar period into the future.
4.2 E A R L I E S T  C O M P E N S A T I O N  P R Q Y I S I Q H S  :
I H  T H E  H I H E T E E H T H  C E N T U R Y  T O  T H E  H I H E T E E H  T H I R T I E S
The principle of compensation being made, to certain 
categories of workers who became unemployed when their 
jobs disappeared under a reorganisation, was captured in 
legislative form surprisingly long ago. In a barely 
intelligible statute of 1834 (1), dealing with "pensions 
compensations and allowances to persons in respect of 
their having held civil office in His Majesty's ser­
vice", it was made lawful to grant compensation in
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specially approved cases where individuals would other­
wise have suffered as a result of the abolition of their 
office. In an Act of 1859 (2), it was provided that a 
grant could be made to any Crown servant "retiring or 
removed from the Public Service in consequence of the 
abolition of his office, or for the purpose of facilita­
ting improvements in the Organisation of the Department 
to which he belongs, by which greater Efficiency and 
Economy can be effected... " (3).
The Local Government Act 1888, reorganising the map 
of local government, provided that council officers who 
suffered a financial loss by "abolition of office, or 
diminution of fees or salary" (4), should also be en­
titled to compensation. The provisions which were 
already in force for such compensation to be paid to 
civil servants, were taken as a yardstick, and the 1888 
Act provided that local government officers could 
receive compensation not exceeding this level. The 
Local Government Act 1933 once more amended the organi­
sation of local government, and again, provisions were 
made to allow compensation to be paid to those local 
government officers whose jobs ceased to exist, or who 
suffered financial loss because of the reorganisation. 
(5). Details of the scheme for assessing compensation, 
provided for it to be made as either an annual amount or 
a lump sum. (6). Other aspects of the scheme included 
the method of calculating loss, and an appeals procedure 
for disputed issues. Similar principles were followed
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inter alla when the public utility boards and cor­
porations, e.g. the Port of London Authority, the 
Metropolitan Water Board, the Central Electricity 
Board, were established.
In the private sector of industry, the Railways Act 
1921 (which rationalised the various privately owned 
railway companies), provided that officers and servants 
who suffered loss (either of office, salary or pension), 
as a result of the reorganisation, would be entitled to 
compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 
Local Government Act 1888. (7). The idea of severance 
payments or loss of employment compensation was applied 
then in the private sector by statute, some 44 years 
before the Redundancy Payments Act made such payments 
into a general right for all redundant employees. 
Underpinning each of these legislative provisions was 
the principle that reorganisation brought about by the 
State, and which resulted in a loss of employment, or 
worsening of conditions of employment, should allow for 
compensation for those concerned. Whilst this category 
of provision contained no hint of the State accepting a 
generalised responsibility for all employees, or for 
that matter conferring such a responsibility on other 
employers, there is some evidence that such provisions 
began to be looked for by workers involved in similar 
exercises of bureaucratic reorganisation, and the ini­
tiative of the State may very well have provided the 
impetus for these expectations. Before continuing to
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unravel the thread of developments in the line of legal 
enactment, it may be informative to consider some early 
examples of the collective bargaining approach.
As early as 1930, a redundancy agreement was negotia­
ted by the National Joint Industrial Council for the gas 
industry, and incorporated into an agreement dealing 
with the amalgamation of gas undertakings. A summary of 
the agreement mentions that...
"... compensation was paid after three years 
service up to the age of 45 years of age at one 
week's pay for each year of service: at 50 years 
of age or over, compensation rises to two weeks' 
pay for each year of service." (8).
There are two points of interest to note in relation 
to this agreement. Firstly, at the time when it was 
concluded, private undertakings as well as municipa­
lities were included in the employers' side of the 
National Joint Industrial Council. Secondly, the condi­
tions under which the agreement arose (namely a reorga­
nisation of the industry) was similar to the conditions 
under which legislative arrangements were made in 1888 
and 1933.
Similar criteria seem to be at the root of develop­
ments in collective bargaining around the same time in 
the United States of America. In the railway industry, 
there was recognition of the fact that employees often 
suffered hardship in reorganisation, which they should 
not be asked to bear alone. As early as 1929, an 
Emergency Arbitration Board adjudicated in a dispute in
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which employees transferring to a new location were
demanding compensation for the losses involved. The
Board concluded that...
"... a loss due to a change made in the interests 
of economy should not fall on the employee alone... 
in the circumstances here presented the loss should 
be borne equally by the carrier and the employees." 
(9).
The principle, that savings which resulted from 
increased efficiency should somehow be shared by the 
employees involved, and the argument that where change 
occurred it should not result in the employees alone 
being compelled to bear the cost, came together in a 
historic agreement negotiated in 1936: The Washington 
Job Protection Agreement. This agreement, negotiated 
between the major carriers and the labour organisations 
at the time of great national unemployment in America, 
provides a detailed programme of compensation and pro­
tection, "for employees adversely affected by rail co­
ordinations". (10). It is an interesting fact then, 
that in the mid-nineteen thirties, collective bargai­
ning, both in this country and in the United States, had 
provided for compensation agreements for redundant 
workers. Whilst it is far from clear what the exact 
stimuli were that gave rise to these developments, it 
would seem that in the British case, the State's recog­
nition of a certain responsibility which it, "in all 
fairness", owed to workers disturbed by reorganisation, 
was at the least a contributory factor. However, it is 
also interesting to note that whereas the first American
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agreements provided for a rational basis of computing 
losses according to the costs of disturbance, the 
British agreements had already fallen into an age and 
service based calculation that did not attempt to 
incorporate any element of "actual loss".
Trade unions facing redundancy among their members in 
the nineteen thirties do not seem to have devised, nor 
even considered strategies of opposing those redundan­
cies, and making a stand for the jobs of their members 
to be saved. Increasingly however, it would seem, trade 
unions projected the view that where reorganisation and 
rationalisation brought about the redundancy of workers, 
monetary compensation was in order. It is not easy to 
accurately assess the factors which influenced trade 
unions to adopt this strategy towards redundancy. 
However, it would seem to be reasonably clear that the 
State itself set a precedent which unions were happy to 
argue should be applied to a number of other 
circumstances.
If one compares the attitude of the State and the 
trade unions at this stage, to redundancy, there would 
appear to be similarity at a number of points. First, 
the State appeared to have conceded the point that 
unemployment created by reorganisation, justified com­
pensation. Trade unions seem to have followed this line 
in the negotiating strategies they pursued. Second, the 
State did not appear to have contemplated the extension 
of the principle of compensation for redundancy to
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employees outside its own direct sphere of influence - 
at least there was no question of legislation to this 
end. Trade unions at this stage were not in the main 
looking for any legislative protection. In general 
terms, therefore, it would appear that the attitudes of 
the State and trade union leaders were in a state of 
passive agreement over several issues. These included: 
the principle of paying workers displaced by reorganisa­
tion; a belief that there was no need for any general 
legislative intervention to extend workers' rights 
beyond this narrow remit; and the belief that the real 
responsibility for making such compensation in general 
rested, not upon the State, but on the shoulders of the 
direct employers of the workers concerned. If compensa­
tion for redundant workers had been provided by statu­
tory enactment in a limited field, it had not as yet 
given rise to any concerted effort to extend the area of 
protection, either by collective bargaining or legisla­
tion. It would not appear in the nineteen thirties, 
that there was in any general sense, a belief that 
redundancy compensation was a social benefit that ought 
to be given to all workers as of right. There were, 
however, a few notable exceptions where individual 
unions were beginning to look beyond the existing narrow 
area where statutory rights existed, and where collec­
tive agreements had been concluded to provide redundant 
workers with compensation.
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4.3 THE LOSS OE EMPLOYMENT (COMPENSATION) BILLS FROM 
1 8 3 0  O N W A R D S
In 1930, a group of Labour MPs sponsored a Bill (11) 
in parliament, to attempt to extend the principle of 
compensation for reorganisation dismissal, into a law of 
much wider ambit. It was, however, directed quite 
specifically at "white collar" or non-manual workers, 
rather than towards all categories. (12). Indeed, 
manual workers were specifically excluded from the 
proposed legislation. The rationale for this distinc­
tion being drawn was - as the mover of the 1930 Bill put 
it - "the great bulk of these people are not covered by 
the Unemployment Insurance Acts". (13). Perhaps, not 
unnaturally, it was a distinction which drew an observa­
tion from the only other MP to contribute to the debate 
on the Bill's first reading, that in order to be logical 
the Bill ought...
"... to compensate not merely the fairly well- 
off, but every worker who is turned out of work 
through circumstances over which he has no 
control." (14).
The 1930 Bill then, was directed towards the specific 
problems of white collar workers. It was supported by 
several trade unions representing non-manual workers.
The main sponsor of the Bill was the Chief Assistant 
Secretary of the Railway Clerks Association, and 
President of the National Federation of Clerical 
Professional and Technical Workers. Both the President 
and General Secretary of the Railway Clerks Association,
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as serving MPs, also acted as sponsors, as did officials 
of the London Society of Compositors, The Amalgamated 
Union of Shop Assistants and The Association of 
Scientific Workers.
The Bill itself did not define the circumstances in
which it was envisaged that dismissed employees would
receive compensation, in explicit or positive terms -
for example, by attempting to devise a definition of
redundancy. It simply sought to provide compensation
for any "unemployed person" who was dismissed...
"... other than for serious and wilful misconduct 
of the employed person, or on an employed person 
attaining the normal retirement age." (15).
Nevertheless, the Bill's sponsors were clearly con­
cerned about the specific form of dismissal that we 
today describe as redundancy. Latham, the Bill's chief 
sponsor, argued that:-
"This is the day of the large scheme reorganisa­
tion of industry and commerce, of trustification, 
of rationalisation... we say there must be protec­
tion for those who, but for such protection, would 
be seriously victimised and affected by such 
arrangements." (16).
If then, one is looking for a precursor to the Bill 
which was eventually passed in 1965 as the Redundancy 
Payments Act, it is possible to go back to 1930, and an 
attempt by MPs representing non-manual workers, to 
introduce legislation on a narrow basis, to afford 
protection in the absence of the minimal cover that 
other workers enjoyed.
Three obvious points can be stressed. The movement 
for protective legislation was on behalf of a compara­
tively small minority of trade unions. The Bill was
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not pressed by the TUC, but by the National Federation 
of Clerical Professional and Technical Workers.
Secondly, the Bill seemed to be an attempt to extend the 
principle of compensating people made unemployed by re­
organisation, beyond the sphere where action had already 
been taken to protect those made redundant by State 
reorganisation. (The level of compensation proposed was 
quite substantial - a twelfth of the total received by 
the employee during the entire employment.) (17). 
Thirdly, nothing about the Bill suggested that it was in 
any sense part of a wider concept of the problem of 
unemployment, which required intervention in a major way 
by the State to assume responsibility. The State was 
not expected to cover the costs of compensation (that 
was to be the responsibility of individual employers). 
Moreover, there was no attempt to argue that the State 
had any need to adopt positive or interventionist poli­
cies either, to create jobs for the unemployed, nor to 
equip the unemployed to do work where they could be 
accommodated. The philosophy seemed to be that the 
inevitability of redundancy had to be recognised, and 
compensation paid to those adversely affected.
The 1930 Bill failed to receive a second reading. 
After a gap of seven years, Latham introduced a second 
Bill substantially the same as the first in 1930. Among 
the minor differences between the two was a provision in 
the 1937 Bill to exclude from entitlement to compensa­
tion, anyone who had been ill for more than a year. The
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Bill also sought to provide that employers should take 
out insurance indemnity policies, in order to meet 
potential liabilities which the Bill would have created. 
Again, the 1937 Bill failed to receive a second reading. 
As before, the only support forthcoming was from a 
minority of MPs representing white collar or 
professional workers' trade unions.
The principle of making provisions for redundancy 
compensation arising out of government reorganisation 
was again followed in the various post-war Acts of 
nationalisation. For example, the 1947 Transport Act 
required the Minister to make regulations for the pay­
ment of compensation to employees of an undertaking 
transferred to the British Transport Commission, provi­
ding they had suffered "loss of employment or loss or 
diminution of emoluments or pension rights as a result 
of the transfer of business". (18). (The "regulations” 
referred to in the Act were produced by a Treasury 
Working Party under the Chairmanship of Sir James 
Crombie. Since being used for post-war reorganisations, 
the "Crombie Code" has been used in a number of subse­
quent statutory reorganisations.)
A further Private Member's Bill was introduced into 
parliament in 1949, in yet one more attempt to create a 
general right to loss of employment compensation. The 
distinction between manual and non-manual workers was no 
longer included - i.e. all would have been entitled to 
protection under the Bill's proposals. The peovisions
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in other respects were similar to the 1937 proposals, 
although one new feature was the provision that regula­
tions should be laid down to devise a means of dealing 
with disputed claims. (19). Although support for the 
1949 Bill came from two MPs sponsored by manual workers' 
unions (Auberey and Hellish), the driving force, as in 
the past, was predominantly the white collar trade 
unions. The National Federation of Professional Workers 
was the major force behind both this and the earlier 
Bills of 1930 and 1937. Also, this same organisation 
featured in the "behind the scenes" lobbying to intro­
duce Private Member's Bills in 1951 and 1952. Let us 
therefore at this stage, consider the arguments in 
relation to the 1949 Bill, and then turn in more detail 
to the role of the NFPW in sponsoring these various 
attempts at legislation.
The first point that needs to be made in relation to
the 1949 Bill, is that its introduction was clearly
influenced by the contemporaneous developments in the
State sector. The provision of compensation for those
whose lives were disrupted by nationalisation schemes,
was a factor very much in the minds of those who sought
to extend the (now established) principle to the private
sector. The following extract from an article in the
Journal of the National Federation of Professional
Workers illustrates this point:-
"In recent years, such compensation 'for loss of 
employment or loss or diminution of emoluments' 
has become an established feature of such
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legislation as that which nationalised coal mines, 
transport, gas, electricity, and the Federation's 
Bill seeks to provide similar protection to those 
employed in private enterprise - for whom there 
is at present no such redress - provided they have 
five years' service with the employer concerned, 
and are at least 30 years of age. It applies to 
both manual and non-manual workers." (20).
Opinion in favour of legislation to provide unemploy­
ment compensation was obviously influenced by the fact 
that it was already in existence to a limited extent in 
those areas where the State had a direct responsibility. 
This stimulant upon those who were pressing for legisla­
tion seems to have been a recurrent theme. The 1930 
Bill was preceded by the Railways Act of 1921, as well 
as a collective agreement for the gas industry in 1930. 
Prior to Latham's second attempt to win support in 1937, 
there had been the Local Government Act of 1933. A gap 
of some twelve years followed before the next attempt to 
introduce legislation. There is clear evidence that it 
not only coincided with, but was to a degree motivated 
by the recent developments to provide compensation to 
employees displaced by the programmes of nationalisa­
tion. (This point is dealt with in detail in the next 
section of this chapter.)
If the 1949 Bill (and further Bills in 1951 and 1952) 
suffered the fate of so many well intentioned private 
members' reforming proposals, it is germane at this 
point to ask, why? The point can be made with respect 
to the 1949 Bill, a particularly suitable illustration 
since a Labour Government was, after all, in office, and 
the Bill was introduced as a Private Member's measure by 
the Labour MP, George Guy. It was strongly opposed by
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the Civil Service, on two principle grounds. Firstly, 
the provision in the Bill to entitle employees to 
unemployment compensation if the conditions associated 
with their jobs altered adversely, was seen as constitu­
ting an unacceptable interference with market forces. 
This point was expressed by a Ministry of National 
Insurance memorandum at the time, which commented
"The Bill if it became law would upset the existing 
wage and industrial relations structure. The pro­
posals aim at giving effective security of employ­
ment and protection against any future worsening of 
conditions (even by agreement) to all workers, 
while at present only a minority enjoy the first 
and none (except perhaps a few statutory officers 
like judges) enjoy the second." (21).
Ironically, in view of the fact that a major reason 
for the eventual introduction of redundancy payments 
legislation in 1965, was to deal with the problem of 
"labour hoarding", and lack of mobility (22), the view 
was also advanced in 1949 that the Guy Bill would "ob­
viously destroy all mobility of labour". (23). The Bill 
was seen then, not as a means of facilitating mobility 
and promoting organisational change, but as an obstacle 
to these objectives.
Secondly, there seems to have been an attitude among 
the Civil Servant advisers, that there was a need to 
stem the flood towards providing workers with compensa­
tion when displaced by reorganisation, whatever the 
causes or factors leading up to their dismissal. The 
argument was as follows:-
"The scheme seems to be actuated by much the 
same ideas as provisons contained in various 
nationalisation Acts for compensation of dis­
placed workers... the case for special
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compensation where people were displaced by 
nationalisation was always a little difficult 
to mark off from the case for special compen­
sation for loss or diminution of prospects 
arising from other government activities, and 
more and more changes affecting employment can 
be linked with government action of some sort 
or another. So long as these schemes were 
strictly confined to the compensation of people 
not taken on when an industry was nationalised 
and we were dealing only with industries which 
had always been marked off as enjoying special 
conditions of employment such as gas and electri­
city or railways, these provisions were not very 
dangerous, but we have recently seen attempts to 
extend this principle of special compensation to 
cases where people are not displaced by nationa­
lisation but maybe displaced by reorganisation 
following nationalisation (which might just as 
well have happened if the government had never 
intervened at all), and we also see these prin­
ciples being applied in industries where there 
has previously been no special security of emp­
loyment and where there is no question of the 
workers concerned having their general prospects 
of employment adversely affected or even their 
opportunities of going on working in much the 
same sort of job as they had before... I feel 
that Mr Guy's Bill is symptomatic of the dangers 
which the extensions of these arrangements may 
lead us into." (24).
It is perhaps inappropriate at this stage for us to 
investigate the faint smell of hypocrisy that surrounds 
the above quotation - written as it was by a Civil 
Servant in the comfortable position of being covered by 
the statutory protection which Guy's Bill sought to 
extend to other workers. The principle point which 
emerges, however, is that it appeared to be by defini­
tion, "dangerous", to contemplate extending the prin­
ciple of employment compensation so that it covered 
reorganisation generally. As far as State enterprises 
were concerned, clearly there would have been cost 
implications in such a change. Outside the State sector 
however, there would have been no direct cost to the
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exchequer, although no doubt government had a responsi­
bility to consider what the effect would have been of 
compelling all companies to take out insurance to indem­
nify them for claims that might arise from displaced 
employees.
What fails to appear directly in the arguments ad­
vanced in opposition to the Guy Bill, but which must be 
taken as a factor nevertheless, is that at this stage 
there was no real conception of a "redundancy problem" 
in the same sense that it was perceived as such, some 
fifteen years later. There had been little trade union 
agitation over redundancy as an issue, although collec­
tive bargaining had developed the concept of severance 
pay agreements. There was no real perception of a lack 
of management willingness to face redundancies in order 
to implement technological or organisational change.
Nor had arguments been developed concerning skill shor­
tages and labour hoarding such that there was seen to be 
a need to promote greater labour mobility. A third 
factor, therefore, in the antipathy of the State to 
redundancy payments being introduced at this stage, was 
quite simply that the issue of worker opposition had not 
surfaced in any serious or disturbing sense. Trade 
union policies and problems appear to have had little 
connection with the government's decision to oppose 
the Bill.
However, an observation can be made which has some 
bearing on the dilemmas that unions seem to have con­
stantly faced over their strategies on redundancy. A
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section of the trade union movement was pursuing here, 
through their sponsored Members of Parliament, the 
possibility of a legal right to compensation for redun­
dancy. Why did they need to do so? Firstly, they 
clearly saw the issue of redundancy not as a "right to 
work" or even a "right to a job" issue, rather they saw 
it in terms of compensation for loss. Secondly, one can 
only assume that they lacked the ability to secure such 
compensation through the means of collective bargaining. 
This may have been inevitable given both the strength of 
union organisation and the limits of what managements 
were both prepared and commercially able to concede.
Had trade unions on any significant scale, however, 
attempted to pursue militant strategies, either to 
secure redundancy payments, or to defend the "right to 
work", this may have altered fundamentally the attitude 
of both employers and the State, to unemployment compen­
sation at this time. A militant strategy in some quar­
ters, in pursuit of the "right to work" consequently, 
might easily have been the very stimulus to success with 
the more accommodative aim of seeking a basic right to 
unemployment compensation by legal enactment. Admit­
tedly these are speculative propositions, but they 
perhaps help to explain why the legislative road was not 
more successful at this stage, in contrast with the 
position that emerged in the different economic condi­
tions and industrial relations' context of the mid 
1960s. At this point, however, there is a need to 
examine more closely the role of the white collar unions
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that were principally involved in the various attempts 
(to this point in time) to introduce legislation.
4 . 4  P R Q g E S S I Q H A L  W O R K E R S /  C A M P A I G N S  F Q R  
R E D U M D M C Y  L E G I S L A T I Q H
The National Federation of Professional Workers 
(originally called the National Federation of 
Professional, Technical Administrative and Supervisory 
Workers) was formed after the First World War. From the 
first it advocated political action as a means of secu­
ring change, largely on the basis that strike action for 
non-manual workers was "a weapon of desperation” . (25). 
The Labour Party, as a potential vehicle of change, was 
(argued the Federation) only worthy of support by "pro­
fessional" workers, if it included in its ranks an...
"...'adequate number' of representatives who were 
'familiar with the position and conditions of the 
non-manual worker, and conscious of the value of 
his contribution to industry and social needs'." 
(26).
This self-defined role as a political federation of 
non-manual workers' unions remained until the Federation 
was eventually wound up in 1983, although it avoided 
close identification with any single political party. 
Partly because of this, no doubt, the Federation was 
able to achieve its second objective of forming not only 
a link between the federated organisations, but also 
between the trade unions outside the TUC and those 
within it. (27). The Federation was the prime mover
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behind early attempts to introduce redundancy legisla­
tion. The then President Latham was (as we have seen) 
the main sponsor of the 1930 Bill. (Besides being 
President of the Federation, Latham was a Member of 
Parliament, and Chief Assistant Secretary of the Railway 
Clerks Association.) Officials of other unions affi­
liated to the Federation acted as co-sponsors to the 
1930 Bill. These included officers of the London 
Society of Compositors, the Amalgamated Union of Shop 
Assistants and the Association of Scientific Workers.
The immediate circumstances which gave rise to this 
initiative were a series of company amalgamations resul­
ting in large-scale dismissals. Latham, in introducing 
the Bill, referred to "large-scale amalgamations of 
insurance companies in London", and pointed out that 
hundreds of members of the clerical staff, "with service 
ranging up to twenty years were dismissed with one 
month's notice". He also commented upon a recent merger 
of two London morning papers, resulting in a loss of six 
hundred jobs. (28).
The problem was made more serious by the fact that 
many of the people concerned were not covered by the 
Unemployment Insurance Acts, and in consequence not 
entitled to unemployment benefit. (The first Act of 
1911 provided benefit only to "workmen" - i.e. manual 
workers - in certain manufacturing industries. Subse­
quent amendments introduced an upper salary limit, 
beyond which entitlement to benefit ceased.) (29).
Hence a major factor in the first attempt to introduce
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legislation was the perceived "unfairness" of long 
serving employees becoming unemployed, "through no fault 
of their own", and having less protection than other 
employees in the general field of unemployment.
By 1936, the Federation had gone further towards 
developing its legislative programme. Thompson, the 
Vice President of the Federation speaking in Glasgow, 
emphasised the need for an organisation, to act on 
behalf of workers, "in all matters of common interest, 
and in connection with legislation and industrial 
reform". The programme covered such questions as 
offices regulation, the extension of workmen's compen­
sation to cover salaried workers, and the raising of 
the then £250 per annum income limit on entitlement to 
unemployment and health benefit. (30). The Federation 
was looking for a...
"... proper and orderly development of our
national system of social insurance." (31).
A major campaign was mounted on the failure of the 
government to include a proposal to alter the salary 
limit for insurance benefit in the King's Speech. (32). 
It was in this context that 1936 also saw the issue of 
unemployment compensation legislation raised once again. 
A conference resolution expressed the view that the time 
had arrived when "immediate steps should be taken to 
ensure that adequate compensation is paid to all 
workers, who lose their employment as a result of ratio­
nalisation". (33). Specific mention was made in 
Federation briefing papers of the compensation schemes
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for other workers, in the nationalised electricity and 
water industries, in the Port of London, and in the 
London Passenger Transport Authority. (34). The result 
was the second attempt to introduce legislation - the 
1937 Bill. The details of this and its eventual defeat 
have already been described.
In February 1940, the Federation's conference commen­
ted on the problems of war-time unemployment. A resolu­
tion from the National Union of Clerks expressed concern 
at the continued high level of unemployment among cleri­
cal and professional workers. Another, from the 
Transport and General Workers Union referred in parti­
cular to clerks thrown out of employment as a result of 
war-time emergency measures, and demanded that...
"... they should be guaranteed the payment of a 
reasonable retaining fee during their enforced 
idleness." (35).
There was, however, no attempt at this stage to 
reintroduce a proposal for legislation. Nonetheless, 
the aspirations of unions affiliated to the Federation 
remained unextinguished with the war-time conditions.
In its report for the year ending March 1947, the exe­
cutive of the NFPW mentioned that one of its "cardinal 
principles" in relation to non-manual employment...
"... was embodied in our pre-war parliamentary 
Bill, brought before the House in 1930 and again 
in 1937, which sought to establish in employment 
generally the principle of compensation already 
so widely established in regard to statutory 
undertakings and government employees." (36).
Consideration was being given to the réintroduction 
of “the Federation's Bill", when the parliamentary
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timetable became less congested. In 1948, "the 
Federation's Bill" was again being carefully scrutinised 
in the light of what was believed to be considerable 
"official endorsement", to the principle that losses 
brought about by reorganisation should be compensated. 
The Federation argued that its case had been streng­
thened by the "parliamentary endorsement" the principle 
had received. (37). The result was the 1949 Bill intro­
duced by George Guy M P . It was, as we have already 
seen, defeated by a lack of parliamentary time.
In 1952, the Federation again sought support for a 
similar Private Member's Bill. Until this time, the TUG 
had not been involved directly in any of the attempts at 
legislation. (Seemingly, this was on the basis that the 
Federation was only attempting to secure the interests 
of a section of employed people - i.e. "Professional 
Workers" - although this hardly explains the TUC's lack 
of involvement in the 1949 Bill, which would have intro­
duced a general right to employment compensation.)
In any event, the TUG did not choose to express any 
view on the 1951 Bill either, until invited to do so by 
the Parliamentary Labour Party. At this stage, much to 
the concern of the NFPW, the TUG came out in opposition. 
The TUG's arguments were firstly, that the NFPW had not 
raised the matter through the Non-Manual Workers 
Advisory Gouncil of the TUG. Secondly, the scope of the 
Bill was now much wider, and manual workers would be 
included within it. More particularly, the TUG did not 
wish to countenance the introduction of law into an area
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of industrial relations that affected workers in such a 
general way. There were also a number of minor points 
of objection to the detailed wording of the Bill. (38). 
Undaunted, the NFPW sponsored a fifth Bill in 1952.
This, however, did not even get a second reading as the 
time was taken up with other business.
Learning the lesson of the sudden and unexpected 
opposition by the TUC to the 1951 Bill, the Federation 
tried to win the support of the TUC by drafting amend­
ments to the "Federation's Bill" of 1951, and submitting 
them for consideration to the Non-Manual Workers 
Advisory Committee of the TUC. Eventually, in April 
1953, the NMWAC considered the Federation's proposals, 
and sought the views of the Economic Committee of the 
TUC. And eventually, the views of the NMWAC (doubtless 
influenced by the Economic Committee) (1), were communi­
cated to the Federation. The text of the letter is as 
follows : -
"As you will know the N.M.W.A.C. Executive have 
given consideration to the document submitted 
by the N.F.P.W. on the advisability of seeking 
legislation to provide compensation for non- 
manual workers who lose their employment...
The views of the Economic Committee were sought 
on the principle. That Committee was of the 
opinion that it would be undesirable to take 
any action which would extend Government inter­
vention in the fixing of wages and conditions.
The trade union movement has always been reluc­
tant to accept any interference in their recog­
nised functions except where there is hardship 
which cannot be relieved by trade union action.
There would not, of course, be anything to pre­
vent individual unions negotiating such a scheme 
within their industries but to make them obliga­
tory by law would not be acceptable.
The General Council accepted this view, which 
was also reported to the last meeting of the 
Non-Manual Workers Advisory Council." (39).
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This response was nothing less than a "bombshell" to 
the Federation's ambitions. A summary of all the pre­
vious efforts to achieve legislation was prepared and 
circulated to affiliated organisations, with a request 
that the nature of further action should be considered. 
The reluctant consensus was that against the opposition 
of the TUC no further action was possible and executive 
policy was "modified accordingly". (40).
The question that arises here can be succinctly put; 
why was the TUC so opposed to legislation in this 
sphere, when a substantial number of unions affiliated 
to both the Federation and the TUC seemed to support it? 
(The CAWU, the Shopworkers Union USDAW, NATSOPA, and the 
clerical section of the Transport and General Workers 
Union, are specific examples.) Within the TUC itself 
there had been very little debate on the issue. On the 
whole, it seemed to be more a question of traditional 
reluctance to tread the "legislative road", than any 
other rational or philosophical argument, that prompted 
the TUC's opposition. In June 1954, the Federation 
asked for amplification of the TUC's grounds of opposi­
tion. The reply received stated that:-
"The point is that while there are some matters, 
e.g. standards of health and safety in industry, 
where the movement must look to legislation, the 
normal union approach is negotiations. On wage 
questions legislation is no substitute for Trade 
Union organisation." (41).
Following objections being raised at the 1954 Trades 
Union Congress an informal meeting was held at the TUC, 
when the Federation's officers met with Victor Feather 
(then an Assistant Secretary of the TUC). Feather
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explained that the Economic Committee's view was that 
the proposals were, "impracticable of general applica­
tion, and would involve an unreasonable financial burden 
on industry. The TUC was completely in agreement with 
the principle of compensation for loss of office... but 
the General Council were not in agreement with the 
suggested common method of application of the 
principle". (42).
At this point, we might pause to consider whether and 
to what extent the TUC and the Federation respectively 
could be seen to be expressing demands for "rights" that 
might in some sense indicate fundamentally different 
ethical orientations. On the face of it, this interpre­
tation might easily be made of the situation thus far 
described... Here was the NFPW seeking the establish­
ment of a legal right, which the TUC opposed. However, 
it should be borne in mind that the TUC was to a far 
greater extent than the NFPW, committed to the philo­
sophy of legal abstention. For professional workers, 
weakly organised in trade unions since the 1920s and 
1930s, legislation seemed the only available means of 
securing gains. In contrast, the TUC unions had, in the 
main, learned to avoid legal routes, and preferred to 
achieve their objectives through collective bargaining. 
The TUC leaders claimed to be supportive of the general 
principle of "compensation for loss of office", but 
whilst the NFPW leaders were pursuing the possibilities 
of achieving this as a legal right, there is little to 
suggest that the manual workers' unions not affiliated
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to the NFPW, were pursuing the same objective through 
the collective bargaining route. If there was an emer­
ging moral principle then, that a worker who lost his or 
her job in company reorganisation should be entitled to 
"compensation for loss of office", it was essentially 
from the white collar workers' unions that this concept 
was being advanced. Indeed, the very wording, "loss of 
office", suggests that the concept was of a staff per­
son, with the presumed security of a staff position, 
finding that such security was no more because of the 
reorganisation of a company. And if one is looking for 
the genesis of this notion, it may be that one needs to 
go back to the earliest examples of legislation in 1834, 
1859 and 1888, which were directed at civil servants, 
and "council officers" in local government. The idea of 
a "right" to job security, or at least "compensation for 
loss of office", would seem then to be, at this stage, 
bound up with the idea of staff status. While there 
were already examples of collective agreements and 
legislation that covered manual workers, too, there 
would seem to have been beliefs among manual workers' 
unions in relation to their moral obligations to defend 
jobs, as opposed to seeking "compensation for loss of 
office", which as we will see shortly, were contributory 
to the TUC's reserve over the ideas being advanced by 
the NFPW at this stage. At this point, however, it will 
be helpful to consider the policies of the TUC and NFPW 
more closely contrasted, in the period 1930-36.
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4.5 E O L I G I E S  O F  T H E  T V C _ A N D  B F P W  C O N T R A S T E D  
B E T W E E N  1 8 3 0  A N D  1 9 3 6
In contrast to the white collar, "professional wor­
kers", minority, how did the mainstream of the movement, 
through the TUC, react to problems of large-scale unem­
ployment through rationalisation and the like, in the 
period in question? In 1930, the TUC was particularly 
concerned at the unemployment brought about by disarma­
ment. Late in 1929, the Transport and General Workers 
Union initiated a joint TUC, Labour Party Committee to 
examine "the economic consequences of disarmament".
(43). A memorandum was submitted to the minority Labour 
Government advocating a series of measures as a result 
of the run-down in the weapons manufacturing industry. 
These were measures to provide:-
"(a) alternative work of a suitable character not 
at present available to industry;
(b) specific government action to increase employ­
ment in the industries chiefly affected;
and in the event of neither (a) nor (b) having the 
desired effect:-
(c) adequate monetary compensation to the work 
people displaced." (44).
A series of meetings occurred, with a Cabinet 
Committee established to deal with the issue. Various 
schemes for providing alternative work were considered, 
including by means of stimulating development programmes 
in the colonies, and the réintroduction of trade facili­
ties with Russia. It was...
"... emphasised that compensation should be the 
last resource", and that every effort should be 
made "... to secure alternative work." (45).
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However, the TUC maintained the view that compensa­
tion should nevertheless be available as a final alter­
native. Eventually, the Cabinet Committee rejected the 
idea of paying compensation to individual workers on 
somewhat curious grounds. These were the administrative 
difficulties of assessing the amount of compensation, 
the "friction likely to be caused through differentia­
ting between workpeople in the same factory... ", and 
the "injustice which might arise" in consequence of 
different treatment of different causes of unemployment. 
(46). A proposal was made by the TUC that local autho­
rities should be given grants to enable them to...
"... make provision for the re-employment of the
workers affected", (47);
in other words, to engage in local economic initiatives. 
This, too, was rejected.
It is, therefore, possible to say that as early as 
1930 the General Council of the TUC was advocating State 
intervention to provide work (rather than compensation) 
for redundant workers, but was prepared to advocate 
compensation as a last resort, with a vision, too, of 
local authorities assuming some sort of role as job 
creation agencies. The limits and reservations made 
about the State's role in providing compensation are in 
marked contrast to the policy of the NFPW at that time. 
Nevertheless, the TUC itself was also, briefly, adopting 
a position similar to that of the NFPW although this was 
a relatively short-lived aberration.
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At the 1930 Congress a delegate from the Shop
Assistants Union moved a resolution expressing "grave
concern" at the...
"... displacement of old and faithful employees 
of firms through the operation of rationalisation 
and amalgamation." (48).
The resolution went on to argue in favour of the 
principle of "compensation for loss of office" being 
made available to all employees, and urged the introduc­
tion of a parliamentary Bill to deal with the matter.
It was carried with very little debate. However, at the 
same Congress, a motion from the Transport and General 
Workers Union, urged unions faced with redundancies 
through rationalisation and reorganisation to adopt a 
policy of reducing hours to minimise the numbers of 
workers displaced, to "institute generally in connection 
with the reorganisation of industry adequate compensa­
tion arrangements" (49), and to "provide avenues of 
employment for younger workers". Although Ernest Bevin 
(the mover) said little to elaborate upon the part of 
this motion dealing with "compensation for those dis­
placed", it would appear that the policy being advocated 
to secure severance pay was of collective bargaining 
rather than by seeking legislation. Other contributors 
similarly laid little emphasis on the compensation 
aspect of the motion, although it was picked up by a 
delegate from the Draughtsmen's Union, the AESD. In
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doing so he referred, somewhat vaguely, to the 1930 Loss
of Employment (Compensation) Bill...
"... in this connection I think the question 
of compensation dealt with in the last reso­
lution ought to be borne in mind. There was a 
Bill introduced. I think by the Railway Clerks 
Association, a few weeks ago upon this very 
question." (50).
One wonders whether many of the delegates were aware 
of the NFPW's efforts to introduce legislation, and if 
not, how seriously they were committed to the earlier 
motion they themselves had carried, calling on the TUC 
to support the introduction of a Bill. If the TUC had 
stumbled into a policy of seeking legislation to provide 
unemployment compensation, it could hardly be said to 
have arisen as a priority objective or a major concern 
of affiliated unions. As to whether the TUC actually 
did draft a Bill on the subject - there is no record of 
this having been done. Doubtless, the reaction of the 
minority Labour Government to the proposal for compensa­
tion in the declining armaments industry would have been 
sufficient to imply a poor chance of success. In any 
event, the political crisis of 1931 intervened and with 
the downfall of the Labour Government, support would 
have had to be sought in a new parliament of quite 
different character.
In 1936, a further call was made at the TUC for 
legislative action. A motion from the General and 
Municipal Workers Union demanded legislation to "secure 
adequate compensation for all workers now being dis­
placed". Again, the focus of concern was "company 
amalgamations, industrial mergers, the growth of State
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action in closing works deemed to be redundant, and... 
forms of rationalisation". (51). The delegate empha­
sised developments which had occurred in the gas and 
electricity industries, where rationalisations had been 
brought about and employees compensated where they were 
made unemployed. Congress adopted the resolution. A 
circular was sent to all affiliated unions calling their 
attention to the need to secure agreements where ratio­
nalisations occurred. Copies of agreements were re­
quested, and on receipt of this information, work began 
to draft a Bill for parliament. (52). However, in 1938, 
it was reported that the Economic Committee had consi­
dered the problems involved in framing legislation of 
this kind, and had decided that it was "not practicable" 
to proceed. (53). The problem, according to the 
Economic Committee, was that arrangements need to be 
specific to different industries. The Committee argued 
that...
"... strong trade union organisation within each 
industry would enable the difficulties to be met 
by the adoption of the shorter working week and 
other measures." (54).
The resolutions of 1930 and 1936, both of which had 
advocated legislation, were defeated then, not on the 
floor of Congress, but in the committees of the General 
Council. This is not of course to suggest that had the 
General Council adopted a different attitude, the TUC 
would have succeeded where the NFPW failed. Rather, it 
may well be that the TUC was less reliant upon the 
"legislative road", in some measure because it (the TUC)
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had a better appreciation of the practical difficulties 
of such an approach meeting with success. However, it 
does also seem that the General Council's reticence was 
derived from something other than an appreciation that 
legislation would be hard to achieve. It took the view, 
too, that there were practical difficulties in adminis­
tering such a law; though by whom these difficulties 
would be faced, the TUC did not specify. It would seem, 
however, that the TUC was aware of inter-industry dif­
ferences; perhaps arising from casual or seasonal wor­
king patterns, perhaps due to the existence of out­
working, possibly because of intrinsically high labour 
mobility rates in certain industries - exactly what, is 
not clear. Legislation would need to take into account, 
"the special circumstances in each industry", and this 
according to the TUC was "not practicable". In any 
event, the General Council argued, there was a need for 
"adequate unemployment benefit for all workers thrown 
out of employment, by whatever cause... ". (55).
There is something altogether unconvincing in the
General Council's argument that with regard to mass
redundancies...
"... strong trade union organisation within each 
industry would enable the difficulties to be met 
by the adoption of the shorter working week, and 
other measures." (56).
Quite what this was meant to imply is also not clear, 
but it seems that the General Council was veering to­
wards a policy of redundancy avoidance, as opposed to 
redundancy compensation. Whether reducing overtime.
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introducing the shorter working week, or worksharing 
really would have been capable of preventing redundan­
cies owing to business amalgamations and mergers, is 
highly doubtful. One assumes, however, that such poli­
cies were being advocated by particular craft unions 
such as the Engineering Union. In such areas there may 
well have been some limited scope for the autonomous 
imposition of measures to ration work. (57). Overall, 
however, the strategy could not reasonably have been 
expected to succeed.
Clearly, the policies pursued by the NFPW and the TUC 
respectively, differ markedly in this area. To what 
might these distinctions be ascribed? It is not enough 
to argue that the NFPW was a federation that existed 
largely to employ the method of legislative action, as 
opposed to the TUC which did not. After all, there were 
innumerable examples where the TUC had itself sought 
limited forms of legislation in different matters. The 
particular problems of white collar workers, including 
their ineligibility to receive unemployment insurance 
benefit in many cases, the notion that "loyalty" would 
be rewarded, and their expectations of pensions on 
retirement, might arguably have contributed to a greater 
feeling that legal protection was required. Neverthe­
less, even these factors seem inadequate to explain the 
differences which existed. Perhaps a more satisfactory 
explanation lies in the relative bargaining power of 
white and blue collar workers at the time. The NFPW, 
and unions associated with it, were weak, and less able
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to achieve gains through collective bargaining than 
their manual union counterparts. In part this may have 
been due to their lower rates of membership organisa­
tion, in part to the more "moderate" attitudes of their 
members, and in part to their comparative lack of expe­
rience of militant action. At any rate, parliamentary 
action, for the NFPW, was explicitly seen as a prefe­
rable option to strike action, as has already been 
shown. For the craft and other manual workers' unions 
attached to the TUC, parliamentary action was less 
necessary - so long as they could secure a reasonable 
degree of support for direct industrial action. Given, 
too, that there had been some success in negotiating 
industry-wide redundancy agreements (The General and 
Municipal Workers Union, for example, concluded one in 
the gas industry in 1930). (58). There was at least 
some basis for the TUC's belief that the issues could be 
tackled on an industry by industry basis. Taken toge­
ther with the greater prevalence of industry bargaining, 
this might have been seen as not too unrealistic an 
approach at the time (though we know now that it was, in 
the event, so manifestly incapable of bringing the 
majority of employees within the scope of agreements, 
that some thirty years later legislation was indeed 
required to achieve this end).
However, it has to be said that the TUC's position 
was nothing if not ambivalent. Government could be 
approached for compensation arrangements in the arma­
ments industry. Demands could be made for State
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intervention for compensation in other industrial sec­
tors (for example, the Cotton Industry in 1935). Yet 
generalised involvement was deemed not to be needed 
because the "shorter working week, and other measures', 
were going to deal with the problem. Such ambivalence 
was at once a reflection of the differing approaches of 
affiliated unions, and the different traditions of trade 
unionism within the movement generally. However, 
dwarfed as it was by issues such as unemployment, union 
policy over redundancy failed to be projected to a 
position where it became the subject of any deep or 
sustained debate in trade unions or between them.
Let us, at this point, consider for one moment what 
the contrasting positions of the NFPW and the TUC seem 
to indicate so far as their underlying ethics and morals 
are concerned. Firstly, the NFPW and its affiliated 
unions were strongly committed to "compensation for loss 
of office". So far as the policy positions of these 
bodies were concerned, there seems to have been a belief 
in a "right" to compensation. Moreover, there was 
substantial support from this, too, from the TUC affi­
liated unions (a number were in any event affiliates of 
the NFPW). Evidence of this, though not of the same 
singleness of purpose as had been shown by the NFPW, was 
seen in the Congress resolutions of 1930 and 1936 
calling for legislation. On the other hand, the TUC 
seemed to waver between an incipient corporatism (iden­
tifying rather closely with the objective problems of 
industry), the idea of individuals having a "right to a
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job" of some kind (even if they were made unemployed 
from their existing jobs), and the idea of a "right to 
compensation " for the loss of a job. Within the TUC 
then, there were differences, particularly on the issue 
of compensation. One suspects that the reason why the 
resolutions of 1931 and 1936 were defeated in the com­
mittees of the General Council (having been carried by 
Congress), was because of the opposition of the craft 
unions, particularly the AEU. Unions were, it seems, 
capable of being influenced by different traditions, 
perhaps different cultures. If opposition to redundancy 
could take the form of restricting overtime working, 
securing a shorter working week and so on, there could, 
so far as some unions were concerned, be an accommoda­
tion to the occurrence of job loss, by making arrange­
ments to compensate those involved. And, while it will 
be noted that neither the policies of the NFPW nor the 
TUC could in any sense be seen as motivated by any 
concept such as a "right not to be made redundant", it 
must be remembered that contemporaneous events in this 
period included the "right to work" marches organised by 
the National Unemployed Workers Movement. This all 
seems to suggest that a wide range of union responses to 
redundancy was evidenced in this period, and that these 
responses were characterised by statements of "rights" 
by unions and national federations. And, in the sense 
that these responses appear to have represented stable 
positions that unions adopted, reflecting policies, and 
methods employed to achieve objectives, it would seem
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reasonable to associate them with variations in union 
cultures. The NFPW it seems, had a more compensation 
oriented culture than some of the unions affiliated to 
the TUC, which appeared to stress job saving activities. 
The TUC itself, it would seem, was subject to pressures 
in different directions and performed something of a 
balancing act in the (at times) hesitant line it 
adopted.
4.6 THE COTTON INDUSTRY ACT 1959
When government action was next taken to apply the 
principle that réorganisâtional job losses should be 
associated with severance payments, it was in the pri­
vately owned cotton industry. The Cotton Industry Act 
1959 represented government intervention to support an 
industry badly hit by recession and problems of foreign 
competition. In world terms the British industry was 
uncompetitive, and there was, moreover, an acute problem 
of over capacity. Although Conservative support for a 
major exercise in industrial restructuring might in 
itself be thought worthy of examination, that particular 
point is not of present concern. It is sufficient to 
note that the Act was (as its long title puts it)...
"... to enable schemes to be made with a view 
to eliminating excess capacity in the cotton 
industry, to provide for compensation for any 
such elimination, and for raising the sums 
required by levies on the industry; to enable 
the Board of Trade to make contributions to­
wards any such compensation and to make grants 
towards the re-equipment of the industry." (59).
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The Act provided that the Cotton Board could...
"... with a view to promoting efficiency in 
the industry and by the elimination of excess 
capacity" (60),
after consultation with employees and employers' bodies, 
"prepare schemes for the elimination of excess 
capacity", and the payment of compensation to those 
firms which were affected. A condition for acceptance 
of the schemes as being eligible for support in this 
way, was that there had also to be an agreement on 
severance payments for the workers who would become 
redundant in consequence of the reduction in manufactu­
ring capacity. The scheme, therefore, did not involve 
the State specifically in finding the money to pay 
redundant workers, simply introducing (albeit somewhat 
indirectly) an obligation on employers to make such 
payments.
The cotton industry was an industrial sector which 
had experienced a long history of crisis and decline.
In 1882-84, 85 per cent of the U.K.'s production of 
cotton goods went to export. In the 1952 cotton depres­
sion, exports slumped to barely 25 per cent. Problems 
of markets, overseas competition, large fluctuations in 
raw materials and above all, efficiency and costs of 
production had bedevilled the industry since before the 
turn of the nineteenth century. (61). As long ago as 
1935, government support was given to assist cotton 
spinners in reorganisation and re-equipment by direct 
funding of a Spindles Board charged with this responsi­
bility. No provision was made by either the State or
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employers for employees made redundant as a result of 
these changes, despite approaches to this end being made 
by the unions in the industry. (62).
It was against this background that the government 
introduced measures in 1959 to attempt to prop up the 
ailing industry. No claims were made as to the boldness 
or imaginative nature of the proposed legislation. 
Rather, the government minister introducing the Bill 
made it clear that conditions associated with obtaining 
grants would be "formidable" and that the difficulty of 
meeting them should not be minimised. (63). The 
Opposition described it as a "belated and unimaginative 
Bill", and suggested that the government, far from 
solving the problems of the industry, had added to its 
difficulties by failing to act, "when world forces were 
acting against it". (64). On the question of redun­
dancy, considerable criticism was made of the draft 
scheme agreed between employers, and the unions.
Nothing, it was said, could really compensate a worker 
who had been deprived of a skill he had acquired. 
Redundancy payments were not enough. The answer was to 
give redundant workers other work, and there was urgent 
need for training. The cotton industry areas needed to 
be re-equipped with new industries, in order to provide 
work for the redundant and unemployed. None of these 
measures were embodied in the government's approach to 
the restructuring of the industry in which, inevitably, 
employees would be left without work. (65).
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The Bill then, instituted a system of support for the 
industry's reorganisation and reduction in manufacturing 
capacity, and for assisting in re-equipping it. The 
support was conditional upon the employers and unions 
agreeing a scheme of compensation for displaced emp­
loyees. Although the Board of Trade (through the Cotton 
Board) was prepared to support the cost of re-equipping 
the industry, and compensating the employers who opted 
to close their mills in order to reduce capacity, the 
full cost of compensating the redundant workers was to 
be borne by the industry itself - i.e. there was no 
State assistance for the redundancy payments. These 
payments were in fact met by levies on all firms in the 
industry. (66).
Three reorganisation schemes were approved, dealing 
with different sections of the cotton industry. On the 
question of severance payments for redundant workers, 
each of the schemes laid down the same agreed scale.
The rates were dependent upon the age of the employee, 
and his or her earnings before redundancy. Half the 
compensation was to be paid in weekly amounts, and half 
in the form of a lump sum. These details are of more 
than passing interest because in certain self-evident 
respects they bear similarity with what eventually 
became the National Redundancy Repayments Scheme, intro­
duced by the Redundancy Payments Act 1965. As will be 
seen, there are other respects in which the Cotton 
Industry Act was a genuine precursor of the 1965 
legislation.
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A year prior to the introduction of the Cotton 
Industry Act, the TUC had considered the problems of the 
industry. A far more interventionist stance had been 
adopted, by endorsing a document presented by the United 
Textile Factory Workers Association (UTFWA) but written 
and prepared by Harold Wilson M P . (67). The document 
was the result of a detailed analysis of the problems of 
the industry and came to be written arising out of a 
decision by the Legislative Council of the UTFWA in 
December 1952. In the event, the policy paper was not 
completed until 1957, but then became adopted by both 
the TUC and the Labour Party. The plan proposed a 
series of interventions by the State:- by dealing with 
supplies problems through the establishment of an insti­
tution for this purpose (The Raw Cotton Commission); by 
providing tax and other incentives to manufacturers to 
encourage them to re-equip; by providing certain new 
aspects of infrastructure including buildings and fac­
tories to produce the required modern plant; by establi­
shing a Cotton Industry Reorganisation Commission which 
would have ultimate powers to enforce company amalgama­
tions and other forms of reorganisation, including rapid 
re-equipment of the industry. The Reorganisation 
Commission, it was suggested, should also have powers to 
"compensate workers made redundant as a result of reor­
ganisation and re-equipment". (68). Other aspects of 
the plan dealt with bulk ordering of textile machinery 
by the Reorganisation Commission, a more intensive use 
of plant, pricing, export and market problems, and
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the need for regular joint consultation, including 
through Mill Production Committees. (69). The ideas 
of the paper reflect many of the principles that were 
later to guide Wilson in the early days of the Labour 
Governments of 1984 and 1966 when, as will be recalled, 
an approach of strategic intervention by the State was 
adopted, through the establishment of an Industrial 
Reorganisation Commission to promote company mergers 
etc, and as we shall see shortly, proposals were made 
for a Redundancy Payments Act to ensure that displaced 
workers were compensated for loss of jobs.
This then, was the "Wilson Plan" for the cotton 
industry. It was, however, also a policy which was 
supported and adopted by the executive of UTFWA, and 
despite bearing the stamp of authorship of the future 
Labour Prime Minister, it represented a line of policy 
and argument with which the union was prepared to 
identify.
It would be wrong to conclude that the UTFWA or the 
TUC had significant influence on the shape of public 
policy in the form of the 1959 Cotton Industry Act. The 
facts suggest that the government acted despite (rather 
than because of) the demands of trade union members.
The objective problems of the industry were difficult to 
ignore. Nor is there any clear link between the demands 
in "The Plan for Cotton" for arrangements for redundancy 
payments to be made, and the eventual provisions of the 
1959 Act. The President of the Board of Trade claimed 
in introducing the legislation, that...
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"... the industry and the government (had) always 
agreed that money could not be made available for 
compensating for machinery' that was scrapped, 
unless compensation were also paid to the workers 
displaced." (70).
Here was a situation where the government felt 
obliged to intervene and promote major industrial reor­
ganisation, and in doing so, accept the application of 
the principles (already established elsewhere) that 
employees displaced should receive financial compensa­
tion. This owed little to the influence of union 
campaigning. Nonetheless, union policy positions in 
relation to unemployment and redundancy compensation 
in the industry raise some interesting points, which we 
should at this stage consider more deeply.
4.7 UNION AND TUC POLICIES ON COTTON CRISIS :
A  C O M M E N T
What then do we conclude about the involvement of the 
trade unions and the TUC in this episode of legislative 
support for labour shedding in the cotton industry?
Here were proposals being made, for forms of structural 
support for the industry that certainly went beyond a 
limited demand for workers displaced to be compensated. 
The intellectual origins of the plan were, as we have 
seen, attributable to Wilson, but nonetheless he was 
commissioned to produce his proposals by UTFWA some five 
years earlier. This was no passive acceptance of the 
suggestions of a labour supporting well-wisher, at a
273
moment of crisis; rather it was a strategy to intervene 
to save the industry, which the cotton unions were aware 
was in a desperate situation.
It is true, that the plan itself was not couched in 
terms of emphasising employees' "rights" in so many 
words, but it is clear that the principal underlying 
concern of workers and their unions was with the safety 
of their jobs. Given the fact that the plan was presen­
ted as a complete document, it would be unwise to take 
isolated aspects of it out of context; and one notices 
that the plan's proposals were presented as unthrea- 
tening, in the industry's interests etc, so as to (hope­
fully) gain a degree of acceptance from the employers.
It was described as a plan for the...
"... maintenance of full employment; (and) 
adequate standards for those who have invested 
their capital in the industry... ". (71).
Nonetheless, it would have represented a substantial 
erosion of management control if implemented. The 
Reorganisation Commission, for example, would have had 
power to enforce amalgamations in the industry or take a 
controlling interest in certain firms in order to press 
through programmes of re-equipment. (72). It is there­
fore interesting to observe that in what is really a 
quite sweeping set of proposals for the reorganisation 
and restructuring of the industry, involving taking 
substantial control away from the employers, relatively 
little is called for in terms of new "rights" for 
employees.
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To clarify this point, it should be stressed that the 
plan's first objective was to save the jobs of those 
employed in the industry. In this sense, it was moti­
vated by the idea of employees having a "right to a 
job". Secondly, it was putting forward proposals for 
redundancy payments, which as we have noted, were avail­
able for a relatively small minority of workers at the 
time. Both of these proposals were significant and 
important demands. However, it is interesting, that in 
proposing the creation of a statutory body with huge 
powers to reorganise and restructure the industry, there 
were no suggestions that unions should have rights of 
involvement in such plans to reorganise and restructure. 
There was no tripartite structure, for example, proposed 
for the Reorganisation Commission, nor were there sug­
gestions that unions should be consulted before mergers 
and amalgamations were arranged. Rather, the plan 
contained more limited suggestions that there should be 
regular consultation with employees at the level of the 
company, and that workers should be involved in joint 
production committees - essentially to maximise produc­
tivity and output etc. What this confirms therefore, is 
that the main focus of the plan was on the provision of 
a more secure employment basis for workers in the in­
dustry, and (to some extent as a secondary factor) the 
provision of rights to redundancy payments when jobs 
were lost, but workers' involvement was not seen as 
essential to achieve these goals.
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In this connection, the role of the TUC and the 
unions is interesting when it came to the proposals for 
the Cotton Industry Act in 1959, some two years after 
the "Plan for Cotton" had been published. When the 
government announced its intentions to introduce the 
1959 legislation, the TUC decided on approaching the 
government to make jobs available in the areas affected 
by redundancies. However, when the General Council 
learned that the cotton unions had reached agreement 
with the employers on the completely separate issue of 
severance terms for those made redundant, they decided 
to play down the issue of provision of jobs, raising it 
instead at a meeting of the National Production Advisory 
Council. (73). Clearly, the fact that the cotton unions 
had reached agreement with the employers caused the TUC 
to alter its plans to press the jobs issue, but why 
should they have done so?
The most obvious explanation of this vacillation by 
the TUC is that it reflected the belief of leaders that 
collective bargaining was, wherever possible, the pre­
ferred approach. As the TUC's evidence to the Donovan 
Commission (some years later than the events considered 
here) was to express it:-
"Collective bargaining is the most important 
trade union method. In fact it is more than 
a method, it is the central feature of trade 
unionism." (74).
It might be assumed that the TUC leaders took the 
view, that once the cotton unions had secured agreement 
with the employers over the details of the redundancy
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scheme for the industry, it was incumbent upon the 
General Council to distance itself from direct discus­
sions with the government. Quite what adverse effect 
such discussions might have been considered likely to 
have, it is not clear, particularly as they would have 
been on the completely separate issue of job provision 
in the areas most affected by redundancies.
However, a more telling point owes somewhat more to 
pragmatism than principle. Although the cotton unions 
and the TUC believed the "Plan for Cotton" to offer the 
best way forward, they recognised that the programme it 
contained was "only achievable under a Labour 
Government". (75). Even so, they believed that the 
issue of jobs was worth taking up with the government 
directly, on the basis that the legislation itself 
linked the provision of support to the industry, with 
agreement between employers and unions on schemes of 
compensation for the redundant. However realistic or 
otherwise the scenario might be in practice, one can see 
that so long as the unions had not agreed a scheme of 
compensation therefore, there might have been a possibi­
lity of applying an element of pressure for further 
concessions, including measures to create jobs. How­
ever, it is fairly clear that the hard-pressed cotton 
employers would have been in a poor position to concede 
such demands, and hence the proposed approach to the 
government. The news that the cotton unions had reached 
agreement, therefore, might have seemed to close this 
opportunity, and hence the change in stance by the TUC.
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Despite all the aspirations of the cotton unions, there­
fore, on the question of creating extra jobs in the 
areas affected by closures, there really must have 
seemed to be little alternative when the employers were 
willing to offer arrangements for severance payments 
schemes. The unions no doubt preferred the bird-in-the- 
hand of an agreement on redundancy terms, to any number 
of wider ranging measures that were buried in the bushes 
of Labour's future electoral fortunes, or the sympathies 
of Conservative Ministers. On this analysis it was 
neither a lack of ideas as to alternatives that might be 
available, nor single minded pursuit of the financial 
bounty, that caused the cotton unions and the TUC to 
acquiesce to the job shake-out and compensation package 
of the 1959 Cotton Act. Rather, it was because the 
likely success of demands for other job saving measures, 
or restructuring of the industry, was seen as too remote 
to justify any delay in concluding agreement on the 
redundancy package, which was at least a real and tan­
gible benefit that the unions could secure for their 
members.
Yet this is only a partially satisfactory answer.
Even given that unions need to learn the art of com­
promise, if they are to achieve agreements, there are 
some issues over which compromises are less willingly 
conceded, as we saw in the discussion of perceived 
"rights" in chapter three. Put differently, a compro­
mise may amount to a concession of principle, and the 
action of the cotton unions in agreeing on the severance
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terms in the circumstances described, was ineluctably a 
concession on the principle of a "right to a job". Of 
course, the jobs of workers were in any event insecure, 
the industry was in a weak state, and "rights to jobs" 
must have been seen as fairly tenuous in any event. 
Nonetheless, the issue had been raised of pressure being 
put on the government to introduce measures to generate 
jobs in the areas concerned with closures. It is fairly 
clear therefore, that even if the government might have 
proved unsympathetic, there were possible avenues of 
discussion that were not fully explored, before the 
severance package was agreed. Once this agreement had 
been produced, there was no particular obstacle in the 
path of employers taking up the possibilities offered 
under the Cotton Act to reduce the capacity of the 
industry, i.e. declare redundancies on a fairly wide 
scale.
In order to understand the process that occurred, we 
might consider for one moment what the reaction of the 
unions might have been if they had been offered job 
creation measures, but no compensation arrangements. 
Would such an arrangement have been equally acceptable? 
Doubtless much would have depended upon the number of 
jobs being made available, and other factors would 
perhaps appear material, e.g. proximity of the new jobs 
to where workers lived, their suitability etc. However, 
it would seem unlikely that in 1959 unions would have 
dropped demands for compensation for loss of employment 
at all easily, even given that positive responses had
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been offered on the above points. There are various 
practical reasons that could be advanced to justify this 
position. Not all the jobs would have been suitable; 
possibly insufficient^would have been made available to 
provide every redundant worker with another job, etc, 
and these perhaps go some way towards explaining the 
relative emphasis that was in fact placed on the two 
possibilities of compensation and job creation. How­
ever, it does seem likely that given the scenario that 
has been created, the unions would nonetheless have 
pressed somewhat harder for compensation, than they did 
in the event press for job creation measures.
Evidence for this analysis is to some extent depen­
dent on parallel events in other industries. The gas 
industry agreement as long before as 1930 had dealt with 
compensation arrangements, but no measures for alterna­
tive work were dealt with. The disputes in the British 
Motor Corporation in 1956 (which we will touch on more 
fully in due course) were aimed at a number of grievan­
ces, including the lack of compensation arrangements, 
but the issue of job creation was not one of them. 
Moreover, if one considers the "Plan for Cotton" and its 
various recommendations, it is clear that whilst it 
would have provided a means of securing jobs in the 
industry - to a certain extent - no measures are put 
forward by the plan for job creation outside the in­
dustry. The expectations of unions it would seem, did 
not embrace the active creation of alternative work, as 
a measure to follow redundancy.
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But if one seeks a deeper explanation for this pat­
tern of events, it is necessary to revert to the theore­
tical framework considered in the previous chapter. To 
some extent anticipating the analysis that will be made 
more completely in the conclusion to the present chap­
ter, one might express it as follows... In a number of 
precedent situations prior to 1959, reorganisation of 
industries that had resulted in job losses had been 
accompanied by payments of compensation to the workers 
concerned. It is quite clear that this was now an 
expectation of some, perhaps most, union leaders, but it 
was also an expectation that was substantially acknow­
ledged by the State, and had been conceded in the above 
mentioned precedent events. To this extent it would 
seem that the idea of compensating workers when they 
lost their jobs, had been recognised as "the right thing 
to do", and in short had achieved the status of a per­
ceived "right". It had achieved this position by a 
sequence of events, in which unions had played a part by 
quoting earlier precedents etc, but the State in par­
ticular had also contributed, as mentioned above.
On the other hand, there were other ideas about 
"rights" and "oughts" that existed in relation to the 
"right to work". As we have seen, the cotton unions 
sought to raise the question of State intervention to 
plan for a more secure basis for jobs in their industry, 
and the TUC raised questions of alternative work being 
provided to those declared redundant. These were always 
more difficult goals to achieve, and there were few
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precedent events to condition perceptions. Conse­
quently, there was little practical experience to in­
grain interventions of this kind into the consciousness 
of trade unionists, and while job creation and the 
protection of an industry were seen as things that 
"ought" to happen, they could not be said to have 
achieved the status of popular perceptions of "rights" 
in the same way as the compensation issue appears to 
have done at this stage. And if we receall that "union 
cultures" have been advanced as an important aspect of 
this theoretical framework, we might at this point touch 
upon their influence, so far as can be seen, in this 
sequence of events.
Union cultures, I have suggested, can be seen to 
operate at local or national levels in trade unions. 
Plainly, we have been looking at national activity and 
if cultures are at work, they must be examined at this 
level. The "right to compensation" would not appear to 
have been a universal demand that subsumed all others, 
and as we have seen, the TUC opposed the idea of general 
legislation to achieve it. Nonetheless it does appear 
that it was sufficiently commonplace to have become a 
basic expectation; if all efforts at redundancy avoi­
dance failed, compensation would probably be looked for. 
In this sense, the "right to compensation" was a basic 
element, and whilst there seemed to be differences on 
the priority it should be given, and as to how it should 
be achieved, there were fewer differences on the ques­
tion of whether it should be applied. Precedent, and
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the attitude of the State, had consolidated this. On 
the other hand, the "right to a job" was less easily 
impressed on the mentalities of people. Whilst unions 
could raise this as a demand, it had not become part of 
the basic element of culture - the "inherent" element, 
to use Rudé's terminology. For the "right to a job" to 
assume such status, it had to be part of an actively 
"derived" element, and much would depend on the effort 
spent on conveying it as an idea, into the mental make­
up of union members. Circumstances (economic, politi­
cal, social), would also have an important influence on 
whether such ideas were implanted in the culture of 
unions.
So, with regard to the "Plan for Cotton", and the 
ideas it put forward to safeguard jobs in the cotton 
industry, it is necessary to note that though the plan 
clearly raised questions of party politics (as evidenced 
by the TUC's view that only a Labour Government was 
capable of supporting it), the textile unions did not 
appear anxious to adopt a high political profile in 
support of their proposals. "Lest it be thought other­
wise", ran a sentence in the journal of the Operative 
Spinners and Twiners in 1953...
"... it should be noted that from a trade union 
point of view there is no political axe to grind." 
(76).
Quite so, and without such a "political axe" it was 
barely likely that the ideas of the "Plan for Cotton" 
could be expected to be taken seriously some five years 
later when a Conservative Government was devising
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its own proposals to deal with the ailing industry. 
Neither was it realistic to expect the cotton unions to 
fight (in whatever way they could) for jobs, at the cost 
of agreements on compensation. The idea of a "right to 
a job" was doubtless a concept that would have appealed 
to many of the cotton workers facing redundancy, but on 
the evidence available, it was not perceived as a 
"right" in the sense of an ethical imperative, at least 
by the union leaders at the time. Moreover, the econo­
mic circumstances at the time, including substantially 
full employment, were not in any obvious way conducive 
towards the idea of a "right to a job" becoming a highly 
significant political slogan, though had circumstances 
changed rapidly, this may well have been the case.
At this point, we will leave further comment to the 
general conclusion of this chapter, and resume our 
historical narrative of the events leading to the 
Redundancy Payments Act in 1965.
4.6 ATTEMPTS TO LEGISLATE IN THE NINETEEN-SIXTIES
In the years 1962 to 1964 three further Private 
Member's Bills were introduced into the House of 
Commons, in attempts to produce legislation providing a 
right to redundancy compensation. For the first time 
the Bills specifically introduced the concept of being 
"declared redundant" (77), as opposed to having one's
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“employment terminated". (78). Entitlement to compensa­
tion was proposed, to be given to any employee of 12 
months or more service with the employer in question, 
who was “declared redundant by his employer" or "ceases 
to be employed by him as a result of circumstances 
beyond the employee's control... ". (79). In no case 
was there any attempt in the Bill to define redundancy 
as distinct from "circumstances beyond the employee's 
control". It is far from clear how, in practice, the 
Bills would have been expected to operate, though the 
intentions of their sponsors are readily apparent. 
Compensation would have been...
"... (a) one fifty-second part of the employee's 
total earnings during the period of employment; 
or (b) the amount agreed between the employer 
and the employee." (80).
The main sponsor of the 1962 and 1963 Bills was the 
then Labour MP for Gloucester, John Diamond (later to 
become Lord Diamond, Chief Secretary to the Treasury). 
The 1964 Bill was presented by Julius Silverman MP, who 
represented a Birmingham constituency. In moving the 
1962 Bill, three main arguments were advanced. These 
were firstly, that in a world of technological change 
redundancies were inevitable if we were to advance our 
standard of living. Secondly, that labour relations
were..
"... bedevilled by anxiety", about redundancies, 
and that this was a cause of strikes. "If we 
could get rid of this anxiety, we should be 
getting rid of something which is a bar to good 
labour relations." (81).
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Thirdly, company amalgamations and rationalisations 
were . . .
"... in the national interest... but the worker 
cannot see - and neither can I - why the nation 
should benefit exclusively at his expense." (82).
The need for legislation to make severance payments
compulsory arose (argued Diamond), because there were...
"... a number of bad or uninformed employers who 
treat their employees in a disgusting manner."
(83).
In moving the 1963 Bill, the arguments advanced were 
very similar. Diamond explained his purposes as 
follows : -
"We cannot escape the conclusion that for 
a prosperous and free society an element 
of mobility of labour is required, but for 
a just society we require that the worker 
involved should not suffer." (84).
On the question of the need to use a legislative ap­
proach to making these provisions available. Diamond 
observed...
"... it is necessary to deal with this matter 
by legislation because negotiation has been 
shown to be far too slow. I estimate that 
there are now only approximately 15 per cent 
of the country's employees who are provided 
with satisfactory redundancy agreements." (85).
Julius Silverman's introduction to the 1964 Bill was
very much in line with Diamond's earlier arguments. The
following comments tend to broaden somewhat. Diamond's
assertion that the worker should not bear the cost of
the process of change which society deemed necessary:-
"We must provide for automation, not by throwing 
the worker on the scrap heap, as has frequently 
been done in the United States, but by providing 
a transitional period for adjustment, by providing 
the necessary training and above all by providing 
a new job . " (86).
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So, providing severance payments was seen as part of
a wider series of obligations which society had towards
workers made unemployed through technological change.
The provision of training and new jobs were tasks of
similar importance. It is interesting to note, too,
Silverman's comment that...
"... it is not anticipated that we shall have many 
hundreds of thousands continuously unemployed. The 
main object of the Bill is to deal with the era in 
which we live. New industries are being born and 
old ones are dying. Whatever we may think of mer­
gers which take place, they frequently indicate the 
birth of a new industry and technologies and the 
passing of the old." (87).
Clearly, here was a very different vision from that
which confronts us today, when redundancy in many cases
is very likely to be followed by long term unemployment,
and any eventual job is gained against competition from
other people sharing the same plight.
Undoubtedly these Bills gave publicity to the idea of 
legislation for redundancy payments, and promoted dis­
cussion in this area. Moreover, the issue seemed to win 
a measure of support from both the Conservative and 
Labour Parties in parliament, and it seems fair to say 
that the Private Member's Bills were in this sense 
contributory to the eventual introduction of government 
supported legislation. (88). Indeed, given the quite 
definite rebuffs which had greeted earlier attempts to 
legislate from the 1930s onwards, it is remarkable how 
narrow were the issues separating the two main parties 
when the 1965 legislation was actually brought forward
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for parliamentary debate. Mr Godber, the Conservative
Labour Spokesman, was able to say...
"... my main criticism of the Bill, and of the 
Minister's speech, is not against the principle 
of the Bill, and not against its detail, although 
I have some criticism of that. My criticism is 
on the government's order of priorities. We are 
discussing the wrong Bill, brought forward for 
the wrong reasons." (89).
How significant were these three Bills in the 1960s, 
in influencing the subsequent Labour Government's deci­
sion to introduce the Bill which became the 1965 
Redundancy Payments Act? Doubtless they played some 
small part in creating the necessary climate of opinion 
However, there was a more significant factor which had 
emerged to form the background to the debate, and this 
now needs at this point to be considered.
4.9 T H E  E M E R G I H G  C O N C E P T  O F  A  " R E D U H D A a C Y  P R O B L E M "
The key factor to emerge in the 1950s was the deve­
lopment of a perceived "redundancy problem". This went 
together with the view that restrictive practices by 
trade unions were a damaging factor of British indust­
rial relations. Trade unions, the argument ran, main­
tained inefficient lines of demarcation, partly through 
an "unreasonable" desire to save the jobs of their 
members. In other respects they opposed redundancies 
when clearly the interests of efficiency dictated that 
they should occur. Quite how generalised was the
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perceived problem is not clear. For example, the
writers of one major study in 1958 put it thus:-
"It can be argued that the workers' collective 
organisations, the trade unions, have a major 
responsibility; a responsibility on the one hand 
for accepting the inevitability of some redun­
dancy (especially where a forward wage policy has 
enforced an economy of increasingly costly man­
power), and on the other for co-operating in 
handling it so as to minimise hardship. Some 
trade unions maintain that redundancy ought not 
to occur, that no-one should be put out of a job 
until another has been found for him. This 
impractical view is, however, rejected by most 
of the trade union movement." (90).
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Labour was sufficiently 
concerned about the perceived problem, that from 1958 
onwards it published a series of surveys and pamphlets 
(91), encouraging firms to adopt what were described as 
"positive employment policies" - that is schemes to 
assure workers of "reasonable" treatment in the event of 
redundancy, so that "impractical" opposition would be 
reduced. (92). The arguments of this series of pamph­
lets were much the same, namely that employers had a 
responsibility to make their own provisions in this 
sphere. The following extract from the first of these 
pamphlets in 1958 is an observation by the then Minister 
of Labour and National Service, Iain MacLeod:-
"Industrial efficiency has always depended as 
much upon human factors as upon mechanical and 
technical resources, and high productivity and 
adaptability demand the active co-operation of 
employees at all levels...
Individuals are naturally concerned about the 
security of their job and income, and change 
is feared as a step into the unknown. There is 
a conflict here, but the answer to it lies in 
encouraging a sense of mutual responsibility; 
responsibility of the employer towards the 
worker and of the worker towards the 
employer." (93).
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The document then sets out to provide examples of 
"forward looking employment policies" - i.e. redundancy 
severance schemes. Overall, however, employers showed 
little sign of enthusiasm for these entreaties. Table 
4.1 (p.292) is a summary of the main findings of the 
surveys, and the relatively low coverage is particularly 
evident. Interestingly, it was a chance comment of 
MacLeod's which gave rise to perhaps the first academic 
study of redundancy, conducted by Hilda Kahn, of the 
mass redundancies in the Midlands motor industry in 
the mid 1950s, which we will shortly consider in more 
detail. For the time being it is, however, sufficient 
to note that they were a source of considerable public 
comment, and criticisms were made of the company's 
behaviour in dismissing large numbers of workers with 
little notice, shortly before the holiday period, and 
with no redundancy compensation.
Against the background of events such as this, it is 
possible to understand the source of growing concern in 
government at what was being increasingly perceived as 
the "redundancy problem". A series of articles in 
papers like "The Economist" from 1956 onwards, urged the 
adoption of policies to help overcome these "problems” . 
The argument advanced was one for greater labour mobi­
lity, and a policy designed to remove restrictions 
placed in the way of employers intending to dismiss
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workers when output needed to be reduced. The problem
was, observed "The Economist", that...
"... the government seems at present to be held 
back by two considerations from a policy of accep­
ting and proclaiming that speedier dismissals in 
times of disinflation would be in the national 
interest. One is its fear that such a policy seems 
inhuman; the other is uncertainty about how such a 
policy could be advanced." (95).
For the writers of "The Economist", the preferred 
solution was to recast the system of unemployment bene­
fit. This, they argued, would...
"... remove some of the present horror of 
the sack felt by steady and regular workers; 
and more important, it would remove some of 
the sympathy for the potentially redundant 
that causes their workmates to spread out 
production among as many hands as possible."
(96).
In short, they argued, a "cushion" was needed, so 
that...
"... when expansion goes awry, there might be 
more readiness to take the necessary action - 
which is to kick more people, more quickly, 
although also no doubt with better planning 
on to it."
It is relevant to add that similar views were ad­
vanced from time to time by other economists in the late 
1950s and 1960s. There was a need, went one argument, 
for a more interventionist role for the State through an 
"active manpower policy". The case had two main lines 
of reason. The first was that worker resistance to 
redundancy hindered technological change, or prevented 
managements from adjusting the size of their workforces 
to cope with demand fluctuations. Because the resis­
tance of workers was generally anticipated by manage­
ments (so the argument went), there was a general
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Table 4.1
S U M M A R Y .  Q g  M A I N  f  I H D I U G S  - Q £ .  I Œ D U M D M C Ï  . E A Y .  S U R V E Y S
Year of Survey 1958 (1) 1961 (2) 1963 (3)
1. Total number of
"ongoing" schemes. 200 236 371
2. Number making compen­
sation payments. 50 90 192
3. Number of persons
employed by 
companies with 
redundancy policies
(million). 1.1 1.75
4. Closure arrangements:
special payments 
made (i.e. "one-off
payments). 66% 90%
5. Closures: employees
consulted in advance
(per cent employers) 50% 50%
Sources:
(1) Acton Society Trust Survey, "Redundancy: A survey of
problems and practices".
(2) Ministry of Labour Survey, "Security and Change".
(3) Ministry of Labour Survey, "Redundancy in Great
Britain".
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reluctance on their behalf to provoke "unrest" by decla­
ring redundancies. Every means possible would be found 
to avoid redundancies, including using inefficient 
practices such as short-time working, and wasteful 
labour practices would be tolerated for the same reason.
The second prong of the argument was more of a criti­
cism of management policies than a condemnation of 
workers' attitudes. In the context of a high employment 
economy there was (it was argued) a tendency for manage­
ments to hold on to labour even when there was a fall in 
demand for the firm's product. The "labour hoarding" 
manager reasoned that a time might come when, given a 
sudden increase in consumer demand, he might be faced 
with difficulty in finding workers with the necessary 
skills to fulfil his needs. Shanks (97), writing in 
1961, suggested a number of remedies to what he per­
ceived as the problem. The first was a government 
imposed payroll tax, "so that the more workers a factory 
employs the bigger tax it must pay". The second was a 
form of earnings related unemployment benefit. Follo­
wing a theme adopted by "The Economist", Shanks proposed 
that unemployment benefit might be raised to a high 
proportion of the worker's wage soon after he loses his 
job, but on a descending scale, "so that in the first 
month or so the unemployed worker has quite a good 
income to cushion him while he looks for a new job. But 
since he knows that the longer he remains out of work 
the lower his compensation will get, he has every incen­
tive to find something quickly".
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Thirdly, argued Shanks, there was the problem of 
union opposition to redundancy, which if unaltered, 
would make it imperative that legislation should be 
introduced "to lessen the workers' fear of redundancy 
and the insecurity to which it gives rise". Shanks 
proposed that the legislation should provide for a 
minimum period of four weeks' notice before dismissal on 
grounds of a general redundancy, a requirement that 
management should discuss the redundancies with union 
officials, and the establishment of minimum levels of 
compensation. Shanks, it should be noted, did not 
envisage the State having a role in actually meeting the 
severance payments to redundant workers. Instead, its 
role was merely to lay down the minimum standards which 
companies would have to implement.
Goodman, a newspaper labour correspondent, argued in 
1962 for earnings related unemployment benefit, a statu­
tory obligation on companies to consult their workers 
before declaring redundancies, statutory notice rights 
and levels of severance pay. He raised the possibility 
of a redundancy fund, and envisaged the establishment of 
an appeals machinery against unjustified dismissals.
The main thrust of Goodman's argument, however, was that 
measures to lessen the hardship caused when workers were 
declared redundant need to go far beyond devising 
schemes for giving severance payments. Essential 
aspects of the approach he advocated was the finding of 
other suitable work for the redundant worker, and redu­
cing to a minimum the period when the worker's income
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declined. Besides legislation to lessen the adverse 
impact of redundancy when it did in fact occur, Goodman 
argued for a range of measures to promote industrial 
training, regulate the distribution of industry, ensure 
the availability of adequate housing to facilitate job 
mobility, and amend apprenticeship regulations for entry 
to certain trades. According to Goodman then, it was in 
the context of a much more interventionist role for the 
State in steering the development of industry, and 
pushing an active manpower policy, that legislation to 
lay down minimum standards of treatment for redundant 
workers was seen to play an integral part in the 
execution of planned objectives.
It is interesting, and doubtless of significance to 
both the initial introduction of redundancy payments 
legislation, and the fact that it has remained in force 
for twenty-five years of Conservative and Labour admini­
strations, that the arguments developing in support of 
legislation came from substantially different political 
directions. "The Economist" newspaper and the views of 
Shanks no doubt found sympathy in the ranks of the 
Conservative Party. Goodman was more identified with 
the Labour Party. (His pamphlet was published by the 
Fabian Society.) There was, it seems, a developing 
consensus that some form of legislation was going to be 
necessary to advance the interests of industry, to 
permit greater efficiency, technological change, and to 
minimise suspicion and hostility to such measures.
Quite what form it would eventually take was undecided.
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but ideas seemed to favour the introduction of earnings 
related unemployment benefit, some form of minimum 
redundancy payments, and possibly the establishment of 
rights to notice periods and consultation. According to 
one view, this was to be a small part of a much wider 
role for the State in administering an "active manpower 
policy". This was not all, however, and further notions 
ranged from introducing in addition, some form of pay­
roll tax to encourage employers to "shed labour", to 
taking a series of measures to provide, for example, 
retraining and relocation opportunities. The common 
denominator in these differing prescriptions, however, 
was becoming the introduction of legislation to deal 
with the "redundancy problem". It would be an exaggera­
tion to suggest that there were no thoughts of a social 
welfare variety behind these proposals, but it should 
certainly be noted that the arguments and reasons were 
predominantly economic.
Perhaps the event which can most accurately be desc­
ribed as the conception of the legislative process, was 
the publication in 1963 of a report by the National 
Economic Development Council, "The Conditions Favourable 
to Faster Economic Growth". (98). The report sought to 
identify the courses of action which needed to be taken 
in order to achieve the objectives which its title 
suggests. Among other factors identified, it focused on 
the fact that rapid industrial and technological change 
would "require movements of work people from declining 
industries to expanding industries and from less
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productive firms to more productive firms". (99). The 
report outlined an elaborate bundle of measures which 
would, taken as a whole, contribute to facilitating this 
"movement of workpeople". Among the priorities for 
action were the provision of jobs for displaced workers, 
improved arrangements for allocating housing to promote 
geographical mobility, action to allow pension benefits 
to be transferred when moving from one job to another, 
the introduction of earnings related unemployment bene­
fit, and the establishment of a National Redundancy Fund 
so that redundant employees would be guaranteed a legal 
right to a severance payment. The economic basis for 
the decision to introduce a Redundancy Payments Act is 
underlined by subsequent developments. On 24 October 
1964, the government issued a white paper, "The Economic 
Situation". (100). Reviewing the state of the British 
economy, the statement concluded...
"... the measures set out below are aimed, first, 
to deal with the immediate and prospective (balance 
of payments) deficit for 1964-65 and, second, to 
begin the task of dealing with the more intransi­
gent economic problem. The plain fact is that 
British Industry needs to become much more competi­
tive and aggressive." (101).
The statement goes on to list a series of measures 
which included plans for import controls, assistance to 
exporters, and measures to enhance productivity and 
control prices and incomes. It also stated that, "An 
active policy will be carried out to make it easier for 
workers to change their jobs in accordance with the 
needs of technological progress. This will include a 
system of severance payments, an improved system of 
transfer grants and other measures." (102).
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Moving the second reading of the Redundancy Payments 
Bill in April 1965, the Minister of Labour, Ray Gunter, 
said : -
"We see this Bill as an important step in the 
government's general programme to push forward 
the modernisation of British industry as fast 
as possible, and to enlist the co-operation of 
workers as well as management in this process.
The scheme embodied in the Bill has to be looked 
at alongside the other measures that the govern­
ment have taken and are planning to take. It 
fits in with the machinery that we are establi­
shing to ensure the planned use of our resources, 
especially our resources of manpower, which will 
be fully stretched in the coming years. It is an 
important complement to our efforts to develop 
the science based industries and to deploy our 
manpower and other resources where they can make 
the most effective contribution to the economy." 
(103).
This then, was how the legislation eventually came to 
be enacted. The story, however, seems to have become 
one in which the central actors suddenly emerged as 
economists and politicians. What part did the trade 
unions play from 1959 onwards until the final Labour 
supported measure in 1965? The conflicts and contradic­
tions within the movement on this issue now need to be 
considered. We will first consider the 1956 Midlands 
motor industry disputes in more detail, before turning 
to the wider policy questions considered at various 
levels of the movement nationally during this period.
4.10 TimJIIDLMDS MOTOR INDUSTRY DISPUTES
Salmon has described the historical background to the 
1956 strikes in the Midlands motor industry. (104). He 
locates the developments which occurred in the context
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of a role that the unions successfully developed in 
Coventry during the Second World War. Because of res­
trictions imposed on them by the Ministry of Labour, 
employers were compelled to submit redundancy lists to 
the scrutiny of shop stewards. Questions of victimisa­
tion often delayed the implementation of redundancies, 
and unions were able to force employers to accept their 
preferred criteria for selecting the redundant. (Non­
trade union members, for example, were often the first 
to go.) The prevention of redundancy as such was, 
however, not seemingly an objective that the shop ste­
wards attempted to achieve.
Salmon argues that the failure of full-time officials 
to challenge the exercise of arbitrary power by manage­
ments, when faced with redundancy in the changed circum­
stances of the post-war era, served as a catalyst to the 
growth of shop stewards' combine committees, and he 
suggests that these latter organisations posed dilemmas 
for trade union leaders, given that the purpose of the 
committees was to defend the "right to work” . (105).
At any rate, we do not have to rely on Salmon to know 
that the stimulus to this concern came from two direc­
tions; firstly, the politically left leadership of the 
committees (associated with the Communist Party of Great 
Britain); secondly, concerns about the growing threat of 
automation. (106). This led to the "Big Six" Motor 
Industry Combine's decision to fight redundancy and 
demand the "right to work". (107). Finch, the union
299
convenor at the Norton Motors factory, has described the
leading role of the committee in this respect...
"... a resolution was unanimously agreed that we 
would not allow automation to drive workers out 
of work, and that we would oppose all sackings, 
and that we would fight for the forty-hour week 
without loss of pay to be progressively shortened 
to prevent mass sackings due to new techniques, 
and that where automation did replace people they 
should be retained and retrained by the company 
on full wages." (108).
At the Standard Motor Company, the "no redundancy" 
policy of the Big Six Combine Committee became the 
formal demand of a highly politicised rank and file 
leadership. (Salmon mentions the level of CPGB involve­
ment, through readership of the "Daily Worker", and 
membership of the party.) Nonetheless, despite this, 
the dispute was eventually settled on the intervention 
of full-time officials by agreement on procedures for 
dealing with future redundancies, and for compensating 
the workers concerned. A similar situation occurred at 
the Norton Motor Company, where again the "Big Six" 
combine demands were taken up by a politically aware 
rank and file.
In the British Motor Corporation, the facts were that
on Wednesday, 27 June 1956, the company announced that
as from Friday, 29 June, they would be dismissing as
redundant some twelve and a half per cent of their
employees in various factories. This was a total of
6000 employees to be dismissed at negligible notice. As
Kahn observes...
"... so large a number to be dismissed, by one 
combine at one fell swoop and with such negli­
gible prior warning, was unprecedented as far 
as post-war Britain was concerned, and it came 
as a rude shock to the nation." (109).
300
Significantly, the redundancies were not brought 
about by a process of automation, but by a downturn in 
the industry. Press and other criticism of the company 
focused not on the idea of a "right to work", but on the 
manner in which the company had dealt with the issue, 
but there seems little doubt that the "Big Six/Big Five" 
policy was a factor in the opposition by workers to the 
sackings.
Both sides of the House of Commons were critical of 
the timing of the decision (immediately before the 
holiday period), and the lack of notice. MacLeod des­
cribed the length of notice as "profoundly disturbing" 
(110), and George Brown for the Opposition contended 
that BMC had...
"... arrogantly decided to pay no heed to the 
Minister's request for adequate consultations 
in problems like this to enable readjustment 
to be made without undue trouble." (111).
The effect of the dispute was to demonstrate to 
politicians and others the inadequacy of the voluntary 
approach to dealing with "the redundancy problem" - i.e. 
not redundancy, but opposition to it by employees. At 
least three motions were carried in the House of Commons 
deploring the action of BMC in giving only one week's 
pay in lieu of notice, and calling on the corporation to 
take action to mitigate individual hardship. (112). 
Strike action took place at several of the plants af­
fected, and other companies involved in handling BMC 
products became drawn into the dispute. (113). The 
Transport and General Workers Union placed an embargo on 
the handling of BMC goods in the docks and elsewhere.
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and the NUR similarly imposed a ban on all goods going 
to or from BMC factories. (114). Eventually, the 
Minister of Labour intervened, and the dispute was 
settled with agreement being reached on additional 
compensation, which was paid to those with three or more 
years' service.
Salmon's verdict on the BMC strike (and that at
Norton and Standard), is that it...
"... completely redefined British industrial 
relations... (This involved) the acceptance of 
expendable employment in exchange for workplace 
recognition and a joint say in the process of 
job loss." (115).
His conclusion is that the settlement agreements 
effectively...
"... usurped the workplace organisation." (116). 
However, to talk of a "redefinition" of the concept of 
the "right to work", is to suggest that the notion was 
already well established as an idea that moved unions to 
activity. The events considered so far in this chapter 
though, suggest that outright opposition to mass redun­
dancies was a comparative rarity, and that it was less a 
matter of unions redefining the "right to work" as a 
concept, and more a matter of long established ideas of 
"the right thing" and "rights" exerting themselves over 
and above the politically sharpened concept of a "right 
not to be made redundant".
In contrast to the ideas of the "Big Five" and "Big 
Six" Combine Committees of shop stewards, it is interes­
ting to consider the general approach to automation by 
the national union leaderships and the TUC in this
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period. From the early 1950s onwards the line advocated 
by the General Council was supportive of the general 
principle of automation in the interests of enhanced 
productivity. Redundancy was recognised as an "inevi­
table" consequence, which had to be balanced against 
this interest, and the role of unions had to be to seek 
various measures to lessen the impact of industrial 
changes. (118). In 1951, observing that:-
"The introduction of new techniques and labour 
saving machinery in order to increase producti­
vity, should not be opposed just in anticipation 
of redundancy",
the General Council took note of the fact that various
schemes had been negotiated to provide compensation to
those who lost their jobs. The TUC affected a position
of neutrality in relation to such schemes, proclaiming
that it was...
"... the responsibility of individual unions rather 
than the TUC to deal with these problems...
(118),
but it is clear that the preferred approach was to deal 
with automation job losses in accordance with the agree­
ments in question.
In 1955, the TUC Scientific Advisory Committee pre­
pared a report which was endorsed by the General 
Council. This covered the development of automation in 
the post-war years, and considered the implications for 
trade unions. (119). The report, commenting on the 
displacement of workers that would "inevitably follow" 
the introduction of automation, took the relatively 
relaxed view that there had been no serious redundancy 
problems arising from the technological change in the
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post-war era. The major task of unions was to ensure 
that automation was introduced within a framework of 
collective bargaining.
Looking at the TUC Congress debates on this report, 
it is fairly clear that the fear of unemployment was 
regarded as a peripheral problem. An optimistic, even 
somewhat complacent attitude was adopted by some spea­
kers; the dial telephone and automatic telephone ex­
changes, for example, far from creating redundancies 
had...
"... spread the use of the telephone far and wide 
at a much quicker rate than would have been so 
with manual operation. There are more telephone 
operators in employment today than there were at 
the time of introduction of the automatic 
exchange." (120).
The idea of active opposition to job losses was 
almost entirely absent from the debate. The sole excep­
tion to this generalisation was from a speaker on behalf 
of the AEU, who quoted from "the secretary of the shop 
stewards of the motor industry of this country", and 
offered the view that...
"... we welcome automation as long as it gives 
workers at least our fair share of the profits.
We want a shorter working week, no reduction of 
wages, better working conditions and longer holi­
days. However, we consider that the most impor­
tant item is no redundancy at any price." (122).
Other than the fact that this was an obvious refe­
rence to the policy adopted by the "Big Five"/"Big Six" 
combine, it does little to presage the active opposition 
that was to come dramatically to the surface during 
1956.
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At the 1956 Congress, there was renewed interest in 
the issues of technical innovation. A further statement 
was put forward by the General Council, and a total of 
eight motions on the subject appeared on the agenda.
The views of the TUC leadership had not altered mate­
rially. Whilst the problems of labour displacement and 
redundancy were recognised, their severity was not held 
to be so threatening as to provide grounds for workers 
to fear the prospect of automation. (123). The problems 
could be solved, and the advantages of technical change 
explored through the normal channels of negotiation. If 
redundancy occurred...
"... the provision of suitable alternative work 
should not prove difficult within the framework 
of a full employment economy."
And for the redundant workers there were...
"... ways and means of helping to cope with it." 
(124).
These optimistic assessments overrode any possibility 
that the introduction of automatic techniques might mark 
a return to the pre-war era of high unemployment. 
According to this view, the problems of automation did 
not warrant any particular alarm, nor did they call for 
any new tactics or strategies to oppose the loss of 
jobs. The well tried methods of consultation and nego­
tiation were thought to be sufficient to protect the 
interests of members, and there was a certain pride 
expressed in the fact that unions were not obstructing 
automation, and on the contrary were...
"... helping it on and, at the same time, meeting 
successfully the challenge of change in the place 
of work." (125).
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One delegate even expressed the view that unions 
should. . .
"... welcome redundancy through the introduction 
of automation... ",
and measure its success (i.e. of automation) by the
extent to which...
"... labour can be released and directed into less 
attractive jobs... ". (126).
The most remarkable aspect of this debate was the 
marked distance between the comments of delegates, and 
the ideas of the "Big Five/Big Six" motor shop stewards, 
which had been so important in the disputes against 
redundancies earlier that year. Maxell, of the ETU 
(whose union's policy identified with the policies of 
the "Big Six" in a formal sense), made no attempt to 
spell out a strategy of opposition to job loss.
Stanley, from the Constructional Engineering Union, 
mentioned the Norton Motors dispute but suggested that 
it was essentially about the employers' "lack of con­
cern", and failure to consult the workers, rather than 
with any principled stand over the issue of a "right to
work". (127). A delegate from the AEU made a similar
point but eventually went further, and queried whether 
rights to consulation and severance pay were arrange­
ments that should be regarded as sufficient by the 
unions in the aftermath of the BMC dispute:-
"All the employers have to do is to tell the
workers what they are going to do, and discuss 
it; they try to reduce to the utmost the number 
affected; they give them a week's pay, and that 
is it. Is that a situation we are going to 
accept?" (128).
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Whatever solutions to this state of affairs the delegate 
had in mind, however, he did not refer to the possibi­
lity of active resistance at the workplace. Nor was 
there any reference to workers being "retained and 
retrained", or to ideas such as a "right to work". 
Rather, the solution was expressed in terms of public 
ownership of the economy, and hoped-for benefits of 
expanding product markets.
It follows from this discussion, and the events 
described in other sections of this chapter, that it 
would not seem appropriate to refer to a "redefinition" 
of the concept of the "right to work", as Salmon does, 
implying some shift away from what might have become (or 
had even already been established) the predominant 
understanding of "rights" and legitimate expectations of 
workers. Rather, it would seem that ideas of employees 
"rights" in redundancy, if not uniformly or universally 
established, were already such that they had consi­
derable hold on opinion. At least, among TUC leaders 
and delegates it would seem, the idea of a "right not to 
be made redundant" in situations where workers faced job 
displacement due to automation, had not found much 
favour. But then, this would seem to have a more rea­
dily achievable counterpart, in ideas of "rights" to 
compensation, and consultation on behalf of redundant 
workers. Whether, and to what extent these ideas of 
"rights" can be seen in the positions adopted by unions 
in relation to redundancy legislation, is a matter that
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we can at this point examine further, with particular 
reference to the period from the early 1950s onwards.
4.11 DIYISIQMS IH..TMDE UNION POLICIES QH REDUHDASCY 
ERQM THE 1950s TD 18.65
Opinion within the union movement remained divided on 
both the question of legislation, and the issue of 
severance payments for redundancy. On the whole, unions 
favoured the pursuit of severance payments in situations 
of redundancy, using collective bargaining. In the 
Transport and General Workers' Union, the BMC dispute in 
July 1956 served to underline the negotiating objectives 
of officers. In October 1956, a document, "Advice to 
officers on redundancy procedure", established that 
three objectives should be remembered. These were that 
there should be:-
"1. Prior discussion with trade unions on 
redundancies.
2. Compensation for employees made redundant.
3. (Adequate) length of notice to be given to
those redundant." (129).
Examples of "good" redundancy agreements were circu­
lated to officers. Several of these covered such issues 
as the order of selection, "bumping", length of notice 
and so on. Nevertheless, the evidence of the Ministry 
of Labour's Survey in 1963 pointed to a conspicuous 
failing of the voluntary or collective bargaining ap­
proach to make such agreements generally applicable.
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To a degree this is explained, at least in the enginee­
ring industry, by the reluctance of the AEU to conclude 
redundancy agreements. This policy was clearly not 
always followed, although it would seem that in general 
the AEU sought agreements only when redundancies were 
announced, and not as contingency provisions before the 
event. (For example, an agreement was reached in 1952 
between the management of Hoover Washing Machines, and 
the AEU, the ETU and the GMWU). (130).
Unions then, were by no means in official agreement 
over the concept of redundancy payments being sought at 
all, much less on the issue of whether there was a need 
for legislation. A debate at the 1962 meeting of the 
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions 
captures the divisions in the movement at that time. In 
the first part of the debate two motions were moved 
which characterised the two conflicting union strategies 
towards redundancy. The first, moved by the Amlagamated 
Engineering Union called for a ban on overtime wherever 
redundancy was threatened, and in the event that this 
failed to "resolve the redundancy", a shorter working 
week of 34 hours should be, if necessary, "insisted" 
upon.
Explaining the motion, John Boyd of the AEU referred 
to the need for worksharing either by co-operation with 
management or where there was no such co-operation, by 
"union discipline". Emphasising the need to "inculcate 
into the minds of members the lessons of unity upon
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which the movement had been built up", Boyd cautioned
against the "fragmentation which resulted from severance
payments". He went on :-
"Agreements providing for severance pay inculcated 
into the minds of our people the idea that, as 
long as the employer gave severance payments, the 
requirements of unions were met, and therefore the 
people who were given the severance payments were 
out, with the employer having no responsibility. 
Instead of building up fellow feeling and brother­
hood, there occurred this fragmentation." (131).
The line advocated by the AEU motion was seen by 
its owner as being "a guiding light, a militant stand 
against the desire of the employing class to do what 
they liked with the workers they no longer wanted." 
(132).
In contrast to the policy advocated by the AEU, a 
second motion from the Amalgamated Society of Painters 
and Decorators called for an approach to employers' 
associations to secure industry level agreements for 
compensation to be paid to redundant workers. (133). In 
support of this motion, Mr P.M. Duffy, the mover, said 
that the resolution, "faced up to the problems" of 
redundancy which was sometimes unavoidable. He argued 
that...
"... in this modern age trade unions had to 
have a realistic approach to life and look at 
redundancy in an understanding manner".
This meant that...
"... if the displacement of workers were unavoi­
dable then the cushion should be such that life 
still had an aim and purpose for them." (134).
The trade union leadership (the argument ran) should be
taking the initiative and seeking to bargain the terms
on which redundancy took place.
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It is an interesting comment on the divisions within 
the trade union movement at the time, that neither of 
the foregoing motions was carried. The AEU motion was 
pressed to a vote, and was lost; the Painters' and 
Decorators' motion was remitted to the Executive Council 
of the CSEU, and it too would probably have been defea­
ted had a vote been taken. It was not then a climate in 
which a clear national lead was likely to emerge, ca­
pable of welding trade union unity. There could be no 
united campaign of outright opposition to redundancy by 
refusing to countenance the severance payments' "buy- 
off" tactic or conversely, a general acceptance of the 
maximum pressure needed to ensure agreement on an 
adequate standard of "cushion" for the redundant.
Two further motions at the 1962 CSEU meeting dealt 
with additional dimensions of trade union policy on 
redundancy. A motion from the Association of 
Supervisory Staffs, Executives and Technicians called 
for acceptance of the principle that legislation should 
lay down minimum levels of severance payments. This 
motion was inspired and supported by an ASSET policy 
document published in 1962, "The Gold Plated Handshake", 
which argued in unequivocal terms, the case for legisla­
tion. (135). Reviewing the increasing likelihood of 
redundancies, the document proclaims, "we now see it as 
an ASSET duty to the whole membership to persuade the 
Labour Party that it should campaign for severance pay 
or compensation for loss of office of all workers... 
(136). Later, the document elaborates on this by
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stating that the legislation should provide for seve­
rance pay, "for workers dismissed through redundancy or 
other causes beyond their control", and that the level 
of payments should be "one week's salary for every year 
of service with the undertaking". (137). The proposal 
gained a stony reception from the CSEU. After a brief 
debate - only one delegate (other than the mover) spoke, 
and made two observations against the motion - it was 
put to the vote and lost. The brevity of the debate, 
and the terseness of the grounds of opposition seem to 
indicate that the legislative approach was not only 
unacceptable to the union movement generally at this 
time, but that (in the engineering industry at least) it 
was barely worthy of consideration. It was in this 
climate of trade union opinion that John Diamond (a 
member of the ASSET Parliamentary Committee) introduced 
the first of his "Redundant Workers (Severance Pay)" 
Bills. His Bill was introduced on 1 May 1962, just one 
month before the CSEU expressed such a lack of 
enthusiasm for legislation.
Nevertheless, there was one motion at this same 
meeting of the CSEU which was carried, and moreover, 
clearly received the overwhelming support of all unions. 
It says something of the common, albeit rather narrow 
area of ground that existed in the movement at this 
stage. This was a further motion from the AEU calling 
for an extension of the industry procedure agreement to 
deal with questions of redundancy. The crucial point
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was that the "status quo" principle should apply so that 
negotiations could take place on all aspects of redun­
dancy proposals, using the procedure for avoidance of 
disputes, before the redundancies were actually imple­
mented. If the unions were hesitant about the strategy 
that should be adopted when redundancies were declared, 
and if they were not favourably disposed to the idea 
of legislation to impose minimum standards, they were 
clearly at one on the principle that collective 
bargaining on redundancies was essential.
Attitudes towards legislation on severance payments, 
however, were equivocal, if not somewhat in a state of 
flux. At the Scottish TUC in 1962, a motion from the 
Transport and General Workers Union was accepted, "by a 
large majority". This called for a scheme to be intro­
duced by the government, "and made obligatory upon all 
employers, whereby the impact of loss of employment or 
threatened dismissal will be alleviated both financially 
and in terms of future employment". (138). Precisely 
what was envisaged by the words in the motion, "and in 
terms of future employment", is not clear, except that 
the mover was concerned about, "the morale-sapping 
effect on adult workers thrown out of employment between 
the ages of 45 and 50". (139). It would seem, however, 
that the idea that severance payment provisions under­
mine the determination of workers to fight for jobs, was 
either being glossed-over or consciously rejected by the 
linking together of the two objectives of financial 
compensation and the securing of future employment
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prospects. In other words, not only did the Scottish 
TUC accept the principles of the ASSET motion which was 
rejected at the CSEU conference in the same year, but 
it also seemed to be accepting the principles of the 
Painters' and Decorators' motion (which found only 
uncertain favour at the same CSEU conference), in see­
king an established scale of severance payments for use 
in the event of redundancies.
In a sense, however, both the CSEU and the Scottish 
TUC are but ripples which indicate the main stream of 
official trade union policy, promulgated through the 
TUC. Here, a similar balancing act was taking place, 
with a distinct note of caution about commitment to 
policies favouring legislation on severance pay (or 
other conditions of employment). A motion at the 1962 
Congress recognised the opportunities for improvement in 
standards of health, safety, job security and other 
"fringe benefits", and called upon the General Council 
to "initiate an inquiry into existing regulations and 
provisions for the health and security of industrial and 
clerical workers with a view to defining by which fur­
ther progress can be made". (140). Both the motion and 
the speeches in support of it underlined the dilemma for 
the trade unions, namely that by focusing on the seve­
rance payments issue there would be an implied accep­
tance of the inevitability of redundancy, perhaps even 
an acquiescence to it. Frank Cousins, moving the
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motion, for example had the following observations to
make concerning reactions to an earlier attempt by the
T&GWU to debate the issues
"We put forward the idea some short time ago that 
greater attention should be given to security in 
jobs, but that inevitably, unless we adopted an 
outmoded attitude that every man must stay where 
he was, there would be need for movement of people. 
This included the requirement of training but also 
the problem of compensation  We were asto­
nished... at one of the other unions with whom we 
were associated in the first approach, publicly 
saying that the T&GWU were talking of buying unem­
ployment... The fact was, that job movement took 
place whether we were in cohort with our other 
unions or not, and as a consequence the joint 
approach that ought to have been made, in our 
opinion, for redundancy payments of substance and 
for security during periods of training did not 
come about." (141).
It was no doubt a sensitivity to the same argument 
which had "astonished" Cousins, which injected a note of 
restraint into the comments of Clive Jenkins of ASSET 
(still persisting in its campaign for legislation on 
severance payments). Referring to the inadequate levels 
of payments being made to redundant workers, he said, 
"There is a case for dealing with it by law, but I do 
not seek to argue that point this morning, because what 
my union is concerned about is to have a good, thorough 
look at the subject." (142). Even those who were pre­
pared to grasp the nettle of the arguments for legisla­
tive action were conscious of a deep-seated reserve in 
the British trade union movement, which made it unlikely 
that the case would be accepted at that stage. The case 
for legislative action on severance payments gained a 
certain momentum after 1962. Besides the continuing 
efforts of John Diamond to persuade parliament to
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his point of view, there was the further contributory 
factor of the "Redundancy in Great Britain" Survey 
(143), which was published in January 1963. The indif­
ferent performance which it revealed of the long 
favoured path of voluntarism must have been difficult 
to ignore.
Representatives of the TUC and the British Employers' 
Confederation meeting at the National Joint Advisory 
Council in April 1963, agreed to establish a sub-commit­
tee to consider in detail the information contained in 
the survey. The views of the General Council were as 
follows. Firstly, the State benefits for all cases of 
unemployment should be at an adequate level. Increases 
in sickness and unemployment benefits were called for, 
and it was proposed that there could be "a wage-related 
element which would reduce the sharp fall in income 
which most people experience during periods of unemploy­
ment and sickness". (144). Significantly, the General 
Council...
"... were not in favour of a 'national redundancy 
fund' which might help only a proportion of unem­
ployed workers and might result in the government 
making no increase in either unemployment or sick­
ness benefits." (145).
Secondly, the TUC emphasised the importance of, "a 
rapid and wide extension of agreements and procedures.." 
(146). Such agreements should include measures to 
minimise redundancies, lay down criteria for selecting 
the redundant and providing them with notice, and should 
provide severance payments to those dismissed, and 
unemployment supplements to the temporarily "laid off".
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Hence the emphasis of the TUC's programme for action was 
in providing adequate State benefits to all the unemp­
loyed, and establishing sound company-level or industry- 
level agreements to provide adequately for those af­
fected by redundancy. The idea of a national redundancy 
fund was considered and quite specifically rejected.
At the April 1963 meeting between the British 
Employers Confederation (BEC) and the TUC, there was a 
measure of agreement between the employers and TUC 
representatives. Firstly, they agreed that it was 
possible to identify two quite separate objectives of 
redundancy provisions. These were, (a) to alleviate 
hardship if redundancy is followed by unemployment, and 
(b) compensation for long service and loss of a job 
whether or not it results in unemployment. (147). The 
first objective, it was agreed, could best be dealt with 
through National Insurance benefits, including the 
introduction of an earnings related element. On the 
question of compensation for long service etc - seve­
rance payments - there were signs of consensus emerging 
that legislation may have a supporting role to the main 
emphasis of collective bargaining. There was agreement 
that, "any statutory requirements should provide for 
lump sum payments according to length of service and 
other factors (such as age) but the qualifying condi­
tions should be flexible to meet the different circum­
stances in some industries (e.g. in construction where 
periods of employment are shorter than average. (148).
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In other words there was a developing view that legisla­
tion may in fact have a function in (it is implied) 
conferring on employees a right to severance payments, 
and defining the factors which should in general be used 
to establish the level of entitlement.
The thinking of the British Employers Confederation, 
the TUC and the Minister of Labour, was apparently in 
accord at this stage, to the extent of being several 
steps away from the ideas embodied in the 1965 
Redundancy Payments Act. (A central feature of the 1965 
Act was to be the support given by the redundancy fund 
to employers making statutory severance payments.) In 
the 1963 NJAC Working Party discussions, the employers' 
representatives, "thought it inequitable to impose the 
whole burden of severance pay on the employers con­
cerned", but it also was accepted that, "a national fund 
would be unsuitable". (149). Moreover, there were 
ministerial reservations about this idea on grounds of 
administrative costs. So what in the event became a 
major feature of the 1965 Act was dismissed by the TUC 
(because it might prevent increases in unemployment and 
sickness benefit), accepted as "unsuitable" by the 
employers, and damned as administratively cumbersome by 
the Minister. The one concession to possible State aid 
to meet severance payments, was with respect to ensuring 
that "employers in special difficulties" met their 
commitments. The Minister undertook to "examine" this 
possibility. (150).
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Hence we see that by 1963 the employers (as represen­
ted by the BEC) and the majority union opinion (ex­
pressed through the TUC) had begun to swing round in 
favour of some form of statutory regulations of the 
right to severance payments for redundant employees. 
Neither side seemed clear about what form this should 
take, however. The NJAC Working Party seemed to be 
facing in two directions simultaneously on certain 
issues, such as accepting the "inequity" of employers 
being asked to meet the full costs of payments, yet 
considering the idea of a national fund to be "unsui­
table" . Clearly, even though the principle of statutory 
regulation was gaining support, the notion was still 
vague and ill-defined. The TUC was, moreover, equi­
vocal, in the sense that it continued to emphasise the 
greater importance which it attached to wage related 
unemployment benefit, and an improvement in the State 
Sickness Benefit scheme. The introduction of a scheme 
of State support for redundancy payments was seen as a 
potential obstacle to the achievement of these objec­
tives. On the other hand, the TUC was beginning to be 
won round to the idea of legislation on a wider spread 
of dismissal related issues. In 1963, the British 
delegation (nominated by the TUC) to the ILO, supported 
the conference resolution, which among other things 
called on member states to legislate for basic rights 
covering:- consultation before collective dismissals; no 
dismissals to occur without a "valid reason"; no dismis­
sals for union membership or other "legitimate
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activities"; the right of dismissed workers to appeal to 
a neutral body; reasonable periods of notice; compensa­
tion in lieu of such notice, or in addition to it.
(151).
Notwithstanding this growth in support for legisla­
tion on redundancy, it does not seem that the influence 
of trade unions was a major factor, other than in the 
indirect sense of creating the perceived "redundancy 
problem". The unions created a "problem", which manage­
ment had seemingly failed to grapple with, and which was 
causing politicians of both parties to see the need for 
State intervention. On the matter of direct influence 
on the policy formulation process, however, the TUC was 
adopting a cautious, and to a degree reactive, position. 
Doubtless this arose from the lack of clarity in the 
TUC's own policy, and the conflicting and contradictory 
arguments of affiliated unions. On the one hand, unions 
like ASSET, and others affiliated to the NFPW, had 
argued in favour of legislation. The Transport and 
General Workers Union also adopted this position. The 
TUC line, in contrast, had been to emphasise the primacy 
of collective bargaining, and while this officially 
remained its policy position, it was a stance that 
seemed of diminishing credibility, given that the objec­
tive was to provide severance payments for all redundant 
workers. At the other extreme, there was the AEU which 
adopted an official stance of opposing the idea of any 
severance payments at all, preferring to emphasise its 
craft-based traditional practices of imposing
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restrictions on working time, and thereby limiting the
need for redundancy per sé. Within this range of views,
there were differing emphases, and often contradictions.
So, the AEU line was not always officially followed by
its shop stewards. Within the Transport and General
Workers Union and others in the motor industry, there
were rank and file shop stewards who adopted a much more
militant attitude than that expressed by official
policy. (As we saw in the last section of this chapter,
they were identified for a period with overt struggles
against redundancy and in pursuit of "the right to
work".) Moreover, even within the NFPW, the view could
be expressed in 1963 that...
"... redundancy payment is a palliative that 
is itself an admission of failure. The impor­
tant thing is to create new opportunities for 
employment." (152).
Given the fact that such payments had been the major
policy objective of the Federation for approaching forty
years, this seems a peculiarly late change of policy
emphasis.
4.12 CONCLUSIONS
We should recall now the point at which this chapter 
commenced, by referring to the ideas developed in the 
earlier part of this thesis. In chapter three we deve­
loped a theory of union cultures, in which moral ideas, 
described as perceived "rights", are conveyed into the 
minds of workers through unions, and the practice of
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trade unionism. At the beginning of the present chapter 
it was suggested that we might examine the historical 
background to the passing of the Redundancy Payments Act 
1965, as a means of assessing the usefulness of this 
theoretical outline. It was hoped that the theory might 
serve to illuminate our understanding of the part played 
by unions in these historical events, and we should at 
this point therefore consider whether or not this is in 
fact the case.
What evidence is there then of the influence of ideas 
of "rights" and moral influences in the above account?
Do we see the practice of trade unionism lending itself 
to the expression of "the right thing", which "ought" to 
happen? If so, can we identify such ideas as continuing 
and durable influences, that might be described as 
aspects of trade union cultures? To a large extent, the 
facts speak for themselves. One such idea or moral 
belief has been the notion of a "right" to a redundancy 
payment. Since the 1930s unions have used collective 
bargaining to obtain payments for workers displaced from 
their jobs. More especially, we have looked at a number 
of attempts to secure legislation. The belief that 
workers displaced from their jobs by reorganisation 
should be financially compensated, appears to have 
become a central tenet of the ideas of trade unionism, 
and the stance it encouraged workers to adopt on the 
issue of unemployment and redundancy. These ideas had 
to come from somewhere. They may have stemmed from 
simple, everyday feelings of moral correctness, and
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common-sense conceptualisations of justice. The State's 
earliest formulations certainly appear to have played an 
important role. But the methods and approaches of trade 
unionism, of seeking to apply the favourable precendents 
established for one group of workers, to the similar 
circumstances of another, and using both collective 
bargaining and the possibility of parliamentary action, 
have played a major part in establishing and conveying 
this belief, for in excess of half a century.
Yet, if the idea of compensation as a "right" came to 
acquire currency, were there not alternative beliefs 
that could have been equally influential? And if so, 
why is it that the concept of a"right" to compensation 
eventually appears to have had such a profound inf­
luence? To pose the question is to make the direct 
implication that very little is absolutely inevitable. 
Alternative ideas of the "right thing" and what is 
morally correct could have been developed, as one may 
readily see by considering parallel developments in 
other countries. (153). For example, one review of 
comparative legislation concluded that...
"... apart from the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
lump sum severance payments are generally not 
based on any narrow criteria such as 
'redundancy'." (154).
So, whilst the State appears to have contributed 
substantially to the expectation of financial compensa­
tion for displaced workers, arising out of its indust­
rial reorganising activities, other means of dealing 
with the problem could have been pursued, and other 
moral expectations might have been fostered to gain
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greater currency. If, for example, in the earliest 
examples of legislation, the State had set the precedent 
of guaranteeing other work, and dealt with the possibi­
lity of unemployment by demonstrating greater concern 
that employees should not be left without work, it would 
seem likely that such ideas could have gathered momentum 
in a wider field.
As we have seen, unions, notably the AEU, were in­
fluenced by equally powerful moral ideas, such as the 
notion of workers having "rights" not to be dismissed, 
"at the whim of the employer", and union members were 
seen to have moral obligations to attempt to prevent 
such arbitrary treatment, by regulating overtime, and 
applying other forms of collective control. Had the 
State shown by its example that such values were capable 
of practical implementation, no doubt this would have 
consolidated such expectations. As it was, the demand 
for a legal right to compensation came mainly from the 
white collar unions under the banner of the NFPW, parti­
cularly in the early 1930s and beyond, which can be seen 
as reflecting the fact that it was largely white collar 
workers who had benefited from the earliest examples of 
legislation. On the other hand, the 1930 TUC, concerned 
at the impact of disarmament on the employment situa­
tion, took up the question of job creation initiatives, 
emphasising the "last resource" nature of compensation 
arrangements, and the preferability of efforts "to 
secure alternative work". Plainly, it would have re­
quired a very different approach to the political
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management of the economy for such measures to have been 
actively sponsored by the State on any scale, though one 
notes that the 1930 minority Labour Government showed 
interest in such work-creating approaches in preference 
to compensation. However, in the absence of such mea­
sures being generally adopted, unions were forced to 
come to terms with a very different reality of the 
labour market, in which they could either attempt to 
spread the available work around by imposing controls 
such as job demarcation, and overtime restriction, or 
alternatively by following the precedent examples set, 
and seeking compensation for displaced workers.
Unions then, in some cases negotiated redundancy 
compensation agreements, and in the case of white collar 
unions (whose bargaining power was weaker) the question 
of legislation was pursued. The perception of a "right" 
to redundancy compensation it seems, gained ground among 
trade union members, including national leadership 
groups. Compensation became regarded as "the right 
thing", not in preference to some other alternative, but 
quite simply because in its absence there was nothing at 
all. Within the limits of a market economy, it emerged 
not simply as a moral "right", but as the most practical 
alternative to total acquiescence. Moreover, in the 
1950s and 1960s, the notion of a "right" to redundancy 
compensation gained considerable momentum through the 
concerns of economists and government ministers, which 
were repeatedly emphasised, to the effect that it was 
both the "right thing" and the most sensible way of
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heading off employee opposition. And whilst such oppo­
sition (feared or actual) may have been only one of 
several factors contributing to problems of skill shor­
tage, labour mobility etc, the "redundancy problem" was 
seen to have significant implications for our national 
productivity, and legislation to deal with it eventually 
came to be acceptable to government.
Here, however, we might raise further questions. If, 
as it would seem, there were alternative beliefs in 
"rights", what might have been their source of inspira­
tion? How prevalent were they, and how were they ex­
pressed? The AEU and other unions in the engineering 
industry were, as we have seen, influenced by the idea 
that they had a "right" not to be dismissed "at the whim 
of the employer". To the extent that the TUC resisted 
suggestions that it should support demands for legisla­
tion on compensation, this belief was shared by other 
unions. However, as we have seen, the TUC and the CSEU 
in the early 1960s were split on the issue, though the 
one concept that received relatively unqualified sup­
port, was the belief that the process of redundancy 
should be handled through collective bargaining. The 
TUC, as we have seen, was led on a number of occasions 
to adopt a somewhat ambivalent position, for example in 
advising unions to attempt to avoid redundancies by 
imposing overtime restrictions and other unilateral 
controls, whislt at the same time appearing to favour 
the conclusion of agreements that provided compensation 
as the price of union co-operation with redundancy. As
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for the source of inspiration of such ideas, it is clear 
that they were not explicitly sponsored by precedents 
set by the State. The idea of a "right to work", it was 
suggested in the last chapter, has a long association 
with trade unions and socialist thought, though it finds 
a variety of expression in many forms. On the evidence 
of this chapter, it has continued to form a current of 
thought in the ideas and beliefs that constitute the 
intellectual basis of trade unionism.
If we then ask whether these moral beliefs have 
emerged as mere sporadic flashes, varying from one 
period to the next, or whether there has been a degree 
of regularity, and permanence, the answer would lean 
markedly towards the latter formulation. Beliefs in 
"rights" it would seem, have emerged with considerable 
consistency over a protracted period of time. To this 
extent, it would seem that we are justified in ascribing 
them to aspects of "culture". And if on one hand, we 
see that there has been a culture that has emphasised 
the primacy of compensation, we should recognise that 
there has also been a culture in which the "right to a 
job" or the "right to work" has persisted.
This leads us to consider in somewhat closer detail, 
the perspectives already adopted on two episodes desc­
ribed in this chapter. The first is the sequence of 
events in the 1950s which surrounded the contraction of 
the cotton industry, and the eventual passing of the 
Cotton Industry Act 1959. It will be recalled that 
despite advancing comprehensive proposals for the State
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to take a strategic role in restructuring and protecting 
the cotton industry in 1957, in 1959 the cotton unions 
were obliged to come to terms with a more limited ap­
proach by the then Conservative Government, based on 
contraction of the industry, for which State support 
would be conditional upon agreement with the unions on 
compensation terms. The TUC and union objectives of 
securing jobs in the industry, and alternatively pres­
sing the government to directly initiate schemes to 
provide alternative work, were put to one side in the 
process of agreeing the said severance terms. The first 
and most obvious reason for this was the difficulty 
which would have been encountered in adopting any other 
approach. Securing a "right to a job" in any real or 
practical sense must have seemed an insuperable dif­
ficulty, when faced with a Conservative administration 
that already clearly indicated its approach by impli­
citly rejecting the unions' "Plan for Cotton", and 
adopting instead the provisions of the Cotton Industry 
Act. Yet, as we observed, the idea of a "right to a 
job" being provided through State intervention, was 
advanced by both the TUC and the cotton unions at 
various stages prior to the enactment of the legisla­
tion. Intrinsically, such a demand had wider political 
implications, and could not easily be accommodated 
within the normal operation of a market economy, a point 
that was recognised by the TUC's analysis that the "Plan 
for Cotton" was only likely to be achievable under a 
Labour Government. In the absence of experience and
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precedent events to ingrain the "right to a job" into 
the consciousness of people, it would appear that it was 
not well established as a cultural influence. Moreover, 
the lack of any overtly political campaigning lead by 
the cotton unions or the TUC, on the issue of a "right 
to a job", meant that it was incapable of acquiring any 
real moral force as an additional aspect of culture. In 
this connection, we might recall the framework provided 
by George Rude, in which the derived element of ideology 
and the circumstances that pertain, are said to be 
crucial aspects that determine the likelihood of popular 
protest. Suffice it to add that with culture lacking 
such a "derived" political element, and without any 
particular aspect of immediate circumstances working 
towards opposition of mass redundancy, the cotton unions 
and members accepted the planned contraction of the 
industry and the job losses entailed, without pressing 
further for the "right to a job" to be implemented. 
Compensation, it has been noted, was provided under 
stipulations in the legislation. Had this not been the 
case, and had workers protested in consequence, it seems 
highly probable that demands would have been couched, 
and conflicts eventually settled on the basis of the 
said compensation, rather than the industrial support 
and job saving or job creation measures which the TUC 
and the unions had suggested in earlier statements.
In contrast to the above example, we have also consi­
dered the episode of the Midlands motor industry dis­
putes in 1956. In this case, as we saw, workers were
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led by the motor industry shop stewards' combine to 
protest at the dismissal of employees, and to demand 
that when automation displaced workers from their jobs, 
they should be "retained and retrained". The fact that 
the concept of a "right to work" was pressed for in this 
case needs to be examined. Like the "right to a job", 
this was a demand which was hard to reconcile with the 
mechanisms of a market economy. In this sense, it might 
be seen as intrinsically incapable of being accommodated 
within the normal mechanisms of collective bargaining, 
and if achievable at all, then only through political 
action. However, unlike the cotton industry example, in 
this case an element of political leadership had been 
given, through the much more overtly, politically in­
spired stance of the motor industry "Big Five"/"Big Six" 
Combine Committee. On the evidence of the events sum­
marised here, it would seem that for a period of time in 
1956, the influence of these ideas in a number of motor 
vehicle companies in the Midlands, was effective in 
causing workers to press and protest for a "right to 
work". In this case, it would seem that the "derived" 
political ideas were present, and that the culture of 
the "Big Five'V’Big Six" was instrumental in raising 
awareness of the "right to work", as a moral demand and 
expectation of workers. Nonetheless, it was subsumed 
eventually beneath the more accommodative, and achie­
vable goal of compensation, and procedural rights. 
However, one is led to doubt any suggestion (as made by 
Salmon) that this represented a "transformation" in
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the meaning and nature of struggles in relation to 
redundancy. Rather, it would seem, the existing domi­
nance of the expectation of compensation - the "right" 
to a redundancy payment - was continuing to exert it­
self. And by way of illustration of this point, we 
considered the prevalent attitudes towards automation, 
as reflected in the debates of the TUC in 1955 and 1956. 
Taking together the episodes of the cotton industry in 
1954, the motor industry disputes of 1956 and the other 
examples in this chapter of union efforts to deal with 
redundancy by obtaining compensation, or other means, 
one is forced to conclude that the "right to work" 
culture, if so it may be called, has been a relatively 
weak phenomenon in British trade unionism. But this 
does not mean that we can dismiss it altogether. As we 
have seen in this chapter, the AEU in particular, empha­
sised the notion of the "right to work" in the policies 
it has pursued, over a considerable period of time. 
Moreover, even the NFPW could stress (as it did in 1963) 
that the creation of new employment opportunities is 
more important than compensation. It would seem, there­
fore, that the idea of a "right to work" remains as a 
cultural influence in unions, and unionism. Its moral 
connotations and political implications far outweigh the 
idea of a "right to compensation", and the practical 
obstacles to implementing or obtaining the said "right" 
would seem to be enormous. For these reasons, rather 
than despite them, we must expect the "right to work 
culture" to continue as a relatively weaker influence
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on unions and unionism. But then, when it does erupt 
(as it did in 1956, and did again in the early 1970s 
with the UCS work-in and other factory occupations) it 
might be expected to do so with correspondingly greater 
impact, as though the periods of repression might add 
something to the energy and determination with which it 
is projected.
Where then does this leave us so far as the predomi­
nant cultural influence on trade unionism is concerned? 
Our account of the historical background to the 
Redundancy Payments Act, suggests that reality is consi­
derably more banal than some of the legendary versions 
that have been offered. Descriptions of trade union 
behaviour prior to the Redundancy Payments Act suggest 
somewhat conflicting images. The first is that unions, 
prior to the Act, opposed redundancy at every turn, 
fought for the "right to work", and spurned the idea of 
payments. Fryer, for example, asserts that...
"... the regulatory effect of the Redundancy 
Payments Act, has been to take redundancy out 
of both conflict and an area of collective 
control by workers" (155);
and he goes on to give the instances of the UCS "work- 
in", and other factory occupations as examples of acti­
vity, counter to both "the spirit and provisions" of the 
Redundancy Payments Act, as though somehow the Act had 
suppressed this type of activity. So whilst, of 
course, legendary accounts might be expected to contain 
elements of reality, it is safest to disregard this 
particular version as based on fancy rather than fact.
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On the whole it would seem, where opposition occurred, 
it took the form of relatively low key resistance, as 
already noted, in overtime bans, and other attempts to 
"spread out" the available work. On the evidence of 
this study, such examples as those quoted by Fryer were 
even rarer before the 1965 Redudnacy Payments Act, than 
they seem to have been after it. Also, he appears to 
overlook the fact that prior to the Act, much union 
activity was directed towards the achievement of pre­
cisely those objectives which the legislation eventually 
provided as a statutory measure. This order of prio­
rities has been long established, and even in the 1930s 
Hunger Marches, it is significant that the TUC and 
official union leaderships maintained a distance, whilst 
shop stewards and rank and file activists in Trades 
Councils provided the input from the trade union 
movement. (156).
A second, somewhat legendary image of union activity 
prior to the 1965 Act, is that unions campaigned for the 
introduction of the Act as a means of securing the 
rights of employees to redundancy payments. Again, this 
is a mixture of truth and fiction, though it contains 
somewhat more of the former than does our earlier legen­
dary formulation. Over the years, however, it would 
seem that the memories of trade unionists and academic 
observers alike have tended to blur the subtleties of 
the differing positions that unions adopted. For
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example, Mortimer, in a review of a book by Hyman,
refers to his (Hyman's) assertion that the Redundancy
Payments Act...
"... has represented an important example of 
government intervention, undermining the basis 
of collective resistance to the elimination of 
jobs." (157).
Mortimer deals with this contention not by pointing (as 
he might have done) to the excessive simplicity of the 
statement, and its lack of evidential support. Rather, 
he asks:-
"Is he not aware that for many years before the 
passing of the Redundancy Payments Act the unions 
(sic) pressed for compensation for loss of jobs?" 
(158).
The truth is, of course, that "the unions" did , and 
"the unions" didn't. "The unions" pressed for compensa­
tion in collective bargaining, and secured agreements, 
as we have seen, from 1930 onwards, and they sought 
legislation from this time onwards, too. But they were 
equally capable of opposing the idea of legislation, as 
they did at the TUC and in other national fora, from the 
same period of time. Moreover, there is at least some 
truth in Hyman's implication that prior to the Act, 
union members collectively resisted the elimination of 
jobs, though we need scarcely labour the point that 
there is little basis for his broader conclusion about 
the effects of the Act. And even if Mortimer's general 
point has at least an element of truth behind it, it is 
nonetheless a startling testimony to the power of legen­
dary accounts (or alternatively to the exaggeration born
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of ideas of self-importance) that one may hear a senior
trade union leader claim that he personally...
"... invented the concept of redundancy payments 
being made to workers dismissed through no fault 
of their own." (159).
As we have seen, unless the trade union leader in ques­
tion enjoyed a previous incarnation some time before 
1834, there is no possible validity in this suggestion!
The predominant cultural influence of moral belief in 
the "right to compensation" then, needs to be seen as 
surrounded by other perceptions of "rights". If, before 
the legislation provided compensation as a legal right, 
the prevalent cultural influence in trade unions empha­
sised compensation as a "right", has it now been sub­
sumed by a "redundancy culture", in which compensation 
is the only material consideration, and opposition in 
any form is not contemplated? Certainly, this would 
appear to be the view of some observers. (Jones, for 
example, has commented that union leaders claim to have 
been "sickened" at the sight of workers queuing up and 
almost fighting each other for the chance of a redun­
dancy payment.) (160). Whether or not this has become 
the case we may now consider, by looking at circum­
stances post the legislation, in a case study of the 
company. International Computers. For this purpose, we 
will turn now to the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
REDUNDANCY AND TRADE UNION ACTION i 
A CASE STUDY
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5.1 UilRQDUGTIQH
Let us at this point return to a matter which we 
touched upon at the end of the last chapter. If union 
action in opposition to redundancy, or aspects of the 
redundancy process, is seen as a product of the moral 
influences embodied in union cultures, how then do we 
characterise inaction in response to collective job 
losses? In the same way as opposition has been iden­
tified with cultures and moral influences, should we not 
expect to find cultural explanations for acquiescence?
On the evidence of the last chapter it would seem 
that the prevalent cultural influence prior to the 
enactment of the Redundancy Payments Act, was the per­
ceived "right" to compensation for loss of employment, 
though this co-existed with other minority influences 
including in some cases the "right to work" culture.
Some writers, as we have already observed, have charac­
terised the period subsequent to the legislation of 
1965, as witnessing a change in the attitudes of union 
members, and have suggested that their desire to "fight" 
redundancy, has evaporated in face of the promised 
compensation. In chapter three and in the conclusion of 
the last chapter, 1 suggested that we might characterise 
such a draining away of the moral beliefs of trade 
unionism, as the influence of a "redundancy culture", in 
which compensation appears to be the only significant 
influence on the minds and actions of workers. The 
existence of such a culture would have significant
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implications for our understanding of trade unionism,
especially were it to be seen that it had become the
dominant cultural influence. To a certain extent, this
appears to be the position adopted by some writers. For
example, Jones has suggested that the argument that:-
"No worker has the right to sell a job that might 
provide employment for a son or grandson (sic) has 
now been swept aside in the rush for the money." 
(1).
And whilst the views of a BBC labour correspondent may
not necessarily be taken as serious academic analysis,
they have been found reflected, too, in the positions
adopted by a number of academic observers, of whom
Fryer, Hyman, and Levie et al come immediately to mind.
For example, Levie et ai claim that:-
"One of the biggest obstacles confronting trade 
unionists fighting closures, is the effect of the 
promise of redundancy pay on the threatened work­
force ..." (2),
and Hyman, in similar vein has argued that the
Redundancy Payments Act...
"... has represented an important example of 
government intervention, undermining the basis of 
collective resistance to the elimination of 
jobs ..." (3);
while Fryer, declaiming against the underlying direction 
of the policies behind the Redundancy Payments Act, 
appears to have implicitly accepted that they have 
weakened workers' resolve in the same way.
To what extent then, can the period post the 1965 
legislation be characterised as an era of dominance by 
such a "redundancy culture"? If it is a traceable 
influence at all, as we may well find to be the case, 
has the "redundancy culture" subsumed all, or most, of
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the other rival moral influences? Alternatively, do 
unionists continue to express beliefs in "rights" other 
than the "right to compensation" for being displaced 
from one's job, and do these beliefs continue to exist 
as cultural influences of trade unionism? As will be 
recalled from chapter two. Hardy has suggested that the 
management of plant closures has inculcated workers' 
perceptions of legitimacy, and defused opposition to 
such events. Such a scenario would be compatible with 
the existence of a "redundancy culture" in which alter­
native rival viewpoints of workers are replaced by a 
consensus which accords them compensation and generally 
"fair" treatment, and in return for which they acquiesce 
to redundancy. How close it may be asked, is this image 
to reality?
This then, is the question to which we will turn in 
this chapter, by way of a case study of the company. 
International Computers Limited (ICL). The computer 
industry, it should be said, would seem to provide an 
ideal context for the growth of a culture that stresses 
compensation and shows little concern for the other 
aspects of job losses. The rapid growth of the industry 
since the 1960s has created circumstances in which one 
would expect employees' fears of unemployment to be not 
as acute as in those industries which have declined over 
the same period of time. The seemingly inexorable 
demand of the market for skilled and qualified staff in 
data processing, maintenance, and other areas of the 
industry, might produce (one would assume) feelings of
347
relatively little concern among employees threatened 
with redundancy, given the prospect of reasonably 
"generous" sums of financial compensation.
In ICL, the staff employees' major union was ASTMS, 
which had (as ASSET) done more than most other unions in 
the nineteen-sixties, to promote legislation on redun­
dancy payments. The existence of formal recognition 
agreements, and collective bargaining in ICL followed 
well-developed lines. Professional personnel manage­
ment, and a high degree of formalisation in bargaining 
committees, and employee representation arrangements, 
all made this a suitable example for a case study. As 
for the company's record in redundancy, there had been 
(as will be demonstrated shortly) a history of mergers, 
rationalisations and "cut-backs" which had made redun­
dancy a frequent event. It would seem then, that far 
from favouring the emergence of oppositional cultures, 
the case study might be an ideal seed-bed in which the 
redundancy culture would be likely to grow. At this 
point it is appropriate to explain briefly how the study 
was conducted.
The possibility of using ICL as a case study arose at 
the beginning of 1981, when in my capacity as an ASTMS 
Divisional Officer, I was asked to assume responsibility 
for the association's members in the Customer Services 
Section of the company. At this time, there were some 
33,000 employees in ICL as a whole, including those 
based abroad. Nine and a half thousand of them were 
represented by ASTMS, of which some 2500 were customer
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service engineers. The other unions representing staff 
had fewer members:- TASS, 783; APEX, 615; EESA, 197. As 
part of my work involvement with the company, it became 
necessary for me to attend a large number of meetings 
with representatives of the engineers, and industrial 
relations management of ICL. Whilst I was myself in­
volved in a number of redundancy events in ICL, I have 
decided against including these in the study as my own 
personal involvement tended to obscure the need for 
objectivity. The material collected here has been 
obtained by looking through a considerable number of 
files of other ASTMS officers, and filling in missing 
pieces of information by direct inquiry of individuals. 
In this way I have attempted to obtain a reasonably 
complete picture of redundancy events in ICL between 
1969 and 1979, a period of some ten years. Some of the 
events can only be described in rather sparse detail.
In other cases the picture is more complete.
One problem with this sort of approach, is that there 
may be a tendency for the researcher to be selective in 
the data recorded, acting in part in response to the 
conclusions he or she expects eventually to be able to 
reach. If this criticism were applied in this case 
however, I would argue that any such tendency ought not 
to have influenced the descriptive picture unduly. This 
is because firstly, I was looking at historical events 
that were in the main recorded in officers' reports, 
minutes, and internal memoranda, none of which should 
provide the same scope for subjective or selective
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accounts, as directly observed meetings, for example.
The second reason to doubt such a personal influence, is 
that in any case there was really no clear idea in my 
mind at the time of collection of the data, of the 
theoretical context in which it would be likely to be 
assessed. Most of these ideas were developed much 
later, and the rather vague expectation I had when 
gathering the data was that it might help to give a 
general picture of redundancy processes in action.
The events which will in due course be described in 
the case study, need to be seen in the context of the 
influences on ICL as a company. ICL was formed in 1968 
under the influence of the then Labour Government's 
Industrial Reorganisation Commission, which injected 
£17 million into the company and took a 10.5 per cent 
shareholding. The companies that came together in the 
merger were International Computers and Tabulators, and 
English Electric. Opinion varied however, as to whether 
the merger was really such a good thing, criticism being 
directed in particular at "loading down ICT with English 
Electric's somewhat dubious product range". (5).
Such was the scope for growth in the industry how­
ever, that despite these handicaps (if indeed they were 
such), the first ten or so years of the company's exis­
tence were, in the main, marked by spectacular expansion 
in turnover and profit. But the recession of 1971-2 had 
its impact on the computer industry at a time when ICL 
was in the process of developing a new range of big 
computers, and a government loan of £40 million was
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required to facilitate the development programme. By 
1975 however. The Financial Times was able to record 
that, "The ICL of today is almost unrecognisable from 
the invalid which was struggling for its life... (6). 
In the year to September 1977, sales grew by 45 per 
cent, profits increased by 31.3 per cent and informed 
opinion predicted that, "ICL looks set for further 
substantial growth over the next couple of years... but 
given the rapid rate of technological change, the real 
test will come in the 1980s". (7).
In the space of three years, the fortunes of the 
company were to change equally dramatically. In the 
year to September 1980, profit declined by 46 per cent 
compared with the previous year. Nevertheless, a divi­
dend to shareholders was declared equal to that of the 
much more successful year before. (8). Within a matter 
of months there was an alarming cash crisis in the 
company. Overall confidence in the management of the 
company appeared to be draining away rapidly. As one 
broker put it, "much of the credibility which the com­
pany [had] built up over the past few years had evapora­
ted" . Share prices plummeted from 196 pence in 1980 to 
70 pence at the beginning of 1981, and there was talk of 
the company being taken over by a "wealthy partner".
(9). (British Petroleum, Shell and GEC were among the 
companies approached.)
In the event, ICL survived as a separate entity, 
though part of the price which had to be paid was the 
creation of a substantial number of redundancies. Since
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the company's creation in 1968 then, changes of market 
pressures, mergers with other companies and the develop­
ment of new technologies all, in their own way, contri­
buted to decisions being taken to dismiss sections of 
the workforce as redundant. This in brief, is the 
context in which trade unions from 1968 onwards, were 
periodically faced with the possibility of redundancy 
among sections of their members. The next section 
describes a number of these redundancy events very 
briefly.
5.2 REDUHDMCIES IE.ICL. 1968 TQ 1979
The main purpose of this section is to build up the 
general outline of the "redundancy picture" in ICL.
Brief details of a number of redundancy events are given 
below. In all, there is a total of twenty events that 
have been chosen to be included in this summary.
1967
Redund an c lea at- ICT. Hanuf ac tut ing. El an ta—Cr o.Yiloa
Experienced electo-mechanical engineers working on 
punch card machines for the ICL '1901' mini-computer, 
were invited to "volunteer" for redundancy. There was a 
threatened strike from the 1200 employees at the Croydon 
assembly plant, but in the event more than the planned 
number of redundancies were achieved by volunteers.
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1 2 m
ICL was formed
A merger between ICT and English Electric was 
encouraged by government intervention.
laea
Southport Factory Closed
Several hundred redundancies. The reason for the 
closure:- electro-mechanical equipment was taken over by 
new technology.
19.7Q
Dartford Factory Closed
About 2000 redundancies. Again, the reason for 
closure was the need to change production from the old 
electro-mechanical technology.
12m 
S-t-eveaage.- Redundancy. Afire eneat.
The unions demanded a clause in the pay and condi­
tions agreement, to deal with the possible contingency 
of redundancy. Agreement was reached on the inclusion 
of a clause laying down compensation terms.
1921 
Croydon Redundancy Agreement
Salaried staff and hourly-rated employees approached 
the company for a redundancy agreement because they were 
troubled by rumours of redundancy. They had seen the
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closure of the Dartford and Southport plants and knew of 
the Stevenage agreement. The agreement they obtained 
was based on the Stevenage agreement. It was ratified 
by the Manufacturing Division, which covered the Croydon 
plant.
1971-72 
Croydon YQluataxy.-Reduadancies
Small numbers of employees took voluntary redundancy 
under the terms of the "Croydon Scheme".
The provisions of the Croydon agreement were applied 
and resulted in all employees made redundant receiving 
considerably enhanced terms - i.e. four weeks' warning 
in advance, arrangements to receive pay in lieu of 
notice if employees left before expiry of notice by 
mutual agreement, enhanced severance pay over and above 
the State scheme. The scheme also provided for pay in 
lieu of untaken leave, and a special hardship supplement 
for employees still unemployed at the end of a measured 
period of time. It laid down selection arrangments and 
allowed for volunteers to opt for redundancy, provided 
efficiency was not thereby damaged.
1972 
Castlerea^h Plant.. Closure announced
The company announced a decision to close the plant 
in Castlereagh, Belfast, manufacturing computer periphe­
ral equipment. The result of closure would have meant a 
loss of 3000 jobs. The unions lobbied to oppose the
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closure, and the government intervened through the 
Northern Ireland Ministry of Commerce. ICL were per­
suaded to climb down, but in view of the fact that the 
factory could not be kept open if it continued to simply 
make computer peripheral equipment, a new company 
(International Engineering Limited) was incorporated, 
wholly owned by the Ministry of Commerce for Northern 
Ireland, and ICL. Undertakings were made by ICL to 
supply the new company with sub-contract work. All 
former ICL employees were employed by lEL on the same 
conditons of service.
1BZ2
SexYice Enfiineers-Redundancies
Three hundred redundancies were declared among the 
service engineers, due to a run-down in certain forms of 
business. The engineers argued against redundancy, and 
in favour of retraining the "earmarked" engineers to 
cope with other forms of work. Agreement was reached to 
operate a voluntary scheme.
About 100 volunteered for redundancy over the next 
twelve months. Later, ICL embarked on a recruitment 
drive, "to restore the skill balance". Some of the 
engineers who had been earmarked for redundancy were 
retrained on other equipment. The engineers came to the 
view that they would always be able to avoid involuntary 
redundancy.
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1S2A
Service Enginesrs Voluntary Scheme
The voluntary scheme described above, was signed as a 
formal agreement. The company saw an ongoing voluntary 
scheme as performing a useful role in manpower planning. 
The scheme became a permanent option available to engi­
neers. Many approaching retirement age at 61 or 62 took 
voluntary redundancy. This confirmed the impression 
that the engineers were a special case, and that they 
would be able to avoid involuntary redundancy, because 
of their unique agreement.
February 1975 
Redundancies in Systems Froarammina Division
Arising out of a need to cut costs, the company 
announced a staff-level reduction programme. Two hund­
red and sixty jobs were to be lost between February and 
September 1975. Ninety were expected to go by redun­
dancy. Initially, one week's notice was intended be­
tween the date of the announcement (28th February) and 
the individual redundancy warnings to selected 
employees. At the instigation of ASTMS this was ex­
tended to allow other proposals to be considered. ASTMS 
members at Gorton and Dukinfield formed a committee to 
co-ordinate opposition to involuntary redundancy.
Limited industrial action occurred at two other sites, 
Bracknell and Reading. In the event, no ASTMS members 
were involuntarily redundant. The terms of the "Croydon 
Scheme" were observed.
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July 1975
ManufagturJiDg Division Redundancies
Notice was given of a total of 205 redundancies in 
the three manufacturing plants in Winsford, Letchworth 
and Stevenage. Work restrictions were applied in an 
attempt to coerce the company into withdrawing the 
redundancies, but these had little effect.
September 1975
International Engineering Plant Cast1 e r closure 
announced
The ICL plant hived off as lEL in 1972 was closed.
The main argument eventually came down to whether or not 
ICL owed the workers redundancy compensation arising 
from their previous employment with the company before 
the lEL "hive down". No such payments were made, but 
the ICL agreements were observed by lEL.
March 1976.
CAD Centre Cambridgeproposed closure
Proposals were made by an ad hoc committee reporting 
to the Secretary of State for Industry, that the 
Computer Aided Design Centre should disband and the work 
be transferred elsewhere. The proposals involved a 
potential of 120 redundancies. ICL was the technical 
employer of the staff of the centre, though it was 
funded by industry-commissioned design projects and 
direct government aid. A vigorous campaign was fought 
to save the centre, led by ASTMS members. A report was
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prepared jointly by ASTMS members and middle management 
at the centre, on the centre's future. A delegation of 
members from the CADC met the Minister of State for 
Industry and the Chief Scientist. After a six-months' 
campaign of opposition, the threat of closure was 
withdrawn.
April 197.6 
Plans anaounced to..Æ&ase or redact jr.QductioaL 
Redundancies proposed
The company announced plans to cease or reduce pro­
duction of a number of products, and that this would 
result in a reduction in manpower needs by 1373 over the 
period July 1976 to September 1977. This would be a 
phased reduction, but would involve involuntary redun­
dancies, if the number could not be otherwise achieved. 
Action was co-ordinated at the seven different locations 
concerned, with a series of sanctions short of strike 
action being formally approved by ASTMS. In August, the 
company stated that they would only use involuntary 
redundancies as a last resort, and even then only after 
further negotiations. By November, the planned 
reductions had been achieved on a voluntary basis.
October 1826.
Merger with Singer. some redundancies
This was a situation where a company (Singer Business 
Machines) was acquired, and with the consequential 
rationalisation some redundancies occurred. The
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majority of the Singer staff were not unionised at the 
time of the acquisition. Most of the 460 U.K. based 
staff were offered employment in ICL. There was no 
negotiation about the conditions of transfer, but 
special arbitration arrangements were made to consider 
redundancy claims where employees rejected offers of 
alternative employment. Whilst job losses in the U.K. 
were not large, there was a greater impact in other 
European countries where Singer employees were located. 
Eight hundred jobs had been lost in Germany and Italy in 
the first eight months of 1976. A delegation of the 
International Metal Workers Federation met the company 
to express concern. This seems to have had no practical 
effect on company policy however.
March 1977 
A MatiQnal.-”S.eaurlty—of Employmeat Agreement! finalised
Over a period of four years the staff unions had been 
discussing a "Security of Employment Agreement". Dif­
ferent initiatives were taken, first by ASTMS and TA3S, 
and eventually all five staff unions joined forces to 
reach a common agreement. The agreement provided for:-
"(i) extended consultation irrespective of the 
number of redundancies;
(ii) a four-week warning period to individual 
employees ;
(iii) pay in lieu of notice to be given to redundant 
employees ;
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(iv) compensation payments, better than those 
previously provided in the "Croydon 
agreement";
(v) pay in lieu of holidays untaken;
(vi) special supplements for continued periods of 
unemployment ;
(vii) special "hardship" cases to be reconsidered;
(viii) arrangements to benefit anyone dismissed and 
subsequently re-engaged by ICL, by protecting 
"fringe benefits".
The essential point was that all of the above were to 
cushion those declared redundant in whatever way (either 
voluntarily or involuntarily). The Customer Engineers, 
who had agreement since 1974 on a voluntary scheme, 
refused to be covered by the National "Security of 
Employment Agreement", in the belief that their own 
scheme offered better protection against redundancy. 
However, they tried to negotiate their own separate 
agreement, extending to engineers the full "cushion" of 
benefits of the National S.E.A., but retaining the 
voluntary element.
August 1977 
Bedundanglea-a.t Putney Systems Centre
A decision was announced to commence a phased run­
down of the systems centre activity. The announcement 
represented the commencement of the 90 days' consulta­
tion period under the provisions of the newly signed 
"Security of Employment Agreement". The reasons for the
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announcement included the fact that the "population" of 
new 2900 system computers had increased over the past 
two years, leading to more computer time being available 
for sale by other 2900 operators. This left the Putney 
Systems Centre "uncompetitive". Also, project teams and 
customers had improved their technical competence, which 
had led to a decline in demand for the specialist sup­
port offered by the centre. Initially, ASTMS represen­
tatives put forward proposals to keep the centre open, 
but by October 1977, they had agreed to co-operate with 
the closure. The company agreed to ensure that maximum 
efforts would be made to ensure that "no involuntary 
redundancies occur at the Putney S.C.S.". They also 
stated that no "undue barriers" would be placed in the 
way of those seeking voluntary redundancy.
ApjiI.J.a78 
Customer..Engiaeering Members acceE.t„.ths S.E.A.
Whilst negotiations had been taking place nationally
for a corporate Security of Employment Agreement
(S.E.A.), this was not intended to be applied to the
Customer Engineering Division (C.E.D.). The Engineers
regarded their 1974 agreement allowing for voluntary
redundancies, as a form of protection against compulsory
redundancy. C.E.D. management approached the engineers
(through ASTMS) for separate talks. They initiated
talks on a separate agreement for C.E.D. which would
enable them to determine...
"... how changes in manpower requirements can be 
handled within a mutual framework and maximum 
consultation."
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A draft produced by ASTMS demanded a commitment to no 
involuntary redundancies. This was not acceptable 
despite the existing agreement that had been in force 
since 1974. (In fact there was an ambiguity in the 
agreement, in that it simply dealt with a voluntary 
continuous severance programme. The agreement did not 
address the situation where sudden or very large cut­
backs might be needed.)
From March 1977, all other ICL employees were covered 
by the far more favourable severance terms of the cor­
porate S.E.A. The C.E.D. employees were covered only by 
their own 1974 agreement. In April 1978, a decision was 
suddenly reached by the Customer Engineers, to adopt the 
corporate agreement. This was subsequently explained as 
happening because a substantial body of the engineers 
foresaw redundancies occurring, and wanted the protec­
tion of the better terms in the corporate S.E.A. The 
Customer Engineers attempted to impose conditions on 
their acceptance of the S.E.A., but these had no 
practical effect of consequence.
October 1979 
Dukinfield factory Closure announced
The closure was planned to be completed by September 
1980. Nine hundred employees would become redundant.
In addition to the severance terms laid down in the 
S.E.A., a "plant closure payment" was promised to those 
employees who agreed to continue so long as they were 
needed by the company.
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The Dukinfield factory was one of two in Manchester 
making large machines. It was an old building (over 90 
years) and these factors, combined with the company's 
general intention of reducing the U.K. manufacturing 
workforce by 1200, led to the Dukinfield closure 
decision.
The unions alleged that the company had broken the 
S.E.A. by announcing a closure decision, without first 
examining other possibilities jointly with the unions.
A ban on overtime was imposed, sub-contract work boycot­
ted, and working-time meetings arranged throughout the 
country, as a sanction in protest at the redundancies.
A working party was set up with the approval of the 
Manchester CSEU and the company agreed to suspend the 90 
days' advance warning of redundancy by 28 days, after 
which the position would be reconsidered in light of the 
working party report. (Effectively, the unions were 
being told to produce a report and to convince the 
company of a different solution to their problems, 
within 28 days, after which the situation would revert 
to the planned closure as already announced.)
The report was produced, and alternative measures 
proposed. These were not accepted. On 25th January 
1980, the workforce voted to accept the closure.
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5.3 DISCUSSION OF THE TWENTY REDUNDANCY EVENTS
In commenting on the broad picture that has emerged 
so far, a number of general points can be made.
Firstly, it is clear that for the company, redundancy 
seemed to be the key instrument to cope with a variety 
of changes in commercial circumstances, that had impli­
cations in staffing requirements. Significantly, whilst 
there were long periods of time when no major cut-backs 
in staffing levels were required, the concept of redun­
dancy (albeit on a voluntary basis) was used to regulate 
skill distributions and manning levels. Four of the 
incidents quoted above arose because of changes in 
technology, or the need to change products and skill 
balances. Six of the plans for redundancy, arose from 
mergers or company reorganisation. Finally, four of the 
announced redundancy programmes arose through fluctua­
tions in demand, and the influence of market forces. 
(Admittedly, there are two occasions which lend them­
selves to a combination of perhaps two underlying 
causes.) Redundancy for the company then, seems to have 
represented a key (perhaps the key) instrument of man­
power control, in a variety of different circumstances, 
for an extended period of time. Table 5.1 (p.365) 
summarises the reasons for redundancies in ICL from its 
formation in 1968, to the Dukinfield factory closure 
which was announced in 1979. (Sixteen events are inc­
luded, omitting the four which refer to agreements being 
concluded making general provisions unrelated to a 
specific redundancy declaration.)
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TABLK.5.,1
CAUSES QE.REDUHDMCY IN ICL, 1968-79
Technological Change, 
New Skills,
New Products.
Market Forces, 
Costs.
Company
Reorganisation,
1969 Southport
1970 Dartford 
1971-72 Croydon V R 
1972 Croydon
1972 C S Field Eng 
1972 Castlereagh 1975
1975
1975
1975
1976 Manufacturing 
Division
S.P.D.
C.D.D.
Manufacturing
Division
Castlereagh
1976 Sydenham
1976 Computer Aided 
Design Centre
1976 S.B.M.
1977 Putney Systems
Centre
1979 Dukinfield
(The dotted lines show the alternative classifications available for 
two of the examples.)
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To what extent can we see a pattern of trade union 
activity over the events described above? Certainly it 
could be said that there has been considerable emphasis 
on the issue of compensation for loss of employment. On 
the question of making jobs secure, the focus has been 
on preventing individual employees from being made 
redundant involuntarily. This distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary redundancy was a central theme 
of ASTMS policy. (Members were told in the union diary, 
"ASTMS opposes involuntary redundancy, but has nego­
tiated a number of voluntary early retirement schemes'.)
(10). This approach by the union might be interpreted 
in a number of ways. On one hand it could be suggested, 
it was no more than a pragmatic compromise by the union 
with the inevitable reality that, members who found the 
attraction of a voluntary redundancy scheme to their 
taste, would volunteer and depart on the financial 
compensation terms offered. Clearly, there was no point 
in resisting such an inevitability, and the union wisely 
did not attempt to oppose voluntary redundancies in this 
way. By this token, the union's stance on voluntary 
redundancy could be seen as a recognition that it had, 
in effect, to come to terms with the "redundancy cul­
ture" and it did so by adopting a line of limited oppo­
sition to it. An alternative view however, might be 
that the union saw some intrinsic merit in allowing
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individuals the opportunity to depart at their own 
behest, with the advantage of a financial package to 
ease their voluntary severance from the company. By 
this measure, the concept of voluntary redundancy would 
be seen as a positive advantage, especially if available 
over a prolonged period, without undue pressure on 
individuals to accept the offer of voluntary departure. 
Which of these possible analyses is the more valid we 
will consider in due course.
The above discussion suggests however, that irrespec­
tive of which of the two possible explanations should 
prove to be more valid, the influence of compensation on 
ASTMS as an organisation in ICL, and individual members 
employed in the company, rated very highly indeed. To 
what extent they may have accepted the need for, or 
"inevitability" of redundancy, or believed that it was 
their responsibility to co-operate with, even manage the 
exercise of redundancy, is another matter altogether.
Perhaps the best way of considering this point is to 
see the various strategies and achievements of the staff 
unions in ICL in summarised table form. Table 5.2 
(p.369) sets out six possible aspects of opposition to 
which the unions may have given effect. In this case, 
all twenty events have been included. The following 
notes explain the terms employed...
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Natga. on-Interpret at ion of Table. _5.2.
Heading Easplanation
(1) Better terms Better terms were secured for redun­
dant workers than had previously 
been applied
(2) Opposed plans The unions opposed the management's 
plans by taking some form of 
industrial action
(3) Won V.R. Management agreed to restrict redun 
dancies to those who volunteered
(4) Saved jobs The proposed redundancies did not 
take place
(5) Campaign Part of the means employed by the 
unions to deal with the problem in­
volved the running of a political 
campaign in which they sent delega­
tions to MPs, government Ministers 
and so on
(6) Other gains Management modified their initial 
plans without withdrawing the 
redundancies altogether
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TABLE 5.2
U N I O N  j ^ £ B Q A C H E S  A N D  S U C C E S S E S - I B  
R E D U N D A N C Y  B A R G A I N I N f i .  I N  I C L
1 2 4
Event/
Date
Better
Terms
Opposed
Plans
Won
V.R.
Saved
Jobs
Political
Campaign
Other
Gains
Southport 1969*
Dartford 1970*
Stevenage 1970 X ------- ------- ------- ---- —
Croydon 1971 X ------- ------- ------- — ---- -------
Croydon 
V.R. 1971-72 — — — — — ^ X — — — ---- —
Croydon 1972 — — — ---- ------- ------- ------- ---- —
Castlereagh 1972 ------- X ------- X ------- ---- —
Service
Engineers 1972 X X — ■ —  — ---- — -------
Service
Engineers 1974 X — —  — — — — — —  — ---- —
SPD Feb 1975 ------ X X ------- ------- X
Stevenage 
CDD June 1975 — — — X — — — — X -------
Manufacturing 
Div. July 1975 — — — X — — — — — — ------- — — —
lEL 1975 ------ X ------- ------- ------- -------
Sydenham 1976 X X ------- — — ------- X
CADC
Cambridge 1976 —  —  — —  —  — —  —  — X X — ----
Mfg. Div. 1976 — — X X ------- ------- -------
Singer 1976 ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
Corporate 1977 X ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
E\itney 1977 ------- ------- ------- ---- — ------- X
Dukinfield 1979 X ------- — ---- -------
* No information available
It will be seen from table 5.2, that out of the total of twenty
events, industrial action in one form or another took place in nine 
of them, in opposition to some aspect of management's plans. Table 
5.3 (p.370) summarises this.
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TABLE 5,3
SUMMARY OF QPPQSITIQM/HQM-QPPQSITIQN
A: Industrial action took place in opposition 9
Political opposition 3
*Total some form of opposition 10
No known opposition of any kind took place 10
Negligible membership strength 1
No immediate redundancy threat (e.g. S.E.A. 
negotiations) 4
No information on union tactics or actions 2
Total no opposition 3
Total events 20
(* Total includes two events where opposition was 
both political and industrial.)
Of the eighteen cases for which reasonably complete 
information was available, it will be seen that there 
were ten events where some form of active opposition 
occurred to an aspect of management's plans. On this 
basis alone, it would not be convincing to argue that 
workers passively accepted redundancy without attemp­
ting in some way to enforce observation of their own 
standards and values. In fact the contrast between 
the number of "protest" and "no protest" events is even 
more striking, as can be seen by considering Section B 
of Table 5.3. Of the ten situations described where no 
opposition occured, one can be accounted for by lack of
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membership strength (Singer, 1976), four were non­
redundancy declarations as such, but rather negotia­
tions over redundancy terms in absence of any immediate 
threat. Finally, no information on union tactics was 
available for Southport 1969, and Dartford 1970. Of the 
remaining three events where no recorded opposition took 
place, we have the following picture:-
TABLE 5.4
BREAKDOWN OF HQH-OPPOSITION EVENTS
Croydon 1971-72 A voluntary programme
Croydon 1972 Croydon severance terms agreed in
1971, applied
Putney 1977 Corporate agreement 1977 applied
It may be significant that the only two events where 
substantial numbers of involuntary redundancies were not 
countered by either political or industrial protest, 
occurred in both cases immediately after agreements had 
been reached, breaking new ground on the management of 
redundancy in ICL, and giving compensation terms for the 
redundant. Possibly this could be put down to mere 
coincidence. Perhaps there would have been a lack of 
protest in these cases, anyway. Equally possible how­
ever, is the scenario that these new redundancy agree­
ments had some sort of impression on the way the union 
and its members saw redundancy in the immediate after- 
math of their being concluded. To this one might legi­
timately enquire, "and why was not the influence more
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permanent?" More detail is needed to illustrate the 
answer to this point. However, we can perhaps antici­
pate at this stage something of what follows, with this 
tentative proposition: if the agreements cast some sort 
of spell of industrial peace over redundancy events in 
ICL, then clearly something seems to have occurred to 
make this relatively short-lived. Perhaps it could be 
that actions by management implying a different attitude 
towards the agreements than what had been expected, 
contributed to this. We shall examine this question 
further in due course.
What apart from this last possibility does this 
general analysis suggest? We are looking here at the 
policies and strategies that the unions in ICL pursued 
over a period of some ten years. One would be hard 
pressed on the basis of the above evidence, to suggest 
the occurrence of any major discontinuities in the 
approaches the unions adopted. The questions of choice 
of involuntary redundancy, and acceptability of compen­
sation, appear in the earliest events of which reason­
ably detailed information is available, and appear to 
have been pressed, if not always achieved, throughout 
the time period considered. Opposition to the plans put 
forward by the company has been a continuing theme from 
1972 at least, to 1979, the end of the study period.
And whilst there are only three examples of the union 
running a major political campaign, it is interesting 
that these occurred once in a period of Conservative 
government (Castlereagh 1972) and twice in periods when
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Labour was in office (CDD 1975 and CADC Cambridge 1976). 
On the basis of the evidence examined here, it would be 
hard to find support for the argument (which we might 
take from Hardy's analysis, for example) that unions 
were led to a view of redundancy as "legitimate", and 
that opposition was largely neutralised by their accep­
tance of this perspective. Nor does the evidence depict 
unions in accordance with Jones's scenario, as standing 
helplessly aside while their members elbow their way 
forward to sell their jobs against the protestations of 
union officers. Whilst compensation for the redundant 
has clearly been an important factor (and certainly has 
been of central importance in union approaches to redun­
dancy in ICL), it is of interest that unions have 
throughout, made the running on this issue, and have 
not, it would seem, been usurped in their functions as a 
result of members' anxiety to "grasp the money and run". 
Neither could it be said on this evidence, that unions 
have been dominated by compensation as a single signi­
ficant factor, as our provisional examination of the 
concept of a "redundancy culture" at the beginning of 
this chapter and elsewhere, has hinted might be the 
case. And whilst final judgement must be reserved on 
these issues, it would appear that there is little here 
to support an image of unions in outright opposition 
to redundancy, but neither can they be seen on this 
evidence as being in supine, helpless acquiescence.
Yet on the question of outright opposition to redun­
dancy, unions could not be said to have met with a great
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deal of success. In two of the cases, the closures and 
redundancies that had been planned were postponed.
These successes however, were both entirely due to 
political, as opposed to industrial campaigns. Of the 
eight cases where there were purely industrial campaigns 
in opposition to an aspect of management policy, none 
resulted in the redundancies being withdrawn. Three 
however, resulted in acceptance of voluntary redundancy 
as the method of selection, and in one other event, 
additional gains were achieved to protect the redundant 
in other ways. Nevertheless, at Putney 1977 and Croydon 
1971-72, the company also agreed to apply the redundan­
cies on a purely voluntary basis, although there was no 
protest of any kind in either case. Moreover, in five 
of the cases where there was industrial action, this 
produced no measurable gains of substance for the 
workers concerned.
If, as the case study suggests, opposition was the 
norm in situations where jobs were immediately under 
threat, what were the key driving motives, given such 
varied outcomes of industrial protest? The next section 
of the case study may go some way towards an answer to 
this question. However, at this stage it is sufficient 
to suggest that a major part of the impetus on trade 
unions to oppose aspects of ICL management's redundancy 
plans, was the existence of a reasonably durable, con­
sistent collection of moral beliefs. Though these 
beliefs did not perhaps confront the principle of redun­
dancy per sé, they sought to encircle the exercise of
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redundancy with "hallmark" standards of fairness, that 
were in their own more limited way, a restriction and 
potential challenge to the authority of management. If 
compensation was the dominant influence, there was it 
would seem, scope for opposition, perhaps to the key 
issue of redundancy, but more likely some less 
fundamental aspect of it.
5.4 THE "RIGHT-JQ MQ-lliYQLÜHATRY REDUMDMCY”
The issue of "compulsion" versus "voluntarism" is a 
theme that seems to have emerged in a number of the 
redundancy events described above. Effectively, this 
amounted to a possibility that individuals could be 
"selected" for redundancy by a simple process of the 
workforce as a whole being invited to volunteer.
Clearly, for the employees, it was preferable to more 
arbitrary methods, and as we shall see, it assumed for a 
period the status of a perceived "right" in ICL. This 
issue will be now considered in relation to the Customer 
Engineering Division (C.E.D.) of the company.
In 1972, ICL management informed the Customer Service 
Engineers (the Field Engineers), that there were to be 
300 redundancies "due to a run-down in data processing". 
The engineers refuted the view that "the 300 could not 
be trained on new equipment". Agreement was reached to 
operate a voluntary scheme of redundancy for data pro­
cessing engineers. About 100 engineers accepted
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redundancy over the next twelve months, and then ICL 
embarked on a recruitment drive for engineers, to "re­
store the skill balance". Some of the very data proces­
sing engineers who had previously been earmarked for 
redundancy, progressed onto working on computer equip­
ment of a different kind. The engineers themselves seem 
to have been conscious of the contradictions in the 
approach originally adopted by the company. Some three 
years later, in 1975, the Chairman of the Engineers 
Bargaining Unit was to comment, "we have never had 
involuntary redundancy in Customer Services, nor will it 
ever be accepted". (11).
These arrangements for inviting engineers to apply 
for voluntary redundancy were "clarified" by an agree­
ment concluded in 1974 which provided for certain condi­
tions under which the voluntary option would apply to 
any particular individual. This included the provision 
that an engineer would...
"... only be granted redundancy if either of the
following conditions were satisfied:-
(a) there is a reduction in workload which would 
mean his skills are no longer required 
locally;
or...
(b) he could not transfer his skills to other 
suitable alternative work." (12).
The agreement stated, moreover, that, "in line with
their previous statements it is not C.E.D. management's
intention to declare any engineer involuntarily
redundant." (13).
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To some extent, it would seem, this agreement con­
tributed to a real belief among the engineers, that they 
could somehow avoid involuntary redundancy, by a mere 
refusal to accept it. So far as is known, there was no 
explicit strategy to defend the agreement by a stoppage 
of work or imposition of other sanctions. However, the 
engineers were the most militant of the staff bargaining 
groups, and exercised considerable economic power in the 
event of a dispute. Usually, the merest hint of unrest 
would cause the company management to become alarmed at 
potential customer losses. Perhaps the belief by the 
engineers that they could avoid involuntary redundancy, 
helped to make this a reality. In any event, between 
1972 and 1981, none of the engineers were declared 
redundant involuntarily, although during this time, 
there were a number of exercises that affected other 
company employees in this way.
To understand why this was so however, we need to
consider how this scheme of voluntary redundancy was
seen by ICL management. It was explained to me in the
following terms:-
"It was a means of redressing skill imbalances 
in the Bargaining Unit. The Secretary of the 
Bargaining Unit would always be told of an
application for voluntary redundancy. The local
representative and the member concerned would go 
and discuss the matter with the manager concerned 
and usually arrive at agreement. The scheme con­
tinued from 1974 up to the present date (1982).
Some 30 to 40 engineers would take the voluntary 
redundancy option every year. Most of them were 
in the 60 to 64 years age range. By the time 
they reached the age of 61 to 62 years there was 
no real sense in continuing with the company be­
cause the redundancy terms were such that they 
would not gain financially by remaining at work.
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From the point of view of the company gaining 
rebate from the redundancy fund, the scheme was 
useful. The men who went were mainly those who 
were skilled in electro-mechanical devices, which 
were rapidly being overtaken by newer technology. 
Other parts of the company would have liked to 
introduce similar arrangements, but they only ap­
plied in Customer Services bargaining units. The 
employees concerned received not only enhanced 
severance pay provided under the "Croydon Scheme", 
but they received a continuing unemployment sup­
plement which did not normally apply in situations 
of voluntary redundancy." (14).
It would seem then, that this voluntary scheme was 
mutually beneficial to the company and the engineers.
For the company it provided a means of adjusting "skill 
imbalances", due to changing technology and obsolescent 
skills of some engineers. For the engineers, it was 
akin to a "right" to take early retirement on full pay. 
The very fact that the scheme operated with a regular 
number of engineers applying for voluntary redundancy 
each year, and the company granting their requests, 
seems to underline its mutually beneficial effects. It 
is easy to see why in this instance, collaboration 
between management and workers was possible. Neverthe­
less, there does not in this seem to be any suggestion 
that management were observing a "right" expressed by or 
on behalf of the engineers, and wrung reluctantly from 
the company by the collective militancy of the workers. 
It could of course be said that since management were 
willing to observe the voluntary redundancy scheme, 
there was scarcely a need for confrontational tactics by 
the union members. Perhaps in that case, a better test 
would be how the engineers behaved when there was a 
threat to withdraw the so-called "guarantee" against
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involuntary redundancy. This situation occurred as a 
result of negotiations on the company-wide "Security of 
Employment Agreement" in the mid-seventies, and these 
events now demand consideration.
In the period immediately after the formation of ICL 
in 1968, ICL management adopted a policy of reaching 
"local" agreements with the trade unions, over redun­
dancy issues. (We have already seen that such agree­
ments were concluded at Stevenage, Croydon and for the 
Customer Service Engineers. Separate agreements were 
also reached for the manufacturing sites in 1969 (15),
and though no information is available with respect to 
the Southport 1969 and Dartford 1970 factory closures, 
it seems probable that severance terms were locally 
agreed.) These locally negotiated agreements subse­
quently became adopted as yardsticks to measure the 
standards that should be set in other redundancy cir­
cumstances. The approach which the unions adopted was 
explained to me by one trade union officer as follows:-
"The Winsford and Holmes Chappell Agreements dif­
fered from the Croydon Agreement with respect to 
the severance terms. One provided better terms 
for long serving employees, the other was best for 
those with short service. We used to try to get 
individuals covered by those terms which were most 
favourable, whichever they happened to be." (16).
One such "local agreement" was that which applied to 
the service engineers from 1972 onwards. Although this 
was based on the "Croydon Scheme" it was, in certain 
respects, unique in that it provided for a continuous 
voluntary redundancy programme and included a premium 
normally reserved for continuing unemployment after
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involuntary redundancy. It would seem then, that the 
"Croydon Scheme" provided the more or less accepted 
standard of redundancy severance terms in the 
Manufacturing Division of the company, of which the 
Croydon site had been an integral part, whilst in some 
cases local agreements provided different arrangements. 
However, the engineers scheme was unlike any other that 
existed, in the sense that it seemed to give an open- 
ended commitment to avoid involuntary redundancy.
The company-wide "Security of Employment Agreement" 
(S.E.A.) concluded in March 1957, was the result of a 
series of meetings with the various staff union national 
officers over a period of some three years. Initially, 
ASTMS and TASS approached the company separately with 
different claims. In due course, the two unions met the 
company at a "single bargaining table" with a common 
claim, and subsequently, APEX, ACTSS and EESA became 
involved in the negotiations. The agreement runs to 
some ten printed pages, plus six short appendices. (A 
separate agreement was concluded in June 1978 to deal 
with the question of interpretation of the paragraph in 
the S.E.A. dealing with consultation.) The details of 
the S.E.A. need not be described fully at this stage. 
Suffice it to say however, that it included a list of 
some seven measures that would be considered in order to 
try to avoid redundancy, from discontinuing the use of 
contract labour, to introducing work-sharing or part- 
time working. However, ultimately the agreement pro­
vided no guarantee that redundancies would not occur.
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and moreover, no commitment to the selection of 
employees for redundancy, exclusively on a voluntary 
basis. The financial compensation for those declared 
redundant however, was markedly better than that provi­
ded in any of the local agreements, including the 
"Croydon Scheme", and that covering the Customer 
Service Engineers.
By April 1976, the negotiations over the company-wide 
S.E.A. were at an advanced stage. All divisions of the 
company, all staff unions, and all staff bargaining 
units were now involved. Whilst representatives from 
these different bargaining units attended the negotia­
tions, it was of course, the national officers who 
actually conducted the exchanges with the company. The 
Engineers Bargaining Committee and National 
Representatives Committee (NRC) met regularly quite 
separately from these negotiations. Whilst there was an 
ASTMS Divisional Officer assigned to take responsibility 
for the bargaining unit, the lay officers of the NRC 
frequently conducted communications directly with the 
company at national level, and there were often meetings 
of the NRC at which no full-time officer of ASTMS needed 
to be present. As a result of such a meeting in April 
1976, the lay secretary of the Engineers' NRC wrote 
directly to the National Officer of ASTMS, informing him 
that the engineers had decided to withdraw from negotia­
tions at corporate level. The reason advanced for this 
decision was that:-
"The draft does not indicate that the only redun­
dancy considered in future will be of a voluntary 
nature in line with an agreement we have at the 
moment with the management of Customer Engineering 
Division." (17).
381
This decision was clearly a source of irritation to both 
the ASTMS National Officer concerned (who had been 
trying to "discourage C.E.D. separatism") (18), and 
management, who were anxious to conclude an agreement 
covering all U.K. based employees.
The initial response of the company was to suggest a
separate agreement dealing with all ASTMS bargaining
units in the Customer Engineering Division; an offer
that the union was able to accept, as it appeared to
provide a means of overcoming the problem that the...
"... undertaking relating to voluntarism is un­
likely to be pressed at corporate level to the 
same extent as we would expect to press it for 
C.E.D." (19).
Remarkably however, when the union was slow to res­
pond to the company, indicating its willingness to 
engage in these divisional negotiations, the management 
threatened to "raise a draft agreement as a company 
reference in each procedure agreement". (20). When the 
company's draft was published, the basis for this 
anxiety to press the Customer Engineers to an agreement, 
became clear. The draft was different from the company- 
wide document in several respects. Its main difference 
was that it was substantially more restrictive, and 
incorporated new procedures to make the dismissal of 
"poor performers" much easier to effect. Although the 
document purported to address issues of "employment 
security" by considering training needs, and setting 
standards of performance in consultation with employees, 
its main effect was intended to give managers
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fundamentally new powers to demote or sack poor perfor­
ming employees. On the issue of voluntary redundancy, 
it was silent, containing instead only a list of 
measures that would be the subject of "consultation" in 
order to avoid redundancies. Bearing in mind the 
reasons the engineers had opted out of the discussions 
on the corporate agreement, there seemed to be little to 
entice them now towards an agreement with management on 
the proposed terms.
It is perhaps worth recalling at this stage, that at 
the time these negotiations over a C.E.D. Security of 
Employment Agreement were commencing, the Manufacturing 
Division of the company was facing the prospect of 1373 
jobs being lost across some seven sites. For these 
people, there was no (real or illusory) "voluntary 
redundancy" policy, and the joint staff unions issued 
the company with an ultimatum that "unless they would 
give a guarantee of no involuntary redundancies arising 
from their proposed reduction in manufacturing capacity, 
talks on the corporate S.E.A. would be suspended". (21). 
No such undertaking was forthcoming, although, in the 
event, the exercise actually was completed on a volun­
tary basis and by October 1976 talks on the S.E.A. had 
resumed. However, it does seem likely that the major 
difference between the company and the unions on how 
redundancies should be seen to take place in the 
Manufacturing Division, would have contributed to a 
sense of purpose among the engineers to defend their own 
"voluntary agreement" at that particular time.
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Precisely how the majority of engineers, or the 
leaders of the National Representatives Committee, 
looked upon the draft agreement put forward by the 
company, is not now easy to ascertain. The committee 
and the engineers themselves were not particularly noted 
for any conscious political affiliation or activity.
(At the time of my own involvement with them some five 
years later there were, in a committee of some twenty- 
one, one Labour Party member, one Communist, and one 
member of the Socialist Workers Party.) As a committee 
however, they tended to follow a strong "trade union 
line", and by my own observation, the politically com­
mitted members of the committee often exercised 
influence in determining what this should be. There 
were usually a majority of committee members who were 
likely to follow the line advocated by Jim Savage, the 
Chairman of the committee, a very experienced engineer, 
trade unionist, and member of his Glasgow constituency 
Labour Party. In rejecting the draft proposed by 
management, it seems likely therefore, that a proportion 
of the committee at least would at that point in time 
have concurred with the following comments of one of the 
Southern Field Engineers Representatives :-
"It is a legal charter for ICL to sack employees.
It represents a form of terms under which sackings 
will be accepted by the union."
Quite possibly also, some of the engineers' representa­
tives would have seen truth in the following remarks:-
"In no way will any document provide security of 
employment. The only security for our members lies 
in their determined industrial action in defence of 
their right to work and the central reps commit­
tee's equal determination to lead such a fight when 
it is required." (22).
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However, there is no suggestion that any real debate 
took place among the engineers on the question of what 
such a "fight" would entail. Altogether it seems un­
likely that their rejection of the new draft from the 
company, and opting out of the corporate agreement, were 
part of any broader conceptual outline of what such a 
struggle might entail at some point in the future. 
Nonetheless, at this juncture there was sufficient 
support for the idea of "non-compulsion" in redundancy, 
to enable the engineers representatives to reject the 
better severance terms of the company-wide agreement. 
Rejecting the company's C.E.D. draft would in all proba­
bility have been an uncontroversial decision for the 
mass of engineers, since its proposals were so obviously 
threatening of disciplinary action, and a "get tough" 
policy towards individuals.
The management of ICL Customer Engineering Division
remained anxious to see progress with a divisional
agreement. They put forward the case that it was
desirable...
"... to have an agreement as to how changes in 
'manpower' requirements can be handled within a 
mutual framework and maximum consultation." (23),
There is no evidence however, that the engineers repre­
sentatives were particularly concerned to secure an 
agreement that gave them any more influence over the 
redundancy process, than their existing "agreement" 
which supposedly allowed for volunteers only. The 
negotiations dragged on, and the union maintained its 
insistence that an aspect of any formal divisional
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agreement, would need to include the commitment against 
involuntary redundancy. Proposals were put forward by 
the union, for a scale of severance payments that would 
have surpassed those provided in the company-wide S.E.A. 
(24). None of this was acceptable to the company, 
however.
From April 1976, the engineers had stood apart from 
the corporate S.E.A. negotiations. In March 1977, the 
corporate agreement was signed, but the C.E.D. bargai­
ning units were excluded from it. From the time they 
had declared their refusal to accept the corporate draft 
agreement in 1976 to the end of 1977, there had been six 
separate redundancy declarations affecting other parts 
of the company. Also, the engineers themselves were 
continuing to take the voluntary redundancy option, when 
small numbers of them approached the age of retirement. 
Comparisons between the redundancy terms provided in the 
corporate S.E.A. and the C.E.D. agreement were being 
made by the engineers. By the end of 1977, a majority 
of representatives of the different C.E.D. bargaining 
groups had decided that they wanted to become eligible 
for the higher payments available under the corporate 
S.E.A. The question of the company formally reiterating 
its commitment against involuntary redundancy was 
quietly dropped, and the C.E.D. bargaining groups came 
under the provisions of the corporate S.E.A. in April 
1978.
It is not altogether necessary to speculate as to 
whether this decision to abandon the somewhat ambiguous
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commitment, to "no involuntary redundancy", ultimately 
had any real bearing on the job security of the engi­
neers. Doubtless a case could be put forward both ways, 
but with no real certainty of accuracy. The point that 
emerges fairly clearly from the events described here 
however, is that there were beliefs in "rights" that 
influenced the behaviour of this group of workers during 
the period in question. For a period of some two years, 
they stood out in opposition to some considerable pres­
sure, to bring them within the ambit of the corporate 
document. Both the company, and the ASTMS National 
Officer, would have preferred to see the C.E.D. bargai­
ning units encompassed within the corporate agreement. 
The appearance of a "right" to "no involuntary redun­
dancy" , was something that the engineers seemed prepared 
to defend. It is of course difficult to say how far the 
engineers would have gone in defending that "right", had 
there been any attempt by the company to infringe it by 
declaring compulsory redundancies. One can only guess 
that they may well have resorted to industrial action, 
but that possibly this would have been of limited dura­
tion. On the other hand, the damage that even limited 
action could have caused to the company's customers, 
might well have meant that this would have been suffi­
cient to provoke a change of stance on the issue. 
Therefore, it does not seem too unreasonable to assume, 
that there was a degree of preparedness to defend the 
paper "agreement" of "no involuntary redundancy". 
Ultimately, the company may have been willing to face
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this challenge, and the depth of commitment of the 
engineers as a whole to the "right" of "no involuntary 
redundancy" might have been insufficient. For all that, 
it was present among a section of the engineers, who, 
acting under the relatively autonomous leadership of 
their lay representatives, were prepared to defend what 
they saw as a "right" or principle, rather than accept 
the option of higher compensation possibilities for 
those who were made redundant. If the touchstone of the 
"redundancy culture" is a willingness of unions to 
relinquish control over job occupation, in favour of 
financial reward for the redundant, then it would seem 
the culture was not dominant or unchallenged among the 
engineers in ICL.
Eventually, it might seem, the engineers were no 
longer prepared to defend the principle. However, it 
would seem that the obvious possibility of the company 
at some point deciding to declare involuntary redundan­
cies, influenced a majority of engineers to take a more 
pragmatic view about the need to reiterate the statement 
on "no involuntary redundancy". Clearly, the higher 
compensation terms were the deciding factor in this 
decision. The general context of an almost permanent 
concern about redundancy in the company made it neces­
sary for the engineers to avoid being over influenced by 
what may have been unreal ambitions. The shadow of 
"reality" doubtless caused many engineers to wonder how 
they personally would fare, if it came to a "showdown" 
over the principle, and they needed support from their
388
colleagues. Moreover, the fact that the engineers' 
voluntary scheme continued in being and that the terms 
of this scheme could be enhanced, merely by adopting the 
corporate agreement, must have caused those engineers 
who were near to taking the voluntary redundancy option, 
to favour this course of action.
If then we were to look at the Customer Engineers in 
ICL, and ask, "Were they influenced in their actions by 
a redundancy culture?", the answer would surely be,
"Yes!". However, it would not seem to be the case that 
the redundancy culture completely dominated and preclu­
ded the expression of other oppositional values. Pos­
sibly, to some extent, those perceived "rights" and 
oppositional values were eventually submerged by the 
influence of the culture. This is not to say however, 
that the "redundancy culture" had either won a permanent 
or complete "victory". As later events were to demons­
trate, the "right" to "no involuntary redundancy" conti­
nued for some time to exert an influence in the thinking 
and behaviour of the engineers in ICL. Also, as the 
details of the twenty redundancy events suggest, it was 
a factor that influenced the actions of several other 
groups of workers. In four of the twenty events desc­
ribed, voluntary redundancy was achieved as the prin­
cipal method of selecting the redundant. In three of 
these events, the company conceded the principle in 
response to some sort of industrial action. Also in two 
of the events (Sydenham 1976, and Putney 1977), the 
company "went along" with the principle of voluntary
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redundancy as far as possible. It seems reasonably 
clear therefore, that the "right" to "no involuntary 
redundancy" was both commonplace and enduring, as a 
factor in the moral perceptions of ICL staff employees. 
Moreover, before claiming any state of total dominance 
for the "redundancy culture" the possibility needs to be 
considered, that other oppositional concepts might 
equally form the subject of defensive struggles by wor­
kers, and make them unwilling to blindly, peacefully, or 
even begrudgingly accept redundancy. The exact scenario 
need not be created in detail at this stage, but it is 
possible to consider whether the case studies point to 
other moral claims as motivating influences in forms of 
opposition to redundancy, or to aspects of redundancy.
5.5 THE "EIGHT TQ TIMELY CONSULTATION.':
What other perceived "rights" might contribute to 
explaining the reactions of ICL workers and their unions 
to redundancy? One such "right" or moral influence 
would seem to be a belief that management should be 
obliged to provide employees with a "fair" measure of 
timely information and opportunities of consultation. 
Just how important this may have been in the twenty 
events considered, can perhaps be judged by expanding on 
the background details to some of these episodes.
The wave of ICL redundancies which began in early 
1975, were (among other things) the subject of
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considerable union dissatisfaction with the amount of 
information given. Moreover, there was in these same 
events, little or no opportunity for union comments to 
be made in advance of the redundancies, that could have 
theoretically caused a different decision to have been 
taken. Criticism by the staff unions was directed 
towards these issues. When, in February 1975, 260 
redundancies were announced in the Systems Programming 
Division (S.P.D.) of the company, the response of ASTMS 
was to reject as totally inadequate, the period of one 
week between the date of the announcement, and the 
planned date of notifying individuals selected. The 
initial "pressure point" of the campaign organised by 
the union therefore, was on the nature and timescale of 
the exchange of information, rather than on the funda­
mental principles of the redundancy decision as such.
In the event, the company agreed to an extended period 
of consultation, before issuing redundancy notices. 
Having achieved a longer time-span to consult however, 
there is no record that in this case the union attempted 
to put forward any structured critique of the decision. 
Rather, attention switched abruptly towards opposition 
to involuntary redundancy.
In June 1975, ICL management announced the closure of 
the Stevenage Research and Development site, part of the 
Computer Design Division (C.D.D.) of the company. The 
plan put forward by the company was to rationalise its 
research and development efforts into other sites of 
C.D.D. at West Gorton and Kidsgrove. A hundred and
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fifty staff would would be offered the opportunity of 
transfers, and the remaining 350 would be redundant. A 
key issue was not simply the proposed site closure, but 
the company's longer term plans for the Letchworth/North 
Hertfordshire area as a whole, in which several estab­
lishments employing some thousands of workers, were 
located. Had the company withdrawn from this area, the 
effect on local unemployment would have been consider­
able. (25). In July 1975, a delegation from ASTMS and 
TASS members, together with local officials, visited the 
Secretary of State for Industry (Eric Varley). The 
ostensible purpose of the visit was to protest at the 
closure of the Stevenage site. However, the discussion 
emphasised the wider issues, in particular the lack of 
information on the company's plans and the absence of 
consultation with the unions.
The case put forward by the unions included the
following points
"That the company had not fully revealed the total 
impact of its proposal on the computer industry as 
a whole and particularly in North Herts."
No statement had been made about "dependent manufac­
turing organisations at Letchworth... ". It was 
believed to be...
"... a further step in the ICL policy to severely 
contract or disband its development resources 
without consultation with the government or 
unions."
The unions were...
"... unable to obtain proper consultation with the 
policy-making management of the company concerning 
[these points], and the long term future of the 
industry."
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Finally, the employees of the company who had given many
years of service to...
"... creating a viable British computer company.. "
did not wish to see this...
"... sacrificed for temporary, short term gains."
The unions asked the Secretary of State to...
"... require ICL management to immediately stop 
the action of closure and transfer of staff for 
a period of 4 months for proper discussions with 
management, government and unions."
They proposed that:-
"In this period, no pressures should be put on 
staff to transfer, all transfer work should be 
abandoned and the overall policy aspects should 
be thoroughly e x a m i n e d (26).
The unions also put forward the idea that the govern­
ment, ICL and the unions should enter into a planning 
agreement. This drew the reply that:-
"The government was currently considering appro­
priate companies, and... would bear ICL in mind." 
(27).
It is not readily apparent how and why the unions 
came to lay such a heavy emphasis on the procedural 
aspects of the proposed closure of the Stevenage site, 
when the delegation met Eric Varley. They might perhaps 
have chosen instead to meet the issues "head-on", and 
express total opposition to the whole concept of the 
closure. Their arguments would not perhaps have been 
any more favourably received, but then if they were 
seeking the intervention of the Secretary of State, it 
could perhaps have been more realistic to expect his 
sympathy to a strongly argued case for intervention, as 
opposed to one of disquiet at a lack of information.
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Had there been a case for opposition to the closure, and 
had the union representatives argued it strongly, they 
would after all, have been able to envisage (at least 
theoretically) a prospect of government intervention. 
(The powers enabling the Secretary of State to regulate 
the affairs of the company, were well known to exist as 
a result of various tranches of support to ICL from the 
government since 1968.) It seems reasonable to presume 
therefore, that the procedural arguments were emphasised 
because this was the area in which the union representa­
tives themselves, were most convinced of the moral 
superiority of their case. What after all could be more 
natural (in the absence of any genuine moral conviction 
supporting outright, fundamental opposition to the 
closure) than to emphasise the issues of how the deci­
sion was being promulgated, who was and who was not 
being consulted, and what the implications might be of 
an unknown but suspected long term strategy for wider, 
more far-reaching rationalisations?
The reference to a possible planning agreement is 
perhaps a reminder of another underlying cause for this 
line of reasoning. The issues of industrial 
democracy... tripartism and exchange of information for 
collective bargaining, had all been pushed more to the 
centre of the industrial relations stage in 1975, by the 
relationship between the Labour Government and the TUG, 
and actual or prospective legislation on these matters. 
It is possible that the unions may have chosen to empha­
sise the procedural issues in the calculated belief that
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this would have been the kind of argument that was most 
likely to appeal. This however, seems rather less 
likely than the possibility that the political debate 
and developments about these issues encouraged a view in 
the minds of union representatives, that "fair" 
approaches "ought" to be adopted by the company, and the 
government might be a potential ally in ensuring that 
this did in fact happen.
The results of the initiative to seek the support of
the Secretary of State for Industry, were of little
consequence to the planned closure. Varley reported
back to the unions that he was satisfied with the course
being followed by ICL. There was no question, he said,
that the company was embarked on a road towards becoming
"merely a marketing organisation for foreign products".
The decision of the company was a...
"... genuine attempt to keep the company's 
products competitive at a time of rapid 
technological advance... ",
and the company had...
"... been trying very hard to avoid consequent 
loss of employment opportunities." (28).
On the question of the provision of "fair" informa­
tion and consultation opportunities to employees, one 
direct consequence of the visit to Varley, was that the 
Managing Director of ICL, Geoffrey Cross, gave a rare 
briefing with trade union officials. It is of course a 
matter of speculation as to whether or not some such 
briefing would have occurred in any event. However, in 
light of the relative paucity of information that had
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been volunteered by the company until this time, one
must suspect otherwise. In any event, the briefing
meeting was, it seems, a remarkable affair. The purpose
was to allow the Managing Director to explain the
thinking of the company underlying the recent spate of
redundancies, and to indicate the company's future
strategy. Detailed figures were produced explaining the
company's strategic development plans. Most were taken
from highly confidential documents, and had never been
released to trade union representatives before.
(Indeed, they were no doubt unseen by some relatively
senior staff in the company.) Then, to the undoubted
surprise of those present, the Managing Director dropped
what can only have been seen (given the context) as
something of a bombshell. He announced that there was
also to be...
"... some rationalisation in manufacturing which 
would have the effect of causing redundancies at 
Letchworth, Stevenage and Winsford. A total of 
a further 205 employees, mainly staff, would be 
affected... Local representatives were to be 
advised of the position in the next few days so 
that consultations could commence." (29).
Given the almost casual way in which this information 
seemed to have slipped out, as an "afterthought", in a 
meeting called precisely to rectify the inadequate 
consultation arrangements concerning the C.D.D.
Stevenage closure, one would expect a degree of anger 
from the trade union representatives present. What in 
fact was their reaction? The unions emphasised to the 
Managing Director that the transfer of C.D.D. from
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Stevenage could not take place without the co-operation
of TASS and ASTMS:-
"This was not likely to be forthcoming when redun­
dancies were announced in what appeared to be an 
endless series of separate managerial decisions."
They complained that there had been...
"... a total lack of any involvement of the unions 
in a global account of the company's future inten­
tions . "
When enquiries had been made about rumours of closures
in the Stevenage area...
"Industrial Relations Management had been unaware 
of the plans which were being made for the transfer 
of C.D.D. When we were discussing the C.D.D. posi­
tion, Industrial Relations Management were unaware 
of the proposed move for Systems Programming 
Division to Bracknell. While we were expressing 
concern about the implications of the Stevenage 
closure on other staff at Stevenage, plans were 
being made for a further redundancy of 205 which 
was now being announced. In these circumstances 
it was not surprising that members had reached the 
stage where they were determined to resist the 
company's proposals, and it would be necessary 
for management to create a different atmosphere 
if productive negotiations were to take place." 
(30).
Again, the striking aspect of the unions' position, 
is that they did not so much oppose the whole concept of 
the redundancies (though in time they may in fact have 
done so). Rather, objection focused on the issue of the 
manner of providing information, and the degree to which 
the unions were taken into the confidence of the 
company, told the whole circumstances behind these 
decisions, and informed of the company's long term 
strategies in a total sense.
There was never a point at which, in the process of 
confronting the three separate sets of redundancies in
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1975, the unions adopted anything approaching a position 
of total and determined opposition as a matter of funda­
mental principle. It is true, limited work restrictions 
were imposed after the July 1975 announcement concerning 
the Manufacturing Division. Also, the official purpose 
of these sanctions was admittedly to attempt to coerce 
the company into withdrawing the redundancies. Perhaps 
there were some members who would have preferred to see 
more outright attempts to "halt the company in its 
tracks". However for all this, there is little recorded 
information to suggest that if this were the case, it 
was in any sense at all, a significant move within the 
ICL workforce. It is of course, difficult to judge how 
widely the sense of moral outrage at the lack of timely 
information and consultation, was shared by the union 
members generally. However, it seems to have been a 
factor (perhaps the key factor), in causing workers to 
take industrial action in two of the three 1975 inci­
dents. To this extent, it would seem justifiable to see 
the belief in a "right" to information and consultation, 
as an aspect of an "oppositional culture", with which 
the "redundancy culture" has had to compete, in claiming 
influence over the thinking of ICL employees facing 
redundancy. Eventually, the redundancies were promul­
gated, and the opposition to the company's plans 
produced little discernable change in policy. If there 
had been greater, more militant, more long-lasting 
opposition, perhaps it would have been different. Was 
it evident that rival values had been incapable of
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influencing the perceptions and actions of workers? 
Clearly, if the "redundancy culture" was a dominant 
ideology, it remained vulnerable to the existence of 
oppositonal values and ideas, to the extent that (as 
seen in the incidents described here) the "right to 
timely consultation" became a rallying point around 
which opposition to the company and its proposals was 
mobilised.
A further example to illustrate this perceived
"right" to timely information and consultation, can be
seen in certain of the events relating to the Security
of Employment Agreement, concluded in March 1977.
The corporate S.E.A. provided that in the event of "a
run-down, transfer of work or reorganisation" becoming
necessary, causing...
"... any possible reduction in manpower require­
ments" ,
there would be...
"... full and early consultation in accordance 
with the provisions of section 99 of the Employment 
Protection Act 1975... with all levels of represen­
tation of the workforce." (31).
The agreement then went on to list a series of seven 
initial steps that would be taken to avoid the need for 
redundancy, including the discontinuation of temporary 
and contract labour, withdrawing outside contracts, 
suspending overtime, banning all recruitment, compul­
sorily retiring all employees over normal retirement age 
and giving consideration to part-time working and work­
sharing schemes. It also made provisions for the
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redeployment of personnel, transfers to other locations
of the company, and went on to say that...
"... should redundancy become unavoidable in spite 
of the foregoing measures, then further consulta­
tion with those union representatives will take 
place." (32) .
On 11th October 1979, ICL management called together 
the National Officials of both staff and hourly-paid 
employees' trade unions. There had been, it should be 
said, no prior consultation of any kind nor any other 
joint consideration of a potential redundancy, nor 
exploration of possible ways of avoiding one. The 
meeting however, was the occasion of a formal factory 
closure and redundancy announcement. A prepared state­
ment was read to the trade union officers. It began as 
follows : -
"Ladies and Gentlemen, I regret to tell you that 
we have been forced to a decision to close down 
our factory at Dukinfield near Manchester by the 
end of September 1980. This decision is 
unavoidable... ". (33).
The statement went on to explain the reasons for the 
decision. It had followed from a "forward review" of 
the following twelve months, which had shown the company 
that they needed to reduce manpower in U.K. manufac­
turing from 8400 to 7200 by September 1980, "to enable 
us to make products at the right cost". Despite the 
fact that ICL's growth in marketing and sales, customer 
service and similar areas was leading to an increase in 
the number of jobs available in these quarters, the 
company had concluded that "only a few could be filled 
by employees displaced in manufacturing... ". Nine
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hundred or so employees would be made redundant as a 
result of the closure of the factory, and the management 
proposed to make an ex-gratia plant closure payment for 
each person who agreed to leave at a date acceptable to 
the company, in addition to the severance payments laid 
down in the S.E.A. (34).
However valid were the business reasons advanced by 
the management for this announcement, there can be 
little doubt that the manner of its presentation - as a 
fait accompli, an "unavoidable" decision - differed 
substantially from the framework of consultation envi­
saged in the S.E.A. It might be said, by way of expla­
nation of the management's actions, that having come to 
the "unavoidable" conclusion that there was no alterna­
tive course of action available to them other than to 
announce the redundancy of 900 employees, they felt 
obliged to release their decision on the factory closure 
immediately rather than go through some kind of sham 
exercise looking for possible alternatives. Neverthe­
less, it was certainly remarkable that in what amounted 
to the first major redundancy after the conclusion of 
the S.E.A. (indeed, in what was subsequently said by a 
member of ICL management to be a test of the efficacy of 
the S.E.A.) (35), there should have been so little heed 
paid to the formal consultative procedures laid down in 
the agreement.
The trade unions' response to the closure announce­
ment was perhaps predictable. The company was criti­
cised for breaching the S.E.A., and the immediate
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response was a refusal by the workforce at Dukinfield to 
accept the closure. (36). National delegate meetings 
were called by both ASTMS and TASS to discuss the pro­
posed redundancies. The ASTMS National Advisory 
Committee for ICL members met on 18th October and con­
demned the company's "blatant disregard for the Security 
of Employment Agreement". It also called on the company 
to "withdraw" the closure announcement "as a pre-condi­
tion for any negotiations on manning levels... ", and 
called on ASTMS ICL groups of members nationally to :- 
" (i) Ban all overtime
(ii) Refuse to handle work normally carried out at 
Dukinfield
(iii) Ban sub-contract manufacturing work except 
sub-contract to Dukinfield
(iv) Organise meetings in work time for Dukinfield 
delegates to address the membership. " (37).
The response of ASTMS groups throughout the country was,
in the main, to support the resolution of the N.A.C.
and, in some cases, action was taken which went beyond
the sanctions listed.
There seems little doubt that the feelings of the
majority of employees over this issue, were of acute
indignation. The Vice Chairman of the ASTMS group at
Dukinfield observed...
"... the company have torn up the useful part of 
the S.E.A. - the measures to be taken to avoid 
redundancy. They have not consulted with us to 
enable us to make suggestions. They have not 
blocked external recruitment or used any of the 
other measures stated in the S.E.A.... "
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"Even worse", was a statement he attributed to a
Director of the company, that...
"... in this day and age, no company like ours can 
guarantee security of employment. It is a complete 
negation of the S.E.A." (38).
Whether the majority of employees would have 
expressed themselves in similar terms is difficult to 
say. However, it is interesting to note that industrial 
action supporting the Dukinfield members occurred 
throughout most of the United Kingdom, involving almost 
all groups of ASTMS members in ICL besides some members 
of TASS and EEPTU. By 7th November 1979 sanctions were 
in force on fourteen sites or divisions of the company, 
whilst only two sites or divisions had no employees 
taking action. (39). The majority of union members 
clearly objected to the way the company had handled the 
Dukinfield issue, and it would seem likely that they 
shared in a moral concern at the failure to consult, and 
the apparent breach of the S.E.A.
The result of the action by the trade unions was that 
the company eventually produced a concession. A working 
party was to be established by the unions representing 
all workers on the Dukinfield site, to examine what the 
company claimed to be its chief difficulties in retai­
ning the factory as a manufacturing unit. On the basis 
that the working party formula was acceptable to all the 
unions, the management agreed to suspend the 90 day 
notice of redundancies, for a period of 28 days to allow 
a report to be prepared. During this period, the provi­
sions of the S.E.A. with regard to the suspension of
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overtime, discontinuing the use of temporary and con­
tract labour etc, would be applied. (40). In the view 
of the ASTMS officers, this represented "significant 
progress" in maintaining the arrangements provided in 
the S.E.A.
The sanctions were withdrawn, and the working party 
began work attempting to put together a case which 
confronted the logic of the closure plan on its merits. 
However, in the event, there were serious practical 
difficulties placed in the way of the working party. 
Documents that might have provided an insight into the 
reasons for the closure, were described as "confiden­
tial" and "secret", and precious time was lost in trying 
to persuade management to divulge the information re­
quired. By the time this problem had been overcome, 
there were only six and a half days left for the unions 
to prepare their critique of the closure plan. Requests 
for an extension of the consultation period were turned 
down.
On January 10th 1980, the working party submitted its 
report to ICL management at Dukinfield. It was a docu­
ment running to some 52 pages, covering such topics as a 
possible alternative strategy for the company, a break­
down of the Dukinfield plant operations, an analysis of 
marketing strategies, cost comparisons, consideration of 
the cost of sub-contracting, the lateness and absen­
teeism statistics of Dukinfield employees, possible 
areas where alternative savings could be made, tech­
nological considerations and employee-relations matters.
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Bearing in mind the difficult circumstances under which 
the working party was compelled to work, it was a cogent 
and comprehensive document. (41). However valid or 
otherwise were the arguments it contained, it would seem 
evident that a proper consideration of it and a reaso­
nably detailed reply to its main contentions would 
necessitate either a substantial written reply or, at 
least, a lengthy verbal "presentation".
On 16th January, the management responded to the 
report of the joint union working party. The manager 
concerned seemingly accomplished this task in a total 
time of four minutes! (42). He concluded his presenta­
tion by saying that the management and the unions 
"should now sit down and discuss redundancy terms". 
Needless to say, the unions were upset, both at the 
answer to their document and the manner in which it was 
given. A request was made for a further meeting which 
should include a member of the ICL main Board. (No such 
representative had been present at the meeting on 16th 
January.) The request was met with a firm refusal by 
the Deputy Managing Director, and an assurance that "a 
full and detailed analysis of the report of the working 
party" had been carried out. (43). No further details 
were given of the reasons why the company had decided to 
reject the alternative plan put forward by the working 
party; it was simply stated that "the proposals do not 
constitute a viable alternative to the closure plan".
Bearing in mind the vigorous campaign which had 
greeted the initial closure announcement, in which staff
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union members from most ICL sites around the country 
participated, one might perhaps have expected a strong 
reaction to such a cursory dismissal of the joint union 
working party report. However, at a mass meeting orga­
nised by the Manchester CSEU on 25th January, the work­
force of the Dukinfield factory voted "by a substantial 
majority" to accept the closure of the site and concen­
trate on obtaining the best possible redundancy terms. 
The contents of the report had seemingly had little 
impact on the views of the workpeople, who had simply 
resolved to accept pragmatically what they now saw as 
the inevitable. The union's success in getting an 
extension of the consultation period, and winning the 
chance to subject the closure decision to closer criti­
cism, eventually proved then, of little consequence.
Not only were management unmoved; in the event the rank 
and file union members saw little point in continued 
struggle.
Although there was no outright opposition to the 
closure here, in the form of a factory occupation, it 
would be grossly misleading to suggest that workers saw 
it as "legitimate", as Hardy has encouraged us to ex­
pect. Not only was considerable opposition expressed to 
the company's actions in failing to consult in accor­
dance with the terms of the S.E.A., the closure decision 
itself was challenged in the efforts made by the unions 
to subject the reasons for it to critical analysis. If 
one is looking for an explanation for the eventual 
acquiescence of the workforce then, it appears to have
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little to do with perceptions of legitimacy, and on the 
evidence available, not a great deal to do with the 
thirst of the workers concerned for the compensation 
that redundancy would bring. A more convincing explana­
tion is that workers simply believed themselves, in the 
last analysis, to be powerless to prevent the company 
from closing the factory if they chose to do so. And 
while no doubt they felt dissatisfied with the way the 
company had so cursorily dismissed their alternative 
proposals, in a sense this high-handed approach con­
firmed them in their views that they were practically 
incapable of preventing such a determined line from 
prevailing, and the decision being ultimately imple­
mented. Our conclusion must be that if there was 
acquiescence, it was begrudgingly given, was based on 
perceptions of power disparities rather than legitimacy, 
and was not rooted in any sense of moral accord nor 
necessarily in any belief that compensation represented 
a fair or desirable alternative to unemployment.
On the other hand, while opposition to the closure 
per séj was bound up with the position adopted by the 
unions, that they should have the opportunity to be 
consulted, and scrutinise the reasons for the decision, 
opposition to the closure as such was not the focus 
around which activity and resistance was organised in 
the plant and among supporters nationally. If this 
seems an odd paradox, there are several reasons which 
might explain it. First, the issue of consultation was 
a unifying theme in mustering support, it was possible
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for the unions to point out to members in other plants, 
that it was their interests which were at stake. Focu­
sing on the question of the closure decision as such, 
might not have been seen as embodying such unifying 
potential. Second, the fact that the S.E.A. had only 
recently been concluded, and that it laid down a proce­
dure which the company now seemed willing to breach with 
impunity, may have appeared particularly morally repre­
hensible to union officials and members, thus confirming 
their oppositon to the manner rather than the fact of 
the closure annnouncement. Thirdly however, it would 
seem that the evidence of the events described here 
tells us something of the perceived "rights" of union 
members in ICL. On the basis of this evidence, it would 
seem arguable that there were widely held beliefs that 
the company "ought" to go through an acceptable form of 
consultation with unions prior to declaring redundan­
cies, and "ought" to allow time and opportunity for 
arguments to be presented and considered. In short, the 
"right" to consultation seems to be based on the essen­
tial notions of "free speech", "democracy" etc, which 
run through society at large, but it is significant that 
it is linked to the practices and needs of trade unio­
nism and collective bargaining. On the evidence avail­
able, it would seem reasonable to identify perceptions 
of this "right" as being bound up with a trade union 
culture, which we might for the sake of convenience call 
the "consultation culture". On the other hand there is 
no evidence here of widely held views that employees had
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an unqualified "right to work", nor a "right not to be 
made redundant". By preparing an alternative plan, 
union leaders may have hoped to organise support for 
such a view, if the logic of the company's case appeared 
weak. As we have observed, it is significant that they 
did not initially organise around this issue, but chose 
instead to emphasise the consultation argument. And 
even if in this case there f/as general support for the 
analysis put forward by the unions, that the closure was 
unnecessary, and that the company's actions were wrong, 
there is no sign on the available facts, that there was 
any attempt to overcome workers' pessimistic visions of 
the outcome of opposition, based on perceived dispa­
rities of power between themselves and the company. And 
while the lack of clear evidence from this particular 
study, of any general consensus belief in a "right to 
work" does not finally pronounce upon this issue, we can 
say with rather greater certainty that the fact that the 
closure was eventually accepted had little to do with a 
widely held perception of legitimacy, and was not in 
itself a sign of the pull of compensation, nor of a 
general absence of objection that might be attributable 
to a "redundancy culture".
5.6 COLLABORATIVE DEALS AND "PRODUCT PATRIOTISM"
A third influence which might be seen as opposing in 
some measure the total domination of the "redundancy 
culture", is a more tentative concept, less easily
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described in a short self-explanatory phrase. However, 
looking at the twenty redundancy events as well as 
subsequent developments in ICL, one is struck by an 
apparent belief in a certain "code" or "standard" of 
"good" management that "ought" to be followed. In a 
sense, this seems to be located in a high level of 
identity and understanding which ICL workers had of 
their own industry, and a pride in their skills, and 
knowledge of the products they helped to make. It could 
be seen as an idea that, management "ought" to look 
after the long term interests of the company, to uphold 
the best traditions and achievements and that a failure 
to do these things was in some way irresponsible, per­
haps even "unpatriotic", in the sense that the British 
computer industry would be likely to suffer. It might 
appear that there is a degree of competitive, perhaps 
capitalist logic in this expectation, but on further 
consideration, this is not the complete explanation. 
Rather it is an expectation that might sometimes fly in 
the face of a strict market capitalist evaluation.
Pride in the product, a belief in the skills of the 
workers, a desire to retain control of the creative, 
innovative forms of work, might in some cases be utterly 
irrelevant to the prime objective of maximising company 
profits. For want of a better phrase I shall call this 
influence, a sense - I hesitate to call it a "right" - 
of "product patriotism". To the extent that it might 
give rise to an "expectation" of certain forms of 
managerial behaviour, it might constitute an influence.
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that is akin to a perceived "right". Some examples at 
this point will be useful.
As a result of the succession of redundancy announce­
ments in 1975, the staff trade unions - principally 
ASTMS - began to develop a critique of company policies 
on marketing and manufacturing. To understand this 
critique, some explanation of the technical aspects of 
computer manufacture needs to be established. In the 
mid-1970s - and probably to some extent today - the 
popular image of the computer was focused on the central 
processor unit, of a mainframe computer. Certainly this 
was, and is, a key area of manufacturing activity. 
However, for a company seeking commercial success (as 
opposed to prestige or scientific excellence), manufac­
turing central processors of mainframes was probably the 
least profitable of activities. (44). At the time of 
the 1975 redundancies, there were at least two areas of 
computer manufacture, which the company was beginning to 
regard as of equal or greater significance to mainframe 
manufacture. The first was the mini-computer (what we 
now call the "personal computer") which at that time was 
rapidly developing as a mass-produced product, for wide- 
scale use in offices, laboratories etc. The second was 
the range of devices that are attached to the central 
processor unit of a mainframe - the computer periphe­
rals. This includes such things as tape drives, termi­
nals and printers, and represents an important part of 
every computer system.
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Since the late nineteen-sixties, ICL (which had been 
the focus of government strategic support for the 
British computer industry) had concentrated its energies 
on the design and manufacture of mainframe computers.
The high revenue earning and growth side of the industry 
- particularly the manufacture of peripherals - had been 
largely ignored. This policy was increasingly the sub­
ject of criticism from union representatives, who be­
lieved that company should be manufacturing its own 
range of computer peripheral equipment. (45). The 
problem for ICL however, was that the company lacked the 
resources to develop a suitable range of peripheral 
products to compete in this sphere, and the answer 
chosen therefore, was to share the development costs by 
a collaborative venture with two American companies, NCR 
and CDC. (46). The vehicle for this collaboration 
however, was a United States-based corporation,
"Computer Peripherals Inc". (47). It requires little 
imagination to see that this arrangement would be 
regarded as, "exporting the jobs of British workers to 
the U.S.A".
In light of the three redundancy announcements in 
1975, there was a feeling of unease among ICL employees 
at these developments. In March 1975, in the context of 
threatened redundancies in S.P.D., the ASTMS/ICL 
National Advisory Committee expressed its concern "for 
the future of ICL as a major British company in advanced 
technology... ", and for the employment prospects of the 
company's staff. A more explicit motion was sent by one
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ASTMS/ICL branch to its Divisional Council in July 1975.
This stated that...
"... in view of the current policy of ICL, which 
indicates a willingness to abandon - to interests 
outside this country - the control and manufacture 
of a significant part of the computer equipment 
field, particularly peripherals, this Divisional 
Council calls upon the government to take account 
of the large community stake in ICL and to ensure 
that we retain a viable computer industry in the 
U.K  " (48).
A meeting of representatives of ASTMS, TASS and the 
EEPTU on the 11th July, at the Stevenage Computer 
Development site, accepted documents outlining opposi­
tion to the redundancies, based on the theory that the 
C.D.D. rationalisation plans were...
"... part of a continued overall management 
strategy of contracting the Design Development 
and Manufacturing capabilities of ICL and hence 
computer industry." (49).
As has already been described, a joint union delega­
tion attended a meeting with Eric Varley, the Secretary 
of State for Industry, to try to persuade him to inter­
vene on the proposed closure of the Stevenage Research 
and Development site. The government's views on C.P.l. 
were sought. As the union report of the meeting puts 
it, the union expressed...
"... deep concern that the tendency was for ICL 
to become a marketing organisation for other manu­
facturers' products to the detriment of the British 
computer industry's long term prospects." (50).
The Secretary of State's view was unsympathetic. The 
best prospect, he said, was for the C.P.l.venture to 
succeed, and to help ICL to expand their sales. (51).
The day after the Secretary of State had sent his 
written reply to the unions, declining to intervene.
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ASTMS members in ICL attended an ASTMS/ICL National 
Advisory Committee (this was effectively an ASTMS repre­
sentatives' "combine" meeting, with representatives from 
all the main interest groups with ICL attending). A 
discussion took place in which the General Secretary of 
ASTMS, Clive Jenkins (52), expressed views that found 
ready support among the delegates. The minutes of the 
meeting record that he expressed concern for the future 
of ICL in the U.K. and felt that certain steps should be 
taken as a matter of urgency. He referred to the C.P.l. 
situation, which he described as "extraordinary" in 
that...
"... a British company was about to submerge it­
self, and £8 million of British money, into an 
American dominated company - whereas there is a 
British company which has also received government 
money - the Data Recording Instrument Company...
He believed that C.P.l. might be formed as a step 
towards the introduction of American interests into 
ICL leaving ICL as a British marketing organisation 
for imported material." (53).
Several of the delegates at the meeting echoed this
concern for the long term future of the company, and in
particular for the consequences of the current policies
on their future employment prospects. The meeting
concluded that...
"... in view of the fact that C.P.l. is being 
'sold' to our members in manufacturing areas, as 
the means of future jobs... we needed to produce an 
information sheet, as some of the members are not 
aware of the longer-term problems." (54).
The view was also, put forward that a further meeting
should take place with Eric Varley, and that he should
be provided with a paper prepared by a working party of
members, giving a detailed analysis of the problem.
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Whilst the working party did, in fact, "get off the
ground", and indeed went as far as preparing a draft
report, nothing finally cam© of it. The reason for the
exercise fizzling out is difficult to establish with any
certainty, but in all probability, the main reason was
simply that it was overtaken by events. The General
Secretary of ASTMS wrote to Eric Varley immediately
after the ICL National Advisory Committee meeting of
13th August, explaining the union's concern at the
long term consequences of the approach adopted by the
company. It seemed to envisage, "a situation in which
there would effectively be no domestic computer industry
concerned with British interests", and the union was
concerned that the Minister should ensure that no
irrevocable steps should be taken...
"... which would reverse the past policies and lock 
us into a situation where we would be completely 
dominated by American interests." (55).
Eric Varley replied in mid-September, referring to 
his earlier response to the delegation from ASTMS and 
TASS which had met him in July. He took his brief from 
the company management, who had assured him that there 
was...
"... no intention that ICL should develop into a 
marketing organisation for foreign products."
As far as the C.P.l. venture was concerned, the
Minister's view was that joining would...
"not lead to domination of ICL by American 
interests... " (56),
an opinion which seemed to at least one ASTMS officer to
be "accepting the company's assurances at face value".
(57).
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ASTMS members were at this time still in the process
of assembling contributions for the paper which it was
hoped might influence the government to intervene.
However, on 23rd September 1975, the company announced
that it had now concluded the agreement with NCR and
C.D.C. for ICL to acquire a one-third share of C.P.l.
According to the company announcement, the establishment
of C.P.l. Data Peripherals Limited would...
"... create more job opportunities in the United 
Kingdom and no adverse effect on ICL's current 
workforce [was] expected." (58).
Union reaction however, was sceptical. The nascent
working party report had drawn the conclusion that...
"... all evidence of the marketing plan points to 
the fact that, if ICL passes over the manufacture 
of peripherals to C.P.l., then the turnover of ICL 
will be reduced, thus necessitating a reduction in 
the number of people employed by ICL, both overall 
and to a greater extent in manufacturing." (59).
However, there was little point in continuing to argue
the case when the decision to which it related had not
only been taken, but fully promulgated. Work continued
on the preparation of the report until March 1976, but
quietly ceased after that. There were, in any event,
other more pressing issues to demand the time and energy
of union representatives after this date, including the
redundancies of July 1976.
Of course, it could be said, there was nothing so 
remarkable about this episode. The unions were merely 
attempting to avoid their members' jobs being "exported" 
to America. Undoubtedly, this was the case, but it 
would seem that there was something more that underlay 
much of the argument and motivation of the union
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representatives. It was the sense that in abandoning 
the manufacture of equipment, and accepting instead the 
role of marketeer of foreign produced goods, the mana­
gers of the company were in some way selling ICL and its 
workforce short, perhaps even acting against the best 
interests of the country as a whole. The language of 
the critique, it should be noted, was not the language 
of "radicalism". There was no talk here of defending 
workers' "rights", imposing militant sanctions in de­
fence of jobs, engaging in "work-ins", or anything of 
that sort. On the contrary, the language used was 
predominantly a language of patriotism, or company 
chauvinism. There was talk of the company being willing 
to "abandon to interests outside this country", the 
manufacture of computer equipment. The government was 
enjoined to intervene, not because of the loss of jobs 
of the workers concerned (though that was of course the 
underlying problem), but...
"... to ensure that we retain a viable computer 
industry in the U.K."
The company's strategy was working to...
"... the detriment of the British computer 
industry's long term prospects... ",
and the long term problem was the Americanisation of the
industry as a whole.
Arguably, the unions could have projected these sorts 
of reasons in defence of their members' jobs, not be­
cause they believed in them, but because some sort of 
case had to be put forward, and this was the one that 
was most likely to appeal to government. This however.
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does not seem a convincing scenario. The arguments 
about the harm that the management's strategy was doing 
to the company, did not come in the main from the full­
time officers, but from members of ASTMS who worked in 
ICL, and who themselves had a considerable measure of 
understanding of the industry. Expressions of concern 
at the direction being pursued by the company were 
doubtless linked to fears of job loss, but a number of 
fairly senior members of staff, who were probably in no 
immediate personal danger of redundancy seemed keen to 
contribute to the ASTMS working party report. It must 
be assumed therefore, that the critique of the company's 
policy was largely based on genuine feelings of concern, 
rather than pragmatic arguments that had been advanced 
to suit the circumstances in hand.
None of this prevented the company from pushing ahead 
with its redundancies in the events of 1975. To a 
degree, this might be explained in terms other than the 
ideas and beliefs of employees involved. (After all, 
there are doubtless some circumstances where any opposi­
tion is unlikely to meet with success for the workers, 
purely because the objective possibilities are severely 
limiting). Doubtless an examination of the tactical 
management of its campaign of opposition, would find the 
union to have been wanting in some important respects 
also. If there was a genuine sense of "product patrio­
tism", it was not until after the redundancies had all 
been declared, that this began to be translated into an 
effort to divert the company from its "misconceived"
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strategy. The issue however, is in this instance less a 
case of "did the union win the day?" than, "did other 
ideas motivate resistance?". There was limited opposi­
tion to the redundancies in S.P.D., C.D.C., and Manufac­
turing Division in 1975. To some extent the issues of 
"voluntarism versus involuntarism", and the need for 
"timely consultation", were both involved here. How­
ever, the overall acceptability of the company's strat­
egy also seems to have been an issue that represented a 
reason of opposition. While concern and a sense of 
importance of the issues of "product patriotism" may 
well have been fairly generally experienced among ICL 
employees, it would not seem to have represented a major 
oppositional influence in causing widespread militancy 
in this particular case. Nevertheless, there might be 
other circumstances where this position is altered 
substantially. The existence of a current of thought 
opposing the tide of the "redundancy culture", should be 
seen as a significant issue in itself.
A further example, will demonstrate that outcomes of 
different struggles and disputes can vary between one 
case and another.
5.7 CLOSURE QF CADC CAMBRIDGE :
"PRODUCT PATRIOTISM" AGAIN
The sense of "product patriotism" seems to have been 
an important factor in another set of circumstances 
where ASTMS members faced redundancy. The events con­
cerned, were in relation to a proposal to close the
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Computer Aided Design Centre at Cambridge, in 1976. The 
centre was established in 1968 as a government-supported 
research institution. Its brief was to encourage and 
sponsor the application of computer aided design tech­
niques throughout the engineering industry. (6). 
Management of the centre was performed under contract by 
a wholly owned subsidiary of ICL, DataSkil Ltd. Some of 
the staff (in total about 120) were employed directly by 
DataSkil, a proportion were employed by ICL (the service 
engineers), and another group were government employees. 
Whilst the centre raised revenue from the sale of its 
software designs to industry, it was dependent to a 
large extent on government support for much of its work. 
In character, as well as in the nature of managerial and 
financial control therefore, the centre was a very dif­
ferent organisation from most of the other servicing and 
manufacturing divisions of ICL.
In 1975, rumours of a plan to close the centre began 
to circulate. Various plans were speculatively dis­
cussed, including possibilities that the centre might be 
taken over by the National Research and Development 
Corporation (NRDC). This plan seems to have been 
opposed by the Department of Industry however, which was 
ready to "float-off" the commercial activities of the 
centre but not the research side. In the background 
were various competing interests. The large engineering 
companies stood to gain less from the centre than the 
smaller and medium-sized firms that made more use of its 
software development packages. Moreover, from the
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computer software industry and others, with a stake in 
the commercial exploitation of the computer aided design 
work, there was only-to-be-expected reserve, at the 
presence of State sponsored research in what was (for 
them) a field of customer competition. It was from 
precisely this grouping of interests (on a Department of 
Industry "Requirements Board") that advice first came to 
be considered, to close the centre, and disseminate its 
work elsewhere. (61). A further factor was the in­
fluence of the then Chief Scientist (a senior civil 
servant) who was keen to merge certain of the CADC 
activities with the NRDC to form a "new and more power­
ful grouping of research and development interests"
(62), the implication being however, that the commercial 
side of the centre's work should be hived off to the 
private sector.
It was more then, in the context of this kind of 
vague rumour of pending demise, than any clear closure 
announcement, that staff members of ASTMS reacted to a 
rather uncertain, unspecified, prospect of job losses.
The response of ASTMS members and officers was to 
mount a political campaign. Efforts were made to put 
the case for keeping the centre open, to the Minister of 
State at the Department of Industry, Gerald Kaufman. In 
February 1976 the National Officer of ASTMS requested 
the opportunity to inform him of the views of staff, 
before any decisions were taken. (63). Other MPs were 
involved, including MPs sponsored by ASTMS. As a 
result of this, certain facts were established.
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Firstly, no decision had been made about the future of 
the centre; secondly, the senior industrialists on the 
Requirements Board had advised the Minister to reduce 
the work done by the centre, and "farm it out" to the 
industry in direct contracts to "develop and demonstrate 
specific C.A.D. applications" (64); thirdly, if these 
recommendations were accepted, the "size and role" of 
the centre would alter, so alternative locations were 
being considered. (65). Whilst it may well have been 
technically correct for the Minister to report that 
no decision had been taken on the centre's future, it 
certainly seemed that plans were nevertheless at a 
fairly advanced stage, and clearly, the fears of 
employees in relation to the centre's future were not 
without foundation.
One of the arguments that was put very strongly by 
the ASTMS representatives during this state of uncer­
tainty, was that there was a need for consultation. A 
government Minister was to take a decision on the reten­
tion or partial closure of the CADC, so it followed that 
if there was to be any "timely consultation" it would 
need to be with the Minister concerned at an early 
stage. However, Kaufman was reluctant to agree to this, 
and replied to the approach by ASTMS to this effect. 
(66). This was not considered satisfactory, and it 
raised for the ASTMS officers the prospect that they 
would have to present their...
"... reasoned arguments in a situation where the 
government and the employer have already reached 
a decision." (67).
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The matter was not resolved, although Kaufman gave 
the rather cool assurance, that when he received any 
recommendations on the future of the centre, he would 
also consider any comments from ASTMS and or DataSkil. 
(68). Eventually the issue was conceded (after further 
letters protesting at the lack of consultation), and a 
delegation from ASTMS members at the centre, together 
with officers, met the Minister on 12th April 1976.
The delegation did not record in detail, the argu­
ments that were presented to Kaufman. In the susbequent 
report to ASTMS members however, the following statement 
was made. The delegation...
"... pointed out that any... dispersal [of CADC 
staff] would mean a great loss of collective exper­
tise to the country and to medium and small com­
panies, which would not be able to fund their own 
research in this field. It was impressed on the 
Minister that the views of industrialists should 
not be allowed to unduly influence any decision.
Other countries have already shown an interest in 
imitating developments at CADC." (69).
The report to members went on to record that the 
Chief Scientist was preparing a report on the future of 
the CADC, and that ASTMS members were collaborating with 
middle management of the centre in preparing their 
arguments for keeping the case open. (70).
The joint ASTMS/middle management working party 
completed its task in a period of some three weeks, so 
that by 21st April 1976, a report outlining the case for 
retention was circulated to a number of interested 
parties (as well of course, as being sent to the Depart­
ment of Industry). The subsequent outcome suggests that 
its findings were considered very seriously. Indeed, it
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would have been hard to ignore, being based on not only
the views of the staff, but evidence taken from some
43 people knowledgeable about and able to comment on,
the centre's achievements in advancing the "state of the
art" in computer aided design. (71). The main findings
highlighted the detrimental effects which splitting up
the centre would have, on the British industries that
needed to incorporate and build upon, the most advanced
computer aided design techniques. The clear message to
emerge was that the centre had...
"... done much valuable work in an area where 
technological progress is extremely fast... " (72),
that the team which CADC had built up had...
"... the expertise and facilities to save British 
industry a lot of money... " (73),
and that overall, ASTMS believed that CADC had...
"... a vital role to play in the development of 
the British Engineering Industry: we believe it 
must stay open, stay active, stay in 
Cambridge... ". (74).
The report contradicted the findings of the civil 
servants, who would have preferred the dispersal plan 
initially proposed. (75). A period of intense lobbying 
ensued, with ASTMS utilising its contacts with MPs and 
(through the General Secretary who sat on the Board) the 
NRDC. A key aspect of the envisaged future of the 
centre, was that it would aim to become more commer­
cially self-supporting, and would remain as a self- 
contained research institution, under the NRDC. The 
Board of the NRDC accepted this as a working proposal, 
and in turn, put the proposition to the Department of 
Industry. (76). Eventually, in August 1976, Ministerial
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approval was given for the centre to remain intact, with 
the NRDC assuming a new overseeing role for it. (77).
What motivated ASTMS to organise this campaign of 
opposition to the closure of the centre? What were the 
ideas and values in the minds of those union members who 
identified with it? One thing seems reasonably clear.
It was unlikely that the fear of unemployment in the 
main caused the staff of the centre to oppose its 
closure. Their skills and highly specialised knowledge 
would have meant that most - probably all - of them 
would have found it relatively easy to secure alterna­
tive employment. Indeed, one result of the rumours of 
the closure, was that a number of members received 
excellent job offers and possibilities of substantial 
salary increases to work elsewhere. (78). Possibly, 
some staff made redundant would have had to move from 
Cambridge, and that may well have been a fear. However, 
set against this would have been the possibility of 
redundancy payments, and a good prospect of finding 
acceptable alternative employment (probably on as good, 
or better conditions) within a very short period of 
time. The fear of redundancy then, may have motivated 
some staff to oppose the closure, but for others redun­
dancy seems to have been a prospect that would have been 
easily brooked. However, it would seem that from both 
the union officers, and the members of ASTMS at CADC, 
there came a certain sense of "product patriotism" (to
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the extent that this term relates equally to a service,
as to a product of manufacture). It was the ASTMS'
contention that...
"... the present staff represents a body of CAD 
expertise unrivalled in Europe... the breaking up, 
of this team would be a decidedly retrograde 
step... ". (79).
The whole thrust of the argument put forward in favour
of keeping the centre open really came down to this sort
of view.
In this instance of course, there was a possibility 
of success, because these arguments were being 
addressed, not to the management of a commercially self- 
financed enterprise, but the Minister of a government 
department that could accommodate this point of view.
In this case, it is sufficient to note that the Minister 
of State was eventually able to accept the union's view, 
that the centre was "a national asset of unique charac­
ter". (80). A decision was taken to keep the centre in 
existence, and maintain support to enable the design 
team to be held together. The battle to oppose the 
closure had resulted in an outright victory for the 
employees and the union, in this instance.
Hence we see in this episode, an example of opposi­
tion to closure which followed a course, and assumed a 
form markedly different from that of a workers' occupa­
tion (which writers like Hardy seem to imply is the only 
significant form of opposition to closure). Moreover, 
the moral basis for opposition appears to have been 
quite different from the underlying morality of the main 
struggles against plant closures (see the literature
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review of this area in chapter two). In these latter 
cases it would seem, unions and workers fought closures 
in pursuit of the "right to work". In the CADC episode 
the "right to work" seems to have been of somewhat less 
importance to the workers concerned, as already argued 
above. More importantly, workers appeared to view the 
proposed closure as an act of industrial vandalism.
They had a high belief in the value of the work they 
did, and saw it as being in the "national interest" that 
the centre should be kept open. This view of the centre 
as being something worthwhile and a source of pride, 
seems also to represent a certain identity of workers in 
the well-being of the company. It is as if they were 
saying, "you cannot prosper if you do not make the best 
use of the products and skills of the employees. We 
know best, listen to us". This perspective, it should 
be said, seems to have arisen not through any concerted 
effort by union leaders (lay or full-time), but as a 
point of view that was largely a feature of the emp­
loyees' relationship to the company, through the jobs 
they performed. Nonetheless, it was union organisation 
that provided the expression for these views. Without 
union organisation the "sense of product patriotism" may 
have remained as simply the personal reflections of 
workers, on the wastefulness of redundancy, and the 
moral culpability of management for it.
The moral influence in question, seems to have been 
present on both the occasions quoted here. In both 
these cases, the unions subjected the strategies of the
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company to critiques based on their sense of the "right 
thing" and the courses of action the company "ought" to 
adopt. In the case of the proposed 1975 link with CPI 
the management of ICL were seen as the guilty party. In 
the proposed closure of CADC Cambridge, the finger 
appeared to be pointing at the government's Chief 
Scientist. In both cases, there seems to have been an 
implied criticism of industrial philistinism, leading 
ultimately to the neglect of the company's long term 
interests. Though the description of this outlook as a 
moral perspective has not been explicitly adopted by the 
writers of the main book on the Lucas Aerospace 
Alternative Plan, it would seem that they too, are 
dealing there with an example of an argument that ex­
pressed just such an ethical position by the workers 
concerned. As the writers of "The Lucas Plan" put it:-
"The plan was an argument for action, a confi­
dence builder, a reason for believing that jobs 
could be saved, and that they were worth saving." 
(81).
As we have seen, in the ICL examples concerns about job 
security were tied up with the criticisms of company 
strategy put forward by the unions, but such concerns 
were not alone a sufficient reason to explain the union 
positions adopted. Essentially, we should see these 
positions as stemming from a moral perspective in which, 
what we have described as the "sense of product patriot­
ism" was an important (though perhaps not the only) 
motivating factor. And if we are looking for evidence 
of a "redundancy culture", in which all opposition to
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redundancy has been subsumed by an overwhelming accep­
tance of redundancy (providing it is accompanied by 
compensatory payments), it follows that the "sense of 
product patriotism" is a further reason to believe that 
such a search will end in disappointment.
In case it should be thought that this is a somewhat 
speculative argument, with little evident connection to 
the generality of experience in industrial relations, 
two pieces of statistical evidence are worthy of note.
In the 1969 OPCS study, "Effects of the Redundancy 
Payments Act" (82), five groups of trade union officers 
were questioned about their attitudes and experiences of 
redundancy. A significantly higher proportion of 
officers of "white collar" trade unions reported that 
their members had demanded that there should be no 
redundancy at all, when faced with a redundancy threat, 
than was the case for officers of manual workers. Some 
support for this finding also appears in the 1980 work­
place industrial relations study by Daniel and Millward. 
A much greater proportion of "recent strikes" had been 
over redundancy questions among non-manual workers than 
had been the case for their manual worker counterparts 
(twelve per cent of strikes against four per cent in the 
latter case). (83). The evidence falls short of 
demonstrating that in absolute terms there is a greater 
frequency of action by white collar workers to oppose 
redundancy, than is the case for blue collar workers. 
Nonetheless, it does at least suggest greater priority 
among white collar workers, on redundancy opposition.
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than other issues that lead to conflict at work. How­
ever, we noted in the previous chapter that a manual 
workers' union, the AEU, had been virtually alone in 
adopting policies to defend "the right to work" in the 
1950s and 1960s, whilst non-manual workers' unions in 
contrast, had been foremost in the campaigns to secure 
legislation to provide compensation as a legal right 
from the 1930s onwards. What possible explanation could 
there be for this paradox?
Light is shed on this question by the work of a 
number of writers looking at unions and unionisation 
among white collar workers. Marc Maurice et al, for 
example, have produced evidence that the priority con­
cerns of cadres in the French aircraft industry are for 
increased participation in decision making in the enter­
prise, and in national economic affairs. (84). In 
another study, by Mercer and Weir, a relatively small 
proportion of members of British white collar unions 
were keen to obtain a direct share in management for 
workers, but 47 per cent of technicians placed "consul­
tation with management on all levels" as their first 
priority for union action - markedly higher than the 
goal of achieving higher wages and better conditions, 
which was given first priority by only 19 per cent of 
the same technicians' group. (85). The "Reluctant 
Militants" study by Roberts, Loveridge and Gennard found 
that the technicians in the study overwhelmingly iden­
tified with management. Their chief grievance was that 
they were denied their proper status and recognition.
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and though they possessed paper qualifications from 
part-time study, they were denied the opportunity to 
progress into more senior management posts, because 
these were in the main filled by people with more pres­
tigious qualifications. (86). Blain's study of airline 
pilots reaches similar conclusions. The factor which 
caused the pilots such dissatisfaction and impelled them 
towards trade unionism, was what they regarded as their 
declining status in relation to airline managements.
They regarded themselves as an elite group of profes­
sionals and expected to be treated accordingly. (87). 
Carter, looking at the apparent conflict in the politi­
cal attitudes of ASTMS members, and the policy positions 
adopted by the union nationally, argues that underlying 
the national union's policy of demanding radical inter­
vention to restructure British industry, is the belief 
that...
"... if only the old inefficient owners and con­
trollers of capital would step aside and let the 
people who really know take control, then British 
industry would be the best in the world. Those 
people are, of course, ASTMS members." (88).
And Topham, in an introduction to Mallet's famous thesis 
on "The New Working Class", has noted with interest that 
in sit-ins and occupations in Britain to prevent factory 
closures, the leading role in demonstrating the irratio­
nality and folly of the proposed closures, has usually 
been assumed by members of the technical and white 
collar unions, ASTMS and TASS. (89).
What conclusions do we draw then, from this work of 
a number of researchers, writing from a variety of
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perspectives? One is aware that the proximity of 
certain workers to areas of technical know-how and 
organisational control, puts them in a unique position 
to criticise management decisions, and advance cohe­
rently argued alternatives. But most of the studies 
referred to here have suggested that this technical 
know-how, and organisational proximity is supplemented 
by feelings of grievance that the said workers' expe­
rience, that they are undervalued, that they do not have 
sufficient influence in the company, are not listened to 
enough, and if only they were, things would be much 
better. If this is a broadly accurate characterisation 
of the orientations of white collar workers towards 
their employment, we may not have to look much further 
to explain the paradox noted above. Whilst in certain 
manual workers' unions (the AEU in particular), there 
has been a source of opposition to redundancy through 
the existence of a "right to work culture", this has not 
in the main been a feature of white collar unions, nor a 
perspective adopted by non-manual workers themselves.
On the other hand, the closer identification of white 
collar workers with management, and the belief that 
given the chance, they could probably manage the enter­
prise quite as well as those in charge, may lead to a 
"product patriotism culture", in which redundancy is 
challenged in part because of its personal consequences, 
but also because the workers concerned perceive an 
unethical betrayal of a valued service, skill, or pro­
duct that the company, if it uses wisely, can turn to
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its advantage. And even if this does not lead to 
opposition in the form of militant action, factory 
occupations and the like, it can nonetheless be active 
opposition, and as our example demonstrates, sometimes 
effective, though from what we have seen, successes as 
complete as that at CADC Cambridge, are relatively rare.
5.8 CQMGLÜglQtl
At this stage it is necessary to return to some of 
the initial objectives we adopted at the commencement of 
this chapter. We began, it will be remembered, by 
noting the absence of evidence to support arguments 
that, prior to the passing of the 1965 Redundancy 
Payments Act, union responses were in general condi­
tioned by an attitude of opposition to redundancy per sé. 
Rather, we observed, union action in opposition to 
redundancy had focused on the absence of compensation, 
and the prevalent "cultural" influence on unions prior 
to the Act was geared to a perceived "right" to compen­
sation for loss of employment. Other minority in­
fluences were present, but not widespread, so far as 
could be seen. Such influences included rare examples 
of a "right to work culture", which some writers 
appeared to have seen as the generality of union orien­
tations to redundancy prior to 1965. The evidence of 
chapter four did not, we noted, support this view. We 
then addressed the question, of how to describe the
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moral condition of unionism that might have been based 
on an attitude to redundancy, that had become drained of 
all ethical orientations other than the emphasis of a 
right to compensation. We adopted the term, "redundancy 
culture", to describe such a condition, noting in so 
doing that whilst such terminology had not been used by 
other writers, it could be directly inferred into the 
essence of a number of contributions. Even if the pre- 
1965 scenario of a generality of union struggles for 
"the right to work" in opposition to redundancy had 
proved to be a chimera, was there nonetheless evidence 
post 1965, of a domination of union actions by the 
"redundancy culture"? Whether or not this was the case, 
we noted, it would be useful to put Cynthia Hardy's 
arguments to the test, by seeking to establish whether 
or not there was evidence that managements successfully 
"legitimised" closures and redundancy in the eyes of the 
workers, and hence eliminated opposition. The ICL case 
study, it was noted, ought to provide evidence of sup­
port for this proposition, if Hardy's view was correct 
that legitimacy was a product of a professional, sophis­
ticated approach to the management of redundancy and 
closure. Finally, the theoretical outline developed in 
chapter three suggested that in seeking to understand 
unions and unionism, we should look for evidence of 
"union cultures" based on ethical and moral influences.
A case study based upon more than one event, over a 
protracted time period, was thought to provide the best 
basis to question whether or not there had been moral
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influences of an enduring character such that we might 
ascribe them to the influence of culture.
What then do we conclude on the basis of the empiri­
cal evidence assembled in this chapter? Our analysis of 
twenty redundancy events in ICL confirmed the importance 
of compensation as a union demand. This was however, by 
no means the sole concern of unions when members faced 
redundancy. The question of voluntarism versus involun­
tarism was another factor that appeared to have been a 
major concern. It was suggested that the pursuit of 
voluntary redundancy might be seen in one of two ways. 
Either, it was suggested, it was no more than a prag­
matic compromise by the union to the inevitability of 
members being carried along by the lure of compensation. 
For the union to seek to project a principled opposition 
to redundancy in such circumstances, could be likened to 
flying in the face of reality, and hence the emphasis on 
voluntarism. Alternatively, it was suggested, there 
might in some circumstances appear to be intrinsic merit 
in a scheme of voluntary redundancy, in that it would 
permit individual members the freedom to depart from the 
company with greater financial security than in other 
circumstances. The examination of voluntary redundancy 
among the Customer Service Engineers, offered some 
confirmation for this latter interpretation. Also, 
there was evidence that the engineers had for a time 
succeeded in establishing a "right" to no-involuntary 
redundancy.
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In summary, looking at the twenty redundancy events, 
and making allowances for situations where there was 
either negligible membership of the unions, or where no 
factual information was available, it apeared that in 
the great majority there was opposition to some aspect 
of the proposed redundancies. The three redundancy 
events that were unreservedly identified as having an 
absence of opposition, were Croydon 1971-72, which was a 
totally voluntary programme, Croydon 1972, and Putney 
1977. In both of these latter cases the redundancy 
followed close on agreements having been negotiated to 
deal with these issues, and there seems to have been no 
question concerning the company's willingness to imple­
ment the agreement in full. To this extent perhaps, the 
"management of redundancy" argument of Hardy finds 
support. However, in most of the remaining cases, there 
was opposition of some form, including strong opposition 
to closures at Dukinfield 1979, and CADC Cambridge 1976. 
In these and other examples of events which were ex­
plored in somewhat greater depth, we found evidence of 
strongly held perceptions of "rights". These included 
the "right" to timely consultation, the "right" to "no 
involuntary redundancy", and the "sense of product 
patriotism". It could perhaps be argued that, e.g. in 
the Dukinfield closure, the ideas and moral positions 
explored in this study were in fact those of union offi­
cials and activists, rather than rank and file members. 
If this were taken to imply a sharp distinction in 
outlooks of the latter group however, one would take
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issue with this position. Even if there were a degree 
to which union leaders were more strongly committed than 
others to forms of opposition, it would not seem cre­
dible to suggest that this disguised a general affilia­
tion to the influence of the "redundancy culture".
False impressions may sometimes be quoted of the views 
of rank and file members by listening to union leaders. 
However, most of the events here involved lay activists 
as key actors, and it would seem unlikely that such 
false positions were systematically adopted, or that 
struggles were acted out as some form of ritualistic 
formality to be gone through before rank and file 
members accepted the redundancy cheques to which they 
had all along been secretly resigned.
Our conclusions then may be succinctly expressed- 
First, in the examples studied over a ten year period, 
whilst there was no case of a factory occupation to 
promulgate redundancy opposition, there were numerous 
examples of opposition to some aspect of redundancy. To 
this extent, even if unions have not fought systemati­
cally for the "right to work", the picture of them as 
having remained docile and quiescent in the face of 
redundancy, meekly accepting their redundancy pay as "a 
mess of pottage" (90), is not an accurate description. 
The "redundancy culture" it seems, is the shibboleth 
that we always suspected it might be. So far as we can 
see, the period prior to 1965 was not characterised by 
general or widespread militant opposition to redundancy, 
and the period since the enactment of legislation
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has not witnessed any dramatic diminution of opposition, 
though the issues of struggle may have altered somewhat 
in recognition that the cash compensation that unions 
formerly had to fight for, is to a degree provided by 
the legislation. As we have seen, this has not preven­
ted unions from striving to gain better compensation 
terms; and just as in the historical analysis of the 
previous chapter, precedent events seem to have defined 
workers' perceptions of "rights", so this same emphasis 
on "precedent" is apparent in the modern history of 
redundancy in ICL.
Our second major finding is that here, in a company 
that should have provided an ideal opportunity for 
management to demonstrate their prowess at "legitimi­
sing" redundancy and closure, according to Hardy's 
scenario, we found no such process to occur. In only 
three redundancy events over a ten year period could we 
categorically state that there was no opposition, and 
while we remain uncertain about some of the facts in 
earlier events, more detailed recent records demonstrate 
the breadth of issues and extent to which struggles have 
continued to occur. As we have seen, there were three 
events where no opposition to redundancy was recorded, 
and this might be considered as evidence of support for 
some of the aspects of Hardy's case. However, one of 
the events in question was an example of the principle 
of no-involuntary redundancy being observed, whilst the 
other two were conducted against the background of 
recent agreements where the unions had consolidated and
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formalised a number of earlier ad hoc successes, and in 
some cases improved upon their previous position. With 
the passage of time, management showed little inclina­
tion to be bound by the letter of these agreements, and 
the unions saw them as in no sense an obstacle to their 
opposition of a closure in the last example quoted. The 
"legitimacy" of redundancy and closure it seems, is as 
much a chimera as the shibboleth of the "redundancy 
culture".
Our third conclusion is more positive, and points to 
features we can find, rather than those we cannot. The 
responses of unions to the redundancy events considered 
here, covering a ten year period in ICL, provide strong 
support for the theoretical outline drawn out in chapter 
three. The actions of union members it was suggested, 
can be understood against the background of perceptions 
of "rights". Such "rights" are to a significant extent 
bound up with unions and the practice of trade unionism. 
Where "rights" can be seen to be enduring moral 
influences over a period of time, we argued, one would 
be justified in ascribing them to the existence of a 
"trade union culture". "Trade union cultures" then, 
were an expression of the ethical and moral influences 
of the practice of trade unionism, and it was suggested 
we might expect to see evidence for them in the reac­
tions of trade unions to redundancy. Our case study 
supports the argument about existence of perceived 
"rights". "Rights" to adequate compensation were fought 
for in the early examples. "Rights" to no-involuntary
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redundancy were prominent among the Customer Service 
Engineers' perceptions, and influenced their response to 
the corporate Security of Employment Agreement in 1977. 
The "right to timely consultation" emerged in events in 
1975, and in the Duckinfield closure in 1979, and the 
"sense of product patriotism", has been described as a 
further moral influence, representing expectations of 
acceptable management standards of responsibility to­
wards the employees, their skills and knowledge, and the 
company's products. And to the extent that these per­
ceptions prevailed, and continued to influence emp­
loyees' and union reactions to redundancy, over a 
sequence of events covering a number of years, it seems 
reasonable to ascribe them to the influence of culture.
Further than this, it seems barely necessary to 
venture at this stage. We will abjure the temptation to 
throw further facts and examples of events in ICL subse­
quent to the study period, like Parthian shots at the 
closing door of this chapter. In the next and conclu­
ding chapter of this thesis we will however, allow 
ourselves somewhat wider scope to consider the more 
general implications of the empirical findings, and 
theoretical framework that has been provided here, for 
the state of unions and unionism both now and in the 
coming decade.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSIONS
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
At this stage it may be helpful to recapitulate on 
the basic arguments which have been followed in this 
thesis, before considering the final conclusions towards 
which we are drawn. There have been two main objectives 
that we have attempted to tackle. The first has been to 
create a theoretical framework within which we could 
understand unions and unionism, and which it was inten­
ded would enable us to evaluate the collective responses 
of employees to redundancy. The second task has been to 
collect facts which would enable us to put this theo­
retical framework to the test. In passing, it was also 
hoped that these same facts would help us to eliminate 
some of the confusion that our literature survey threw 
up in academic and public policy approaches to unions 
and redundancy. Also, we identified two positions 
adopted by Celia Hardy (1), and Andrew Oswald (2), that 
merited some further investigation. In this final 
chapter then, we will summarise the main points of deve­
lopment of these themes, before drawing some conclusions 
on their application to the industrial relations scene 
in Britain at the end of the 1980s decade.
447
6.2 MAIN-EIJHDJLHGS.
Our literature survey referred to a number of aca­
demic and policy oriented studies that seemed to draw 
questionable conclusions regarding the impact of the 
1965 Redundancy Payments Act on the responses of workers 
to redundancy. In part, we observed, these seemed to be 
based on assumptions of a generality of union reactions 
that were largely untested. Ellis and McCarthy in the 
major empirical investigation into the effects of the 
Act (3), argue that prior to the legislation, workplace 
opposition was "typical and natural in the redundancy 
situation". (4). With limited evidence of the pre-1965 
responses of unions, they nonetheless claim to detect a 
reduction in opposition, which they attribute to the 
provisions of the Act, The position of Fryer was, we 
noted, in some respects similar. He, too, appears to 
have assumed that workers' opposition to redundancy was 
"typical and natural" prior to the Act. (He demonst­
rates this for example, by insisting that "resistance to 
redundancy is a rational response even in a full employ­
ment situation". (5). And though he criticises Ellis 
and McCarthys' apparent endorsement of the Act's under­
lying objectives, he appears to be at one with them in 
accepting that the legislation achieved its intended 
purpose. Underlying his analysis in a number of ar­
ticles, is the view that prior to the Act there was a 
generalised opposition to redundancy which the
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legislation's purpose and effect has been to reduce.
Overall then, he argues...
"... the regulatory effects of the Redundancy 
Payments Act has been to take redundancy out of 
both conflict and an area of collective control 
by workers." (6).
Other writers would appear to have substantially shared
in these assumptions. Hyman, as we have noted, suggests
that the Act undermined...
"... the basis of collective resistance to the 
elimination of jobs... " (7),
and writers such as Levie et al assert that the promise 
of redundancy pay undermines the willingness of workers 
to fight closures, without in any way appearing to 
consider the obvious corollary that by this token, 
occupations and sit-ins should have been more common­
place before the legislation of 1965 than after it. (8).
At various points in this study, I have attempted to 
characterise this view of the impact of the 1965 Act, 
within the parameters of the broad outline of the theory 
developed here, relating moral perspectives of workers 
to trade union collective action. If it were true, I 
have argued, that the 1965 Redundancy Payments Act has 
been the cause of a change in the attitudes of union 
members, so that their previous "typical and natural" 
opposition has been replaced by passivity and acquies­
cence, we might see this as the generation of a "redun­
dancy culture", in which compensation appears to be the 
only significant influence on the minds and actions of 
workers. The existence of such a culture would have 
important implications for our understanding of trade 
unionism, especially were it to be seen as the dominant
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cultural influence. To some extent, it was suggested, 
the scenario of a "redundancy culture" appears to find 
support in the writings of two other writers whose work 
has been touched upon, representing contributions on 
different aspects of the study of industrial relations 
and redundancy. Hardy (9), beginning from a general 
approach of organisational theory, puts forward an 
argument based on the exercise of power by managements 
over workers, through a process of legitimisation of the 
events of redundancy and closure. An important aspect 
of the process of achieving legitimacy, she suggests, is 
the creation of an acceptable culture for managing the 
closure. As a result of creating such a culture, she 
argues, union officers and members responded passively 
to managements' closure decisions. By this reasoning it 
would be possible to see the "redundancy culture" as a 
product of managerial strategies, in combination no 
doubt, with legislation establishing a right to redun­
dancy payments. The question would therefore arise as 
to whether, as Hardy suggests, personnel departments of 
companies have successfully generated cultures that give 
rise to a generality of acquiescence to redundancy, or 
whether there is evidence of other cultures underpinning 
a more oppositional response.
Andrew Oswald's work (10), was considered as an 
example of the contributions that have been made by a 
number of neo-classical labour economists to the study 
of industrial relations. Touching on various models of 
economic behaviour of union members in pay bargaining, 
we saw that Oswald offers a view of workers' attitudes
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to redundancy, which stresses their assessments in 
purely personal terms, disregarding the impact of their 
actions on other colleagues. Essentially, union beha­
viour is seen as being conditioned by the preferences 
of the majority of older workers to take higher pay 
increases, whilst consciously setting aside the impact 
that these will have on younger workers who, according 
to Oswald, will lose their jobs under redundancy, and 
the generality of "last in, first out" arrangements. 
Quite apart from the absence of evidence to support 
Oswald's argument that LIFO provisions generally apply 
in redundancy selection, reservations were expressed 
about the model, in that it fails to acknowledge non­
economic factors as influences on workers' behaviour in 
response to redundancy. There was, we noted, no attempt 
to introduce questions of moral or political values to 
modify the simplistic picture of "economic man", even 
where (as in the coal and steel industries) Oswald's own 
research appeared to question the validity of the model 
he presents. Whilst it follows that Oswald himself is 
not concerned with moral or cultural influences of 
unions and unionism on the behaviour of workers, the 
picture he presents of union members' behaviour is 
consistent with the notion of a "redundancy culture", in 
which responses to redundancy are entirely conditioned 
by economic factors.
These then were some of the themes we hoped to 
illuminate by a study of trade union responses to 
redundancy. For reasons relating to the nature of the 
questions raised (as well as the theoretical analysis
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upon which we will recapitulate in due course), it was 
decided that we needed to explore union reactions in two 
different studies. Both of these give a picture of 
union responses to redundancy over a long term period, 
rather than in discrete episodes of short duration.
The empirical evidence gathered in chapters four and 
five permitted union responses to redundancy to be 
considered "before and after" the Redundancy Payments 
Act, as well as providing a context in which the theo­
retical approaches of Oswald and Hardy might reasonably 
be put to the test. What then did the evidence lead us 
to conclude concerning this "before and after" contrast, 
in the first instance?
Examining the historical background prior to 1965, 
when the Redundancy Payments Act was passed, we found 
that for many years unions had seen job losses arising 
from reorganisation as meriting compensation. In the 
main, pressure for legislation on this issue came from 
white collar unions beginning as early as 1930. The 
TUG, meanwhile adopted an ambivalent position. Agree­
ments on compensation were favoured, in line with the 
TUC's emphasis on collective bargaining, whilst legis­
lation was opposed on the grounds that it would not 
reflect the variations in needs of the different 
industries. This uncertainty mirrored divisions with­
in the trade union movement, which continued until the 
time that the legislation was eventually enacted in 
1965. In addition to these differences in emphasis on 
the importance of compensation, we were also able to 
observe a relative absence of outright opposition. Our
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analysis of the background to the Redundancy Payments 
Act could not confirm then, the view that prior to the 
legislation providing rights to compensation, unions had 
systematically fought redundancy and struggled instead 
for the "right to work".
In our case study of the computer company, ICL, we 
found little support for the view that union responses 
post 1965 had been passive and quiescent. Far from 
passively accepting redundancy on the promise of compen­
sation, unions had pressed for observance of a range of 
additional "rights", and had frequently adopted posi­
tions that were forms of opposition, focused around 
specific issues. Examples of the "rights" and prin­
ciples around which opposition to redundancy was focused 
included the "right to no involuntary redundancy", the 
"right to timely consultation", and we noted too, that 
there was a "sense of product patriotism" which led 
workers to resist what they perceived to be a negligent 
or "unpatriotic" attitude towards the company's products 
or services. This latter position was considered to 
emanate in particular from the orientations of white 
collar workers, a point to which we will refer in more 
detail in due course in this chapter.
Contrasting these two periods then, we found little 
to support (but plenty to refute) the supposition that 
the Redundancy Payments Act had led to a draining away 
of opposition. Nor had it presided over the establish­
ment of a "redundancy culture" in which compensation had 
become the whole (or even the main) aspect of union and 
members' concerns over redundancy. On the contrary, the
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period before the passing of the Act had been charac­
terised by a variation of union responses ranging from a 
few limited examples of outright opposition to redun­
dancy, to struggles focused around the issue of adequate 
notice (11), non-victimisation of union members (12), 
and the award of compensation to those whose jobs were 
displaced. On the evidence available, subsequent to the 
Act we had an equal variety of union responses to redun­
dancy, with opposition and resistance taking the forms 
outlined above. While both "before" and "after" the Act 
outright opposition to redundancy in the form of insis­
tence upon a "right to work" had been rare, it was 
therefore an excessive and inaccurate simplification to 
conclude that in either period, union responses could 
be characterised as in general taking the form of 
acquiescence.
Underlying the characterisations of other researchers 
such as Ellis and McCarthy, and Fryer, there was not 
only a lack of evidential support for the assumptions 
made concerning the effects of the Redundancy Payments 
Act, but also an absence of theoretical perspectives on 
unions and unionism. Deriving and applying such a per­
spective in the present study has led to a more refined 
analysis of union responses to redundancy, and has ulti­
mately afforded some more general insights into the 
underlying influences on unions and members' involvement 
in collective action. Crucially, we have been able to 
discern evidence of a continuity in the demands of 
workers and unions in response to redundancy over long
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periods of time. Moral claims or "rights" have been 
seen to emerge with such regularity in association with 
specific unions (or groups of workers within unions) 
that we have been able to confirm the analysis of union 
behaviour in terms of "cultural" influences. In the 
sense that this range of "cultures" within trade unions 
has assisted in both describing and explaining the 
variation of union responses to redundancy, we find an 
essential justification of our theoretical position.
Our case study of the computer company, ICL, found 
little to support Hardy's argument that employers have 
been able to manage redundancy and closures by control­
ling workers' perceptions and encouraging them to view 
these events as "legitimate". On the contrary, it 
seemed that even where workers did acquiesce to redun­
dancy, it was likely that they did so because of actual 
and perceived power differences rather than because they 
had formed beliefs of the "legitimacy" of management's 
actions. Neither could it be said that there was evi­
dence of management succeeding in creating cultures in 
which redundancy and closures became "legitimate" or 
acceptable, nor for that matter of union members manife­
sting an overwhelming tendency to willingly trade in 
their jobs for redundancy cheques. Equally, there 
seemed little support for Oswald's view of workers 
responding to redundancy in terms of their narrow econo­
mic self-interests. If the "redundancy culture" was a 
useful means of characterising the positions of these 
and other writers within the overall theoretical
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framework advanced here, it was no less a shibboleth in 
terms of the reality revealed by our empirical evidence.
The theoretical outline provided in the earlier 
chapters of this thesis was based upon the assumption 
that workers are not mere tools in the hands of manage­
ment, but that on the contrary they bear some respon­
sibility for their own actions. The evidence of this 
study would seem to confirm the veracity of this propo­
sition. Neither are they passive balls of clay in the 
hands of the State, easily moulded to adopt this or that 
form by the passing legislation. Our theoretical argu­
ment advanced the case that action and inaction in the 
industrial setting are as strongly related to the moral 
perceptions of individuals as they are elsewhere.
Workers do not simply absorb these moral perceptions 
from their employer or the State (though these agencies 
may indeed exert rival claims for loyalty and a sense of 
moral duty). Rather, workers themselves are involved in 
creating the parameters of moral judgements, by their 
association with trade unions and trade unionism. While 
"union cultures" appear to provide relatively enduring 
influences, creating a degree of regularity and predic­
tability in workers' responses, there are nonetheless 
variations between different work groups and unions, as 
well as elements of change associated with different 
historical periods. We will now consider the extent to 
which our theoretical approach lends an explanation of 
some of these shifts and variations.
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6.3 CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON OPPOSITION AND ACQUIESCENCE
At this point it may be helpful if we summarise the 
essential elements of the theoretical outline adopted in 
this study to explain union responses to redundancy. It 
was suggested that workers could be expected to react to 
events and changes in the employment context (including 
redundancy) according to how such occurrences confronted 
their moral and ethical expectations. The identifica­
tion of normative and ethical factors with collective 
action by workers, requires an argument utilising their 
collective morality or collective conscience. Moral 
outlooks, it was argued, derive not simply from the 
beliefs brought to the workplace by atomised individuals 
in the wider society. On the contrary, processes of 
socialisation at work and elsewhere ensure that to a 
degree, outlooks and moral perceptions constitute part 
of a body of shared perspectives by individuals coming 
together in the work community. A variety of influences 
lead towards the adoption of shared perspectives; the 
common experiences of work, the technologies employed, 
wider structural aspects such as the legal system, or 
the economy, being a few. Crucially (it was argued), 
workers' experiences of unions and unionism provided a 
locus around which strongly influential moral perspec­
tives could be formed. Our explanation of the process 
through which this could be seen to operate, was in the 
inculcation into workers' beliefs, of perceptions of 
"rights". However these perceptions of "rights" arose
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initially it was argued, they were conveyed and re­
affirmed by the existence of trade unions, and the 
practice of trade unionism. While such perceived 
"rights" would not necessarily find support as legal 
rights, they could nonetheless occupy important ground 
in workers' views of the legitimacy or otherwise of 
managerial actions, and if breached might contribute to 
powerful feelings of injustice which could then underpin 
collective action in any of its various forms.
An essential aspect of this argument then, was that 
unions and unionism have an effect on the moral perspec­
tives of workers. The mechanism through which this 
process may be understood to occur, is through a "union 
culture", of shared beliefs and values. While "union 
cultures" may remain relatively consistent over time, 
there would be scope for many variations of "culture" 
from one union to another, and between workplaces, or 
factions within union organisation generally. Moreover, 
it was understood that like the concept of "ideology" as 
adopted by George Rude (13), cultures could embody 
"inherent" elements (the basic assumptions and ideas 
that seem to be passed from one generation to the next 
as traditional principles), as well as more explicitly 
political "derived" elements taken from speeches or 
political tracts, and frequently containing aspects of 
socialist thought. While the "inherent" elements of 
"cultures" might be expected to remain relatively stable 
over time, the addition of other "derived" elements 
might be expected to represent a more variable entity.
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and could be fundamental in stimulating struggles to 
pursue more radical demands such as "the right to work". 
"Union cultures" might be expected to reflect in the 
willingness of workers to adopt courses of collective 
action, and could be identified nationally, or locally, 
and there would be scope too, for rival "cultures" 
between or within unions, leading to differences in 
moral perceptions etc. And whilst "cultures" might be 
expected to evolve and alter somewhat over a period of 
time, perhaps reflecting different political ideas, new 
contexts in the economy, the policies of management or 
the State etc, such changes should not be seen as vitia­
ting the essential continuity of influence which they 
provide from one period of time to the next. Moreover, 
though external factors would frequently be important in 
either repressing or encouraging the expression of 
protest, such factors could only provide a context in 
which the essential motive force had to come from wor­
kers themselves, and hence the continuing importance of 
moral ideas and the influence of "cultures" in under­
standing union action or inaction in any given 
situation.
Hence, it will be seen, the theoretical approach 
adopted here emphasises action as well as inaction, 
consistency as well as variation, and national policies 
as well as those of informal factions or local and 
workplace groups. In dealing with the issue of redun­
dancy it lends itself therefore, to explaining the 
variations in employee behaviour alluded to in the title
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of this thesis - i.e. that there is both "opposition and 
acquiescence". To illustrate this, let us consider the 
question of variations between manual and non-manual 
workers to redundancy. In examining the background to 
the 1965 Redundancy Payments Act, we saw sharp divisions 
in the approaches of manual and non-manual workers to 
the question of redundancy payments legislation. Non- 
manual workers' unions appeared much more concerned than 
their manual worker counterparts to provide compensation 
rights to redundant workers. On the face of it, this 
might seem to point to a greater tendency among white 
collar workers to acquiesce to redundancy and reconcile 
themselves pragmatically to its consequences. (Such a 
view would incidentally seem to be consistent with that 
of writers such as Ellis and McCarthy, Fryer and others 
who appear to believe that there is a substitution 
effect between opposition to redundancy on one hand, and 
compensation payments on the other.) A closer examina­
tion of the evidence however, suggests otherwise, and 
points rather, to a more generalised concern by white 
collar workers over redundancy, than that experienced by 
their blue collar colleagues.
Empirical justification of this proposition can be 
found for example, in the 1969 study, "Effects of the 
Redundancy Payments Act". Officers of CAWU, the white 
collar union in the survey, were much less likely than 
others to say that redundancies were "unavoidable either 
in the short term or the long term". (14). White collar 
workers in the survey were less willing than skilled or
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semi-skilled colleagues to volunteer for redundancy 
(15), and 52 per cent of white collar union workplaces 
in the survey raised demands of "no redundancy", whilst 
the average for the five unions sampled was 25 per cent, 
and the highest response from a manual union was mar­
kedly lower at 29 per cent. On this evidence, there 
would seem to be support for the writers' view that the 
white collar union, CAWU, was "most militant on this 
issue". (16). To some extent this is supported by the 
1980 workplace industrial relations survey. In the 1980 
survey, 12 per cent of non-manual workers' "most recent 
strikes" were over redundancy issues, compared with 
3 per cent for manual workers. In 1984 these differen­
ces had disappeared, though there are additional factors 
(the lower number of actual redundancies, the emulative 
effect of the miners' strike) which may account for 
this. (17).
To explain the existence of such apparent differences 
in militancy, we need to refer back to arguments of our 
theoretical framework. Sabel, it will be recalled, 
utilised the notion of "world views" to explain the 
occurrence of both industrial conflict and relative 
peace. "World views", he argued, represented orienta­
tions to the world of work, and like "penal codes or 
codes of honour", permitted actions to be perceived as 
"licit or illicit" - a view which seemed very much at 
one with the eventual emphasis placed on "union cul­
tures" in this study. (18). Sabel clearly saw "world 
views" as substantially deriving from workers' places in
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the occupational structure, and a large part of his book 
is devoted to a description of the labour market and the 
development of a typology relating groups of workers 
with shared expectations of work, to the clusters of 
jobs roughly corresponding to their expectations. 
Essentially, Sabel's focus is on "blue collar" workers, 
but there is nothing in his argument which prevents us 
from describing the "world views" of sectors of the 
white collar workforce in the same way. In explaining 
differences in responses of white collar and blue collar 
workers to redundancy, we need therefore to look for 
aspects of their "world views", or "cultures", that 
might underpin their responses in the way described.
It will be recalled that this ground was covered 
towards the end of chapter five in which we summarised 
the work of a number of writers on white collar workers 
and their unions. Writers like Maurice (19), Roberts et 
al (20), Blain (21), Carter (22), and others, would seem 
to provide evidence to support the view that white col­
lar workers adopt "world views", or have "inherent" 
cultural tendencies, that are more sensitised to redun­
dancy than their manual worker counterparts. White 
collar workers' emphases on their own status and sense 
of worth in the company lead to feelings of ambivalence; 
while on one hand they are aggrieved that their status 
and value is not more fully recognised, they identify 
closely with the fortunes of the company and the areas 
where it excels in its products or services provided. 
Craft workers, it would seem, adopt a more distanced
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posture. Their self-image is more closely tied up with 
their own skills, their pride resides in the achieve­
ments of their craft, which is defended by them against 
the incursions of management. They have relatively few 
aspirations to become part of management and feel them­
selves to be rather, part of a community of craftsmen, 
judging success and failure within the terms of the 
craft group rather than the extent to which their 
efforts are acknowledged or appreciated by the senior 
bosses of the company. (23). In these terms, it would 
seem craft workers may be somewhat better prepared to 
cope with the idea of redundancy than white collar
workers. They have few feelings of loyalty towards the
company, and have few expectations that the company will 
be so inclined towards them. In keeping with their 
emphasis on maintaining craft control, they may take the 
view that they themselves should adopt measures to 
regulate and dampen fluctuations in employers' require­
ments for labour, that will bring redundancies about, as 
much of the policy debate and literature on the pre-1965 
situation suggests. (24). While we have noted that in
the AEU in particular, there was an element of emphasis
on redundancy opposition in favour of a "right to work", 
we have also observed that this was a minority position, 
strongly associated with the organised left within the 
union (25), and that although the union itself adopted 
formal policies in keeping with the "right to work" 
objective, it was left to a minority of militants in 
District Committees to struggle to implement them 
locally. (26).
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For white collar workers facing redundancy then, it 
would seem that somewhat more is at stake. Redundancy 
is not simply the loss of a job, it is the loss of a 
position, or to use the archaic terminology of the 
earliest legislation in this field, it is the "loss of 
office". By this token, the need for compensation, 
consultation, and wherever possible the opportunity to 
choose whether to leave or stay, assume rather greater 
importance in the minds of the workers concerned. 
Precisely because white collar workers have higher 
expectations of their employer than their manual worker 
counterparts, they may be expected to respond with more 
bitterness and aggression when these expectations are 
violated. This, and the fact that white collar workers 
may also take the view that in any event, they have a 
rather better understanding than their bosses of "what 
is best" for the company, may lead to a more rigorous 
ethical framework within which the company's action^ can 
be judged. Even if redundancy itself is not the subject 
of outright opposition, it becomes (as we have seen) 
surrounded by a fence of "rights", on which struggles 
may centre, rather than necessarily taking issue with 
the closure decision or whatever, that brings the redun­
dancy about. Studies such as those of Foster and 
Woolfson (27), Mills (28), andi others, emphasise the 
importance of left-wing political leadership in bririëing 
about activity to mobilise opposition to redundancy 
around claims for "the right to work". An examination 
of white collar responses to redundancy however.
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suggests that elements of opposition may stem from less 
overtly political aspects of workers' orientations, 
including the perspective which I have dubbed as a 
"sense of product patriotism". This does not of course 
negate the possibility of political influence in redun­
dancy opposition of white collar workers. However, it 
does suggest the existence of "inherent" tendencies more 
resonant with the idea of redundancy opposition than may 
be the case with manual workers. Whilst white collar 
workers may, on the evidence available, be somewhat more 
likely to respond to political leads to oppose redun­
dancy, the paradox is that it would seem that the orga­
nised left in trade unions has campaigned conspicuously 
on the issue of redundancy opposition in a handful of 
cases, all of which have involved blue collar workers.
The above line of reasoning then, helps to illuminate 
certain of the themes to which we have found ourselves 
returning in looking at the response of predominantly 
white collar workers to redundancy in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis. Redundancy payments were 
emphasised as "rights" that white collar workers ought 
to be able to expect on "loss of office". In the same 
way, demands for "timely consultation" and "no involun­
tary redundancy" were arguably the products of white 
collar workers' orientations towards work. Other 
studies provide evidence that seems to demonstrate that 
higher redundancy payments do not necessarily moderate 
the feelings of concern that workers experience when 
redundancy is threatened. (29). The fact that position.
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status and occupation are most strongly linked factors 
to reported feelings of intensified anxiety in the face 
of redundancy threats, cannot for example be explained 
away by these higher status groups having greater diffi­
culties in finding comparable work after redundancy. 
Daniel's study of Woolwich workers found 74 per cent of 
supervisory workers feeling "very concerned" about the 
redundancy announcement, compared with 84 per cent of 
the higher status category of middle and senior manage­
ment, technical and professional workers who felt this 
way. However, it was the supervisory workers who 
experienced the greatest difficulty in finding com­
parable work after they had been dismissed. (30). This 
finding is consistent with the evidence of our ICL case 
study. It will be recalled that when CADC Cambridge was 
threatened with closure, there were many workers who 
possessed such marketable skills that they could have 
reasonably expected to find better-paid work if made 
redundant. Yet for all that, there was strong opposi­
tion to the closure decision, and enthusiastic support 
for efforts to overturn it. This apparent paradox 
can be understood within the framework of "inherent" 
elements in the "culture" of "white collar" unionism, 
as outlined above.
If therefore, opposition and acquiescence to redun­
dancy are to be properly understood, it would seem that 
we need to look beyond the economic repercussions which 
are experienced by redundant workers, and seek to under­
stand the way redundancy is perceived within their wider
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normative outlooks upon the world. Industrial conf­
licts, we are reminded by Sabel, arise when "managements 
violate workers' expectations of propriety and justice" 
(31), so that their integrity is threatened, and in 
consequence they rise up in defence. And while this is 
not perhaps a complete explanation in itself, it does 
seem to go a long way towards accounting for both the 
opposition and acquiescence of workers to redundancy 
that we have taken as the focus of our study in this 
thesis. But while we may associate "world views" with 
the existence of “inherent" elements in union cultures 
that derive from the position of groups within the 
occupational structure, we should not overlook the 
possibility that changes in the political and economic 
context as well as the influence of more overtly politi­
cal ideas, may be as important (perhaps more so) in the 
formation of perceived "rights". As we have seen, these 
may eventually come together to form a palisade of moral 
standards surrounding redundancy, so that whilst the 
fence of "rights" comes under attack from management the 
effect may be to stimulate opposition to those particu­
lar violations rather than to take issue in a more 
direct sense with the prospect of redundancy itself.
6.4 INFLUENCES ON "RIGHTS" AND “CULTURES::.
It has not of course, been an objective of this 
thesis to explain in any comprehensive way how percep­
tions of "rights" are formed, in "trade union cultures" 
Nonetheless, some consideration of this point will help
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to carry our discussion forward. Examples of instances 
where workers have acted in defence of "rights" suggest 
that they emerge from a number of directions. These 
different courses of evolution would seem to be consis­
tent with the proposition by Rude that "ideology" em­
bodies "inherent" and "derived" elements, and that the 
political and economic circumstances of the day repre­
sent a third important factor in the occurrence or 
otherwise of political protest. In chapter three, we 
noted the conceptual similarity between Sabel's use of 
"world views" and Rude's adoption of "inherent ideo­
logies" . Both writers separately drew parallels with 
the concept of "culture" moreover, and the usefulness 
of this can now be seen. White collar and blue collar 
workers' responses to redundancy might be seen to vary, 
substantially as a result of the "inherent" orienta­
tions they adopt according to their positions in the 
occupational structure.
But "cultures", like "ideologies" would seem to 
embody more than "inherent" elements. Our study of the 
1965 Redundancy Payments Act suggested that the State 
may be one agency that sows the seeds of "derived" 
ideas, by setting precedents which workers may then 
seize on and translate into a general perception of 
"rights". Some examples of this process could be ob­
served in chapter four where we saw that the State 
legislated to provide a legal right to compensation,
"on loss of office", for certain categories of civil 
servants, well over a century before the Redundancy
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Payments Act 1965 appeared on the statute book. The 
various efforts by unions to secure legislation to 
provide members with the legal rights to compensation, 
in the main followed closely on milestone extensions of 
the existing provision, such as the Railways Act 1921, 
the Gas Industry Agreement of 1930, the Local Government 
Act 1933, and the various Acts of post-war nationali­
sation. Even if workers do not automatically adopt 
perceptions of "rights" that accord with the legal 
framework therefore, it would seem that the action of 
the State can sometimes stimulate them to advance moral 
claims of this kind. As our study of the background to 
the Act showed, unions were not by any means united in 
demanding legal rights to compensation, nor were they 
universally successful in achieving them by negotiation. 
However, one might speculate that were the legal right 
to redundancy compensation to be abolished now or in the 
future, union efforts to ensure its continued observance 
would achieve an intensity considerably greater than 
that in the pre-Act period.
State activity then, may be one source of the 
"derived" ideas that eventually emerge as perceived 
"rights". An alternative source may be the political 
influences of the socialist or left parties to which 
trade union activists sometimes associate. This source 
of ideas is exemplified in the emergence and pursuit of 
the "right to work" objective in trade union struggles. 
The influence may be either direct in the involvement of 
politically aware leaders in a particular dispute, or it
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may be less so, relying rather more on the tendency of 
other groups to emulate the actions of those who have 
set the initial example. For instance, after the first 
strikes against redundancy at the Norton and Standard 
companies in Coventry, there was a large and well publi­
cised stoppage at BMC factories. In each of these 
strikes the organisation of the Big Six Motor Combine 
Committee was an important factor, though there was also 
the additional ingredient of a high degree of political 
organisation at the Standard and Norton workplaces. The 
same level of political leadership was not it seems, 
present in the BMC dispute, partly because the Communist 
Party involvement among stewards and members was less 
evident, and also because the Transport and General 
Workers Union was more influential in the latter case, 
and had a lesser commitment to redundancy opposition 
than the AEU. Again, in the UCS work-in. Communist 
stewards gave a vital lead, but in the wave of emulative 
struggles which followed, it would seem that this was 
less in evidence. Mills (32), has noted the involvement 
of Communist and left oriented officials in factory 
occupations, through the organised left in the AEU. 
However, Coates (33), has argued that this was by no 
means the general case after the initial impact of the 
UCS "work-in", and that "right to work" battles were 
frequently led by officials who distanced themselves 
from the Communist Party or the left of the Labour 
Party. In the miners' strike of 1984-85, the political 
leadership of the president, Scargill, and other members
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of the executive was a crucial factor, and once more the 
emulative effect of this struggle appears to have been 
reflected in the behaviour of other workers who (so far 
as one can tell) were not directly exposed to these 
ideas in the same manner. Our graph in Figure 3.1, for 
example, demonstrates that in 1984, before the miners' 
strike was generally expected to be heading for defeat, 
there was a marked increase in redundancy stoppages, 
whilst the actual number of redundancies that might have 
provoked these stoppages declined. In fact, the ratio 
of stoppages to actual redundancies peaked at this time 
to an all-time high, since this type of data was collec­
ted first in 1966. It would seem reasonable therefore, 
to infer a connection between the increase in redundancy 
stoppages in this year, and the miners' strike which 
occupied such a prominent position in the media, and 
involved large numbers of people in providing support in 
various ways. The influence of political leadership in 
disputes of this kind is particularly important then, 
because it appears to have an effect in shaping the 
culture of the labour movement on a far wider scale than 
the number of workers directly involved in the initial 
action.
Looking at the question of variations in political 
and economic circumstances, it is possible to see the 
importance of such factors in the early 1970s outbreak 
of opposition to redundancy through factory occupations. 
Unions were in a confident mood. Opposition to the 
Conservative Government's Industrial Relations Act had
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exerted a powerful effect in mobilising the movement at 
all levels. In this context the left-led initiatives to 
fight for the "right to work" gained the support of an 
already active rank and file, as well as being able to 
gain approval from the official trade union establish­
ment. When the Labour Government came to power in 1974, 
there was a resurgence of interest in efforts to secure 
the "right to work". Support given by the Department of 
Trade and Industry to a number of workers' co-operatives 
fuelled the idea that redundancy opposition and fights 
against closures, could result in a successful outcome.
Examining the elements which appear to influence the 
adoption of perceived "rights" and the formation of 
"cultures", might lead us to anticipate future develop­
ments. The 1980s decade has of course been visited by a 
political and economic context somewhat different to 
that in which the main empirical evidence of this study 
was gathered. Should any of the major events which are 
on the horizon at the time of writing (the Single 
European Market of 1992, entry into the European 
Monetary System etc) produce economic recession and 
redundancies that lead to higher unemployment, it is by 
no means clear on the evidence of the 1980s decade, that 
this will result in any widespread outright opposition 
by workers. However, whilst one must accept that nei­
ther the necessary "derived" elements of political 
leadership nor the prevailing economic and political 
circumstances appear to favour any pronounced increase 
in outright opposition to redundancy, opinion survey
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evidence nonetheless points to the continuation of 
social attitudes that are broadly sympathetic to "right 
to work" objectives. A Gallup survey in 1985, for 
example, showed that 79 per cent of the public agreed 
that the government should spend more money to create 
jobs, whilst 93 per cent of young people agreed that 
"everybody should have the right to a job". (34). A 
further survey showed that 28 per cent of those sampled 
felt that they might break the law if they were opposed 
to it, "in the interests of protecting existing rights 
and liberties (including trade union rights). (35). On 
this evidence, one could not discount the possibility 
that there is sufficient support and belief in the 
notion of "a right to work", as a deep-rooted (or "in­
herent") element in union cultures, for workers to 
periodically engage in strong forms of outright opposi­
tion that run counter to the main political and economic 
influences of the period. Examples of such episodes 
have erupted at regular intervals throughout the past 
ten years, from the Staffa Products and Lee Jeans occu­
pations in the early years of the decade, to the 
Caterpillar Tractors occupation in 1987. Whilst these 
episodes have been very much the exception, it would 
seem that they have had a significant impact on a far 
wider section of the labour movement, by their publicity 
effect, and by involving activists in all parts of the 
movement in giving support in various forms to assist 
workers engaged in efforts to defend their jobs from 
abolition. Even in unfavourable economic and political
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circumstances therefore, the elements of an "opposition 
culture" would seem to have been kept alive in the 
episodes referred to above.
Should the political and economic circumstances alter 
so that unions and their members have more reasons to 
expect struggles to result in positive outcomes, then 
outright opposition via occupations and sit-ins, could 
well experience a resurgence of popularity. The evi­
dence of this study however, suggests that most opposi­
tion to redundancy is less direct than the rare episodes 
of sit-ins, work-ins etc, and there seems no reason to 
believe that this will not be the case in the future. 
Even if circumstances are such therefore, that there is 
an increase in outright opposition, one must expect the 
factory occupation to be a much less frequently encoun­
tered example of resistance to redundancy, than the 
regular, almost routine struggles that occur over ele­
ments in the "fence of rights" which workers seem to 
construct around the redundancy issue. Ultimately, the 
balance of the type and form of worker resistance to 
redundancy (as well as the degree of opposition or 
acquiescence) will substantially derive from the nature 
of unionism in which workers have been exposed to moral 
and ethical influences. The mix of "cultures" as well 
as the political and economic contexts in which redun­
dancy is encountered, will therefore shape the patterns 
of responses that workers adopt on this issue in future 
years.
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6.5 FUTÜRE-FEQSPECTS
What prospect then, does the longer term hold for the 
balance between opposition and acquiescence by trade 
unions to redundancy? It has been suggested that there 
is a basic sympathy in public opinion at large, with 
such objectives as a "right to work", but in the past 
this has not been translated into correspondingly wide­
spread struggles to oppose redundancy. What are the 
chances that it will be in the future? Our argument 
has insisted upon "cultures" as influences upon the 
behaviour of workers, but within this a framework has 
been created that stresses the "inherent" and "derived" 
elements, as well as the effect of political and econo­
mic circumstances. The political circumstances in the 
country as a whole might be expected to provide a key 
influence not only on the state of organisation of the 
trade union movement, but also on the capacity of radi­
cal elements to seize initiatives, define the terms of 
debate and ultimately shape the perceptions of workers 
of the likely outcome of struggles. The influence of 
"derived" political ideas are not however, totally 
dependent upon the political and economic superstructure 
and even in circumstances where the wider context is 
essentially repressive of radical ideas, such ideas may 
emerge with a degree of confidence and crusading zeal 
that surprises most observers. Moreover, the basically 
stable "inherent" elements of union cultures would also 
seem to embody ideas that have a certain capacity to
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supply some workers with the moral beliefs necessary to 
oppose the idea of redundancy, rather than to simply 
assert the observation of limited "rights" within a 
general position of conditional acquiescence, so that 
again the wider context is not the only, or final deter­
minant of trade union responses.
Looking forward into the 1990s decade then, it is 
somewhat easier to say what we might not expect, rather 
than what positive prognosis awaits us. The pessimistic 
analysis of the 1980s offered by some writers, has been 
balanced in this thesis by the argument that "right to 
work" struggles have always been relatively rare aspects 
of union opposition, and this has been complemented by 
evidence of more widespread reactions against redundancy 
that our research has uncovered. One argument that 
might be advanced is that the ideas of "new unionism", 
or "new realism", or simply of unmitigated "economism", 
might have such an effect on the "cultures" of unions in 
the 1990s, that they never again return to the levels of 
opposition which were displayed during the 1970s decade.
There are several reasons to doubt the validity of 
such a scenario. Firstly, even if the explicit ideas 
and formal policies of the trade union movement were to 
move towards a greater proximity to "right wing" or 
centrist positions currently advocated, in all probabi­
lity there would remain unions (and groupings of members 
within them) who were opposed to these ideas, and would 
not only agitate for alternative policies on the 
national scene, but press for strong measures to
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counter redundancy and closure when these problems are 
encountered at the workplace. For the foreseeable 
future therefore, it seems untenable to hypothesise the 
complete disappearnce of the political catalyst of 
"right to work" struggles. Moreover, in the unlikely 
event that the political organisation of rank and file 
activists were to become totally blunted by oppressive 
union legislation (for example by making unions offi­
cially liable for the unlawful actions of unofficial 
strike leaders) it would still be a far cry from the 
complete elimination of ideas and values that form part 
of a culture of widespread beliefs in moral "rights".
At its most fundamental level, the "inherent" elements 
in the "cultural" outlooks of workers would seem to be 
secure enough to ensure that opposition will continue 
over elements in the "fence of rights", and that from 
time to time this will resit in more fundamental opposi­
tion postures being assumed. Among some categories of 
workers, as we have noted, there would appear to be 
strong influences (which may be attributed to their 
"world views" or "inherent" elements in "cultures") that 
cause them to view redundancy in severely critical 
terms. For the foreseeable future therefore, though 
there may indeed be acquiescence by workers to redun­
dancy, it would seem that postures of opposition in 
various forms will continue to be adopted.
Moreover, it will not escape attention that the 
"inherent" aspects of white collar "cultures" may well 
be capable of a degree of resonance with the political
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ideas of a "right to work", so that if the latter were 
to exist in any general sense, one might be rather more 
likely to find it developing in this quarter than else­
where. Evidence in support of this view is admittedly 
uneven, but we should recall the influence of the 
element which we described as the "sense of product 
patriotism" in a number of episodes in the ICL case 
study. This perspective, it will be recalled, led to 
the most fundamental and far reaching of criticisms of 
managements' decisions on closures and redundancy which 
we have in this chapter (and that preceding) traced back 
to the basic orientations of white collar workers to 
their work situation. The "alternative plans" which in 
the 1970s, and to some extent in the 1980s, were pro­
duced by workers facing redundancy, were, in great 
measure, the result of critiques by white collar wor­
kers. Apart from the Lucas Aerospace example (36), 
there were others at the River Don Steel Works, Imperial 
Typewriters in Hull, and the formation of the "Scottish 
Daily Express". In the main, it would seem that when 
workers, in these examples of redundancy opposition, 
drew up alternative proposals, the driving impetus for 
such initiatives came from white collar workers. (37).
On this basis it is hard to see any reason why changes 
in the composition of the workforce should have a nega­
tive effect on the frequency of opposition, though much 
will depend on the ability of the trade union movement 
to unionise the increasing numbers of white collar jobs 
that are replacing manual occupations. With this
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important proviso, it would seem that there is a 
possibility of more concern, and more opposition to 
redundancy, rather than either of these elements 
declining in the future.
On the other hand, the evidence of the present study 
does not give any real basis for expectations that the 
"right to work culture" will become a general perspec­
tive through which workers will in future view the event 
of redundancy. Nonetheless, seen together with the 
above examples of non-manual workers' opposition, we 
might expect the white collar area to be the focus and 
most interesting area of activity in the future. Con­
sider for example, a 1989 policy paper in MSF setting 
out the union's desire to campaign vigorously on the 
issue of inward investment. The paper notes...
"We must begin the campaign for a selective 
approach which safeguards British interests 
and protects union rights... This policy 
stance would be totally inadequate unless
placed with the context of campaigning in
British industry - of restoring pride in 
national development, of struggling to deve­
lop British technology, and British companies 
which can compete in world markets." (38).
On this basis then, we might expect the "sense of pro­
duct patriotism" to become a more explicit aspect of
union national policies in the coming decade. Whether 
this will reflect in changes in workers' responses to 
redundancy would seem to depend largely upon the extent 
to which the "national interest" appears to become 
accentuated as a result of discussion and debate over 
these issues both within unions and in the wider politi­
cal arena. In this connection, it is also of interest
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that the Labour Party's Policy Review for the 1990s, 
embodies in several sections, policy positions that 
appear to harmonise with the "sense of product 
patriotism". Its stand against the "open door" policies 
of the Conservative administration for example, suggests 
that an approach will be sought by any future Labour 
administration, of attempting to regulate the company 
mergers and takeovers that are currently presaging the 
full effects of the unified European Market of 1992. 
Whether and to what extent this sort of approach will 
impinge upon workers' consciousness to the extent that 
they adopt more overtly critical attitudes to "unpatrio­
tic" acts by increasingly Europeanised companies, will 
be a matter for future observation.
Factors in the political arena which might influence 
developments, are difficult to predict. We might 
however, narrow down some of the areas of uncertainty. 
Should there be a continuation of the present 
Conservative administration for a further period, the 
signs are that additional steps may be taken to con­
strain unions' abilities to take forms of industrial 
action over the whole range of issues that cause them 
concern. The intervention of the courts in industrial 
disputes with employers seeking injunctions to prevent 
the most orthodox forms of strike action, are an increa­
singly common feature of the present scene. Precisely 
what effect this has had upon workers' willingness to 
fight redundancy is not clear, though it would seem 
likely that, as over other issues, workers will hold
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back from adopting a militant stance if they see the 
balance of forces arranged against them as obstacles to 
a successful outcome. This however, does not neces­
sarily imply that they see struggles to oppose redun­
dancy as less legitimate, and even in an environment 
where political and legal factors are clearly hostile, 
strong forms of opposition may break out. Examples of 
such episodes have erupted at regular intervals through­
out the past decade, as we have already noted. In these 
events the increasingly draconian nature of the law 
relating to industrial disputes has, it seems, had 
little practical effect in preventing the workers them­
selves from prosecuting their demands, though it would 
seem that they have had an effect in inhibiting other 
groups of workers from engaging in sympathetic action in 
support.
In the main however, as the ICL case study in this 
thesis illustrates, workers construct notions of 
"rights" surrounding redundancy which do not necessitate 
outright opposition. There seems little doubt that they 
will continue to do so in the future, though when speci­
fic "rights" are breached (as in the case of a denial of 
"rights" to consultation, or protection against involun­
tary redundancy in some circumstances), it is sometimes 
the case that struggles assume a more overtly confronta­
tional nature. Even if the Conservative Party should 
continue in power for a further period beyond the next 
election, adopting measures to constrain unions for 
example by legislating against leaders of unofficial
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disputes, there seems no particular reason to expect 
this pattern of union activity in response to redundancy 
to alter fundamentally. Apart from reducing the statu­
tory consultation period, ending rebate of a proportion 
of payments to employers, and terminating the special 
schemes that applied to dockworkers and miners, the 
Conservative administration has left the redundancy laws 
intact. At present it seems unlikely that even a 
government such as that presently in office, would wish 
to abolish redundancy payments legislation altogether, 
though doubtless in the remote eventuality of this 
occurring, workers' struggles would be even more sharply 
focused on protecting the "fence of rights", rather than 
outright redundancy opposition. The escalation in 
conflict that would certainly ensue from even a substan­
tially weakened trade union movement, would no doubt 
prove the nemesis of such an ill-advised course of 
policy.
Towards the end of the 1980s decade, the prospects of 
a Labour Government coming to office within the next two 
years appear to have considerably improved. What effect 
might this have on the pattern of workers' reactions to 
redundancy? Labour's policies on employment and 
industry matters have been outlined in a series of 
documents issued over the course of the past years. The 
present thrust of the proposals with regard to redun­
dancy is that employees should have "increasing access" 
to major decisions such as plant closures, large-scale 
redundancies etc. It appears that the 1989 policy
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review has moved the party away somewhat from its pre­
vious commitment to constructing systems of joint plan­
ning (though this is not entirely clear). (39). Instead, 
the thrust now appears to be on supporting the role of 
"democratic trade unions and positive collective bar­
gaining" (sic). The main emphasis is on enhancing 
individual employees' rights and providing unions with 
rights to be consulted and access to information. The 
1986 TUC-Labour Party document, "People at Work: New 
Rights, New Responsibilities", refers to strengthening 
the requirements on employers to consult unions about 
proposed redundancies. Employers are obliged to "jus­
tify" proposals, and "explore" ways of avoiding redun­
dancy, whilst the levels of statutory compensation would 
be increased. (40). Exactly what the above would amount 
to in practice is not clear. However, the evidence of 
the present study does not point to any especially 
significant change in the actual practice of implemen­
ting redundancy decisions as a result of the consulta­
tion provision in Section 99 of the Employment 
Protection Act 1975. Further research in this area 
might provide a different picture (41), but on this 
evidence at least, it seems unlikely that the proposals 
as they currently stand would have any marked impact on 
the existing patterns of union behaviour.
One notes in these proposals, little influence of any 
wider examination of either the concept of redundancy, 
or the measures that have been evolved elsewhere to deal 
with it. In France for example, a legal duty exists to
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seek prior approval for dismissals for economic reasons; 
in Belgium the public authorities can intervene in dis­
missals (though their power is limited to postponing 
their date of implementation). In Germany the workers' 
councils have the right to refuse consent to the 
recruitment and transfer of employees in certain circum­
stances, and dismissals may be challenged by the works 
council. If dismissals are attempted without the 
employer having heard the works council, they can be 
declared null and void, and the council, if it opposes 
dismissals, can insist that they are suspended until the 
issue is referred to a labour court for further consi­
deration. (42). In the Netherlands, as in France, 
"consultation" with workers' representatives is closely 
linked to the role of the State in authorising dismis­
sals. In France (as in West Germany) the consent of 
the enterprise committee is required before dismissal 
of members of the committee or works council. (This 
arrangement might be of importance where employers have 
been thought to use redundancy to remove trade union 
representatives from the plant.) Finally, in Sweden, 
the 1974 Employment Protection Act, and the 1976 Act on 
the Joint Regulation of Working Life, aim to involve 
unions in negotiations before steps are taken to effect 
redundancies, and the employer must not give effect to 
decisions regarding the reduction of the workforce until 
the negotiations procedures have been exhausted. (42).
Against the background of trade union responses to 
redundancy considered in this thesis, in varying degrees
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of detail over the past sixty years or more, the pro­
posals of the Labour Party seem unlikely to bring about 
many changes. Further than this, having regard to the 
outline of some comparative provisions that have been 
very briefly sketched out above, they seem somewhat 
narrow and unrepresentative of the broader approach 
adopted in the legislation of European States. In the 
circumstances, it is surprising that the unions have not 
made more of an issue of this. Whether and to what 
extent union and worker responses to redundancy differ 
in Europe as a result of these legislative distinctions 
would of course, be a matter for further study, as would 
be needed too, to establish the effects on British 
unions of such legislation as is eventually introduced 
by a Labour Government in this country. Some aspects of 
legislation might indeed have an impact on the perceived 
"rights" over which future struggles occur. Despite 
such changes in detail and emphasis however, one would 
not on the whole expect to see changes in the general 
framework that provides our reference marks for opposi­
tion and acquiescence. Union responses will not be 
easily characterised as falling into one or other cate­
gory. Perceptions of "rights" will continue to be 
important and "union cultures" will continue to exert an 
influence. Strong forms of "right to work" struggles 
may occur, but probably rarely so. If compensation is 
increased, then doubtless there will be speculation as 
to whether or not this is further weakening the resolve 
of workers to fight redundancy, and the "redundancy
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culture" scenario will become a relevant consideration. 
As before, it seems an unlikely outcome. The prospect 
then, seems to be of a repetition of past experience, 
though doubtless with some variations in detail. In 
brief, it will be characterised by the title adopted for 
this study, emphasising both "opposition and acquies­
cence". Hopefully however, confusing assumptions, and 
the absence of theory which have characterised some 
earlier studies in this area, could be avoided in any 
future analysis, and the general perspective adopted in 
this study might perhaps contribute something towards 
this end.
486
R E F E R E N C E S
1 . Cynthia Hardy: "Managing Organisational Closure", 
1985.
2. Andrew J. Oswald: "The Economic Theory of Trade 
Unions: An Introductory Survey", Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, Vol.87 (2), 1985.
3. S.R. Parker, C.G. Thomas, H.D. Ellis, and 
tf.E.J. McCarthy: "Effects of the Redundancy 
Payments Act", 1971.
4. Ibid, p.10
5. R. Fryer in R. Martin and R. Fryer: "Redundancy and 
Paternalist Capitalism", 1973.
6. Robert H. Fryer: "The Myths of the Redundancy 
Payments Act", Industrial Relations Journal, 1973.
7. Richard Hyman : "Industrial Relations: A Marxist 
Introduction", 1975.
8. Hugo Levie, Denis Gregory, Claire Callender:
"Redundancy Pay: Trick or Treat?", in Levie et al 
(eds.): "Fighting Closures", 1984.
9. Cynthia Hardy: "Managing Organisational Closure", 
1985.
10. Andrew J. Oswald (op cit); see note 2.
11. The BMC dispute in 1956 was in part caused by the
lack of notice of redundancies, a point stressed in 
the House of Commons debates on this issue. ("The 
Times", 29 June 1956)
12. See for example, John Salmon, Ph.D Thesis, Warwick 
University, 1983.
13. George Rude: "Ideology and Popular Protest", 1980.
14. Parker et al, op cit, (see note 4), p.140.
15. Ibid, p.15.
16. Ibid, pp.134-135.
17. Neil Millward, and Mark Stevens: "British Workplace 
Industrial Relations 1980-84", 1986, p.271.
18. Charles F. Sabel: "Work and Politics: The Division 
of Labor in Industry", 1982.
487
19. M . Maurice et al: "Les Cadres et 1 'Enterprise", 
1967, quoted in Jean Daniel Reynaud:
"Stratification and Industrial Relations", 1969.
20. B.C. Roberts, Ray Loveridge, and John Gennard:
"Reluctant Militants", 1972.
21. A.J.H. Blain: "Pilots and Management", 1972.
22. R. Carter: "Class Militancy and Union Character: A 
Study of the Association of Scientific Technical 
and Management Staffs", Sociological Review,
Vol.27, May 1979.
23. See Sabel in Chapter 3 (op cit).
24. For example, see Santosh Mukherjee: "Through no 
Fault of their own", 1973.
25. See Albert J. Miller: "Factory Sit-ins", New 
Society, 22 August 1974.
26. See Dey's Study, Ian Francis Dey Ph.D Thesis, 
University of Bristol, 1979.
27. J. Foster and C. Woolfson: "The Politics of the UCS 
Work-In", 1986.
28. Albert J. Mills op cit (note 25).
29. W.W. Daniel: "Whatever Happened to the Workers at 
Woolwich?", 1972.
30. Ibid, p.8.
31. Sabel (op cit), p.15.
32. Mills (op cit).
33. Ken Coates: "Work-ins, Sit-ins and Industrial 
Democracy", 1981, p.113.
34. Gordon Heald and Robert J . Wybrow: "The Gallup 
Survey of Britain", 1986.
35. Roger Jowell and Sharon Witherspoon: "British
Social Attitudes: The 1985 Report", 1985.
36. Hilary Wainwright and Dave Elliot: "The Lucas Plan:
A new Unionism in the Making", 1982.
37. See Topham's introduction to S. Mallett: "The New 
Working Class", 1975.
38. MSF NEC Paper: "On Inward Investment", 1989.
488
39. See Labour Party, "A Talent Based Economy", Report 
of the Policy Review Group on "People at Work", 
1989.
40. TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee: "People at 
Work: New Rights, New Responsibilities", 1986.
41. See W.W. Daniel: "The United Kingdom"; in Cross 
(ed.): "Managing Workforce Reduction", 1985. 
(Daniel confirms the minimal effect of the 1975 
legislation.)
42. See Blainpain (ed.): "Bulletin of Comparative 
Labour Relations", No. 11, 1980.
43. See B.A. Hepple in Blainpain (ed.). Ibid, p.43.
489
